

**Final Report**

# **MOPAN Strategic Review**

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March 19, 2018

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# Acronyms

DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DCD	Development Co-operation Directorate (of the OECD)
DFI	Development finance institution
EU	European Union
GPGs	Global Public Goods
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MO	Multilateral organisation
MOPAN	Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MR	Methodology Review
MS	Member States
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations

# Executive summary

In today's fast changing global context, MOPAN and its stakeholders must navigate the multilateral "ecosystem" in a way that addresses underlying development and humanitarian challenges, new and old. Some long-observed trends – major shifts in the geography of poverty, and the continued diversification of actors, objectives, and instruments – have intensified. They also now combine with newer phenomena, notably populism and its fracturing of public attitudes on migration, rules-based trade and climate change. This combination represents a powerful challenge to multilateral action.

Against this shifting backdrop, MOPAN itself has been making significant, if low-profile, progress. The rhythm of its assessments has nearly trebled and their quality—in terms of rigour, transparency, and systematic consideration of results—has also improved under the new MOPAN methodology. The Secretariat has also been professionalised, within a robust institutional hosting framework. The MOPAN glass is definitely at least half full - but is MOPAN ambitious enough?

The review complements the parallel Methodology Review and focuses on how MOPAN's direction and organisation should evolve in the next 3-5 years, with an eye to its longer-term sustainability. It draws on: an extensive document search facilitated by the Secretariat; multiple interviews, mostly preceded by short questionnaires; write-in responses by MOPAN member officials we were not able to interview; and the preliminary results of a stakeholder survey conducted by the Secretariat in early 2018.

We start from an overarching question: how does one move from multilateral *assessment* to multilateral *improvement*? Three possible, and largely complementary, answers can be stated in the form of 3 different business models:

1. an *accountability or compliance* function;
2. a *learning or self-improvement* function; and
3. a *support for systemic coherence* function.

**Model 1: Accountability or Compliance.** This is the widely acknowledged bedrock of MOPAN today. It exists first and foremost to help members demonstrate to their domestic constituencies that taxpayer funding routed through multilaterals is in safe hands and delivers adequate returns. By satisfying these concerns and helping to rebut unfounded criticisms, MOPAN sustains members' investments in these organisations, even if no learning or self-improvement takes place.

We judge MOPAN's current capacity against this business model to be medium-high. There are three potential weaknesses which should be addressed to preserve and if possible enhance it. The first is that MOPAN does not cover important sub-sets of the multilateral system—the EU development and humanitarian institutions, and blended finance instruments more generally—which reduces its relevance and encourages additional bilateral assessments of these agencies. Such gaps could be partially closed via expanded coverage enabled by additional resources or voluntarily reported assessments meeting MOPAN standards. The second is the weakness of MOPAN's country survey mechanism in grounding assessments in the specifics of country contexts, and how organisations' policies translate into practice there. Technical fixes can improve coverage and relevance, but there is also a political need to re-engage local stakeholders, including member states' country offices.

The third weakness is in assessment presentation and communications: the full assessments are too long for senior managers and the executive summaries are not crisp and action-focussed enough, especially on the crucial question of fitness-for-purpose. Direct comparison of ratings across organisations may be technically unsound, but such information can be readily extracted for advocacy purposes by others if MOPAN does not do so first, with all due precautions. More generally, MOPAN needs to provide an enhanced toolkit of information and support on how assessments can be used to service the accountability and compliance needs of members and decision-makers.

***Model 2: Learning or Self-Improvement.*** In addition to compliance, MOPAN has long tried to inform and support the quest for improvement by multilateral organisations themselves, meaning their staff, management and governing bodies. It could achieve this primarily by working through its members and associated shareholders, who would be better informed on the organisation's areas of strength and need for improvement and thus more able to focus their direction and support from the outside; and/or it could work directly with internal change efforts led by the management.

We judge MOPAN's present capacity against this model to be medium-low, with a somewhat greater confidence in the learning route operating via member representatives than the one operating directly through the institutions' managements. We acknowledge however that the latter may be learning much more through the overall assessment *process*, as against only what is documented in the final reports. The first area for upgrading of capacity for this function is greater differentiation, or modularisation, of assessments-to allow more concentration of resources on areas needing greater improvement, and transfer of best practice, or where conditions have changed markedly since the last assessment. Potentially, the modular approach could evolve into a system of progressive levels or "standards" of performance.

The second area for change under this model is to increase the participation in the assessment process, and ultimately in MOPAN, by non-DAC members. This is particularly relevant for emerging economy members of the assessed organisations, who have expressed occasional interest but are unsure of how they should engage. Their participation need not initially be formalised into some form of associate membership, affecting MOPAN governance and logistics, but those avenues should also be explored. Thirdly, a more effective learning platform for MOPAN would require considerable investment in knowledge capture and peer learning, including sharing of best practices across organisations-which implies suitable organisational approaches and incentives across a wide array of stakeholders, not just technical and financial investments by MOPAN itself.

***Model 3: Supporting System Coherence and Reform.*** In this third model, MOPAN should increasingly support the search for system-wide solutions on the part of various global fora and their member governments, by providing them with relevant knowledge in the form of evidence and analysis spanning across clusters of organisations of particular types, thematic purposes etc. It should complement other actors supplying such knowledge, including the OECD itself and non-governmental think-tanks.

We judge its present capacity to do so to be low, given also that MOPAN is just starting to grapple with this type of demand. It will need to boost its capacity by, first, investing in significant partnership and outreach efforts, so as to be present and visible in, and supportive of, the main global fora for multilateral system reform. This will require more senior staff time, some tailoring of its contracting approaches for external expertise in specific thematic areas, and progressive engagement of senior member representatives in defining priority areas for analysis. Secondly, this model implies a different approach to sequencing the selection of organisations for assessment (or "clustering") based on different criteria than those required, for example, purely by an accountability model focussing on the financial dimensions (size, replenishment frequency etc.) of single institutions. This added complexity should be manageable, but will require some give-and-take by members.

Thirdly, as MOPAN's role and profile develops down this path, and as it engages more with non-DAC actors under the learning model, its co-branding and hosting arrangements with the OECD will necessarily come under more scrutiny. MOPAN must above all demonstrate its continued financial and editorial autonomy from its host-which are adequately safeguarded by its current legal framework. It should also develop synergies with other departments of the OECD, both to gain from their intellectual capital and to dispel the impression that it represents any single development perspective.

***Phasing and Implementation.*** These models are not mutually exclusive: various combinations and gradations are possible. Our impression is that it should be possible over the next 4 years to combine (a) further improvement and streamlining of the compliance model with (b) partial moves towards more learning, especially through member states, and (c) key initial steps toward the systemic coherence model.

In the short term, starting immediately, work should be undertaken on closing the *country-grounding* gap, and improvement of *presentation and communication* of (2017-18) assessments, developing a greater *differentiation* (or modular) approach for subsequent cycles, as discussed earlier, and continuing current efforts on *outreach and partnerships*.

The next phase involves more analysis and design, including on: how to increase *organisational coverage* including via voluntary reporting; what specific offers of participation, association or membership should be made to what types of *non-members*; cost-effective investments in *knowledge capture and peer-to-peer learning*; and how to *cluster selection* of organisations for systemic analysis purposes.

Finally, the *hosting/branding* arrangement with the OECD (and its linkages within the OECD) should be kept under review. There should be a strong presumption of renewal for the next cycle (due to be finalised mid-2019) providing safeguards for MOPAN independence remain adequate. There will need to be a thorough re-consideration in the light of MOPAN's evolution by 2022 and beyond.

# 1. Introduction: approach and sources

- 1.1. This Strategic Review, commissioned as ‘light-touch’ and complementary to the parallel Methodology Review (MR), probes how the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) can best progress, with an eye to longer-term sustainability.
- 1.2. The key questions set in the Terms of Reference (ToR) (see Box 1, p 25) begin with asking how well MOPAN currently addresses the needs of the membership and other stakeholders, and move on to how MOPAN might maximise its value-added for learning and accountability purposes in future. A second block of questions relate to its own organisational fitness for purpose, including the evolving roles of the Secretariat and Service Provider, and the hosting arrangement and synergies with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
- 1.3. We found, based on preliminary interviews and readings, that stakeholders have very different views on MOPAN’s end-purposes and change pathways of the Network’s endeavour writ large. As these logically precede and underpin questions about institutional roles and capacity, we chose to respond to MOPAN’s ToR from that perspective: *How exactly does one move from multilateral assessment to multilateral improvement?* Or from improvement of one agency at a time, to greater coherence of the multilateral system as a whole? And, depending on the way one chooses, what are the implications of each for MOPAN in terms of fulfilling the needs of its members, maximising its value, and setting itself up in the right way from an organisational perspective?

**We therefore decided to first take a step back and frame these questions within a set of 3 different but complementary business models: an accountability/compliance mission; a learning/self-improvement mission; and a systemic coherence mission (see Figure 1) The balance between these goals, in particular that between accountability and learning as mentioned in the ToR, will drive key strategic choices.**

- 1.4. The Review also takes an ‘outside in’ approach, starting from the shifting international context faced, respectively, by the development and humanitarian community, by the multilateral system(s) they rely on and support, and therefore by MOPAN. One of the few certainties of this context is increasing systemic uncertainty and complexity.
- 1.5. This Review drew on: frequent contacts and exchanges of material with the MR team and the Secretariat (to whom go our sincere thanks); an extensive document search, including the 2013 evaluation and a full portfolio of MOPAN assessments and related reports by multilateral organisations (MO) and Member States (MS); analyses prepared for the Steering Committee and Technical Working Group, summaries of their deliberations, as well as recent reports on, e.g. the United Nations (UN) development system and multilateral development bank (MDB) reform; other recent research reports on the multilateral architecture, including by ODI; and access to initial responses to a Survey among MS and Organisations, commissioned by the Secretariat.

1.6. We also conducted nearly 40 phone and face-to-face interviews, preceded by structured written questions, with a large majority of MS representatives, including Steering Committee members and Institutional Leads, as well as a subset of MOs, the current Service Provider (IOD PARC), Secretariat, key OECD staff and other knowledgeable international observers. In addition, the opinions of some senior MS officials were canvassed in written form via the Secretariat. These sources – in particular the interviewees, whose opinions were volunteered in strict confidence – proved insightful and thought-provoking. Nilima Gulrajani (ODI) also provided valuable comments and inputs on the draft report. However, the authors take full responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation in this report.

**Figure 1. Approach taken by this review and link with the ToR**

	A.1 How to better meet the needs?	A.2 How to maximize value?	B.1 How to ensure best support by Secretariat?	B.2 How to optimize the link between Secretariat and provider?	B.3 How to maximise the value of the hosting agreement?
<b>Model 1: accountability or compliance function</b>					
<b>Model 2: learning or self-improvement function</b>					
<b>Model 3: support to systemic coherence and reform function</b>					

*Notes: This matrix was framed to support the discussion at the MOPAN workshop on 28 February 2018 in Copenhagen. We invited participants to mark the intersects in this matrix which they think are most important in their view.*



## 2. Implications of a changing global context

- 2.1 The international environment affecting the multilateral system – as well as development and humanitarian challenges more broadly – has continued to evolve since the 2013 evaluation of MOPAN, mostly, (1) in continuation of then-observed trends (more actors, more motives, more fragmentation, slowing poverty reduction and greater geographic concentration of its locus on Africa and fragile states, etc.). Also, (2) some inherently unpredictable and disruptive factors have appeared subsequently, which have yet to reveal their full scope or impact (see, e.g. Kharas and Rogerson, 2017).
- 2.2 The first category includes: the rise of Chinese-led models of cooperation, including the creation of two major new MDBs; the progressive elimination of hitherto vast pools of poverty in Asia; and the transformational challenges of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including their universality and resolute emphasis on equity, with which all development agencies, including MOs, have yet to come to terms. As one interviewee pointed out: ‘every day that MOPAN is not contributing to the 2030 Agenda is a missed opportunity. They should be looking at how organisations structure themselves for this agenda’.
- 2.3 In the second category, in addition to unforeseen conflicts and humanitarian crises, are the after-effects of waves of populist, anti-globalisation and anti-multilateral sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic. Attitudes to aid-related collective action on climate change and mass migration, among other global public goods (GPGs), have recently fractured, especially across the Atlantic and within the EU.
- 2.4 The longer-term impact of these phenomena on the multilateral system is still uncertain and probably asymmetric, as some categories of MO (principally those with robust access to capital markets) will be better positioned to withstand budget pressure than more grant-dependent ones. The long-term shift toward a higher share of earmarked funding (also known as non-core or multi-bi financing) of the multilateral system is continuing and intensifying. This funding pressure is particularly relevant for norm-setting agencies with a GPG mandate, like the World Health Organisation and the Food and Agriculture Organisation, where cumulative funding shortages, albeit small in terms of absolute increments, might potentially undermine larger parts of the system which depend on these norms.
- 2.5 There is also likely to be much more emphasis on blended finance via development banks and other development finance institutions (DFIs) within the architecture, both multilaterally and bilaterally, including in emerging economies. A greater variety of ‘semi-concessional’ channels are available than ever before to help stretch finite grant resources, but it is crucial that ambitions for private-sector mobilisation remain realistic and that the risks resulting from country debt sustainability are mitigated.
- 2.6 The 2013 MOPAN evaluation, which celebrated a growing funding pool and greater high-level political interest in the multilateral system, may paradoxically have preceded a high watermark of core MO funding. Moreover, it is unlikely that either non-OECD official sources or private

sector (or philanthropic) ones can entirely replace the likely gap left by declining overall funding of MOs by MOPAN/DAC members in the medium term (e.g. Manning, 2017).

- 2.7 A wider concern is how the UN development system will be able to continue to raise sufficient funding and/or whether greater pooling of efforts, even some organisational consolidation, might be necessary. Within that system, decisions on further coherence and integrated country action plans, driven by the 2016 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) and the Secretary General's recent implementation report (December 2017), have yet to play out on the ground and will need rigorous monitoring by the membership. Similarly-inspired reform efforts are underway in the humanitarian system.
- 2.8 These are potentially seismic shifts, which at some point must impinge on MOPAN. As a thought experiment, assume the UN development system will indeed eventually 'deliver as one', with existing agency headquarters effectively becoming technical offices for integrated country operations under strong Resident Coordinators. In such a world, as one of our respondents put it, '*what would be the point of MOPAN repeatedly assessing only the individual back offices*'?
- 2.9 Fragility is the 'new frontier'. If the development community proves unable to help restore key populous fragile states like Nigeria to sustainable growth – and its past track record does not give rise to great optimism on that score – global absolute poverty numbers will inevitably bottom out and might conceivably start to rise, sometime during the early to mid-2020s. There are no easy wins left. The ability of MOPAN to focus its attention on specific types of country contexts, such as large fragile states, will likely become critical.
- 2.10 Also, now more than ever, MOPAN members also need to secure the whole-hearted engagement of major middle-income countries in tackling global 'bads' – like unsustainable migration and carbon emissions – so the focus on low-income and least developed countries cannot be an exclusive one. (Fragility is also, increasingly, a feature of middle-income countries).
- 2.11 Such trends are bound to reinforce the quest for ever more cost-effective (value for money) channels for development and humanitarian action. They may also lower public tolerance for both MO and bilateral aid funding, but most MOs, unlike bilateral aid, lack a natural local stakeholder base to begin with. Inevitable accidents of project failure and/or corruption will occur, given the on-average much harder contexts in which all aid must now operate. There will also be raised expectations, perhaps unrealistically so, for success in the regional and GPGs arena, on which the attribution chain is still fragile. For example, all the evidence suggests that aid to countries below about \$7,000 per capita income actually increases out-migration, so the design of programmes running against this tide is particularly challenging. The bar on the quality of MOPAN assessments and their credibility and communication clarity will inevitably be raised.
- 2.12 In this tougher accountability environment, it is arguably less likely that a major MS will delegate performance assessments entirely to MOPAN (or anyone else, for that matter). They will certainly want to stay on top of risks of domestic political backlash. Given the increasing tightness of their own administrative resources, however, they may well focus bilateral efforts on more subjective, national-interest and foreign policy perspectives and challenges, leaning more on MOPAN for independent and credible performance metrics. This is already becoming the case for many MSs, with the notable exception of the United Kingdom's Department for International Development, which still has a full-scale periodic multi-MO comparative performance assessment of its own, albeit showing some signs of greater convergence with MOPAN. A likely paradox faced by MOPAN is that while its measurements of performance are progressively establishing themselves as a global benchmark (see next section), the appetite for measurement and for related results-based funding approaches among its members has sharply increased (cf. ToR question A1, Box 1).

# 3. MOPAN's journey so far: a glass at least half full

- 3.1 The simultaneous shift within the current (2015-2018) four-year service provider contract, to both a substantially reinforced assessment methodology and a significantly faster rhythm of assessments (26, compared to 18 in the previous four years, and nine in the four before that) represents tangible progress – assuming, at least, that the quality remains constant, or better still, improves.
- 3.2 The new methodology, considered in greater depth by the MR, retains the broad theory of change of MOPAN assessments from their inception, which is that ‘organisations which exhibit effective systems, practices and behaviours will also tend to achieve more effective delivery *and hence* obtain enhanced results on the ground’ (from MOPAN 3.0 Methodology Manual (2017), our emphasis). At MOPAN’s origins, the attribution link between behaviours and results was mostly implicit. The new methodology adds the reinforcing dimension of directly examining available evidence of results, decomposed by target group, by relevance to gender, climate change and other cross-cutting priorities, and along other dimensions such as efficiency and sustainability.
- 3.3 MOPAN’s assessment processes have also been re-designed to become more transparent, systematic and consistent, and increasingly to bring to bear in a sequenced way multiple sources of information (document reviews, surveys, interviews) against a single indicator, with explicit strategies for triangulation and validation. Feedback received by this review from MO staff and MS officials was uniformly positive on the independence, credibility and professionalism of the current process, which the MR investigates in more detail. Our respondents also drew attention to the less visible learning benefits conveyed through the assessment process itself, as against the final report taken in isolation: ‘the process has a lot more merit than the final report’. We return to this important point under the learning model rubric below.
- 3.4 In the background, meanwhile, the progressive upgrading of the Secretariat’s own staff base, hence its ability to complement the facilitating role of MS Institutional Leads, guide the Service Provider and ensure coherent engagement and continuity of representation of the Network, is frequently cited as a positive contributory factor (ToR B1). So is the OECD hosting arrangement, to which we return later, which is recognised to have contributed both via strong personnel and administrative processes, and by interconnecting MOPAN and its Secretariat to the analytical and dialogue capacities of the OECD itself, for example in areas like multilateral aid reviews, DAC peer reviews and their multilateral components, and the wider DAC Evaluation Network (ToR B3).
- 3.5 As specified in the OECD Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), MOPAN requires each of its 18 members to contribute EUR110,000 a year for four years. Over two cycles totalling 26 assessments, each member’s total contribution per assessment would therefore be about EUR17,000, of which less than half goes directly to assessment-related consultancy (the provider contract includes other services, and the Secretariat costs include other activities). So, the stripped-down cost-what a MS ‘pays’ for one assessment probably comes in at under five figures (EUR or USD).

3.6 This leveraged cost recovery structure is a double-edged sword: ostensibly therefore, MOPAN is good value-for-money, especially when compared to replicating assessments bilaterally; but at the same time, it is understandably low on members' list of priorities for major efficiency gains. *'If nothing is broken, why fix it?'* was a phrase we heard more than once. The answer must come largely from the transformative upside potential of MOPAN's mission, as against marginal improvements in leveraging its modest cost base within a largely unchanged mission.

# 4. Three Business Models: an overview

4.1 The table below interprets MOPAN’s current mission statement<sup>1</sup> along three functional dimensions implicit in it, emphasising different attribution links from assessments to intended development and humanitarian benefits. It also draws on MOPAN’s draft Logic Model (2015) and the earlier analysis of MOPAN’s Theory of Change in the 2013 Evaluation, discussed below.

4.2 In each case, we assess the likely capability, or strength of fit, of the current MOPAN approach to this core purpose (summarised in the middle column of the table), and discuss key areas for improvement (summarised in the third column). We also identify some tensions that need to be managed, particularly between the first two models, accountability and learning. In later sections, we suggest possible priorities and sequencing.

**Table 1. Overview of MOPAN’s multiple missions: a simplified map**

Business Model	Current Capability	Areas for Improvement
1. Accountability/Compliance	Medium-High	1. Coverage 2. Country grounding 3. Presentation
2. Learning/self-improvement	Medium-Low	1. Differentiation 2. Membership 3. Knowledge capture
3. Systemic coherence support	Low	1. Partnerships 2. Clustering 3. Branding

<sup>1</sup> “The mission of MOPAN is to support its members in assessing the effectiveness of the multilateral organizations that receive development and humanitarian funding. Aiming to strengthen the organizations’ contribution to overall greater development and humanitarian results, the network generates, collects, analyses and presents relevant and credible information on the organizational and development effectiveness of multilateral organizations. This knowledge base is intended to contribute to organizational learning within and among multilateral organizations, their direct clients/partners and other stakeholders”. (MOPAN website)

# 5. Business model 1: accountability or compliance function

- 5.1 This section considers the first of three stylised versions of MOPAN’s mission and business model, summarised above. We call this an accountability, or *compliance*, function, primarily on behalf of today’s MS. In this first model, **MOPAN exists first and foremost to demonstrate to MS domestic accountability constituencies – such as ministers, parliaments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – that taxpayer funding routed via multilaterals is in ‘safe hands’ and delivers adequate returns.** This arguably remains the reputational bedrock for MOPAN: *‘you can build on it and streamline it, but not safely abandon it altogether’*, was the mainstream view we heard, and agree with.
- 5.2 Some vulnerabilities exist in the MOPAN system today, even if one starts with this deliberately narrow view of its core business. The first point of weakness is the incomplete coverage of the full spectrum of MOs and types of development finance. For example, the European Union (EU) development institutions are no longer assessed by MOPAN, but remain among the largest global channels of multilateral (pooled) official development assistance (ODA) and non-ODA development finance. There are both political and technical challenges to their re-inclusion. This situation might be finessed by encouraging the Commission and maybe the European Investment Bank to voluntarily contract independent assessments meeting MOPAN standards. The majority of MS who are also EU members will otherwise have at least this major reason to conduct additional assessments (cf. ToR A1). A similar gap, and possible remedy, arises with the newly established MDBs, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which are already becoming major comparators/competitors to longer-established MDBs. We discuss clustering and selection of MOs further in the third, systemic coherence, model.
- 5.3 A variant of this problem is the heavy MOPAN focus on grants, just as the options for market-linked development finance – such as equity, blended terms, loan guarantees as quasi-equity, market borrowings against concessional loan books, special bonds – are diversifying and expanding, both within institutions MOPAN already assesses and some it does not, like the DFIs mentioned earlier. The boundary between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ financing for development is blurring, and definitions of public-private resource mobilisation packages are still in flux, which calls for different types of expertise on development finance. This skills challenge is arguably manageable by MOPAN if phased appropriately, but may have implications for future service provider contracts.
- 5.4 A more important – but potentially manageable – handicap, is the weakness of the current partner survey mechanism as the only way of grounding assessments in the specifics of different country contexts faced by the MO, and of testing how their headquarters’ policies get implemented in practice. This has two mutually reinforcing dimensions. The first is that the current ‘omnibus’ country survey is widely considered to add insufficient practical value to the assessments. This is linked to its patchy country coverage for many MOs, variable response

rates (in the range 17% to 50% for the 2015/16 batch), and some inevitable limitations of perception surveys, for example differential interpretation of scales. In its defence, assessors report that where they get sufficient respondents, the country survey does feed through as a useful point of triangulation in the overall performance analysis. The methodology review is considering possible remedies, for example deliberate clustering of batches of MOs to achieve higher country concentration, and the option of commissioning fewer, but more granular, country case studies, with a field visit dimension. MOPAN assessments also already draw on larger panels of MO-commissioned “client” surveys where possible.

- 5.5 The second dimension is more socio-political: MOPAN initially co-opted clusters of MS country offices to organise dialogues around local perceptions of the in-country effectiveness of chosen MOs active in a given country. Fragile though that approach may have proven, MOPAN has now gone full circle, by almost entirely disconnecting MS country staff from its assessment system (which probably also feeds back to lower response rates). These are influential voices within donor agencies which are no longer being, and feeling, heard. Many of them then rotate through multilateral desks and thence question the relevance of MOPAN reports which do not resonate with their personal experience. The case study approach, and/or some lighter-touch link-up (such as combined launch events in-country for small groups of MOs, perhaps?) may help restore some of this confidence and sense of joint ownership.
- 5.6 Still in pursuit of the basic compliance function, the form in which MOPAN assessments are framed and communicated also needs re-visiting. The structure of the full reports is clear and is felt by some interviewees to provide a consistent framework for MO engagement, at least for working level counterparts. Their language was however considered by others – and by us as first-time readers – to be too opaque and homogenised, and to have low impact as well as low accessibility (cf. also ToR question A1, see Box 1). The full assessments are too long for use by non-specialists (MO board members and senior managers included), whilst the executive summaries may be too cropped and bland, not delving forensically enough into key areas of best practice or potential for improvement. *‘There are too few recommendations woven into the storyline: the reader wants to know, “okay, what’s next?”*, is how one interviewee put it. This situation was also said to prompt multiple ad-hoc syntheses produced for the benefit of readers higher up the accountability chain in MS capitals, and in the process, may disconnect them further from MOPAN. Note also that this ‘presentational’ issue comes over and above debates over whether MOPAN scoring is in fact tougher or more lenient, on balance, than its bilateral assessment equivalents, on which the limited evidence we have seen is inconclusive (cf. ToR question A1).
- 5.7 We accept the technical argument that MOPAN scores are based on widely different mandates and levels of ambition across MOs, thus rendering direct comparison of average indicator scores invalid. Every assessment summary, however, also includes a brief overall opinion on the fitness for purpose of that institution, or lack of it, measured against its unique mission. These encapsulated statements are frequently qualified, in different ways, requiring reading between the lines. In a compliance model, the main target audiences are likely to be uninitiated third parties, which calls for sharper and more standardised summary ‘verdicts’. There are alternative, and on balance crisper, presentational models available, for example the traffic-light summaries of the UK Parliament’s Independent Commission on Aid Impact, which MOPAN could borrow from and adapt to its specific needs. Below, we look at the ‘learning’ model, which conversely, assumes an audience which is much more familiar with the current context of a given MO.
- 5.8 There is considerable latent appetite for more comparative analysis, and even rankings and ratings, of MOs, of which MOPAN probably needs to become more aware, but not necessarily accommodate all at once (cf. ToR question A1). The more sophisticated and (in reputational terms) better-performing MOs know who they are, of course, and seek comparative information on how they stack up against MOs they consider their nearest equivalents. The less-well-performing ones (again, in reputational terms), hope to use MOPAN scoring to fight what they

consider to be unfair stigmatisation, using third-party evidence of improvement, in comparison to ‘donor darlings’. Journalists, politicians and NGOs search for simple but revealing snapshots across this hugely complicated landscape. If MOPAN does not produce these, with appropriate caveats, they can always be extracted (see Annex 1 by way of illustration) by others, some of whom may have fewer scruples than MOPAN in producing them. Our third business model – on systemic coherence – points to a legitimate MOPAN role requiring much more comparative analysis across MOs.

- 5.9 More generally, even within a relatively narrow interpretation of the accountability/compliance function, there is clearly a strong felt need across the membership to have the Secretariat engage more with them and help service their demand for clear and timely communications, beyond the assessments themselves. This support-sometimes referred to as “an expanded toolkit”- does have some learning elements, particularly in the sense of sharing good practices in the uses made of assessments across the membership, in support of the accountability function .



## 6. Business model 2: learning or self-improvement function (for MOs)

- 6.1 From the outset, MOPAN has not simply confined itself to compliance (Model 1), but has also tried to **inform and support the quest for self-improvement by MOs themselves, i.e. mainly their staff, management, and governing bodies**. This learning model (Model 2) runs along one or both of two mutually reinforcing change tracks (applying here a simplified version of MOPAN’s draft Theory of Change, outlined in a ‘logic model’ from 2015 which is not fully developed yet). The first track is mostly from the *inside*, using MOPAN assessment processes and tools to inform and enhance existing institutional change efforts initiated by the MO itself, primarily its management.
- 6.2 The second is outside-inside, by enabling a more informed set of MO members (or shareholders) who are thus better able to guide and support the MO leadership, and to hold it to account. The emphasis here is particularly on the member representatives that engage directly with the strategic direction of the institution. This track includes, but is not limited to, MS representatives, and extends to all members of the major governing bodies of the institutions, the vast majority of whom are not yet associated with MOPAN.
- 6.3 There is plenty of room for MO improvement that does not jump out immediately from, say, a review of the 144 key performance indicators of the most recent 12 MOPAN assessments (Annex 2). At first glance, the vast majority of the cells are rated Satisfactory or Highly Satisfactory – their combined share is in fact 92%, or even 96% if the one obvious negative outlier (the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)) is omitted. If fully colour-coded, this would look like a sea of (mostly lighter) green with a handful of red spots, mostly on the far right hand (results) side. Does this mean MOPAN’s job is mostly done already?
- 6.4 Not at all. As one person familiar with MOPAN told us: ‘It would be bizarre, and extremely worrying, if major, well-funded and long-established MOs failed to rise even to the Satisfactory bar in most key indicators, if not all’. However, these summary scores can mask considerable divergence – including unsatisfactory ratings – in the far larger number of underlying or ‘micro’ indicators. As one of those consulted told us, not tailoring findings to take account of this in-category variance runs the risk of ‘hitting the target, but missing the point’. Only the ‘highly satisfactory (HS) star’ rated cells – a minority of less than 10% of the 144 observations – identify cases where the MO is also rated highly satisfactory in all underlying indicators. If we take attaining a ‘HS star’ status across all 12 key indicators as a rough proxy for the ultimate end-point of an MO’s ‘performance journey’, then all MOs, however large and sophisticated, still have considerable room for improvement, albeit in different areas particularly relevant to them. They will most likely never quite get to that distant horizon, but the journey is what matters.

- 6.5 Indeed, we heard from assessment participants that the assessment process is, if anything, more useful, in learning terms, than what is eventually documented in the final reports. This can happen, first, because respected independent expertise, at its best, can confirm the initial perspectives of thoughtful insiders and innovators on areas for improvement and best-practice approaches to adopt, whether these are already documented internally or simply well-informed hunches. Second, of course, they can help such agents of change ‘market’ their ideas, vertically to senior managers and the Board, and horizontally to other stakeholders. Third, potentially they provide a platform for convergence between otherwise conflicting views on priorities and implementation, particularly if powerful constituencies initially disagree with each other.
- 6.6 The degree to which this kind of self-learning process actually applies to most MOPAN assessments is debatable. The MOPAN framework is quite far from the stylized ‘developmental evaluation’ paradigm (Michael Quinn Patton, 2006) referenced in our ToR, implying a creative and safe, flexible and formative joint learning space. Patton (2006) contrasts this with a ‘traditional evaluation’ – with its inevitable rigidities, distance between the observer and observed, and mostly summative, at worst tick-box or inspectorial, “got you”, connotations. There is an intrinsic tension between the compliance and learning models, and it is not clear whether any single MOPAN assessment framework can accommodate both objectives equally. The 2013 Evaluation report, which was however assessing a different (Common Approach) methodology, did not believe Model 2 was MOPAN’s relative strength, and emphasised Model 1, plus some indirect benefit to MOs via improved information available to MS representatives. We come out rather more positively on learning than they did, without brushing under the carpet some major inherent difficulties of the type Patton highlights. Transformation will in any case be a gradual process.
- 6.7 The first area for improvement along the way toward Model 2 is the need for greater differentiation in assessment approaches, based on the status and trajectory of different institutions, and their current major needs and opportunities for improvement. There seems little sense, for example, in revisiting a major MO like the World Bank and going back in detail through the entire battery of indicators every three or four years, when in some cases they have been rated highly satisfactory several times over and nothing relevant is known to have changed recently. It would be better to focus on a few identified areas where improvement needs have been noted and/or major change is under way. This would also have the potential benefit of freeing up some resources for more tailored diagnostic work and deeper understanding of best practice.
- 6.8 Presumably, this adaptation could be done in a modular way, with the more straightforward items getting a very light-touch review, retaining the option of a deeper dive if circumstances change. The overall scoring presentation, combining light-touch updates and deeper dives, would remain broadly similar, enabling some level of comparability. Potentially, this modular method could also evolve into a system of progressive levels or ‘standards’ against which the MO would be certified, to which new modules would be added periodically to reach the next level. We defer to the Methodology Review for deeper insights into these possibilities. It might also be possible for some element of self-certification to be adopted, at least for some modules, but the risks of undermining perceptions of full MOPAN assessment independence need to be carefully weighed. Differentiation through the addition of specific assessment modules may also be needed in model 3 (systemic coherence) if MOPAN chooses to commission cross-cutting thematic analyses of MO operating in particular sectors, like health, or country contexts, like post conflict states.
- 6.9 The second and even more obvious area for change for this model to work well is expanding participation in MOPAN by non-DAC actors. This is not only a ‘branding’ question, though that is also a relevant consideration, to which we return in the next model. In the context of working with the grain of MO, whose Boards already have universal (or whole-regional) government representation, and many have some participation of civil society, MOPAN will not engage those constituencies adequately from a narrow platform of overwhelmingly DAC

countries. Integrating the broader perspective of the wider membership may also change the balance of emphasis of many assessments. And it will facilitate what is one of the more obvious gaps of the MOPAN approach—an almost complete lack of follow-up within the governance structures of the MO, and/or instigated by MSs, between one assessment and the next.

- 6.10 There are both legitimacy and inertia problems here, in that MSs themselves – including their Institutional Leads – may hesitate to push too hard for a higher-profile dialogue that could come across as ‘Northern’ arrogance, while non-MSs are not aware of what they might gain from it, nor of who does what going forward. We heard anecdotally of considerable interest in that wider MO membership spectrum to know more about MOPAN. The first priority should be to reach out to a few large emerging economy MO members, as well as to non-government actors with a significant governance stake of their own, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in the case of the health-related MO. They could be offered, initially, a no-cost (and no-strings) ‘associate’ or ‘observer’ status on demand, and more practically, the opportunity to act as one of the Institutional Leads in upcoming assessments of interest to them.
- 6.11 In the longer term, formulas like full membership at reduced rates for aid-eligible countries could be used to upgrade their status. The substantial initial convening and network administration costs of this option need to be explored further before going ahead, of course. We surmise, without prejudging this calculus, that it could well prove a strategic investment. In any event, it will be important to bring together, using different dialogue platforms that do not imply a change of governance, groups of non-members (especially non-DAC non-MS), and indeed groups of MO representatives, in topical fora convened by MOPAN. For example, a panel of MO should ideally be consulted as just one part of the next Service Provider selection process.
- 6.12 The third area for improvement to strengthen Model 2 is greater investment in knowledge capture and peer learning, particularly in mapping good and best practice approaches across MO. A good learning network—such as the Health Learning Network for example—needs considerable agility in finding, capturing and transferring state-of-the-art knowledge in readily manageable and actionable form. There is the existing idea of creating a MOPAN ‘repository’ of information, a searchable and user-friendly database of assessment findings with good and best practices in mind. That seems a legitimate ambition, phased in over time. The bigger challenge will be how to keep the information set fresh, relevant and dynamic and to reward effective ways of mobilising it, debating it (and improving it) for the purposes of peer learning. These mechanisms are typically labour-intensive, and not just within the Secretariat and its capacity, but also for the membership at large. We suggest that this topic be explored in greater depth, using best practice lessons from other institutions Cf. ToR A2).
- 6.13 A complementary measure could be to set up a roster of former senior managers of (other) MOs to participate, as true disinterested ‘peer’ reviewers, in future assessments, and to help with learning capture and dissemination. This might be extended in rare cases to still-serving MO managers loaned to other MOs, but it is unlikely they could be released for long, so their participation would have to be strictly time-bound at key stages. Again, this should be investigated in greater detail.
- 6.14 Finally, of the two possible “tracks” of this model we presented earlier—working directly with the MO and/or working primarily through a more informed and engaged membership of their governance structures, including MSs, we tentatively conclude that the latter is rather more promising as the main learning focus for MOPAN in the short and medium term.
- 6.15 That endeavour will however imply significantly more investment, especially by the Secretariat and the Institutional Leads, in “thickening-up” contacts and relationships within those bodies and MO leadership. This includes more regular follow-up after assessment launches, and perhaps also elaboration of (informal, unpublished) interim advisory notes, aimed at dialogue on emerging recommendations. Such a shift has practical implications. The

consultants arguably need to keep their discussions with such stakeholders at arms-length until the draft assessment is ready to discuss, so will not want to be drawn into informal dialogue in the meantime. That suggests that the Secretariat should give more emphasis to engaging senior management and Board-level actors on emerging recommendations, and on their post-launch implementation, including by working closely with Institutional Leads (who tend to experience high turnover themselves). If so, the staff needs, on average, the experience and seniority to be credible in that role and at that level. At the moment, as the Reviewers heard, “the pattern of the Secretariat’s staffing has not been fitted to that purpose”. (ToR B1)

# 7. Business Model 3: supporting systemic coherence and reform

- 7.1 MOPAN starts with a considerable situational advantage, in that there is nothing quite like it anywhere else, in terms of a credibly independent observatory, and a networking opportunity, spanning most types of MO, just at the time when the multilateral system is under increasing stress. Governments and major global fora are reaching out for system-wide solutions, as in the already referenced cases of UN and MDB reform, and within the humanitarian-development nexus. What could MOPAN reasonably do to help meet that crucial need?
- 7.2 In this third business model, supporting systemic coherence and reform, which is complementary to the other two, MOPAN would also increasingly carry out analytical work spanning across multiple MOs. This should be in explicit partnership with the bodies (the UN Secretary General/Economic and Social Council, Tharman Commission and future equivalents, also G20) charged with designing and promoting, and later overseeing, system-wide improvements. Where possible, it would base this analysis on best-practice information and other lessons extractable from its assessments of the relevant sets of MOs. These sets could be types of institutions as mentioned, or different classes of institutions working in similar contexts (e.g. fragile and conflict-affected states) or particular themes (health). It may have to draw on other resources and expertise in addition to its in-house knowledge stores, of course, and as mentioned earlier may also need to introduce specific additional indicator modules for that purpose. (Cf ToR question A2)
- 7.3 We looked at some of the complementarities between MOPAN and other potential sources of such analysis, starting with the Development Co-Operation Directorate (DCD) of the OECD to which the Secretariat is administratively attached. This could include re-invigorating the work stream on behalf of the DAC on multilateral aid (in which both the lead author of this review and the current Head of Secretariat were, coincidentally, involved at its inception). There could be collaboration between MOPAN and the DAC Secretariat, for instance, in illustrative mapping of funding patterns against selected indicators of MO performance. However, it is likely that MOPAN would have to carry most of that multilateral aid work itself initially, using readily available DAC financial statistics, due to the current lack of funding for multilateral analyses on the DAC side. Other areas for synergy with the DAC/DCD include collaboration on the multilateral aspects of DAC peer reviews, links with the DAC's Evaluation Network, and best-practice insights on effective aid to fragile contexts, gender, and climate change, which are increasingly built in to MOPAN's results framework (cf TOR A2).
- 7.4 There are wider opportunities for partnership with thematically specialized areas of the OECD and associated networks - for example its globally recognised education, tax, and statistics initiatives, and the Development Centre with its expanded 52-country membership and specific focus on developing country policies. These actors can mobilise considerable intellectual capital, including on state-of-the-art assessment methods, and have experience in reaching beyond any narrower "donor", aid-focussed, or even OECD-specific agenda to mesh with the

preoccupations of a wider set of actors, including emerging economies. Their relative focus on the specific links between policies and outcomes, rather than primarily on development finance inputs, would also be an asset for MOPAN. Partnerships with research institutes such as Brookings – which published recently an informative and accessible update on patterns of MO funding – and also others including ODI, could also prove productive. Care will need to be taken in not attempting to duplicate these actors' greater capacity to analyse multiple information sources, while MOPAN enhances its own product and seeks to extract greater value from it.

- 7.5 What might be the major areas for improvement and investment needed to make this third model more feasible? Again, we see three. The first is partnership, the imperative of approaching such a mission modestly, objectively and in close collaboration with others, within their own frameworks (such as the UN's QCPR), as against from any predetermined MOPAN position. This in turn will require significant outreach effort and diplomacy on the part of the Secretariat, so as to be present, visible, and supportive in the main global fora for such discussions. This would become a major time investment for the Head of Secretariat, even when ably deputised. As one of our senior interlocutors put it 'you need to raise your institutional profile even to be considered for the task, before you can prove yourself on that task so as to justify that profile'. The Head of Secretariat, for this and other purposes, will need to have full operational and financial autonomy and flexibility, within the work priorities set by the Steering Committee. (ToR B1)
- 7.6 There will be direct financial implications also, not just in a (relatively modest) further increase in staffing, but also for contracting some research expertise that may not link directly to the assessment framework – for example on the evolving division of labour between MOs in a given specialised area. This would be one of the logical reasons for MOPAN to keep some funds in reserve for direct contracting, outside of the main service provision contract. The priority topics to be investigated should ideally be discussed at quite senior level by the MS. One of MOPAN's relative historical weaknesses, as we heard in interviews, has been in not generating strategic agendas that engage these senior staff sufficiently. One way to do this would be to bring the results of a stimulating proof-of-concept 'pilot' to such a meeting, and then discuss further priority topics and interested champions/leads, within and outside the membership. The challenge will be to pin down as soon as possible the main policy audience for such analyses and the practical answers they seek.
- 7.7 The second requirement is a different approach to selection (or "*clustering*" in MOPAN jargon) of MO for assessment, by grouping them in analytically relevant ways (for example, by category of institution or main areas of intervention) or at least sequencing them deliberately so that still-current and incisive comparative information can be extracted subsequently. This does not mean that the cross-cutting 'cart' should somehow be put ahead of the MOPAN assessment 'horse' of Model 1, serving compliance needs. But now that MOPAN has hit a potential cruising speed of roughly 30 assessments every four years – even more perhaps if it implements a modular approach – it could combine broad and specific coverage through still-sizeable clusters. For example, it could take within the next two cycles eight MDB and eight UN system agencies, followed by, say, eight health-related agencies and eight humanitarian/fragile contexts agencies, in whatever sequence international priorities dictate. It could do that without losing the value of its 'accreditation bank', which would remain current for the range of MO which are most significant for compliance purposes. That said, discussions around agency selection would inevitably become more and more complex when such multiple criteria are invoked. A partial safety valve is for MOPAN to 'license' self-funding of additional assessments through a roster of accepted service providers – or just the one provider as now, operating within the same agreed methodology and standards.
- 7.8 The third requirement, better branding and higher profile, is potentially the most challenging one. MOPAN's role and profile should grow progressively, both within this model, and as a result of deliberate membership expansion under the learning model. The two are linked, as

MOPAN's name recognition, now virtually non-existent outside very limited MS expert circles, needs to rise along with its membership, or MOPAN may suffer in the longer term.

7.9 Its link to the OECD (ToR B3), however, which we believe is a positive factor for both practical and analytical reasons in the short and medium term, could potentially become counter-productive eventually. To guard against this, MOPAN needs to prove and promote itself continuously as both a membership construct clearly distinguishable from OECD/DAC, and one sufficiently independent from its host in substantive policy terms. This is already the case legally – the MOU with the OECD safeguards MOPAN's financial autonomy (full earmarked funding which is not fungible with other OECD activities) and editorial independence (what to say in published assessments). Recent OECD Council discussions on whether MOPAN should perhaps be involved in an assessment of the OECD Secretariat itself also speak loudly to this present presumption of independence, at least in some important quarters.

7.10 The risk of OECD brand contamination, without this constant reinforcement of MOPAN's distinctiveness, is particularly relevant when viewed from the perspective of G-77 interests at the UN, for whom the OECD brand in development issues has on occasion proved toxic. The same might be said for some members of the G-20. This semi-autonomous path may sometimes seem a tight-rope to walk, but other agencies hosted by the OECD, one thinks for example of the International Energy Agency, have managed it successfully. Given the wider nature of what MOPAN does, it should actively pursue collaboration opportunities across the OECD, including with its development cluster and thematic directorates. The MoU arrangement requires a reporting to the OECD Council and thereby it is important to ensure that these broad synergies are cultivated. It might also be - and this is something best re-examined at the next-but-one renewal of the MOU, by about 2023 – that MOPAN's future in the longer horizon is to become a fully independent foundation. But that depends on its evolution and success in the meantime, not least as validated, ideally, by a markedly different membership.

# 8. Priorities and sequencing: the way forward

8.1 *So what comes first, and next?* Obviously these three stylised business models are not mutually exclusive. Various combinations and gradations are possible. It is fair to say, though, that while the systemic coherence function (Model 3) is in many ways compatible with either of the other two, some aspects of models 1 and 2 are in tension with each other, and it will be difficult for MOPAN to give its unflinching support to both at the same time. This is one reason why we suggested above that the “outside-inside” learning track (via the institutions’ membership) was a better fit for MOPAN in the immediate future, compared to the “inside” track of influencing, mainly, MO management directly, which we think is less realistic in the short term.

8.2 Priorities and sequencing heavily depend also on the level of ambition of the Network membership for how to shape its role in the next four years. This Review’s sense is that it is both possible and desirable to combine further improvement and streamlining of Model 1 (compliance), which comes closest to today’s main mode of operation, with partial but progressive moves toward Model 2 (learning) and key initial steps toward Model 3 (systemic coherence).

8.3 Let’s return to the summary table (Table 1) on page 13 and try to suggest how MOPAN might prioritise among the nine possible areas for improvement in the right-hand column, reading from top to bottom. Here are four suggested top choices on which significant work could start immediately, or very soon:

- i. In first place comes fixing the *country-grounding gap* (improving substantially on the present Survey tool) as in paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5.
- ii. Almost equally urgent, even if nothing else changes, is a tightening of *presentation and communication of assessments*, as in paragraphs 5.6 to 5.8.
- iii. There is also value in *greater differentiation* of assessments, to use a lighter touch and enable greater learning focus on best practice and improvement, as in paragraphs 6.7 and 6.8.

On these first three, investigations have already begun via the Methodology Review, and specific proposals need to be fleshed out in greater depth—we believe they are mission-critical.

Then:

- iv. There should be increasing and sustained effort on outreach and *partnerships*, demonstrating that MOPAN is connected to major systemic reform processes, and (as soon as possible) proving the concept that it can add value to them, as in paragraphs 7.5 and 7.6 .

8.4 The next rung on the priority ladder features measures which also appear desirable, but where decisions to move ahead, even in principle, should be based on further rounds of analysis and discussion, such as:



- v. *Coverage*. Extending to the EU, and to DFIs with little or no ODA footprint, is desirable, but the process of encouraging voluntary self-funded assessment and ensuring it meets MOPAN standards needs more investigation (5.2 and 5.3).
- vi. *Membership*. The idea of co-opting wider participation is something of a no-brainer (6.9 to 6.11), but the precise offer terms, financial and governance, need careful consideration, as do the logistical and decision-making implications of wider membership or quasi-membership.
- vii. *Knowledge capture and peer-to-peer mechanisms*. The design and feasibility of a support infrastructure for a “learning network” (6.12 to 6.15) is not just an IT or funding issue, it has social, financial and human resource implications that need to be built in from the outset.
- viii. *Clustering for systemic coherence* (7.7). MO selection criteria are already complex and the pressure to contribute to systemic reform in different geometries makes them more so. This discussion could begin soon, but will inevitably expose differences of opinion on underlying objectives, which need to be worked through.

#### 8.5 Finally:

- ix. *Branding* (and hosting) (7.8 to 7.10). No new action is needed here, beyond ensuring that the next MOU with the OECD at least preserves the key safeguards to MOPAN’s financial and policy autonomy that characterise the present one. By the end of that next MOU period (say, 2022-23), the intervening evolution of MOPAN’s membership, and degree of accomplishment of its three missions and particularly the systemic coherence one, will point the way toward either further continuity, or significant change in the relationship.

### Box 1. Key ToR questions revisited

#### ***A. Is MOPAN delivering on its promised value and where can it increase its value?***

**A1: What information gaps currently exist between comprehensive bilateral assessments and MOPAN assessments? How can MOPAN better address these gaps and, more broadly, how can MOPAN better meet the needs of members, Multilateral Organisations, and other relevant stakeholders?**

There are coverage gaps, such as the EU; there are presentational gaps including an (unproven) sense that MOPAN scoring is more lenient; there are unavoidable gaps in terms of addressing the individual national interest and political pressures which point to additional reviews. The underlying need for bilateral assessments of objective performance indicators may have been reduced, but the appetite for measurement has paradoxically increased – partly as a result of MOPAN’s relative success.

Addressing needs of current MSs and MOs requires more clarity on MOPAN’s theory of change and core business, and particularly distinguishing between a compliance model, in which MOPAN currently has relatively strong capabilities and a learning function, which is frequently asserted but in which its current capability is weaker, as well as a systemic coherence (cross-MO) function which it is only just beginning to develop. Critical to better learning outcomes are greater differentiation and greater participation of non-MS stakeholders, which should be encouraged in different ways.

**A2 How can MOPAN further maximise value from its knowledge, data, and its position in the multilateral system to better support organisational learning and accountability processes?**

Critical to systemic coherence contributions will be effective partnerships with bodies engaged in reforms, with other parts of the OECD and research institutions. A case in point is to build on the earlier Multilateral Aid Report experience. In terms of learning methods and instruments, MOPAN needs to invest more in knowledge capture and peer learning mechanisms, but in a dynamic sense. Even within the core accountability function, MOPAN could provide enhanced support services to its members, such as sharing good practices on uses made of assessments across the membership.

***B. Is MOPAN's organisational structure best suited to delivering its strategic goals?***

**B1 How can the MOPAN Secretariat best support the Network to live up to its full potential? Are the conditions being met and is the Secretariat suitably capacitated to reach MOPAN's strategic goals?**

The recent strengthening of the Secretariat has been a significant and widely appreciated contributory factor to overall progress. Pursuit of more ambitious change models, particularly on wider knowledge dissemination and on systemic coherence analysis, will be very demanding in senior Secretariat staff time, and presumes it benefits from full management autonomy and flexibility within the work program set by the Steering Committee.

**B2 How well has the division of labour between the service provider and the Secretariat worked to effectively deliver the assessments while maintaining credibility and independence?**

The independence and credibility of the service provider is mission-critical for MOPAN, but the growing capacity of the Secretariat, which is still quite recent, to act as a facilitator and continuity-link with MO and their Boards is an important factor going forward. They should work in close tandem with the Institutional Leads in this respect.

**B3 Has the MOPAN Secretariat being hosted at the OECD delivered the envisaged mutual benefits (as outlined in Annex 1 of this document), and what further synergies and complementarities could be pursued?**

The more direct benefits are in terms of professional services and standards, for example in human resources and procurement while preserving the operational and financial autonomy of MOPAN. There has been some increasing interaction and synergy, for example on peer reviews and evaluation, but some of that effort (e.g. on multilateral aid reports) has been delayed through lack of sufficient funding on the OECD side, and needs to be developed further. There also appear to be major opportunities for synergy to be developed with other OECD departments.

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NB: a much longer selection of (mostly internal) MOPAN documentation was supplied by the Secretariat and consulted by the review team.

# Annex 1. List of persons consulted

## *Interviews*

Asian Development Bank	Stephen Groff
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation	Hetty Kovach
Brookings	Homi Kharas
Government of Canada	Maria Garasa
Government of Canada	Tamara Sorger
Government of Denmark	Peter Jul Larsen
Government of Germany	Daphne Gross-Jansen
Government of Ireland	Leonard Durac
Government of Ireland	Sinead Walsh
Government of Luxembourg	Rene Lauer
Government of Norway	Siv Cathrine Moe
Government of Norway	Tom Hunstad
Government of Sweden	Erik Jonsson
Government of the USA	Lauren Platukis
ILO	Parth Kanitkar
Independent Consultant	Elliot Stern
Independent Consultant	Paul Isenman
IOD PARC	Dorte Kabell
IOD PARC	Julian Gayfer
MOPAN Secretariat	Suzanne Steensen
MOPAN Secretariat	Samer Hachem
MOPAN Secretariat	Jolanda Profos
MOPAN Secretariat	Katie Vanhala
MOPAN Secretariat	Mitch Levine
OECD - GPEDC	Chantal Verger
OECD/DCD	Jorge Moreira da Silva
OECD/Development Centre	Mario Pezzini
OECD/DCD/REED	Rahul Malhotra
OECD/EVALNET	Hans Lundgren
OECD/LEG	Lucie Buxdorf
OECD/SDF	Olivier Cattaneo
UNDP	Jimmy Tang
UNDP	Lina Fernandez
UNDP	Mariko Aoki
UNDP	Nick Hartmann

UNIDO  
United Kingdom/ DFID  
United Kingdom/ DFID  
World Bank

Giuseppe de Simone  
Andrew Haughie  
Emma Spicer  
Björn Erik Gillsäter

# Annex 2. Chart of 12 key performance indicators for the 12 MOs, 2015-16

HS\* = Highly satisfactory including on all micro indicators  
HS = Highly satisfactory  
HU = Highly unsatisfactory  
U = Unsatisfactory  
 All other ratings are satisfactory (not shown)

	Org. Architecture.	Cross cutting issues	Operating model and resources	Transparency Accountability	Relevance and agility	Leveraging/ catalytic use of resources	Results focus	Evidence based	Achievement of results	Relevance	Efficiency	Sustainability
	KPI1	KPI2	KPI3	KPI4	KPI5	KPI6	KPI7	KPI8	KPI9	KPI10	KPI11	KPI12
AFDB	HS		HS	HS				HS		HS		
GAVI	HS*		HS	HS		HS	HS					
GFATM	HS*		HS*	HS								
IDB	HS*		HS*	HS*	HS	HS	HS					
ILO	HS										U	
UNAIDS	HS						HS*	HU	HS	HS*		
UNDP	HS			HS			HS				U	U
UNEP	HS			HS		HS	HS	HS				
UN-Habitat	HS			HS								
UNICEF	HS*		HS*	HS		HS					U	U
UNOCHA	U	U	U			HS	U	U			U	U
WBG	HS*		HS	HS	HS	HS		HS				

