



MOPAN 2015-16 Assessments

**United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA)**

Institutional Assessment Report



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Preface

ABOUT MOPAN

The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) is a network of donor countries with a common interest in assessing the effectiveness of multilateral organisations. Today, MOPAN is made up of 18 donor countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States of America and the United Kingdom. Together, they provide 84% of all development funding to multilateral organisations.

The mission of MOPAN is to support its members in assessing the effectiveness of the multilateral organisations that receive development and humanitarian funding. The Network's assessments are primarily intended to foster learning, and to identify strengths and areas for improvement in the multilateral organisations. Ultimately, the aim is to improve the organisations' contribution to overall greater development and humanitarian results. To that end, MOPAN generates, collects, analyses and presents relevant information on the organisational and development effectiveness of multilateral organisations. The purpose of this knowledge base is to contribute to organisational learning within and among multilateral organisations, their direct clients, partners, and other stakeholders. MOPAN members use the findings for discussions with the organisations and with their partners, and as ways to further build the organisations' capacity to be effective. Network members also use the findings of MOPAN assessments as an input for strategic decision-making about their ways of engaging with the organisations, and as an information source when undertaking individual reviews. One of MOPAN's goals is to reduce the need for bilateral assessments and lighten the burden for multilateral organisations. To that end, MOPAN members are closely involved in identifying which organisations to assess and in designing the scope and methodology of the assessments to ensure critical information needs are met.

MOPAN 3.0 — A reshaped assessment approach

MOPAN carries out assessments of multilateral organisations based on criteria agreed by MOPAN members. Its approach has evolved over the years. The 2015-16 cycle of assessments uses a new methodology, MOPAN 3.0. The assessments are based on a review of documents of multilateral organisations, a survey of clients and partners in-country, and interviews and consultations at organisation headquarters and in regional offices. The assessments provide a snapshot of four dimensions of organisational effectiveness (strategic management, operational management, relationship management and performance management), and also cover a fifth aspect, development effectiveness (results). Under MOPAN 3.0, the Network is assessing more organisations concurrently than previously, collecting data from more partner countries, and widening the range of organisations assessed. Due to the diversity of the organisations' mandates and structures, MOPAN does not compare or rank them.

MOPAN assessed 12 multilateral organisations in the 2015-16 cycle. They are the African Development Bank (AfDB); Gavi; the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (The Global Fund); the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the International Labour Organization (ILO); the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); UN-Habitat; the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA); and the World Bank.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all participants in the MOPAN 2015-16 assessment of UNOCHA. UNOCHA's senior management and staff made valuable contributions throughout the assessment, in particular in relation to the document review and headquarters interview processes, and they provided lists of their direct partners and co-sponsors to be surveyed. Survey respondents contributed useful insights and time to respond to the survey. The MOPAN Institutional Leads, Canada and the United Kingdom, represented MOPAN in this assessment, liaising with UNOCHA throughout the assessment and reporting process. MOPAN members provided the MOPAN Country Facilitators who oversaw the process in the partner countries where the survey took place.

Roles of authors and the MOPAN Secretariat

The MOPAN Secretariat, led by Björn Gillsäter (until early May 2016) and Chantal Verger (since then), worked in close co-operation with the MOPAN Technical Working Group and IOD PARC on all methodological aspects. Together they developed the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and micro-indicators (MIs), designed the survey and its methodology, and defined the approach to the document review. The MOPAN Secretariat drew up lists of survey respondents with the help of MOPAN members and the multilateral organisations being assessed, and approved the final survey questionnaire. IOD PARC carried out the survey in partnership with Ipsos mori. IOD PARC also analysed the survey, carried out the document reviews, conducted the interviews, analysed the data and drafted the reports. The MOPAN Secretariat oversaw the design, structure, tone and content of the reports, liaising with MOPAN's Institutional Leads and the focal points of the multilateral organisations. Katie Vanhala from the MOPAN Secretariat provided the oversight for this UNOCHA report.

IOD PARC is an independent consultancy company specialising on performance assessment and managing change in the field of international development. Through this blended expertise IOD PARC helps organisations, partnerships and networks identify the needs, chart the journey and deliver improved performance to achieve greater impact.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
CAR	Central African Republic
CBPF	Country-based pool fund
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
ERF	Emergency response fund
GenCap	Gender Standby Capacity
HNO	Humanitarian needs overview
HRP	Humanitarian response plan
IAHE	Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
INSARAG	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
MI	Micro-indicator
MOPAN	Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network
MoU	Memorandum of understanding
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OASG	Office of the Assistant Secretary-General
ODSG	OCHA Donor Support Group
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OPR	Operational peer review
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territory
OSOCC	On-Site Operations Coordination Site
ProCap	Protection Standby Capacity Project
PSC	Programme support cost
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
RBM	Results-based management
SPEGS	Strategic Planning, Evaluation and Guidance Section
STAIT	Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team
UBRAF	Unified Budget, Results and Accountability Framework
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN-SWAP	United Nations System-wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WHO	World Health Organization

Executive summary

This institutional assessment of UNOCHA covers the period from 2014 to mid-2016. Applying the MOPAN 3.0 methodology, the assessment considers organisational systems, practices and behaviours, as well as the results UNOCHA achieves. The assessment considers five performance areas: four relate to organisational effectiveness (strategic management, operational management, relationship management and performance management) and the fifth relates to development effectiveness (results). It assesses UNOCHA's performance against a framework of key indicators and associated micro-indicators that comprise the standards that characterise an effective multilateral organisation. The assessment also provides an overview of its performance trajectory. This is the first MOPAN assessment of UNOCHA.

Context

UNOCHA

- It is an entity within the UN Secretariat that supports the mobilisation, funding, co-ordination and policy setting of humanitarian action in response to emergencies
- It has a mandate for advocacy and co-ordinating the humanitarian system, rather than operational activity
- It does not have an executive board, but is directly accountable to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly
- It works towards a vision of a world where *“people are better able to withstand shocks: governments are aware of risks, are well prepared and able to respond to disasters quickly and effectively; and international assistance is provided quickly, efficiently and appropriately”*
- It is 95% dependent on voluntary contributions from Member States and the European Commission
- It commissioned and conducted a ‘root and branch’ functional review of its internal structures, resources and capacities in 2016

Organisation at a glance

- Established in 1998
- Expenditure: USD 334 million (2015)
- Active in 37 countries (2015)
- Over 2 300 staff
- Operates through:
 - New York and Geneva headquarters
 - 6 regional offices
 - 29 field offices
 - 20 Humanitarian Advisory Teams

Overall performance

The 2016 MOPAN 3.0 assessment finds overall that the strategic relevance of UNOCHA is unquestioned. Its role is increasingly important given expanding humanitarian needs. However, in terms of its systems, practices and behaviours, UNOCHA does not yet meet the requirements of an effective multilateral organisation.

UNOCHA is strategically positioned in relation to the Security Council, and demand for its services is increasing. It possesses a range of potentially valuable assets and comparative advantages to serve the humanitarian community. It has deployed these effectively in many areas, driving the humanitarian effectiveness agenda, leading humanitarian advocacy, and raising financing for the humanitarian community. It has deepened and expanded the humanitarian discourse, and used its convening power and its political intelligence to inform high-level debate. These assets serve a critical function within the humanitarian architecture.

However, the value of UNOCHA's activities is currently constrained by organisational weaknesses including the lack of a clear and cohesive management vision, conducting work in silos and communication

blockages. Activities are not geared to a common strategic direction and lack coherence and prioritisation. UNOCHA's political co-ordination and policy analysis work are not currently maximised to best effect, and the organisation suffers from weak accountability systems. Because of these systemic shortcomings, the 'sum' of UNOCHA's activities is currently somewhat less than its parts.

The balance between UNOCHA's potential roles — as a technical co-ordinator and/or an enabler, solutions broker, convenor, modeller, knowledge provider or intellectual leader within the humanitarian system — is not yet confirmed. To fully realise its potential, UNOCHA requires significant structural reform. The 2016 Functional Review provides a window of opportunity for change, although procedures for its follow up are not yet clear. Swift action will be needed, both to address UNOCHA's internal constraints and to restore external confidence.

Key strengths and areas for improvement

Key strengths

- **Prioritisation of relevance**, through context analysis which has enabled the humanitarian community to come together and take difficult political decisions and implement reforms
- **Knowledge generation**, which has provided a platform for dialogue, influenced the humanitarian agenda and informed international-level advocacy
- **External co-ordination**, including contributions to major international groups and managing major events
- **Systems building**, including improvements in the humanitarian architecture
- **External accountability**, with improvements in the accountability and learning of the wider humanitarian system

Areas for improvement

- **Function:** core functions not yet clearly defined and undermined by the lack of a clear and cohesive management vision
- **Form:** an organisational structure and operating model that require reform to be fit for purpose
- **Internal accountability systems and culture:** improvements needed to the performance culture and management systems
- **Prioritisation and sequencing:** critical areas of activity and associated criteria for resource allocation need to be defined and geared to a strong vision of the future
- **Cross-cutting issues:** a clear definition of protection needed as well as greater cross-organisational ownership on gender, and a stronger focus on environmental sustainability and governance issues



INTRODUCTION



1.1 THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

Mission and mandate

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is an entity within the UN Secretariat that supports the mobilisation, funding, co-ordination and policy setting of humanitarian action in response to emergencies. UNOCHA is responsible for providing support to Humanitarian Coordinators who provide overall leadership of the international community's response in emergencies.

UNOCHA's mandate comes from UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 in 1991, which aimed to strengthen the UN response to complex emergencies and natural disasters. The mandate provides for no operational authority but rather for an advocacy and co-ordination role for the humanitarian system. The head of UNOCHA is the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, appointed by the Secretary-General and supported by a secretariat, which has evolved to become UNOCHA as an organisation.

UNOCHA's mission is to:

- Mobilise and co-ordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies;
- Advocate the rights of people in need;
- Promote preparedness and prevention;
- Facilitate sustainable solutions.

The organisation works across the full range of humanitarian crises, as well as engaging in preparedness and resilience-building activities.

Governance

As part of the UN Secretariat, UNOCHA does not have an executive board. Instead, it is directly accountable to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly. In 1998 a small group of donors established the UNOCHA Donor Support Group (ODSG), which now brings together 27 of the top UNOCHA donors in an informal group. The ODSG is led by a Chair that serves for one year.

The ODSG serves as a 'sounding board' and a source of advice on policy, management, budgetary and financial questions, but is not a body that officially holds UNOCHA to account. Its goal is to support UNOCHA in fulfilling its mandate and its members commit to provide political, financial and technical support towards fulfilling UNOCHA's mandated co-ordination activities.

Organisational structure

UNOCHA is headed by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, supported by an Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator. The organisation currently has three main divisions: the Corporate Programmes Division, the Coordination and Response Division, and the Geneva Office. Functions are split across these three divisions, with policy-related activities (as well as administration and communications) hosted within the Corporate Programmes Division, and the Coordination and Response Division responsible for field activities. UNOCHA has two headquarters, one in Geneva and one in New York; six regional offices (Latin America and Caribbean, West and Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Caucasus and Central Asia, and Asia and the Pacific); and (currently) 30 field offices and 18

humanitarian advisory teams. The organisation has over 2 300 staff working around the world, with over 500 staff at headquarters, 191 in regional offices and over 1 500 staff in field offices. UNOCHA, as part of the UN Secretariat, is bound by the Secretariat's administrative procedures, rules and regulations.

Strategy and services

UNOCHA works towards a vision of a world where *“people are better able to withstand shocks; governments are aware of risks, are well prepared and able to respond to disasters quickly and effectively; and international assistance is provided quickly, efficiently and appropriately”*. UNOCHA has two strategic goals for the 2014-17 period. The first is field effectiveness, defined in its strategic plan as *“more effective and principled humanitarian action that meets the needs of affected people”*. The second goal, fit for the future, is *“a more diverse and adaptable humanitarian sector, spanning a variety of existing and emerging responder-and-partner networks”*.

UNOCHA aims to deliver its mission through core functions that derive from its mandate. These are:

- Co-ordination
- Policy
- Advocacy
- Information management
- Humanitarian financing

UNOCHA's 2014-17 strategic plan is accompanied by strategic and management results matrices that further specify the organisational targets and indicators for ten strategic objectives associated with its two key goals. A related management plan, focused on making UNOCHA fit for purpose, sets out how the organisation will strengthen its operations to deliver against the strategic plan. The management plan is structured around five objectives covering: people management; staff learning and performance; support services, systems and tools; standards and innovation; and resources, structure and management.

Finances

The scale of demand for humanitarian assistance has increased rapidly in recent years as the global community struggles to respond to an increasing number of protracted and complex crises. Consequently, resources for UNOCHA and other members of the humanitarian community have grown significantly. UNOCHA's annual budget has been over USD 200 million since 2011, and was between USD 200-300 million in the period of the current strategic plan.

Only 5% of UNOCHA's annual budget is funded from the United Nations regular budget, which is approved by the UN General Assembly every two years and funded by assessed contributions paid by each Member State. UNOCHA is therefore dependent on voluntary contributions from Member States and the European Commission. In 2015, ODSG members provided USD 214.8 million of voluntary contributions.

UNOCHA has faced a growing financial crisis over the last few years. Its 2016 extra-budgetary budget was USD 309 million, a decrease of USD 4 million from the 2015 approved budget of USD 313 million. Its administrative budget, funded by programme support costs levied on the extra-budgetary budget at 7%, was USD 25 million. With projected income of USD 261 million from donors in 2016, UNOCHA has drawn on its programme budget carry-over to help finance its activities.

Organisational change initiatives

Recognising challenges in its internal organisational structure and systems, UNOCHA commissioned a functional review in 2016. This 'root and branch' analysis reviewed the organisation's internal structures, resources and capacities. The functional review found that while UNOCHA is strategically well-positioned to support the humanitarian system of the future, its role and operating model, management model and organisational design require revisiting to ensure that it is optimally positioned to deliver on its mandate. In particular, management needs to develop and communicate a clear vision for the organisation. Human resourcing systems and the organisational culture also require action for improvement.

1.2 THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Assessment framework

This MOPAN 3.0 assessment covers the period from 2014 to mid-2016. It addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours, as well as results achieved during the relevant period of the 2014-17 Strategic Plan. The assessment focuses on five performance areas. The first four performance areas, relating to organisational effectiveness, each have two Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The fifth performance area (results), relating to development and humanitarian effectiveness, is comprised of four KPIs.

Each KPI is based on a set of micro-indicators (MIs) that, when combined, enable assessment against the relevant KPI. The full set of KPIs and MIs is available in Annex 1.

Table 1: Performance areas and Key Performance Indicators

Performance Area	KPI
Strategic Management	KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results
	KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms in place and applied to support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels
Operational Management	KPI 3: Operating model and human/financial resources support relevance and agility
	KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency/accountability
Relationship Management	KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility (within partnerships)
	KPI 6: Works in coherent partnerships directed at leveraging and/or ensuring relevance and catalytic use of resources
Performance Management	KPI 7: Strong and transparent results focus, explicitly geared to function
	KPI 8: Evidence-based planning and programming applied
Results	KPI 9: Achievement of development and humanitarian objectives at the institutional/ corporate-wide level and regional/country level, with results contributing to normative and cross-cutting goals
	KPI 10: Relevance of interventions to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and extent to which the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate
	KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently
	KPI 12: Sustainability of results

UNOCHA's specific role within the humanitarian system means that MOPAN's Key Performance Indicators and micro-indicators have been interpreted as appropriate for this assessment. While UNOCHA's core functions (such as co-ordination and policy work) are central to the analysis, the services it manages on behalf of the humanitarian community, such as country-based pooled funds and the Central Emergency Response Fund, have also been included as these form part of UNOCHA's functions more broadly.

Lines of evidence

Four lines of evidence have been used in the assessment: a document review, a survey, interviews and consultations. These evidence lines have been collected and analysed in a sequenced approach, with each layer of evidence generated through the sequential assessment process, informed by, and building on, the previous one. See Annex 2 for a list of documents analysed as part of the UNOCHA assessment and Annex 3 for a process map of the assessment. The full methodology for the MOPAN 3.0 assessment process is available at - <http://www.mopanonline.org/ourwork/ourapproachmopan30/>

The following sequence was applied:

- The assessment began with the collection and analysis of 98 documents. Evidence of results was limited, with just seven independent evaluations available for review. Only three of these —evaluations of UNOCHA's role in the Syria regional crisis, in preparedness and in civil-military co-ordination — assessed UNOCHA's own responses and or activities within humanitarian events. Three other evaluations assessed functions and/or processes managed by UNOCHA for the humanitarian system. These evaluated the former common humanitarian funds (CHF), emergency response funds (ERFs) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Another of the available independent evaluations, of the response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, was an inter-agency evaluation managed by UNOCHA. The evaluations of the CHF and ERFs also pre-dated changes that resulted in their integration into country-based pooled funds (CBPFs). Operational Peer Reviews and other reviews, where available, were therefore used to supplement information.
 - An interim version of the document review was shared with UNOCHA. It set out the data extracted against the indicator framework and recorded an assessment of confidence in the evidence for each of the Micro Indicators. UNOCHA provided feedback and further documentation to enable finalisation of the document review, which was completed in September 2016.
 - An online survey was conducted to gather both perception data and an understanding of practice from a diverse set of well-informed partners of UNOCHA. The survey generated a total of 111 responses drawn from seven countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, Nigeria, Somalia), including from donor and national government representatives and UN agencies. An analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative survey data has informed the assessment. Annex 4 presents results of the Partner Survey.
 - Interviews and consultations were carried out at UNOCHA headquarters in New York and Geneva in June and July 2016 with 65 members of UNOCHA staff, ensuring coverage of all the main parts of the organisation. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way, guided by the findings and evidence confidence levels of the interim document review.
 - Discussions were held with the Institutional Leads of the MOPAN 3.0 UNOCHA assessment, as part of the analytical process, to gather insights on current priorities for the organisations from the perspective of MOPAN member countries.
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Analysis took place against the MOPAN 3.0 scoring and rating system, which assessed data from all evidence lines combined. These scores and the evidence that underpins them form the basis for this report. Annex 1 presents the detailed scoring and rating system as applied to UNOCHA.

The main limitations of the report include limited evaluative evidence available to assess results, and changes underway in UNOCHA since the period of this assessment, particularly following the publication of the Functional Review. This assessment report itself therefore represents only a snapshot view of UNOCHA at a particular moment in time.

1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This report has three sections. Section 1 introduces UNOCHA and the MOPAN 3.0 assessment process. Section 2 presents the main findings of the assessment in relation to each performance area. Section 3 presents the conclusions of the assessment.



2. ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE



2.1 ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

PERFORMANCE AREA: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities

Strategic management: UNOCHA's strategic direction and management is assessed as unsatisfactory. While the 2014–2017 strategic plan provides a strong strategic architecture and direction and integrates gender and protection as cross-cutting issues, limitations in UNOCHA's organisational architecture and financial framework have constrained implementation of the plan. The strategic plan is not yet fully owned across the institution, and management have not applied it to shape or prioritise activity. Systemic limitations in UNOCHA's organisational architecture have also restricted use of the strategic plan. UNOCHA's financial framework is not fully linked to its strategic planning and results, and the organisation has faced a significant financial crisis in recent years. The strategic architecture and financial framework have therefore been unable to foster organisational change and reform.

SCORING COLOUR CODES

Highly unsatisfactory
(0.00 – 1.00)

Unsatisfactory
(1.01 – 2.00)

Satisfactory
(2.01 – 3.00)

Highly satisfactory
(3.01 – 4.00)

KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework to enable mandate implementation and achieve expected results

KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms in place and applied to support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues

KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework enable mandate implementation and achieve expected results

UNOCHA's performance against this KPI is rated as **unsatisfactory**.

A strategic plan is clearly articulated but not institutionally 'owned': UNOCHA's current 2014-17 strategic plan articulates a clear long-term vision for the broader humanitarian system as a whole and describes UNOCHA's intended role as a service provider to the humanitarian community. The plan also specifies that UNOCHA's remit is to contribute to principled, effective and timely humanitarian responses through strategic co-ordination, advocacy, policy, information management and humanitarian financing services.

The 2014-17 strategic plan lacks a theory of change or alternative underlying results logic. However, it does contain a clear statement of UNOCHA's comparative advantage in relation to its mandate as a humanitarian actor. This envisages UNOCHA's specific advantages as a combination of its "*unique mandate and cumulative experience*", as well its ability to serve as a neutral convening authority and an agent of change and long-term strategic planning. The strategic plan also recognises UNOCHA's strategic position within the humanitarian architecture and in relation to the Security Council.

In practice, however, the strategic plan is not fully assimilated or owned across the organisation. Management have not consistently conveyed or communicated the plan's intended role as a strategic

driver for the organisation, and has not set out a coherent vision and framework for UNOCHA's activities. Accordingly, staff do not perceive the strategic plan, or its associated results, as the main guiding instrument for their work. This 'hole at the heart' of strategic management recalls the finding of the 2016 functional review, which found that the absence of a "*clear management vision*" underpins many of UNOCHA's current difficulties.

An organisational architecture that is not yet fit for purpose: Similarly, the 2014-17 strategic plan and associated management plan state that they will define the most relevant organisational architecture (the "*right people in place, supported with the right systems, tools and services*") to serve the needs of UNOCHA's strategic intentions in the period. However, as of October 2016, this architecture is not yet in place. While the balance of staff is broadly appropriate numerically — with around 78% of personnel field-based, just 8% of which are based at regional level – the two-headquarter system means that 22% of staff are still headquarter-based. The role of regional offices has evolved organically, with roles and remits not clearly defined or consistently applied, and unclear management lines from regional to country offices.

The 2016 Functional Review identified a range of specific weaknesses in UNOCHA's organisational architecture. These are reconfirmed by this MOPAN 3.0 assessment, and are listed in Box 1.

Box 1: Limitations in UNOCHA's organisational architecture

- The two-headquarters arrangement, which causes confusion, inefficiency and unnecessary complexity, with some functions split between New York and Geneva.
- The unclear rationale for some functions' positioning, such as the positioning of the Policy Branch within the Corporate Programmes Division alongside administrative and communications services, rather than more centrally to inform normative, policy and field-level work.
- The fragmentation of roles across headquarters, with functions such as policy guidance split across branches.
- The tendency for substantive work to be conducted in silos, risking duplication.

At the field level, the roles and remits of country and regional offices are not distinct, with both reporting in to the Co-ordination and Response Division and with regional offices not holding an oversight role over country offices. The disconnect between central branches also filters down to the field level, so that field offices are at risk of being overburdened with multiple requests.

The Functional Review has extensively documented these challenges in the organisational architecture. Many of them have impeded the implementation of a potentially strong strategic plan, particularly through fragmented responsibilities and unclear communication lines. The variable management ownership of the plan, and a resulting lack of clarity over responsibilities for results, have further compounded the difficulties.

A financial framework unconnected to results: UNOCHA's financial framework is not currently linked to its strategic results framework. The organisation draws up budgets annually, but these are primarily informed by the work plans of UNOCHA's branches rather than being directly linked to corporate results. The organisation's financial contributions system does however enable high levels of unearmarked funding, which have comprised approximately 45 per cent of its income in recent years. Specific windows for non-earmarked contributions, such as thematic funds for key cross-cutting or substantive issues, do not yet form part of the financial framework, although UNOCHA is considering a new contingency fund to cover sudden and unanticipated requirements in new or worsening crises. Mechanisms are in place to ensure that resources earmarked for crises are appropriately targeted.

The organisation's dependency for 95% of its resources on voluntary contributions, combined with six Level 3 emergencies in a period of two years, has left it facing a significant financial crisis in recent years. Since 2013, UNOCHA has experienced a shortfall in resources raised of USD 21 million a year, on average. This rose to USD 50 million in 2015. Consequently, it has had to use carry-over resources to meet rising operational needs.

A need for reform: Overall, therefore, while its strategic architecture has the potential to enable UNOCHA to deliver on its mandate, the organisational architecture and financial framework are not currently optimally configured to enable such delivery. The 2014-17 strategic plan represents a significant step forward in UNOCHA's strategic articulation, but has encountered internal organisational limitations that have prevented the Plan from enabling change and reform.

The functional review presented a clear set of recommendations to address the shortcomings it identified in July 2016. Following a Global Management Retreat in August 2016, the Under-Secretary-General set out his vision for UNOCHA that considered findings from both the functional review and the retreat. This included establishing a Change Management Unit, to be led by a person outside the organisation and placed within the Office of the Under-Secretary-General. As of October 2016, the membership of this Unit was under discussion.

KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms in place and applied to support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues

UNOCHA's performance against this KPI is rated as **unsatisfactory**.

A strategic plan that partially integrates cross-cutting issues: UNOCHA does not yet have structures and mechanisms in place to support the comprehensive implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues. Its strategic commitments in the 2014- 2017 period prioritise protection, for which it is the UN Secretariat lead. Gender features to a limited degree within the current strategic plan, although there is evidence of a renewed focus on the issue in 2016. The organisation's strategic commitments do not yet reflect good governance and environmental sustainability.

Variable integration of cross-cutting issues into guidance and tools: Specifically in relation to each of the four cross-cutting issues for this assessment:

- **Protection:** The strongest performance in the four cross-cutting areas is in protection. UNOCHA's strategic plan includes an organisational commitment to work with partners, including the Protection Cluster as part of its cluster co-ordination role, to ensure that protection issues are mainstreamed and prioritised in all humanitarian action. UNOCHA plays a lead role in the UN Secretariat on protection, briefing the Security Council, and runs the ProCap project, which trains staff and partner UN agencies on protection issues. The Strategic Indicator Framework includes indicators for accountability on protection. UNOCHA has produced a range of policy statements and guidelines on the organisation's role in ensuring protection, but the conceptual definition adopted is unclear, and the last policy statement dates from 2009. Staffing resources comprise a small team in New York to cover protection issues and provide advice to the field. By the end of 2015, UNOCHA had trained or provided detailed information to 120 humanitarian leaders on mainstreaming protection. However, training for UNOCHA's own staff is limited to the publication of resources, and skills and experience at the field level are perceived to be mixed. Nonetheless, survey respondents assessed UNOCHA generally positively in relation to its work on protection (see Figure 1).


- **Gender:** A growing strategic momentum is evident on gender, with a 2016-2020 Policy Instruction setting out clearer responsibilities and a sharper approach to accountability for gender than the predecessor 2012-2015 Policy Instruction. A Gender Action Plan was developed following a 2015 gender audit, which found that the 2012-2015 Policy Instruction was not widely disseminated or utilised. The gender function was recently placed within the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General. However, the responsibilities for gender within the organisation remain confused, with an overlap between the central gender function (which consists of a single adviser) and an adviser with a gender remit who has recently been appointed within the Co-ordination and Response Division. Respective roles and remits therefore need to be clarified.

In 2015, UNOCHA's self-assessment against the UN System-wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-SWAP) reported that it had met or exceeded requirements on 14 of 15 indicators, although progress was still needed on financial benchmarks. The organisation applies the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Gender Marker systematically for all new interventions, and has revised this to extend its use "beyond compliance". UNOCHA also houses the GenCap project on behalf of the humanitarian community, which provides gender advisors to UN country teams and is broadly considered to work well. Survey respondents assessed UNOCHA generally positively in relation to its work on gender (see Figure 1).

- **Environmental sustainability:** Performance is weaker on environmental sustainability. Despite clear corporate statements of intent in the current strategic plan and the production of relevant information resources in collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), UNOCHA has no dedicated policy statement on the environment. There is conceptual confusion over where the issue sits within the different dimensions of humanitarian activity; in the recent period, it has been combined with preparedness. Financial and human resources to address environmental issues are limited and corporate results frameworks do not require reporting on environmental and climate change issues. Environmental Impact Assessments are not routinely required as part of approval processes for new interventions.
- **Good governance:** This is currently an area of strategic weakness. Within UNOCHA the issue is understood to mean building national and regional commitment to and institutions for supporting emergency preparedness and response. Corporate documentation references the need to address wider systemic factors that give rise to humanitarian emergencies, although these factors are not clearly defined and no clear strategies for tackling them are set out. There is no dedicated policy or strategy statement on good governance, nor are there systems for accountability, and human and financial resources are limited to the existing professional knowledge of governance issues of staff in their own contexts.

Figure 1: Partner Survey Analysis – Strategic Management

An illustration of aggregated partner views from across the countries




PERFORMANCE AREA: OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results to ensure relevance, agility and accountability

Operational management: Demand for UNOCHA's assets and capacities has grown in recent years, as humanitarian needs globally have increased. These changes have placed pressure on UNOCHA's operating model, and have thrown existing weaknesses into sharp relief. There is little common strategic direction to UNOCHA's activities, meaning limited prioritisation and an attendant risk of duplication. Human resourcing faces challenges, being subject to UN Secretariat Staff Rules and Staff Regulations, which as they stand are largely unsuited to UNOCHA's need for swift and flexible processes. Financial and oversight systems are highly rigorous and robust, due to UNOCHA's positioning within the UN Secretariat, but can be cumbersome for an organisation requiring agility to be effective.

SCORING COLOUR CODES

**KPI 3: Operating model and human/financial resources support relevance and agility**

UNOCHA's performance against this KPI is assessed as **unsatisfactory**.

Weaknesses in the operating model and limited internal coherence: Since 2012, the humanitarian system has faced vastly increased needs and increased complexity of crises. As demands upon UNOCHA have grown, the need for a strong central co-ordination and knowledge generation function has increased. UNOCHA has faced sharply increased pressure to fulfil its co-ordination mandate, and to bring its assets and capacities to bear on a system that is experiencing very considerable strain.

Under this magnifying effect, existing weaknesses in UNOCHA's operating model have been thrown into sharp relief. The lack of a unified strategic direction, internal disconnects and strains on resources have placed very considerable burdens on the organisation.

While UNOCHA's remit is to lead co-ordination across the UN system, its own internal coherence faces challenges. As identified by the functional review, senior management have not developed or conveyed a clear and cohesive central vision to staff that could act as a "unifying principle" to shape the organisation's choices and actions. In the absence of this central and cohesive vision, staff have developed activities in response to specific circumstances in the humanitarian system, rather than through a process of strategic prioritisation. Activities are not therefore pulled together in a common central direction. This lack of cohesiveness has led some parts of the organisation to develop in a way that duplicates functions in other parts and has resulted in poor linkages across functions, leading to weak internal communication.

Lack of a clear strategic direction and prioritisation: The lack of coherence has also increased the risk of duplication across different areas of activity, along with a lack of clarity over who is responsible for specific activities. Policy, political and normative work, which would usually inform the activity of the rest of the organisation, including field-based activities, is not centrally situated and is not being undertaken within a coherent framework. UNOCHA's field presence rightly forms the bulk of the organisation, but the role and remit for regional offices are neither clearly defined nor consistently interpreted. Nor are lines of communication between field offices and central functions clearly set out. The triggers and thresholds for opening field offices, and for closing them post-emergency with associated mechanisms for transition, are not laid down in a set of documented procedures.

At the same time, tensions and uncertainties about the boundaries of UNOCHA's role have caused fragmentation and even internal competition among units and branches. These are reflected for example in concerns over increasing directiveness in some areas, and varied interpretations of the organisation's 'non-operational' remit.

The weak prioritisation has also caused challenges for internal resourcing. UNOCHA produces annual plans and budgets that include a broad set of priorities for resource mobilisation. However, these are not explicitly linked to the specific objectives of the strategic plan or strategic results. For example, the balance of resourcing between preparedness and response is not corporately defined, and there appears to be no consensus on what an optimal balance should be. In 2016, direct field costs made up around 72% of the budget; when indirect costs are included, field costs rise to 86% of the budget.

Human resourcing constraints: Human resourcing also faces challenges. UNOCHA is subject to the UN Secretariat Staff Rules and Staff Regulations, which as they stand are largely geared to more predictable operations. The lack of flexibility in these systems creates difficulties when they are used to recruit and to manage staff in response to rapidly emerging and changing needs. To navigate these restrictions pragmatically, managers have in some cases developed parallel structures for recruitment, although this has left the organisation without a coherent approach to staffing overall.

There are few linkages between the strategic plan and staff work plans, which effectively disconnects activities from corporate results. Weak staff performance management systems compound this disconnect: current systems have been in place for several years, and compliance rates with performance management requirements are low (60% in 2015, and 30% to July 2016). UNOCHA lacks a 'performance culture', and there is considerable scepticism across the organisation about the way staff are managed and rewarded through promotion or headquarter postings. Many staff express their main motivation as their commitment to the broader humanitarian agenda, rather than to UNOCHA as an institution or to their management.

Lack of a cohesive management approach: The now well-documented lack of cohesion in the senior leadership team (as also recorded by the Functional Review) has affected team members' willingness to come together to resolve the issues that the organisation faces. A lack of clear decision-making authority means that follow-through on decisions, whether strategic or technical, is often inconsistent.

The Functional Review has brought these issues out into the open. They are now being debated and discussed, both externally and internally. Yet uncertainty remains, and disagreement still exists within the organisation about the optimal choice of operating model.

KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency/ accountability

UNOCHA's performance against this KPI is rated as **satisfactory**.

Robust but cumbersome financial management systems: UNOCHA's financial management and fraud detection systems are rigorous and robust, due to its positioning within the UN Secretariat. The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) provides the functions of internal audit for UNOCHA and carries out audits in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. The UN's Board of Auditors provides external audit. Regular reports to the Committee for Programme and Coordination of the Economic and Social Council provide a record of progress against recommendations. UNOCHA's Internal Control Framework is based on UN core principles and institutional control mechanisms, including clear provisions and safeguards on operational and financial risk management. Systems for tracking issues and for ensuring that timelines are followed are in place, although the OIOS has concluded there is a need for training and support to users, as well as continual monitoring to troubleshoot problems.

Working in challenging operating environments, fraud is a consistent concern for UNOCHA. The organisation is subject to UN Secretariat rules and regulations on financial management, and states that all staff are required to complete a mandatory training course on fraud identification and prevention. While fraud within country-based pooled funds has previously been a concern, the new Operational Handbook for Country-Based Pooled Funds, produced in February 2015, has provided some reassurance, as certified by the OIOS.

For UNOCHA-managed services for the humanitarian community, clear criteria for fund allocations to Country-based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) are set out and publicly available. The CERF Secretariat revised the CERF's performance and accountability framework in 2014 for enhanced oversight and accountability, and a guidance note was issued on communicating cases of fraud.


However, the rigour associated with UNOCHA's financial management systems brings with it constraints. Despite corporate commitments to "eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic processes" to ensure "nimble and effective co-ordination", UNOCHA is required to work through UN Secretariat administrative systems. These are not configured for the sort of swift and light administrative procedures needed within UNOCHA's complex operating environments. This is reflected in survey data, with less than half of respondents rating UNOCHA positively on whether its bureaucratic procedures cause implementation delays (see Figure 2).

The advent of Umoja, a new administrative system, aims to address these blockages, although its implementation has been far from smooth. Field offices have complained of procedural delays that have actively impeded UNOCHA's ability to fulfil its role in supporting humanitarian co-ordination on the ground. At a time of increased pressure on the system, this has significantly decreased UNOCHA's procedural agility and increased the strain on the field. It has also created significant internal tension among staff, some of whose roles and mindset are geared to improving corporate effectiveness, and others, mostly field-based staff, for whom the humanitarian imperative supersedes all other concerns.

Limited financial transparency: Financial transparency is a major commitment in the 2014- 2017 strategic plan, with the intention to develop a "more transparent, prioritized and streamlined budgeting process". However, to date, UNOCHA's annual budgeting process has not been linked to the strategic planning process and transparent allocation criteria are not in place. The rationale for choices made both at strategic and within field-level work are not clearly defined. UNOCHA's reporting on the disbursement levels for the Country Based Pooled Funds in 2014 and 2015 shows that these were lower than intended; against a baseline in 2013 of 65% and a target for 2015 of 85%, achievements were 49% in 2014 and 34% in 2015 respectively. This was explained as the result of problems in the switch over to the Umoja administrative system.

Figure 2: Partner Survey Analysis – Operational Management

An illustration of aggregated partner views from across the countries




PERFORMANCE AREA: RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT

Engages in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, leverage effective solutions maximise results (in line with the Busan Partnership commitments)

Relationship management: Many of UNOCHA's activities are critical for supporting the relevance of the humanitarian system and helping it deliver results. These include: work on context analysis and humanitarian effectiveness; hosting the Transformative Agenda and efforts to improve humanitarian leadership; producing knowledge products and analytical outputs; deploying UNOCHA's convening power to bring stakeholders around the table at multiple levels; and raising resources for humanitarian response. Partnerships are core to UNOCHA's mandate. The organisation hosts key global mechanisms such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the Emergency Directors Group, and works to support cluster co-ordination. Such partnerships are successful at a strategic level, although hampered occasionally by the current confusion over UNOCHA's vision and role. Technical co-ordination has experienced more mixed performance, with a lack of clear procedures and cumbersome internal administrative systems impeding UNOCHA's agility. Internal information is not always transparent.

SCORING COLOUR CODES

**KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility**

UNOCHA's performance against this KPI is rated as **satisfactory**.

Despite the challenges with its organisational structure and operating model discussed above, and the dramatic increases in external pressure, UNOCHA has continued to deliver many of its important activities. Its core role and central positioning means that many of its activities are critical for improving the performance of the humanitarian system.

Context analysis prioritised: UNOCHA supports the relevance and agility of the humanitarian system in a range of ways. It invests considerably in context analysis, with humanitarian needs overviews providing the major vehicle to bring partners together around a common understanding of needs. The value attached to these is reflected in survey data, with almost three-quarters of respondents rating UNOCHA positively on its production of relevant and timely context analysis to support humanitarian responses in the country (see Figure 3).

At policy and normative levels, UNOCHA undertakes a range of horizon-scanning activities on the global policy context (and provides policy advice and analysis to field offices) on key issues such as humanitarian access, internal displacement, protection, gender-based violence, international humanitarian law and explosive weapons in populated areas. Globally, at the Security Council level, UNOCHA's reporting on

issues such as access and protection has provided the information base that supported political decision making. UNOCHA also conducts major advocacy exercises, in part to raise humanitarian financing but also on substantive themes, such as such as access and protection, at operational, thematic and political levels.

Where conditions have permitted, UNOCHA-co-ordinated Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) have reflected strong efforts to align with national objectives and priorities for emergency preparedness and response, even though this can often be complex for humanitarian actors. UNOCHA has also made many recent efforts to work in partnership on humanitarian planning and preparedness with emerging regional actors, such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and national players such as Turkey. At the national level, country-based pooled funds, managed by UNOCHA, have provided a valuable mechanism to enable responses to local needs in emergencies. These efforts are reflected in positive survey perceptions, with almost three-quarters of survey respondents rating UNOCHA positively on whether its activities support the national government's disaster response/management/preparedness plans in the country (see Figure 3).

Efforts to build and improve capacity: Capacity analysis and development supports UNOCHA's work in ensuring the relevance and agility of the humanitarian system, both at country level and within the international system. The organisation is supporting increasing efforts aimed at building up the preparedness and response capacities of key national and regional actors, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. As with context analysis, as noted above, just over two-thirds of survey respondents rated UNOCHA positively on its use of capacity analysis in developing its interventions (see Figure 3).

Within the international system, UNOCHA has dedicated considerable resources to improving humanitarian effectiveness. Key areas of this work are reflected in Box 2.

Box 2: Improving humanitarian effectiveness

UNOCHA's areas of effort to improve humanitarian effectiveness include:

- Work on humanitarian leadership and humanitarian co-ordination
- Efforts to improve the global cluster system
- Hosting of the Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team, whose work has helped systematise and improve collective action in humanitarian emergencies
- Improving the Humanitarian Programme Cycle, developed as part of the Transformative Agenda, to emphasise the needs of affected people, improved targeting and greater accountability for results.
- Co-ordinating Humanitarian Response Plans at country level, which provide the collective vehicle to respond to needs (although these show varied depth and breadth of analysis and sometimes inconsistent planning).

Weak attention to planning for resilience and recovery: UNOCHA's current approach recognises the need to link humanitarian planning and interventions with resilience, recovery and development efforts, but these links are neither systematically addressed nor comprehensively reflected in the work the organisation does. They are inconsistently treated in HRPs, with few intentions stated, and few clear strategies articulated. Operational Peer Reviews (OPRs) do not routinely assess links to resilience/recovery, with their treatment the exception rather than the rule. Risk is also diversely treated, with HRPs reflecting emphasis on operational risk and UNOCHA's management information addressing business continuity and reputational risk. Survey data found just over half of respondents positively assessing UNOCHA's approach to risk at country level (see Figure 3). As part of its Grand Bargain commitments, however, UNOCHA has committed to increase efforts to support the development of multi-year plans in appropriate contexts, and to enhance work with development actors for improved linkages to transition.

Mixed performance on agility: UNOCHA shows mixed performance when it comes to agility. In the absence of clearly documented triggers and thresholds for opening and closing field offices, the organisation has been criticised at times for being slow to respond, for example in the case of opening offices and planning in response to the Syria regional crisis. The evaluation of the Syria response also found that UNOCHA had a highly centralised and directive model of decision making in relation to the crisis. UNOCHA's own delegation of authority to field offices is also still limited, with a ceiling of only USD 10 000 in 2016. However, over two-thirds of survey respondents rated UNOCHA positively on whether its staff can make critical strategic or programming decisions locally in the country (see Figure 3).

Beyond its own activities, some of the services UNOCHA provides to the humanitarian community have been criticised for cumbersome procedures. For example, partners have experienced significant delays and administrative burdens in humanitarian financing, particularly in using the country-based pooled funds. Within UNOCHA's internal administrative systems, it is hoped that the introduction of a new system, Umoja, alongside a proposed review of the root causes of delays in humanitarian financing recommended by the Functional Review, will reduce some of these blockages. More strategically, the reform process put in motion by the Functional Review is intended to address some of the challenges around institutional decision making.

KPI 6: Works in coherent partnerships directed at leveraging and/or ensuring relevance and catalytic use of resources

UNOCHA's performance against this KPI is rated as **highly satisfactory**.

Partnerships successful strategically, but with implementation weaknesses: Partnerships are core to UNOCHA's mandate for co-ordination. They are broadly successful at a strategic level, although hampered on some occasions by the current confusion over UNOCHA's vision and role. There is more mixed performance on technical co-ordination, working well in some contexts, but struggling in more difficult operating conditions.

At a global level, UNOCHA uses its comparative advantage to support a wide range of partnerships, as illustrated in Box 3.

Box 3: Supporting partnerships

UNOCHA works to support global partnerships such as:

- The Emergency Directors Group
- The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)
- The global cluster system

It also hosts a wide range of networks and mechanisms of service to the humanitarian community, including:

- The Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT)
- The UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination system (UNDAC)
- The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG)
- The Emergency Response Roster
- The Stand-By Partnership Programme
- The GenCap and ProCap initiatives

Such partnerships and networks provide a wide range of documented benefits to the humanitarian system. Their value is well-recognised by stakeholders: over three-quarters of survey respondents positively assess UNOCHA's prioritisation of working in synergy or partnerships with the wider humanitarian community as part of its business practice (see Figure 3).

UNOCHA's convening power is also a major part of its comparative advantage. The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit is the flagship example of its application, but other events include the Humanitarian Networks and Partnership Week, which had over 800 participants in 2016, World Humanitarian Day, and the annual Global Humanitarian Policy Forum. At country and technical levels, UNOCHA's work within the cluster system brings partners together to set priorities and implement responses. UNOCHA also applies its considerable convening power to introduce and generate global agreements, such as a global pre-positioning strategy that has the potential to significantly improve international capacity for emergency response.

Some more traditional partnerships have not always run smoothly. The relationship between UNHCR and UNOCHA has been challenging, in part due to mandate interpretation and with uncertainties arising over areas of responsibility. Evaluations have identified tensions between the two organisations at country as well as global levels. Some other humanitarian actors have struggled with what they have perceived as a more directive role taken by UNOCHA in the work on the Transformative Agenda. Some operational peer reviews report mixed performance in technical co-ordination at the field level, with scope for building better links among players and facilitating inter-cluster co-ordination.

Moreover, some partnerships could be seen as transactional, lacking the strategic or political nuance that the changing humanitarian architecture requires. UNOCHA has not yet conducted the kind of overarching analysis that would help position actors such as China or the private sector within the changing humanitarian landscape, or yet sought to engage with the different conceptual frameworks these 'new players' hold (though efforts on private sector engagement resulted in the launch of a series of private sector related initiatives at the World Humanitarian Summit).

Successful resource mobilisation: UNOCHA's resource mobilisation role has been successfully used to leverage and catalyse resources for humanitarian response, through the services it manages on behalf of the humanitarian community. Over USD 1 billion was raised through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) in 2015. UNOCHA's hosting of the CERF Secretariat and management of CBPFs provide a critical financing mechanism for emergency response, notwithstanding bureaucratic delays in disbursement of CBPFs, as noted above. Overall, UNOCHA's co-ordination role in humanitarian financing is well-regarded by stakeholders: over two-thirds of survey respondents rated the organisation positively on its co-ordination of humanitarian partners to ensure that funding for humanitarian activities in the country are coherent and not fragmented (see Figure 3).

Strong external information and knowledge generation – but weaknesses in internal transparency: UNOCHA works to improve global knowledge on humanitarian activity and needs, partly through collating data and making it transparently available, and partly through analytical products. Data on humanitarian financing are openly available through the Financial Tracking Service and will be available through the Humanitarian Data Exchange, which will provide a platform for humanitarian agencies to pool information. UNOCHA produces publications that bring together dispersed data to inform the humanitarian community and its stakeholders about the current state of affairs (see Box 4).

Box 4: Sharing information

Ways that UNOCHA contributes to information sharing include:

- Annual Global Humanitarian Overview reports, which forms the basis for consolidated appeals to support people affected by disaster and conflict
- The World Humanitarian Data and Trends series, which analyses global and country data on the state of humanitarian needs and assistance
- During emergencies, UNOCHA also manages the virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC), which provides an information exchange for responding agencies. It was used by more than 116 teams in the Nepal earthquake disaster
- The World Humanitarian Summit, co-ordinated by UNOCHA in 2016, provided a major platform for information-sharing as well as decision-making.


UNOCHA also produces a range of analytical publications that serve to advance the global debate on humanitarian issues. Examples include *Saving Lives Today and Tomorrow*, which looks at preventative work and a more sustainable approach to humanitarian action, and *Leaving No One Behind*, which addressed the link between emergency efforts and the Sustainable Development Goals, in a framework for humanitarian effectiveness. UNOCHA has also developed political analysis to inform the input of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs in his/her increasing number of appearances before the Security Council. UNOCHA has used its political analysis capacity to inform debates on issues that the humanitarian community has encountered but has struggled to explicitly conceptualise or strategically address. These include interoperability and the humanitarian-development nexus.

The lack of transparency regarding the use of UNOCHA's own resources is a significant weakness. Corporately, UNOCHA does not have a corporate statement on transparency of information. While the organisation has signed up to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), its 2016 rating report records a decline in performance, from fair to poor. There have also been concerns about the accuracy and quality of the UNOCHA-related information that is shared in documentation the organisation produces. However, over three-quarters of survey respondents positively assessed UNOCHA's provision of information on budgets and financial resources, perhaps reflecting greater openness at field level (see Figure 3).

Improvements to joint progress assessment: UNOCHA has worked to develop and improve mutual progress assessment, as part of the Transformative Agenda and wider efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian system. Instruments such as Operational Peer Reviews and Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations have both benefited from increasing systematisation, transparency and rigour in recent years. These processes, managed and co-ordinated by UNOCHA, have helped support accountability among the humanitarian community, as well as building learning for improvement.

Accountability to Affected Populations prioritised: UNOCHA's commitments to Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) are reflected in its current strategic plan. UNOCHA hosts the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Secretariat, which has issued a wide range of guidance tools on AAP. Clear guidance for staff is available on how these commitments should be reflected in all aspects of intervention design, implementation and monitoring, and UNOCHA has made available training on AAP. Guidance for developing strategic response plans, for CBPFs and the application format for the CERF, includes explicit instructions on ensuring accountability to beneficiaries.

Figure 3: Partner Survey Analysis – Relationship Management
 An illustration of aggregated partner views from across the countries



PERFORMANCE AREA: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results, as well as the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson learning.

Performance management: Despite having a strong results management architecture and considerable efforts from some parts of the organisation, UNOCHA currently suffers from a weak accountability for results culture. This is based in wider organisational challenges, including limited institutional and management commitment to results reporting. UNOCHA does not have a fully independent evaluation function, although it has previously conducted some independent evaluations and does have the relevant quality assurance processes in place. At present the organisational space for evaluation is restricted, following a challenging process of evaluating UNOCHA's work in the Syria regional crisis. The commissioning and implementation of the Functional Review, however, signalled that senior management are willing to open up the organisation for scrutiny.

SCORING COLOUR CODES

Highly unsatisfactory (0.00 – 1.00)	Unsatisfactory (1.01 – 2.00)	Satisfactory (2.01 – 3.00)	Highly satisfactory (3.01 – 4.00)
KPI 7: Strong and transparent results focus, explicitly geared to function			
KPI 8: Evidence-based planning and programming applied			

KPI 7: Strong and transparent results focus explicitly geared to function

UNOCHA's performance against this KPI is rated as **unsatisfactory**.

An evolving results architecture but weak implementation: UNOCHA has dedicated significant effort to build a results-based management system and practice in recent years. The organisation developed and adopted a comprehensive results architecture under the strategic plan 2014-17, including a new suite of global and field-level indicator results frameworks aligned to the two-year planning cycle adopted under the previous strategic plan. The development of the results framework has been a significant step forward for UNOCHA, despite some technical weaknesses in the framework including; heavy reliance on perception data to be gathered by survey, indicators with only mixed relevance, and causal pathways that have gaps in the logic between outputs and outcomes.

The monitoring and evaluation plans that accompany the strategic plan and results framework clearly set out the strategic layers of the results management system. Regional and country offices now develop four-year results frameworks aligned with the higher-level corporate results architecture. Planning and reporting processes have been reformed, with procedures now clearly laid out. Most, but not all, of the corporate strategic and management results have baselines available, although these are not yet required for country-level interventions. Results targets have not been reviewed since their development for the current strategic framework.

Annual results reports are produced and discussed with the UNOCHA Donor Support Group (ODSG). Strategic results for 2015 over 2014 show progression on 57 out of 65 indicators, although some strategically important areas of weak performance lack clear or adequate explanations.

However, some significant challenges have arisen in the implementation of these systems. The main monitoring systems are based on corporate reporting on an annual basis, rather than on regular performance reporting. This limits the utility of monitoring information to inform planning. Reporting structures are also not fully clear; heads of branches or, at field level, country offices, in theory are responsible for results reporting, although in practice this responsibility is often delegated in various ways, with managers not appearing to take a consistently strong lead in requiring reporting. Regional offices do not play a quality assurance function in results reporting, in line with their non-oversight roles of country offices. Staff and management are also not held individually accountable for, or assessed on, the achievement of results.

Variable management commitment: Management commitment to results-based management is highly variable, reflected in the lack of clear and consistent management directives for staff to report in a timely way. While some managers have welcomed the opportunity to report on results, others consider it an unwelcome distraction from their ‘real business’. Field-level capacity and expertise in results-based management approaches remain low, despite training carried out. Consequently, results reporting has proven challenging, with delays and concerns over data quality and reliability. The Strategic Planning, Evaluation and Guidance Section (SPEGS) is tasked to ensure data quality and has prepared extensive guidance material. However, ensuring the quality and reliability of data from all UNOCHA’s field and regional offices, as well from headquarters, is a major task, and stretches the resources of the section.

At the corporate level, an attempt to produce a performance report against the strategic plan in 2015 proved challenging and the exercise was not repeated in 2016. Similarly, a planned mid-term review of the current strategic plan did not take place. The commissioning and publication of the Functional Review, however, have been major steps forward in opening up UNOCHA to external assessment.

Finally, adjustments to interventions are mainly made on the basis on changing humanitarian needs, rather than based on performance reporting of corporate results. The annual results report provides an opportunity to review progress and course correct where necessary, but evidence from interviews indicates that these opportunities are not generally taken.

KPI 8 Evidence-based planning and programming applied

UNOCHA’s performance against this KPI is rated as **unsatisfactory**.

UNOCHA’s evaluation work has two dimensions: internal evaluation of its own initiatives and inter-agency humanitarian evaluations (IAHEs). This section concentrates on the former, with IAHEs considered part of UNOCHA’s work to support the humanitarian community and addressed under KPI 6.

Lack of a structurally independent evaluation function: Independent evaluation has experienced similar challenges to results management. UNOCHA does not have a fully independent evaluation function; the responsible unit sits within the Strategic Planning, Evaluation and Guidance Section (SPEGS). The chief of the Evaluation Unit reports to the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs through the chief of SPEGS. He/she does not have the authority to issue reports without clearance from the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs.

UNOCHA's policy instruction on evaluation was issued in 2010. A monitoring and evaluation plan covers the period 2014-17 and an updated evaluation policy exists, although this is on hold following the Functional Review. The 2014-17 monitoring and evaluation plan commits to a "high-evaluative coverage" of the 2014-17 strategic plan, although the intended coverage and the key priorities for UNOCHA's programme of work are not explicitly set out.

A restricted climate for internal evaluation: The Evaluation Unit has developed evaluation plans for UNOCHA, although these have not been implemented to their full extent in recent years. Budget lines are set by management, meaning that the Evaluation Unit lacks budgetary independence, with evaluations funded from donor contributions. The climate for independent evaluation of UNOCHA's own work is currently uncondusive, following a challenging and extended process of evaluating UNOCHA's work in the Syria regional crisis. The issues experienced in carrying out the evaluation were eventually resolved, but both the process itself and the resulting hesitation to conduct further independent evaluations of UNOCHA's activities, raise questions about the organisation's openness to external accountability.

Systems for quality assurance and management responses in place: UNOCHA has in place comprehensive quality assurance processes for its independent evaluations. These aim to ensure that the design, planning and implementation of evaluations are carried out in conformance with a set of quality standards including guidance on methodology. Few recent independent evaluations are available (see Chapter 2.2 and KPIs 9-12). Those reviewed however show mostly credible methodological designs, with some shortcomings in terms of justification for methods identified, consistent use of evaluation criteria and explicit rationales for sampling.

Guidelines for evaluation reports include a requirement to provide a management response and outline the process for responding to evaluation recommendations. Management responses have been developed for all the evaluations conducted, although they are variable in nature. For example, rather than producing a formal management response to the evaluation of UNOCHA's work on the Syria regional crisis, UNOCHA developed an internal statement which largely defers the management response to the findings of the Functional Review and other processes taking place in response to different oversight recommendations.


A database of all evaluation recommendations is included in the implementation tracking process. As part of its Management Results Framework, UNOCHA has committed to increasing implementation of evaluation recommendations to 80% by the end of 2015. Management information records this as being achieved in 2015. There is no separate annual report on the status of use and implementation of evaluation recommendations.

Lack of a systematised lesson-learning function: Learning within UNOCHA takes place mostly through implicit, informal systems and knowledge transfer between staff. UNOCHA staff see themselves as part of a shared humanitarian community and, as a result, individual staff members disseminate information to each other and communicate across existing institutional boundaries. No formal feedback loops or incentives exist to feed lessons learned into design, although a knowledge platform has recently been set up. Survey data find less than half of respondents positively assessing UNOCHA on whether it identifies interventions that are underperforming, and even fewer on whether the organisation identifies and addresses areas of underperformance. Just over half of respondents assessed it positively in terms of learning lessons from previous experience, rather than repeating the same mistakes (see Figure 4).

To support knowledge management, UNOCHA's internal evaluations and inter-agency humanitarian evaluations (IAHEs) are available in an online repository that includes their recommendations. No formal system exists for distilling and disseminating lessons learned, however, and dissemination mechanisms mainly take the form of evaluation publication as well as workshops and launches where appropriate. Similarly, there is no institutional mechanism to track the uptake of lessons learned, although learning from operational peer reviews (OPRs) is deployed as a management tool to improve humanitarian co-ordination and leadership at the country level.

Significant efforts on external evaluation: The situation regarding external accountability is different, as it is with co-ordination, above. UNOCHA's work to build capacity and systematise IAHEs and OPRs has led to major improvements, with a stronger set of procedures and guidance in place. However, recent changes in the Humanitarian Programme Cycle Guidance removed the automatic trigger for the evaluation for all Level 3 crises.

Figure 4: Partner Survey Analysis – Performance Management
 An illustration of aggregated partner views from across the countries



Organisational effectiveness scoring summary

SCORING COLOUR CODES

Highly unsatisfactory (0.00 – 1.00)	Unsatisfactory (1.01 – 2.00)	Satisfactory (2.01 – 3.00)	Highly satisfactory (3.01 – 4.00)
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PERFORMANCE AREA: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities

KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework	MI 1.1	MI 1.2	MI 1.3	MI 1.4
KPI 2: Implementation of cross-cutting issues	MI 2.1	MI 2.2	MI 2.3	MI 2.4

PERFORMANCE AREA: OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results to ensure relevance, agility and accountability

KPI 3: Operating model and human/financial resources	MI 3.1	MI 3.2	MI 3.3	MI 3.4		
KPI 4: Financial transparency/accountability	MI 4.1	MI 4.2		MI 4.4	MI 4.5	MI 4.6

PERFORMANCE AREA: RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT

Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, leverage effective solutions and maximise results (in line with the Busan Partnership commitments)

KPI 5: Planning and tools support relevance and agility	MI 5.1	MI 5.2	MI 5.3	MI 5.4	MI 5.5	MI 5.6	MI 5.7		
KPI 6: Leveraging/ensuring catalytic use of resources	MI 6.1	MI 6.2		MI 6.4	MI 6.5	MI 6.6	MI 6.7	MI 6.8	MI 6.9

PERFORMANCE AREA: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results, as well as the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson learning

KPI 7: Strong and transparent results focus	MI 7.1	MI 7.2	MI 7.3	MI 7.4	MI 7.5		
KPI 8: Evidence-based planning and programming	MI 8.1	MI 8.2	MI 8.3	MI 8.4	MI 8.5	MI 8.6	MI 8.7

2.2 HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

PERFORMANCE AREA: RESULTS

Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way

Results: The very limited evidence available from independent evaluations hinders assessment of UNOCHA's humanitarian effectiveness, with only three of seven available evaluations reporting on UNOCHA's own core activities. These few evaluations find that its interventions are broadly relevant and have achieved mostly positive results against UNOCHA's own aims. The evaluations also show that UNOCHA has delivered some very significant achievements at policy and normative levels, some of which show plausible connections to results for beneficiaries. There is limited evidence on efficiency or sustainability. The evidence that is available shows mixed performance on cost-efficiency and timeliness, and few links to recovery, resilience, development or capacity enhancement. However, the evaluations show that UNOCHA has made some positive contributions to building the enabling environment.

SCORING COLOUR CODES

Highly unsatisfactory (0.00 – 1.00)	Unsatisfactory (1.01 – 2.00)	Satisfactory (2.01 – 3.00)	Highly satisfactory (3.01 – 4.00)
KPI 9: Achievement of development and humanitarian objectives and results			
KPI 10: Relevance of interventions to needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries			
KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently			
KPI 12: Sustainability of results			

KPI 9: Achievement of development and humanitarian objectives and results

UNOCHA's performance against this KPI is rated as **satisfactory**.

Limited evidence but intended results broadly achieved: Evaluative evidence is limited overall on humanitarian results, with only seven independent evaluations available for review. Just three of these assessed UNOCHA's own responses and/or activities within humanitarian events; these evaluated UNOCHA's role in the Syria regional crisis, in preparedness and in civil-military co-ordination. Three others assessed functions and/or processes managed by UNOCHA for the humanitarian system; these evaluated the common humanitarian funds (CHFs), emergency response funds (ERFs) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Another evaluation, of the response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, was an inter-agency evaluation managed by UNOCHA. The evaluations of the CHFs and ERFs also pre-dated changes that resulted in their integration into country-based pooled funds (CBPFs). Operational peer reviews and other reviews, where available, were used to supplement information.

UNOCHA's co-ordination mandate and its role as a service provider to the humanitarian community, rather than as an agency specialising in direct delivery to affected populations, affects the nature of the results information available. Its most immediate 'beneficiaries', by consequence, are the humanitarian community, host governments, donors, Member States and other partners rather than affected populations.

In terms of achievement against its own intended objectives, whether achieved through its own core functions or through services or functions it manages on behalf of the humanitarian community, UNOCHA scores relatively highly, based on eight evaluations or internal reports. Six of these – assessing both UNOCHA's core functions and the services it provides to the humanitarian community – found that more than half of all intended objectives were achieved; two found that half or fewer of the intended objectives were achieved. Key achievements mostly relate to UNOCHA's normative or global-level role, or its influence with the Security Council (see Box 5).

Box 5: Key achievements

Some of UNOCHA's major policy and normative-level achievements include:

- Delivery of the first World Humanitarian Summit, held in Istanbul in May 2016 and bringing the international humanitarian community together to face highly challenging issues
- Contributions to UN Security Council Resolutions on access in the Syria regional crisis
- Humanitarian advocacy and resource mobilisation, including the provision of funding for underfunded crises and clusters
- Improved co-ordination of military and civil defence assets, use of armed escorts and deconfliction
- Increasing UN agencies' ability to respond in the field, even in highly complex emergencies
- Improved prioritisation of needs, and stronger strategic planning and strengthened humanitarian co-ordination at the country level
- Improved and strengthened humanitarian leadership

Some significant potential results for beneficiaries: UNOCHA does not directly service affected populations, but in line with its non-operational mandate some documented achievements indicate, through a plausible pathway of contribution, potentially significant results for populations (beneficiaries) immediately affected by crises. These are listed in Box 6.

Positive contributions to national results: Contributions to national results are assessed as largely positive. For preparedness, UNOCHA has improved the baseline status of the countries it has worked in. It has also brought Member States together to build consensus around key humanitarian advocacy issues, such as in the Syria regional crisis. It has built national ownership of and capacity for humanitarian response in diverse regional and national organisations, among them the Africa Union Commission, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the Southern African Development Community.

Limited evidence of cross-cutting results: Evidence of results in cross-cutting issues is scant, with insufficient evidence available to draw conclusions on environmental sustainability/climate change and governance. The few evaluations available found limited consideration of gender overall in UNOCHA activities. However, management information cites achievements including the integration of gender equality perspectives into the humanitarian programme cycle and work on the IASC Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Action; the operation of the Gender Standby Capacity (GenCap) inter-agency mechanism; the inclusion of gender equality indicators in humanitarian response plans; and a pilot project on senior female humanitarian leadership.

Box 6: Results for beneficiaries

Plausible results for beneficiaries through logical chains of contribution include:

- Contributions such as the concept of “arbitrary denial” to passage of UN Security Council resolutions on cross-border access during the Syria crisis, which significantly expanded access to groups in need
- Advocacy by the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, who is also head of UNOCHA, during the Syria crisis on behalf of people trapped by the fighting, helping to mobilise the international response to reach people in need
- The CERF’s facilitation of UN agencies’ abilities to respond to new crises by providing reliable funding even for low-profile crises
- The former Emergency Response Fund Mechanism for filling gaps across a broad range of activities including responding to rapid onset flooding; responding to conflict situations that affected nutrition and access to water; responding to unforeseen situations of internally displaced people; responding to small-scale emergencies; providing emergency clinics in conflict areas; and accessing restricted areas
- Contributions by the former Common Humanitarian Funds to the collective humanitarian response including: being entirely needs oriented; allowing for programming coverage in insecure areas inaccessible to UN or INGO personnel; contributing to increased participation, co-ordination and information sharing; strengthening the effectiveness of the humanitarian response through greater targeting and improved project proposals, and ensuring better implementation and reporting

KPI 10: Relevance of interventions to needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries

UNOCHA’s performance against this KPI is rated as **satisfactory**.

Mostly relevant interventions: Despite a limited evidence base, evaluations find UNOCHA’s interventions to be largely relevant to the needs and priorities of its target populations – i.e. the humanitarian community, in the first instance. There is also evidence that UNOCHA’s activities have supported more immediate beneficiaries of humanitarian action.

Three evaluations find UNOCHA having aligned with needs, for example through work on enhancing access and supporting UN Security Council resolutions in the Syria regional crisis and through its work on preparedness, which has enabled governments to support those most in need. In addition, the corporate results target for the development of strategic response plans to include consultations with affected communities (in nine countries), an approach that supports relevance, was exceeded in 2014 and 2015.

Two evaluations raise questions about relevance, although neither of these concerns UNOCHA-specific interventions but instead, activities in which UNOCHA is involved. The evaluation of the CERF questioned the repeated application of response activities in the same set of countries, whilst the Inter-agency evaluation for the international response to Typhoon Haiyan found a need for greater adaptation from response to early recovery, although coverage was adequate to meet the needs of affected communities.

For UNOCHA, the overarching priority is alignment with humanitarian need, rather than with government responses. The only independent evidence assessing how UNOCHA’s core function have aligned with government responses comes from the Syria evaluation, which points to the difficult balancing act that UNOCHA has faced in securing humanitarian access while needing to uphold the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality. In terms of UNOCHA’s services to the humanitarian community, performance is mixed. The evaluation of the ERFs found that limited scale prevented any significant contribution to

national response strategies. The evaluation of the inter-agency response to Typhoon Haiyan, of which UNOCHA formed part, pointed to differences of interpretation between national and international actors in terms of recovery, resilience and development objectives.

Mixed performance on coherence: Seven evaluations report on coherence. Findings are mixed. All three evaluations of the UNOCHA-managed pooled funds found that each mechanism functions well as part of an overall suite of response mechanisms at the country level, and supports coherence. The evaluation of UNOCHA's own performance in the Syria regional crisis however found the organisation has struggled to fulfil its traditional co-ordination role – in part due to the extreme political complexities of attempting to operate in Syria, with a focus on access and other global priorities sometimes coming at the expense of providing operational co-ordination products to partners. Other limitations include unclear roles for partners in preparedness and the establishment of parallel structures in the response to Typhoon Haiyan. Operational peer reviews also report a need for UNOCHA to place a stronger emphasis on coherence, for example in the Central African Republic.

KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently

UNOCHA's performance against this KPI is rated as **unsatisfactory**.

Mixed performance on cost efficiency and timeliness: Six evaluations assess efficiency, and these find mixed performance. Cost efficiency is positively assessed in UNOCHA's role in civil-military co-ordination and within the CERF and variable across regions in preparedness, but limited within the UNOCHA-managed pooled funds (CHFs and ERFs). The Syria evaluation found that tensions between UNHCR and UNOCHA affected operational efficiency.

Performance on timeliness is similarly mixed. The evaluation of UNOCHA's response to the Syrian regional crisis found delays in configuring UNOCHA's presence in/preparing country strategies for neighbouring countries affected by the crisis, which similarly impeded the rapid response required. UNOCHA's management of pooled funds sees variable timeliness, with only CERF assessed positively here. Concerns in relation to CHFs and ERFs include a process-heavy approach that has impeded swift action on the ground. Operational peer reviews similarly note the application and allocation processes to be lengthy and cumbersome.

KPI 12: Sustainability of results

UNOCHA's performance against this KPI is rated as **unsatisfactory**.

Limited evidence of links to recovery, resilience or development: The limited evidence available finds variable performance. The preparedness evaluation found positive performance, with benefits likely to continue to support resilience building in countries where gains had taken hold at the national level. Country-based pooled funds saw mixed performance, with ERFs making only minimal contributions to resilience and disaster preparedness, but some progress in integrating components of resilience programming in humanitarian responses within common humanitarian funds. Evaluation of the response to Typhoon Haiyan found differences of conceptualisation in the Philippines between national and international actors.

Limited evidence on contributions to capacity development: Evidence on UNOCHA's contribution to building capacity at the country and regional level is similarly scant. Only two evaluations report here, with UNOCHA contributions found to be limited in the case of the emergency response funds. The Typhoon Haiyan response evaluation pointed to the need for a clearer understanding of external agencies' role in a high-capacity national disaster where improvements have been absorbed into government systems.

Limited evidence but positive contributions to building the enabling environment: The few findings available on contributions to the enabling environment are positive. UNOCHA's role in civil-military co-ordination led to stronger civil-military co-ordination guidelines and policies, and enhanced dialogue, advocacy and training. UNOCHA's interventions in preparedness brought about faster and better-co-ordinated responses, and the UNOCHA-managed CHFs created enhanced co-ordination of disaster responses and stronger networks.

Development and humanitarian effectiveness scoring summary

SCORING COLOUR CODES

Highly unsatisfactory (0.00 – 1.00)	Unsatisfactory (1.01 – 2.00)	Satisfactory (2.01 – 3.00)	Highly satisfactory (3.01 – 4.00)
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PERFORMANCE AREA: RESULTS

Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way.

KPI 9: Achievement of results	MI 9.1	MI 9.2	MI 9.3	MI 9.4	MI 9.5
KPI 10: Relevance of interventions	MI 10.1	MI 10.2	MI 10.3		
KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently	MI 11.1	MI 11.2			
KPI 12: Sustainability of results	MI 12.1	MI 12.2	MI 12.3		



3. CONCLUSIONS

3.1 CURRENT STANDING OF THE ORGANISATION AGAINST REQUIREMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE MULTILATERAL ORGANISATION

This section brings together the findings of the analysis against the micro-indicators (MIs) and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of the MOPAN assessment methodology to report against MOPAN's understanding of the current requirements of an effective multilateral organisation. These are reflected in four framing questions corresponding to relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact/sustainability.

Illustrative quotes from Partner Survey on overall performance

"It has an important mandate and provides sought-after services. Many field staff are dedicated, professional and high performing. It is relatively fast in delivering information about humanitarian contexts, as well as increasingly effective in managing the Humanitarian Programme Cycle."

"We value UNOCHA's role as a provider of humanitarian information. We use OCHA's information as one of the primary resources for our decision making."

"Internal conflicts/differences in opinion seem prevalent in OCHA's senior management, hampering effective management and external communication about the organisation's strategic direction."

RELEVANCE

Does UNOCHA have sufficient understanding of the needs and demands it faces in the present, and may face in the future?

UNOCHA's own institutional core relevance is assured through its positioning as a co-ordinating entity as part of the Secretariat and its reporting to the Security Council on matters of humanitarian access, for example. In its role as a service provider to the humanitarian community, it prioritises the analysis of context, both at the country and regional level as well as in its global-level policy and political analysis. It conducts some cutting-edge work to further the humanitarian debate and to generate information and knowledge as platforms for advocacy and political decision making. However, despite a strategic plan that aims to operationalise its relevance through appropriate actions, and individual activities geared to generating and improving contextual knowledge, internal limitations constrain UNOCHA's alignment to the needs of the humanitarian community, which it is mandated to serve.

UNOCHA's current strategic plan provided, at the time of its development, a clear window of opportunity. Universally described as a major step forward for the organisation, it specified UNOCHA's clear comparative advantages within the humanitarian architecture. In doing so, it clearly articulated the relevance of the organisation, focused on its role as a service provider to the humanitarian community.

However, systemic limitations in UNOCHA's organisational arrangements have undermined the strategic plan as a vehicle for reform. Weak organisational ownership and the lack of a cohesive management vision have constrained its implementation. Rather than functioning as an instrument for reform, which sets strategic direction and behind which operational activity is shaped, the Strategic Plan has become a

document geared to a largely external audience. It has little immediate institutional relevance and does not form a reference point or guiding principle for staff.

Consequently, whilst the Strategic Plan lucidly articulates the relevance of UNOCHA and clearly sets out the organisation's comparative advantages that could enable delivery against this, this vision has not been taken forward institutionally by management. UNOCHA's relevance and comparative advantages have therefore not been translated into a coherent institutional architecture that would enable it to comprehensively implement its mandate. Thus, UNOCHA's current institutional alignment to the needs of the humanitarian community is currently constrained.

Nevertheless, within the organisation individual units make important contributions that improve the relevance of UNOCHA's actions and inform and guide the global humanitarian debate. Policy, normative and knowledge-generation work, combined with astute political intelligence, have brought partners around the table, informed political debate and shaped advocacy. At times they have led to tangible gains, such as facilitating UN Security Council decisions on access in the case of Syria. UNOCHA has driven the humanitarian effectiveness agenda, led humanitarian advocacy and raised millions to help respond to humanitarian need. UNOCHA has used its intellectual leadership to push forward key concepts and agendas and has helped to deepen and expand the humanitarian discourse.

However, piecemeal excellence is not a substitute for comprehensive institutional relevance; nor can it carry an institution when weighed down by weak management structures and disconnected planning and activity. UNOCHA's many valuable activities are institutionally constrained by the tendency to conduct work in silos and are impeded by communication blockages. As such, these activities do not currently translate into a fully corporate understanding of the organisation's relevance within the humanitarian architecture. Moreover, the balance between the technical aspects of UNOCHA's role as a co-ordinating entity and the more strategic and political dimensions of its role and remit as a key actor reporting to the Security Council, is not universally agreed. Resolving these issues is fundamental going forward.

EFFICIENCY

Is UNOCHA using its assets and comparative advantages to maximum effect in the present, and is it prepared for the future?

UNOCHA possesses a wide range of assets and comparative advantages that could enable it to deliver against its mandate. Its strategic position, its convening power and co-ordination remit, its political intelligence, policy analysis and formulation, its knowledge generation and advocacy capacity, as well as its field outreach and committed staff, all constitute a potentially powerful mix of properties. Combined, and effectively deployed in a coherent way, these properties can potentially serve a critical function within the humanitarian architecture - which is now, more than ever, acutely needed.

UNOCHA's comparative advantages are clearly set out in its strategic plan. In many specific areas it deploys these effectively. It applies its convening power extensively, and provides a wide range of global public goods to the humanitarian system and community. These include effective use of partnerships, despite mixed performance in practical co-ordination; the capacity to bring stakeholders around the table even under very difficult political conditions; the capability to provide knowledge and information that can inform debate; and the ability to develop shared products that can improve humanitarian action and leadership at the country and regional level. UNOCHA's ability to serve as an agent of change and reform is reflected in its advocacy and political negotiations work, and through its work on humanitarian effectiveness and leadership.

However, while all these areas of work are valuable in and of themselves, they are not currently geared towards achieving a comprehensive institutional vision or set of intended results. They function in a strategic vacuum, lacking coherence, prioritisation and sequencing. Financial resourcing and expenditure are not aligned to strategic planning, and with a disconnect between the annual budget and the strategic plan itself. Efficiency is therefore compromised and gains are not maximised for the greater good. The 'sum' of UNOCHA's work, therefore, is currently somewhat less than its parts.

In particular, UNOCHA's political co-ordination work and its positioning are not currently maximised to best effect. The organisation's role as an enabler and solutions broker could be a major comparative advantage, acting as it does in a sphere of influence with the potential to affect decision-making at the highest levels of the international system. Yet major assets such as political intelligence and policy analysis are not yet consistently informing interventions across the organisation. UNOCHA's model of partnership also remains heavily transactional, even while new actors with different conceptual frameworks are entering the humanitarian arena. These issues reflect the need to address the balance between technical and strategic roles.

Finally, UNOCHA's cumbersome bureaucracy constrains efficiency, linked largely to the organisation's need to apply UN Secretariat procedures and administrative systems. In some ways the challenges in the implementation of a new administrative system reflect UNOCHA's more systemic difficulties. The absence of a cohesive approach has caused the implementation of a new administrative system, which should be inconvenient at worst, to become a major procedural blockage.

EFFECTIVENESS

Are UNOCHA systems, planning and operations fit for purpose? Are they geared in terms of operations to deliver on their mandate?

A major plank of UNOCHA's intentions in this strategic planning period is to adjust its business model to respond to the requirements of its 2014-17 strategic plan and to improve its operational effectiveness. However, as yet, its systems, planning and operations cannot be described as fit for purpose. The organisation is still immersed in efforts to untangle some of its systemic organisational weaknesses. As a result, it is not yet realising its potential as an enabling actor for the humanitarian system.

Efforts have been made to address some of UNOCHA's structural limitations, such as building the results function, positioning gender within the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General, and establishing the new knowledge function. All these elements are geared to improving the effectiveness of individual 'pieces' of the structural jigsaw. However, effective change and reform require a vision of the whole picture, something that is not yet institutionally in place. The Functional Review provides the entry point for discussions, but a clear-sighted understanding of UNOCHA's potential future roles and the balance between them – whether as a technical co-ordinator, and/or an enabler, solutions broker, convenor, modeller, knowledge provider and intellectual leader for the humanitarian system – has not yet been formulated.

Moreover, a pervasively weak system and culture of accountability pervades the organisation. UNOCHA has conducted some valuable work to improve the outward-facing aspects of accountability and learning within the humanitarian system. Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations and Operational Peer Reviews are now more systematised and rigorous as a result, providing valuable tools for the humanitarian system. Internally, however, a major accountability gap exists. This extends from corporate accountability for results right through to individual staff performance management. Strategic and management results are not consistently corporately owned, nor is reporting against them effectively managed. The climate

for independent evaluation of UNOCHA's own work is currently closed.. This alone raises some serious questions of accountability for both UNOCHA and its stakeholders.

IMPACT/SUSTAINABILITY

Is UNOCHA delivering and demonstrating relevant and sustainable results in a cost-efficient way?

UNOCHA's ability to robustly measure and report on its results is limited by the scant evidence available, a function of the weak accountability culture described above. Because of this, many of its results are not yet visible. UNOCHA's main results are also focused on services provided to the humanitarian community, not on direct implementation to beneficiaries. With technical co-ordination, a mainly 'silent' activity, many of its visible results are seen through its advocacy and knowledge-provider roles.

Based on the limited evidence available, UNOCHA's interventions are largely relevant, although on their own terms and in relation to those of national stakeholders, rather than in aggregate or at the institutional level. UNOCHA's co-ordination function has also allowed it to play a significant role in coherence, although there is evidence of the need for improvement at times. UNOCHA has performed well in achieving its own intended objectives. In doing so it has created some highly valuable results for beneficiaries through influencing decision making at the highest level of the international system, which has improved conditions for those in need on the ground. Its production of knowledge and its systems-building work within the humanitarian architecture have contributed to building the enabling environment for humanitarian planning, preparedness and response. However, efficiency is limited, with timeliness variable and cost efficiency not always optimal.

3.2 THE PERFORMANCE JOURNEY OF THE ORGANISATION

The 2016 MOPAN 3.0 assessment finds overall that the strategic relevance of UNOCHA is unquestioned. Its role is increasingly important given expanding humanitarian needs. However, in terms of its systems, practices and behaviours, UNOCHA does not yet meet the requirements of an effective multilateral organisation.

UNOCHA is strategically positioned in relation to the Security Council, and demand for its services is increasing. It possesses a range of potentially valuable assets and comparative advantages to serve the humanitarian community. It has deployed these effectively in many areas, driving the humanitarian effectiveness agenda, leading humanitarian advocacy and raising financing for the humanitarian community. It has deepened and expanded the humanitarian discourse; and used its convening power and its political intelligence to inform high-level debate. These assets serve a critical function within the humanitarian architecture.

However, the value of UNOCHA's activities is currently constrained by organisational weaknesses, which include the lack of a clear and cohesive management vision, silo-ed ways of working and communication blockages. Activities are not geared to a common strategic direction and lack coherence and prioritisation. UNOCHA's political co-ordination and policy analysis work are not currently maximised to best effect, and the organisation suffers from weak accountability systems. Because of these systemic shortcomings, the 'sum' of UNOCHA's activities is currently somewhat less than its parts.

The balance between UNOCHA's potential roles — as a technical co-ordinator and/or an enabler, solutions broker, convenor, modeller, knowledge provider and intellectual leader within the humanitarian system — is not yet confirmed. To fully realise its potential, UNOCHA requires significant structural reform. The 2016 Functional Review provides a window of opportunity for change, although procedures for its follow-

up are not yet clear. Swift action will be needed, both to address UNOCHA's internal constraints, and to restore external confidence.

Table 2: Strengths identified in 2016

Strengths

- **Relevance** – UNOCHA's emphasis on context analysis has enabled the humanitarian community to come together around an understanding of context, to take difficult political decisions and to undertake necessary systemic reforms. While still imperfect, the approaches to such analysis serve the humanitarian community well, and the difficulties in acquiring and collating the information are often underrated, particularly in difficult operating conditions.
- **Knowledge generation** – UNOCHA has made significant contributions in areas such as transparent and accessible information on humanitarian crises and humanitarian financing. Not all this work takes the form of tangible results, with its knowledge products serving to inform rather than guide the humanitarian system. These products do, however, provide a platform for dialogue that would otherwise not be present and have influenced the international humanitarian agenda and relevant responses to specific humanitarian crises. This work has also informed advocacy at the international level, with tangible results for example in the case of Syria.
- **External co-ordination** – UNOCHA makes some significant contributions to co-ordinating various dimensions of the humanitarian system, including hosting the IASC Secretariat and Emergency Directors Group, managing major events such as the World Humanitarian Summit and Humanitarian Network Week, and hosting international networks such as the UNDAC and INSARAG. Co-ordination is challenging to convey as a tangible result, with its absence often proving the only viable way to fully understand its merits.
- **Systems building** – UNOCHA has made significant contributions to improving the humanitarian architecture by investing in humanitarian leadership, cluster co-ordination and other improvements through the Transformative Agenda.

- **External accountability** – UNOCHA has led some significant improvements in the accountability and learning of the wider humanitarian system through its management and co-ordination of the OPR process and IAHEs. Under UNOCHA's co-ordination, these processes have become more systematised and rigorous, as well as more transparent. While not matched, unfortunately, with equivalent internal accountability, they have enabled wider knowledge sharing and helped develop capacities inside the humanitarian system.

Table 3: Areas identified for improvement and/or attention in 2016

Areas for improvement

- **Function** – UNOCHA's core areas of responsibility are not yet clearly defined. The Functional Review refers to a lack of management vision as lying at the heart of many of UNOCHA's issues. This assessment finds that UNOCHA's core roles within the humanitarian architecture — whether as technical co-ordinator, and/or enabler, solutions broker, convenor, knowledge provider and/or intellectual leader — and the respective balance between these potential roles, need to be clearly defined before the form of the organisation can be agreed.
- **Form** - UNOCHA's organisational structure and operating model are not currently fit for purpose. Following the Functional Review, their weaknesses need to be tackled, integrated with a clear view of UNOCHA's function and balance of roles within the humanitarian system. There is a particular need to establish clear linkages between the normative, policy and political dimensions of UNOCHA's work and its field-level interventions.
- **Internal accountability systems and culture** – Currently, UNOCHA lacks a strong performance culture and management systems. Clear linkages are missing between resources to results, and staff performance management is neither systematically implemented nor culturally respected as an institutional process. An ethos of accountability for results needs to be owned and communicated by senior management, so that it permeates the organisation. There is a need for a clear delineation of who is responsible for what, why and when; how that relates to other areas of organisational performance; and, when and how reporting need to happen.
- **Prioritisation and sequencing** – UNOCHA undertakes a range of valuable activities in a diverse range of areas. Yet there is no clear definition of which activities are critical for the business of the organisation; no associated criteria for transparent resource allocation; and no clarity on the 'order of play'. A process of defining critical areas of activity would create a more cohesive approach, geared to a strong vision of the future.
- **Cross-cutting issues** – Currently only gender and protection are systematically implemented as cross-cutting issues. However, protection conceptually is insufficiently defined and an out-of-date policy statement currently guides the organisation's work. Momentum on gender has been built, but the issue is not yet institutionally owned at all levels of the organisation. In addition, senior management have not adequately communicated accountability, responsibility and ownership for these issues. Going forward, a greater focus on environmental sustainability and governance has the potential to provide clearer linkages between relief, recovery and resilience.



4. ANNEXES

1. Detailed scoring and rating on KPIs and MIs for UNOCHA
2. List of documents analysed for UNOCHA
3. Process map of the MOPAN 3.0 assessment of UNOCHA
4. Results of the MOPAN survey of UNOCHA Partners

Annex 1: Detailed scoring and rating on KPIs and MIs for UNOCHA

The Scoring and Rating was agreed by MOPAN members in May 2016.

Scoring

For KPIs 1-8: The approach **scores** each Micro Indicator per element, on the basis of the extent to which an organisation implements the element, on a range of 1-4. Thus:

Score per element	Descriptor
0	Element is not present
1	Element is present, but not implemented/implemented in zero cases
2	Element is partially implemented/implemented in some cases
3	Element is substantially implemented/implemented in majority of cases
4	Element is fully implemented/implemented in all cases

For KPIs 9-12: An adapted version of the scoring system for the OECD DAC's Development Effectiveness Review is applied. This also **scores** each Micro Indicator on a range of 0-4.

Specific descriptors are applied per score.

Score per element	Descriptor
0	Not addressed
1	Highly unsatisfactory
2	Unsatisfactory
3	Satisfactory
4	Highly satisfactory

Rating


Taking the average of the constituent scores per element, an overall **rating** is then calculated per MI/KPI.

The ratings scale applied is as follows:


Rating	Descriptor
3.01-4	Highly satisfactory
2.01-3	Satisfactory
1.01-2	Unsatisfactory
0-1	Highly unsatisfactory

MOPAN scoring summary


PERFORMANCE AREA: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT



PERFORMANCE AREA: OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT




PERFORMANCE AREA: RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT



MOPAN scoring summary

PERFORMANCE AREA: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT



PERFORMANCE AREA: RESULTS



SCORING COLOUR CODES



Performance Area: Strategic Management

Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities

KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework enables mandate implementation and achievement of expected results

Overall KPI Score	1.98	Overall KPI Rating	Unsatisfactory
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MI 1.1: Strategic plan and intended results based on a clear long term vision and analysis of comparative advantage

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: The Strategic Plan (or equivalent) contains a long term vision	2	UNOCHA has undertaken a major strategic planning exercise, resulting in the 2014-2017 Strategic Plan, which presents a more ambitious vision; clearer internal logic and clearer definition of intent than the precursor 2010-2013 Strategic Framework.	1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 30, 38, 39, 43, 45, 46, 53
Element 2: The vision is based on a clear analysis and articulation of comparative advantage	2	The current (2014-2017) Strategic Plan articulates a <i>clear long-term vision</i> of humanitarian assistance, with UNOCHA's mission envisaged as the lead <i>co-ordinator</i> of principled, effective and timely humanitarian responses. However, the Functional Review of UNOCHA, ongoing at the time of writing, identified the lack of a consistent organisational vision, internalised and communicated by management, as lying at the heart of many of UNOCHA current difficulties. 'OCHA's leaders have different visions for the organization and have concurrently pursued different activities aligned with their individual visions'. Accordingly, UNOCHA's comparative advantages have been differently interpreted and applied.	
Element 3: A strategic plan operationalizes the vision, including defining intended results	2	Similarly, the Strategic Plan contains a clear and explicit analysis of UNOCHA's	

Element 4: The Strategic Plan is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance	0	<p><i>comparative advantage</i> as a service provider to the humanitarian community (a combination of its ‘unique mandate and cumulative experience,’ as well its ability to serve as a neutral convening authority and an agent of change and reform long-term strategic planning). It <i>operationalises</i> the vision of UNOCHA as a service provider to the humanitarian community through a set of two Goals and accompanying Strategic Objectives, and under which a set of clear actions/intentions are laid out. These are appropriately aligned with the vision, tangible and concrete. A related Management Plan explains how OCHA will strengthen its operations to deliver against the Strategic plan. However, interview evidence finds the real application of the Strategic Plan’s vision into programming and funding cycles to be variable, however, with buy-in across the organisation inconsistent. No review or mid-term evaluation of the Strategic Plan has been undertaken or is planned.</p>	
Overall Score:	1.5		High confidence
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		

MI 1.2: Organisational architecture congruent with a clear long term vision and associated operating model

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: The organisational architecture is congruent with the strategic plan	1	<p>UNOCHA's Strategic Plan defines its mission as '<i>mobilizing humanitarian assistance for all people in need</i>'. Its organisational architecture and operating model are currently undergoing review, informed by the findings of the July 2016 Functional Review, commissioned to review UNOCHA's role and operating model.</p> <p>The Strategic and associated Management Plan for 2014-2017 indicate organisational intent in relation to UNOCHA's setting of priorities for a relevant organisational architecture (the 'right people in place, supported with the right systems, tools and services'). Improving UNOCHA's 'field effectiveness' (in seven key areas) is a major strategic thrust under the current Strategic Plan, along with strengthening regional offices. However, no evidence is available on the implementation of these commitments. The Functional Review has identified some critical shortcomings in the organisational architecture and operating model, including:</p>	1, 3, 11, 16, 23, 25, 30, 31, 38, 63
Element 2: The operating model supports implementation of the strategic plan	1	<p>1. Identifying New York and Geneva as two distinct headquarter offices leads to complexity and confusion.</p>	
Element 3: The operating model is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance	4	<p>2. The span-of-control of some top-level managers is very broad.</p> <p>3. The fragmentation of functions across branches leads to confusion as to who does what, and is a driver of duplication in the organization.</p> <p>4. Some functions receive insufficient management attention due to (1) insufficient elevation, and (2) blending of internally and externally facing work.</p> <p>5. There is a disconnect between functional groups at headquarters and in the field.</p> <p>6. OCHA headquarters size remains heavy and has not achieved economies of scale.</p>	
Element 4: The operating model allows for strong cooperation across the organisation and with other agencies	2	<p>7. The demands of the Emergency Response Co-ordinator role place stress on the USG's time to focus on internal OCHA oversight.</p> <p>8. There is an imbalance in resources between functional leads.</p> <p>Additionally:</p> <p>1. The management model is not codified in a clear way, and is lacking key components and interconnections</p>	

Element 5: The operating model clearly delineates responsibilities for results	1	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Decisions made at the senior management level generally lack disciplined follow through; and 3. The leadership team does not work well together and perspectives on specific managers have become an entrenched lens through which all actions are viewed. <p>Such shortcomings are reflected in available evaluations, such as a recent evaluation of UNOCHA's role in the Syria regional response. UNOCHA's operating model, in its co-ordination remit, allows for strong co-operation across the humanitarian community, though internal co-ordination, as noted by the Functional Review, is weak. Responsibilities for results are clearly delineated in the Strategic Plan 2014-2017 but it is generally agreed that there is highly variable ownership among senior and middle management, with significant difficulties encountered in obtaining results reporting.</p>	
Overall Score:	1.8		
Overall Rating	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

MI 1.3: Strategic plan supports the implementation of wider normative frameworks and associated results (i.e. the quadrennial comprehensive policy review (QCPR), replenishment commitments, or other resource and results reviews)

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: The strategic plan is aligned to wider normative frameworks and associated results	3	The Strategic Plan 2014-2017 contains a specific section on cross-cutting issues. These are applied as protection, Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP), resilience and communication with affected people.	9, 11, 16, 26, 38
Element 2: The strategic plan includes clear results for normative frameworks	3	Although explicit references to QCPR implementation are not explicitly cited, the current Strategic Plan and associated documentation clearly aim at its direct implementation. No areas of dissonance within QCPR intentions are identified; and specific areas of coherence include: The intended enhanced role in co-ordination within the humanitarian system, and to improve the humanitarian tools available; linking relief with early recovery and development; expanding partnerships; increasing field representation and strengthening regional offices; and building resilience and national capacities for response and recovery. Associated results are contained within the Strategic Framework.	
Element 3: A system to track results is in place and being applied	2		
Element 3: Clear accountability is established for achievement of normative results	1		
Element 4: Progress on implementation on an aggregated level is published at least annually	2	Gender concerns are integrated (to some degree) in the 2014-2017 Strategic Plan and to a more limited degree within the Strategic Framework for results; protection concerns are comprehensively integrated; environmental sustainability and good governance elements are not integrated. Reporting against gender and protection concerns is intended to take place through annual corporate results reporting; this was delayed for 2015 results due to late provision of information by some teams and to quality concerns. The 2015 management results reports were produced in July 2016. Accountability for normative results is vested in senior management through theoretical 'ownership' of the Strategic Framework results, but interview evidence is clear that responsibility is not fully assumed by all members of senior or middle management, also evidenced through challenges in acquiring robust results information from different teams across the organisation.	
Overall Score:	2.2		
Overall Rating:	Satisfactory		High confidence

MI 1.4: Financial Framework (e.g. division between core and non-core resources) supports mandate implementation

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: Financial and budgetary planning ensures that all priority areas have adequate funding in the short term or are at least given clear priority in cases where funding is very limited	1	UNOCHA budgets in 2014 and 2015 were 95% dependent on voluntary contributions to deliver on UNOCHA's mandate. The organization's revised requirements in 2015 for its extra-budgetary programme budget were \$333.9 million. Donors contributed \$233.4 million in 2015. UNOCHA has experienced a significant financial crisis in recent years, facing a shortfall of on average of \$21million/year, rising to \$50 million in 2015. It has needed to employ its carry-over to meet rising operational needs.	2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 29, 30, 32, 34, 37, 39, 43, 57, 90, 93
Element 2: A single integrated budgetary framework ensures transparency	3	UNOCHA appealed in 2016 to its donors for contributions that would bring its income to \$270 million which, combined with intended efficiency savings, would enable it to move through its current financial crisis. In exchange, it committed to outlining contingencies for underfunding and prioritisation for 2017 if extra income is not forthcoming.	
Element 3: The financial framework is reviewed regularly by the governing bodies	4		
Element 4: Funding windows or other incentives in place to encourage donors to provide more flexible/un-earmarked funding at global and country levels	0	UNOCHA produces an annual plan and budget, which includes a budget breakdown by activity area (though this is not linked to results). The budget is reviewed by the OCHA Donor Support Group, which comprises UNOCHA's lead donors and UNOCHA is in close touch with donors particularly in light of its financial crisis. UNOCHA's financial contributions systems enables high levels of un-earmarked funding, with approximately 45 per cent of its income un-earmarked in recent years. UNOCHA also has good levels of flexible income, carrying some funds into the following year to maintain an opening balance.	
Element 5: Policies/measures are in place to ensure that earmarked funds are targeted at priority areas	4		
Overall Score:	2.4	Specific windows for unearmarked contributions, such as thematic funds, do not yet form part of its architecture, though it is considering a new Contingency Fund to cover sudden and, unanticipated requirements in new or worsening crises. Mechanisms are in place to ensure that resources earmarked for particular crises are appropriately targeted.	
Overall Rating:	Satisfactory		Medium confidence

KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms in place and applied to support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels

Overall KPI Score	1.61	Overall KPI Rating	Unsatisfactory
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MI 2.1: Corporate/sectoral and country strategies respond to and/or reflect the intended results of normative frameworks for cross-cutting issues.

a) Gender equality and the empowerment of women

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on gender equality available and showing evidence of use	2	UNOCHA's 2012-2015 Policy Instruction on Gender (2012-2015) identifies seven minimum institutional commitments; but the Participatory Gender Audit of 2015 notes that it was neither widely disseminated nor utilized. A Gender Action Plan in 2014-2015 was developed as a result of the Audit. The successor 2016-2020 Policy Instruction also lists seven priorities, although this time accompanied by a set of five clear outcomes, and effort has been made to embed this across the institution. The Policy Instruction sets out clear roles and responsibilities for staff.	80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 96
Element 2: Gender equality indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	2	Gender concerns are integrated (to some degree) to a limited degree within the Strategic Plan and the Strategic Indicator Compendium, with organisational recognition that this should be intensified in future strategic planning and accountability products.	
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect gender equality indicators and targets	2	UNOCHA's main form of accountability for gender is through UN-SWAP reporting: self-assessment found in 2015 that UNOCHA had met or exceeded requirements on 14/15 indicators, in particular on financial resource tracking, organisational culture and the gender architecture, as well as on capacity assessments and communication. Progress was still needed on financial	

Element 4: Gender screening checklists or similar tools used for all new intervention	3	<p>benchmarks. Reporting against corporate gender indicators takes place through annual results reporting, though this experiences challenges of management ownership and technical capability (see MI1.3 above).</p> <p>The main gender screening checklists and tool applied for interventions is the IASC Gender Marker mechanism. This is applied systematically for all new interventions. The Gender Marker has been revised to extend its use 'beyond compliance'. Survey responses found that 55/66 (80%) of those rating UNOCHA on its promotion of gender equality in all areas of its work found it to be 'excellent, very good or fairly good'.</p>	High confidence
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address gender issues	2	<p>In terms of human and financial resources for gender: the lack of a well-staffed and resourced gender unit, an organizational architecture/ structure and the presence of a singular gender adviser were identified by the Gender Audit to be constraining progress. As a result, the gender function was brought under the Office of the Assistant Secretary General, giving it a stronger strategic position within UNOCHA. UNOCHA currently has one Gender Adviser within the OASG and also one member of staff brought in to work on gender issues within CRD. However the links between the two agendas are not yet clarified. UNOCHA houses the GenCap project, which provides gender advisors to UN country teams. Financial benchmarks, as indicated by the UNSWAP report, do not exceed benchmarks.</p>	
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on gender is underway or has been conducted	2	<p>Capacity building and guidance for staff on gender has been provided although not comprehensively.</p>	
Overall Score	2.17		
Overall Rating:	Satisfactory		

b) Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on environmental sustainability and climate change available and showing evidence of use	2	<p>UNOCHA does not have a dedicated policy statement on environmental sustainability, with the issue being brought together with Preparedness in a single institutional section. Through its partnership with UNEP to provide the Joint Unit for Humanitarian Action and Environment it issues a number of statements and guidance on the role of the environment and climate change in humanitarian emergencies and response. UNOCHA also hosts an inter-agency secretariat which advocates around the links between humanitarian need and climate change.</p> <p>However, interview evidence indicates a lack of conceptual clarity around the issue, particularly how the issue relates to different dimensions of humanitarian action.</p> <p>UNOCHA's accountability for results on environmental sustainability and climate change is limited however: strategic results do not include reference to environmental sustainability /climate change, and corporate reporting systems do not require reporting on the environment or climate change factors.</p> <p>Environmental Impact Assessments are not routinely required as part of approval processes for new interventions, other than in some instances such as the integration of the Environment Marker as part of the Common Humanitarian Fund funding strategy. However, the issue is not reflected in CBPF or CERF guidelines or templates. Survey responses found that 43/61 (70%) of those rating UNOCHA on its promotion of environmental sustainability /climate change in all areas of its work found it to be 'excellent, very good or fairly good'.</p> <p>Staff time available to address the issue is limited, with two posts cut in the recent period and the lead adviser for example also undertaking preparedness activities. There is no evidence regarding the implementation of training for staff on environment and climate change issues.</p>	1,2, 11, 17,18, 22, 38, 51, 52
Element 2: Environmental sustainability and climate change indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	0		
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect environmental sustainability and climate change indicators and targets	0		
Element 4: Environmental screening checklists or similar tools used for all new intervention	2		
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address environmental sustainability and climate change issues	2		
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on environmental sustainability and climate change is underway or has been conducted	No evidence		
Overall Score:	1.2		
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

c) Good governance (peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, reduced inequality, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels)

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on good governance available and showing evidence of use	0	<p>Good governance is only approached in UNOCHA's strategies in planning in relation to the need to address wider systemic factors that give rise to humanitarian emergencies. However, there is no dedicated policy or strategy statement to the issue; corporate targets and indicators do not reflect the issue; there is no screening requirement for new interventions related to good governance; and human and financial resources are limited to staff's existing professional knowledge of governance issues in their contexts.</p> <p>Survey responses found that 53/76 (70%) of those rating UNOCHA on whether it seeks to ensure that wider systemic factors that give rise to humanitarian emergencies are addressed (good governance) found it to be 'excellent, very good or fairly</p> <p>There is no evidence of training undertaken.</p>	1, 2
Element 2: Good governance indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	0		
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect good governance indicators and targets	0		
Element 4: Good governance screening checklists or similar tools used for all new intervention	0		
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address good governance issues	2		
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on good governance and climate change is underway or has been conducted	No Evidence		
Overall Score:	0.4		
Overall Rating:	Highly unsatisfactory		Medium confidence

d) Protection

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on Protection available and showing evidence of use	4	<p>UN OCHA is the UN Secretariat lead on protection and reports to the UN Security Council. Protection features within UNOCHA's Strategic Plan, which commits the organisation to working with partners including the Protection Cluster, as part of UNOCHA's cluster co-ordination role, to ensure that protection issues are mainstreamed and prioritized in all humanitarian action. A range of policy statements and guidelines on UNOCHA's role in ensuring protection is also produced, though the last policy statement dates from 2009.</p> <p>Strategic Outcome 6 of the Strategic Indicator Framework holds the organization to account for its work on protection. Reporting against corporate protection indicators takes place through annual results reporting, though as for gender this experiences challenges of management ownership and technical capability (see MI1.3 above).</p> <p>Protection features in organisational guidelines for new interventions, such as the updated Strategic Response Plan guidance. Protection is part of the CERF's lifesaving criteria, which constitute the framework for defining CERF eligibility, though protection is not explicitly reflected in Pooled Fund guidelines.</p> <p>Protection staffing and resources are limited to one staff member in New York.</p> <p>Similar to gender, UNOCHA operates the ProCap project, which trained staff and partner UN agencies during 2014. 120 humanitarian leaders in 2015 received training or detailed information on mainstreaming protection. However, no training for staff has taken place beyond the publication of resources, and interviews indicates mixed skills and experience at field level.</p> <p>Survey responses found that 69/84 (82%) of those rating UNOCHA on whether it seeks to ensure that wider systemic factors that give rise to humanitarian emergencies are addressed (good governance) found it to be 'excellent, very good or fairly</p>	1, 4, 5, 8, 51, 52
Element 2: Protection indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	4		
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect Protection indicators and targets	2		
Element 4: Protection screening checklists or similar tools used for all new intervention	3		
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address Protection issues	1		
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on Protection is underway or has been conducted	2		
Overall Score:	2.67		
Overall Rating:	Satisfactory		Medium confidence

Performance Area: Operational Management

Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance, agility and accountability

KPI 3: Operating model and human/financial resources support relevance and agility

Overall KPI Score	1.96	Overall KPI Rating	Unsatisfactory
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MI 3.1: Organisational structures and staffing ensure that human and financial resources are continuously aligned and adjusted to key functions

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: Organisational structure is aligned with, or being reorganized to fit the requirements of, the current Strategic Plan	2	<p>There are considerable weaknesses in the existing organisational structures and staffing, which are recognised within UNOCHA and are laid out clearly in the Functional Review. Organisational structures are identified as a continuing area of concern in management information and evaluations. The Functional Review identifies the problems clearly: A number of shortcomings in OCHA's management model have led to widespread organizational dysfunction.</p> <p>There have been significant staffing problems, with staffing not being clearly linked to the requirements set out in the strategic plan. Management reporting identifies specific problems including, the need to: improve field effectiveness, including reducing field vacancies; enhance surge capacity to deal with the high level of humanitarian need; and improve staff skills and knowledge. The Functional Review makes the problems clearer still: OCHA's organizational structure, as the result of a string of past adjustments, is not currently based on a single discernible organizing principle but is instead configured partly according to function and partly according to geography.</p>	1-12, 18-22, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41-44, 60, 90, 95
Element 2: Staffing is aligned with, or being reorganized to, requirements set out in the current Strategic Plan,	2	<p>Staffing is allocated with 22% at HQ level, 8% at regional level and 70% in the field. The roles of regional offices are varied, having evolved organically rather</p>	

<p>Element 3: Resource allocations across functions are aligned to current organisational priorities and goals, as set out in the current Strategic Plan</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>than being developed according to an agreed and consistent remit.</p> <p>Overall the financial resource allocation is focused on field level operations. Financial resources were split HQ/field 28%/72% in 2015, while in 2016 direct field costs made up circa 72% of the budget, rising to 86% including indirect costs. There is, however, no clear overview of resource allocations against organisational priorities and goals. As a result, some parts of the organisation have grown and developed in a way that risks duplicating functions in other parts of the organisation, with no overview as to how these functions should fit within the organisation as a whole. The Functional Review identifies two negative consequences of such fragmentation: risks of duplication of activity across different groups within the organization, reducing efficiency; and lack of clarity for others within the organization leading to confusion over who is accountable for specific activities. The rationale for closing field offices post-emergency is not laid down in a set of documented procedures.</p>	
<p>Element 4: Internal restructuring exercises have a clear purpose and intent, aligned to the priorities of the current Strategic Plan</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>Internal coherence is also notably weak. There is a concern that in some areas the organisation has become increasingly directive, and the lack of clarity over its 'non-operational' remit, such as in relation to its role in the Transformative Agenda.</p>	
<p>Overall Score:</p>	<p>1.75</p>	<p>Whilst the Functional Review has been undertaken, there remains a great deal of uncertainty within the organisation about the future structure and staffing. In interviews in particular staff raised concerns about the lack of agreement amongst senior management about the way forward.</p>	
<p>Overall Rating:</p>	<p>Unsatisfactory</p>		<p>High confidence</p>

MI 3.2: Resource mobilisation efforts consistent with the core mandate and strategic priorities

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: Resource mobilization strategy/case for support explicitly aligned to current strategic plan	4	OCHA's Plan and Budget for 2016 includes a broad set of priorities for resource mobilisation, which are aligned to the current strategic plan.	90
Element 2: Resource mobilization strategy/case for support reflects recognition of need to diversify the funding base, particularly in relation to the private sector;	3	Documentation prepared for OCHA's donor group in 2016 signalled the importance of diversification: pointing out that the top ten members of the ODSG provide OCHA with about 80% of its annual income, with an average of 60% coming from the top five alone. Recent efforts made reflect recognition of need to diversify the funding base. These include: working with a wider range of member states, including countries from the Arabian Gulf and from Asia, to encourage them to provide more regular resources: carrying out advocacy for humanitarian financing, through working to engage non-traditional donors such as China, based on their specific interests and capacities in the region. Particular efforts have been put into diversifying the funding base, for example, working with the private sector in the lead up to and during the WHS to identify where they can potentially make a contribution. In terms of funding there have, however, been relatively limited results so far.	
Element 3: Resource mobilization strategy/case for support seeks multi-year funding within mandate and strategic priorities.	4		
Element 4: Resource mobilization strategy/case for support prioritises the raising of domestic resources from partner countries/institutions, aligned to goals and objectives of the Strategic Plan/relevant country plan	2	OCHA has raised larger voluntary contributions and has continued to encourage multi-year funding from its main donors. The ODSG HLM 2016 background document on the budget and financial situation reports that OCHA had secured paid and pledged income of \$135.6 million, and further pipelines of \$52 million, for a total of \$187.8 million, against a budget of \$314 million. OCHA's Plan and Budget reports that 78% of this income comes from 10 member states. The plans for raising domestic resources, as set out in OCHA's Plan and Budget are general rather than specific.	
Element 5: Resource mobilization strategy/case for support contains clear targets, monitoring and reporting mechanisms geared to the Strategic Plan or equivalent	2		
Overall Score:	3		
Overall Rating:	Satisfactory	The case for resource mobilisation in relatively broad and does not include clear targets or reporting mechanisms.	High confidence

MI 3.3: Aid reallocation/programming decisions responsive to need and can be made at a decentralised level

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: An organisation-wide policy or guidelines exist which describe the delegation of decision-making authorities at different levels within the organisation	2	UNOCHA is part of the UN Secretariat and uses the general UN guidelines and has used the UNDP administrative guidelines for its operations in the field.	2, 4, 6, 11, 20, 30, 39, 41, 63
Element 2: <i>(If the first criterion is met)</i> The policy/guidelines or other documents provide evidence of a sufficient level of decision making autonomy available at the country level (or other decentralized level as appropriate) regarding aid reallocation/programming	1	There is, as a result, limited delegation of authority to country offices, which has been set at \$4,000, recently increased to \$10,000. The limitations of this low level of delegated authority are recognised in UNOCHA's own reporting.	
Element 3: Evaluations or other reports contain evidence that reallocation / programming decisions have been made to positive effect at country or other local level, as appropriate	1	There is evidence from evaluations that this lack of delegated authority has impacted on UNOCHA's effectiveness in the field. The Syria evaluation, found that UNOCHA had a highly centralised and directive model of decision-making. With the introduction of a new administrative system (UMOJA) there has been the opportunity to manage aid reallocation more effectively. However, UNOCHA has had considerable internal problems with the new system, so that it is currently not fully implemented, as evidenced in interviews and in the Functional Review. In particular, field staff have experienced major challenges.	
Element 4: The organisation has made efforts to improve or sustain the delegation of decision-making on aid allocation/programming to the country or other relevant levels	2		
Overall Score:	1.5		
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

MI 3.4: HR systems and policies performance based and geared to the achievement of results

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: A system is in place which requires the performance assessment of all staff, including senior staff	2	The human resources system that has been in place for a number of years is limited in its capabilities and there is evidence from interviews that the system is still used only to a limited extent. The linkages between the strategic plan and staff workplans are limited, with managers being reminded about the corporate objectives, but not being required to base their unit and staff workplans on them.	2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 30, 38, 41, 42, 63
Element 2: There is evidence that the performance assessment system is systematically and implemented by the organisation across all staff and to the required frequency	2	There are also issues with the use of the system, so that in 2015 there was a 60% compliance rate for conducting staff performance reviews, while in 2016 up to July the compliance rate had only been 30%.	
Element 3: The performance assessment system is clearly linked to organisational improvement, particularly the achievement of corporate objectives, and to demonstrate ability to work with other agencies	2	There is considerable evidence from the Functional Review and interviews that there is a weak performance management culture. The Functional Review identifies two specific problems: the leadership team does not work well together, which impacts on their willingness to come together to resolve the issues that the organisation faces; and, decisions made at the senior management level are not followed through in a consistent way or according to the current management model. This is clear in the relatively limited use of the staff performance review system and the decline in its use between 2015 and 2016.	
Element 4: The performance assessment of staff is applied in decision making relating to promotion, incentives, rewards, sanctions etc	1	Both of these problems affect the performance assessment of other staff and the ways in which disagreements and complaints are dealt with. It was reported in interviews that there is a weak performance management culture at present, with staff being unwilling to use the complaints system. Management go through the motions of performance management but are unwilling to engage with challenging behaviour.	
Element 5: A clear process is in place to manage disagreement and complaints relating to staff performance assessments	1		
Overall Score:	1.6		
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost and value conscious and enable financial transparency/accountability

Overall KPI Score	2.92	Overall KPI Rating	Satisfactory
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MI 4.1: Transparent decision-making for resource allocation, consistent with strategic priorities

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: An explicit organisational statement or policy exists which clearly defines criteria for allocating resources to partners	4	Financial transparency is a major thrust of corporate intent in the 2014-2017 period, with a stated commitment in the Strategic Plan to a 'more transparent, prioritized and streamlined budgeting process'.	2, 21, 22, 30, 37, 39, 44, 47, 87
Element 2: The criteria reflect targeting to the highest priority themes/countries/areas of intervention as set out in the current Strategic Plan	2	Externally, UNOCHA's Plan and Budget sets out the means by which humanitarian financing is provided through the Member State-supported Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and country-based pooled funds. The HRPs and the CERF and the CBPFs clearly set out the criteria for targeting priority themes and areas. Clear criteria for allocation are publicly available.	
Element 3: The organisational policy or statement is regularly reviewed and updated	2	Internally, UNOCHA uses an annual budget process whereby the annual cost plans are reviewed and approved for the following years. However, the budget process is not linked to the strategic planning process. Moreover, clear procedures for allocation to functional leads are not in place, and management and staff are unable to express a clear view on prioritisation. For example, the balance of resourcing between preparedness and response is not clearly set out corporately, and there appears to be no consensus on what an optimal balance should be.	
Element 4: The organisational statement or policy is publicly available	2		
Overall Score:	2.5	UNOCHA publishes annual Plan and Budget reports and updates, setting out its budget requirements and the main priorities for funding. However, these are not organisationally linked to strategic planning and do not address how UNOCHA will prioritise its own workplanning areas, and on the basis of which criteria, on which no publicly accessible information is available.	
Overall Rating:	Satisfactory		High confidence

MI 4.2: Allocated resources disbursed as planned

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: The institution sets clear targets for disbursement to partners	2	<p>UNOCHA sets clear targets for disbursement to partners in its Strategic Framework management results, though these are limited to the Country Based Pooled Funds. They are: percentage of OCHA offices with CBPFs that meet the minimum management standards; and, percentage of disbursement from CBPFs to implementing partners made within 10 days. These are reported on annually (though with delays to reporting in both 2014 and 2015 – see KPI 7 below).</p> <p>According to the OCHA Management Results for 2014 and 2015, funds raised against the budget set for the CBPFs were not disbursed as intended: against a target of 85% for 2015 and a baseline of 65% in 2013, the achievements were 49% in 2014 and 34% in 2015.</p> <p>The OCHA Management Results explains some of the variances against the agreed margins, setting out the issues encountered with the switch from the IMIS system to the UN-wide UMOJA system. However, these are presented as wholly external factors, with no internal procedural blockages responsible.</p>	1, 2
Element 2: Financial information indicates that planned disbursements were met within institutionally agreed margins	1		
Element 3: Clear explanations are available in relation to any variances	2		
Element 4: Variances relate to external factors rather than internal procedural blockages	2		
Overall Score:	1.75		
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

MI 4.3: Principles of results based budgeting applied – Not applicable

MI 4.4: External audit or other external reviews certifies the meeting of international standards at all levels, including with respect to internal audit

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: External audit conducted which complies with international standards	4	<p>UNOCHA's internal audits are conducted by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which provides the functions of external audit and carries out audits in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. Externally, UNOCHA is audited by the UN's Board of Auditors.</p> <p>OIOS evaluations confirm compliance with international standards in a report that provides an overview of responses to audit findings in September 2015 and a report to the Committee for Programme and Coordination in April 2016.</p> <p>There are regular reports on progress against recommendations in reports to the Committee for Programme and Coordination of ECOSOC. There was, however, no evidence on management responses to external audits or clear action plans for addressing gaps or weaknesses.</p> <p>OIOS also oversees and reports on the internal audit functions, ensuring that these functions meet international standards, with the most recent report being a review of recurrent issues identified in internal audits published in September 2015.</p> <p>OIOS provides publicly available commentary on the reports, on the OIOS website.</p>	2, 41, 43
Element 2: Most recent external audit confirms compliance with international standards across functions	4		
Element 3: Management response is available to external audit	No evidence		
Element 4: Management response provides clear action plan for addressing any gaps or weaknesses identified by external audit	No evidence		
Element 5: Internal audit functions meet international standards, including for independence	4		
Element 6: Internal audit reports are publicly available	4		
Overall Score:	4		
Overall Rating:	Highly satisfactory		High confidence

MI 4.5: Issues or concerns raised by internal audit mechanisms (operational and financial risk management, internal audit, safeguards etc) adequately addressed

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: A clear policy or organisational statement exists on how any issues identified through internal control mechanisms will be addressed	4	As part of the UN Secretariat, UNOCHA's Internal Control Framework is based on UN core principles and institutional control mechanisms.	4, 7, 21, 53
Element 2: Management guidelines or rules provide clear guidance on the procedures for addressing any identified issues, including timelines	2	The framework provides clear provisions and safeguards on operational and financial risk management that sets out the separation of responsibilities and internal controls in place to ensure proper stewardship and accountability for the organization's resources. This included establishing in 2013 a more transparent and clearly defined budgeting control process including a Budget Review Committee comprising senior managers to review budget allocation decisions based on priorities reflected in its annual cost-plans.	
Element 3: Clear guidelines are available for staff on reporting any issues identified	2	UNOCHA has put in place guidelines for staff, including an Operational Handbook for CBPFs in 2015. At the same time, OIOS has concluded that there is a need to ensure proper use of these systems.	
Element 4: A tracking system is available which records responses and actions taken to address any identified issues	2	There are systems for tracking issues and for ensuring timelines are followed, though OIOS has concluded that there is a need for training and support to users, as well as continual monitoring to trouble-shoot problems.	
Element 5: Governing Body or management documents indicate that relevant procedures have been followed/action taken in response to identified issues, including recommendations from audits (internal and external)	3	In the most recent review of recurrent issues identified in internal audits in September 2015, the report examined eight internal audit engagements for OCHA that were completed between January 2012 and March 2015 and reported on progress in addressing these issues. Whilst OIOS carries out regular reviews of progress in addressing issues identified, there are no clear timelines set for taking action.	
Element 6: Timelines for taking action follow guidelines/ensure the addressing of the issue within twelve months following its reporting.	1		
Overall Score:	2.33		
Overall Rating:	Satisfactory		High confidence

MI 4.6: Policies and procedures effectively prevent, detect, investigate and sanction cases of fraud, corruption and other financial irregularities

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : A clear policy/guidelines on fraud, corruption and any other financial irregularities is available and made public	4	UNOCHA applies the UN Secretariat fraud and corruption policies, as reported by OIOS. OIOS reports that circulars provide staff with information relating to fraud and corruption.	4, 7, 10, 14, 22
Element 2: The policy/guidelines clearly define the roles of management and staff in implementing/complying with the guidelines	4	Management information reports a specific training programme for the identification and assessment of fraud and corruption risk for expat and local staff in the field.	
Element 3: Staff training/awareness-raising has been conducted in relation to the policy/guidelines	4	Concerns over the potential for the fraudulent use of funds within pooled funds, and need for stronger risk management, are identified in of management reports, external assessments and independent evaluations. OIOS reports find that the Operational Handbook for Country-based Pooled Funds produced in February 2015, has provided some reassurance. The CERF performance and accountability framework was revised in 2014 for enhanced oversight and accountability and a guidance note issued on communicating cases of fraud. OIOS reports to the Committee for Programming and Coordination on a regular basis, with recommendations to the General Assembly to take note.	
Element 4: There is evidence of policy/guidelines implementation, e.g. through regular monitoring and reporting to the Governing Body	4		
Element 5: There are channels/mechanisms in place for reporting suspicion of misuse of funds (e.g. anonymous reporting channels and “whistle-blower” protection policy	4	An ECHO assessment finds that UNOCHA has established a plan for dealing with suspected fraud. OIOS reports that both the CERF and the CBPFs have taken active steps to address concerns raised with regard to fraud, set out in a guidance note for the CERF of July 2015 and in the Operational Handbook for CBPFs of February 2015 respectively.	
Element 6: Annual reporting on cases of fraud, corruption and other irregularities, including actions taken, ensures that they are made public	4	OIOS reports regularly on cases of fraud, corruption and other irregularities to the Committee for Programming and Coordination, which in turn reports to the General Assembly, and these reports are publicly available on the OIOS website.	
Overall Score:	4		
Overall Rating:	Highly satisfactory		High confidence

Performance Area: Relationship Management

Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, to leverage effective solutions and to maximise results (in line with Busan Partnerships commitments)

KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility (within partnerships)			
Overall KPI Score	2.03	Overall KPI Rating	Satisfactory

MI 5.1: Interventions aligned with national /regional priorities and intended national/regional results

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Reviewed country or regional strategies make reference to national/regional strategies or objectives	3	<p>Humanitarian intervention normally only occurs at the host government's invitation. This indicator therefore applies in terms of UNOCHA's role in supporting host government's disaster response/ management/ preparedness plans.</p> <p>There is evidence that UNOCHA has made efforts to work with regional bodies and a range of governments (particularly around the Syria crisis) to engage them more effectively in the humanitarian agenda. There are good examples at both the regional and national levels where efforts have been made to align responses to longer-term objectives and where strategies aim to build longer-term disaster response capacity.</p>	2, 7, 9, 20, 15, 16, 18, 25, 39, 44
Element 2: Reviewed country strategies or regional strategies link the results statements to national or regional goals	2	<p>A summary mapping of Memoranda of Understanding (March 2016) lists achievements to date on engagement with a range of countries, including Turkey, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Efforts (and some gains) relate to improved ownership of the humanitarian agenda within some relevant government departments and entry points established in others, and the</p>	

<p>Element 3: Structures and incentives in place for technical staff that allow investment of time and effort in alignment process.</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>development of joint plans of action.</p> <p>Analysis of a sample of 6 HRP's from 2015 and 2016 (Nigeria, Iraq, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Afghanistan) shows that in the majority of cases the strategies are aligned with the governments' own objectives and, where relevant, aim to build national disaster response capacity in the longer-term. There are, however, some cases where this analysis is not presented and where there are no links between strategy objectives and national goals.</p>	
<p>Overall Score:</p>	<p>2.67</p>	<p>Evidence from interviews indicates that staff have a clear understanding of the organisation's role in aligning work with national and regional priorities, though no explicit guidance is available to this effect. Survey data found that 61/84 (73 %) of total respondents rated UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether its activities support the national government's disaster response/management/preparedness plans in the country.</p>	
<p>Overall Rating:</p>	<p>Satisfactory</p>		<p>High confidence</p>

MI 5.2: Contextual analysis (shared where possible) applied to shape the intervention designs and implementation

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Intervention designs contain a clear statement that positions the intervention within the operating context.	4	<p>Analysis of a sample of 6 Humanitarian Needs Overviews and Humanitarian Response Plans from 2015 and 2016 (Nigeria, Iraq, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Afghanistan) finds detailed context analysis in all cases, which positions the response clearly within the operating context. Given UNOCHA's coordinating role, contextual analysis is consistently carried out jointly with partners, whether these are humanitarian actors or national governments.</p> <p>In the majority of cases the contextual analysis either covers gender broadly or does not cover gender issues at all. Only two HRP's covered gender in any depth at all. None of the HNOs and HRP's contained references to environmental sustainability and climate change. However, in the majority of cases the contextual analysis covers governance issues, with only one HRP making no reference to these issues.</p> <p>As part of its co-ordination remit, UNOCHA takes a lead role in ensuring that partners jointly review the contextual analysis of the HNOs through regular updates of strategies, with updates now being published on the internet.</p> <p>Survey data found that 66/84 (78%) of total respondents rated UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether it provides useful and timely context analysis to support the humanitarian response in the country.</p>	1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 26, 41, 59, 63, 74-79, 97
Element 2: Context statement has been developed jointly with partners	4		
Element 3: Context analysis contains reference to gender issues, where relevant	2		
Element 4: Context analysis contains reference to environmental sustainability and climate change issues, where relevant	0		
Element 5: Context analysis contains reference to governance issues, including conflict and fragility, where relevant	2		
Element 6: Evidence of reflection points with partner(s) that take note of any significant changes in context.	4		
Overall Score:	2.67		
Overall Rating:	Satisfactory		High confidence

MI 5.3: Capacity analysis informs intervention design and implementation, and strategies to address any weaknesses are employed

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Intervention designs contain a clear statement of capacities of key national implementing partners	3	<p>UNOCHA undertakes capacity analysis and development on a range of dimensions.</p> <p>Analysis of a sample of 6 HRPs from 2015 and 2016 (Nigeria, comprehensively addressed. All of the HRPs reviewed include a statement on the capacities of key national implementing partners, although the depth of analysis varies considerably.</p>	1, 4, 5, 11, 18, 21, 22, 30, 32, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 91, 94
Element 2: Capacity analysis considers resources, strategy, culture, staff, systems and processes, structure and performance	2	<p>In two of the six cases reviewed the capacity analysis is in-depth, detailed and forward-looking. In the other cases, there is a limited analysis of capacity, although there are links to aims to address weaknesses. In the small number of cases the capacity analysis is much more limited and focuses primarily on the numbers of partners available only.</p>	
Element 3: Capacity analysis statement has been developed jointly where feasible	2	<p>In two of the cases reviewed the capacity analysis was undertaken jointly with government partners. In the remaining cases, the analysis has been undertaken with humanitarian partners only and makes no reference to local capacity.</p> <p>In two of the six cases there are clear links to addressing weaknesses identified, whether these be in implementation partner capacity or longer-term government capacity to be able to respond to future crises. Other examples make the links to addressing weaknesses, although the analysis is limited. While the HRPs are regularly updated, there is only limited evidence in them that reviews of capacity are undertaken on a regular basis.</p>	
Element 4: Capacity analysis statement includes clear strategies for addressing any weaknesses, with a view to sustainability	2	<p>Survey data finds 56/84 (66%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether its interventions in the country are based on realistic assessments of national / regional capacities, including government, civil society and other actors for humanitarian action.</p>	

<p>Element 5: Evidence of regular and resourced reflection points with partner(s) that take note of any significant changes in the wider institutional setting that affect capacity</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>Other areas of capacity development include work on humanitarian effectiveness, including the development of humanitarian leadership. There is strong evidence of improved humanitarian leadership through a more systematic approach to selection, training and performance management and better support. The Humanitarian Programme Cycle has also created a more systematic and agreed set of processes. The work on the Transformative Agenda has raised concerns about the directiveness of UNOCHA's role, but has produced a set of parameters for improved collective action in humanitarian emergencies.</p>	
<p>Overall Score:</p>	<p>2.2</p>		<p>High confidence</p>
<p>Overall Rating:</p>	<p>Satisfactory</p>		

MI 5.4: Detailed risk (strategic, political, reputational, operational) management strategies ensure the identification, mitigation, monitoring and reporting of risks

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for operational risk	2	UNOCHA has begun to employ a comprehensive risk management strategy at the international level. However, at the level of responses to crises, there is much less evidence of the analysis of different types of risks.	1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 18, 28, 19, 22, 28, 29, 30, 32, 39, 48, 51, 52, 96
Element 2: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for strategic risk	2	The analysis of a sample of 6 HRPs from 2015 and 2016 (Nigeria, Iraq, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Afghanistan) shows only very limited attention paid to operational risk analysis, with those cases identified primarily looking at risk in terms of access, rather than political, reputational or strategic risk.	
Element 3: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for political risk	2	Operational, reputational and business continuity risk are however recognised within UNOCHA's management information. There is evidence of significant attention to operational risk in corporate strategies and accountability frameworks, of attention to reputational risk in the strategic plan and of business continuity risks in the management plan and regional plans.	
Element 4: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for reputational risk	2		
Element 5: Risks are routinely monitored and reflected upon by the partnership	2	However, there is little evidence that the attention to risk at the global and regional level is routinely monitored, documented or communicated in the updates of response strategies.	
Element 6: Risk mitigation actions taken by the partnership are documented and communicated	2	Survey data finds 43/84 (51%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether its interventions appropriately identify and manage risk within the context of the country e.g. in pooled funds.	
Overall Score:	2		
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

MI 5.5: Intervention designs include the analysis of cross-cutting issues (as defined in KPI 2)

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Intervention design documentation includes the requirement to analyse cross cutting issues	2	Guidance for developing Humanitarian Needs Overviews and Strategic Response Plans primarily cover gender and protection issues, while environmental sustainability and governance are not covered. Guidelines are available for staff on gender and protection issues, but these do not exist for environmental sustainability and climate change or good governance, beyond some joint publications with UNEP for the environment.	51, 52
Element 2: Guidelines are available for staff on the implementation of the relevant cross-cutting issues	2	The IASC gender marker is used widely in approval processes, while there are no similar requirements for protection, environmental sustainability or governance. Similarly, Country Based Pooled Fund guidelines have sections on gender mainstreaming and accountability to affected populations (AAP) including protection, though not environmental sustainability and climate change.	
Element 3: Approval procedures require the assessment of the extent to which cross-cutting issues have been integrated in the design	2	Analysis of a sample of 6 HNOs and HRPs from 2015 and 2016 (Nigeria, Iraq, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Afghanistan) finds mixed analysis of cross-cutting issues. Gender and protection are covered in all of the cases analysed and there is a consistently strong coverage of Gender Based Violence issues. Environmental issues are treated only in two of the cases analysed, and specifically in response to WASH cluster work. Governance issues are covered in the majority of cases, with only two cases not covering the issues.	
Element 4: Intervention designs include the analysis of gender issues	3	In all of the cases analysed cross-cutting issues are only covered to a very limited extent in monitoring and evaluation plans.	
Element 5: Intervention designs include the analysis of environmental sustainability and climate change issues	2	Survey data finds: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 56/66 (85%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether it promotes gender equality in all areas of its work; 43/61 (70%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether it promotes environmental sustainability in all relevant areas of its work. 53/76 (70%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether it seeks to ensure that wider systemic factors that give rise to humanitarian emergencies are addressed (good 	
Element 6: Intervention designs include the analysis of good governance issues	3		

Element 7: Plans for intervention monitoring and evaluation include attention to cross cutting issues	1	<p>governance)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 69/85 (81%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether it promotes protection concerns in all of its work. 	
Overall Score:	2.14		
Overall Rating:	Satisfactory		High confidence

MI 5.6: Intervention designs include detailed and realistic measures to ensure sustainability as defined in KPI 12)

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Intervention designs include statement of critical aspects of sustainability, including; institutional framework, resources and human capacity, social behaviour, technical developments and trade, as appropriate.	2	UNOCHA's corporate documentation contains some evidence of a recognised need to link humanitarian planning and interventions with resilience/ recovery/ development efforts, though previous evaluations suggest a weak link in this respect. However, this is not systematic or comprehensive.	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 29, 51, 52
Element 2: Key elements of the enabling policy and legal environment that are required to sustain expected benefits from a successful intervention are defined in the design	2	Analysis of a sample of 6 HRP's from 2015 and 2016 (Nigeria, Iraq, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Afghanistan) presents a mixed picture when it comes to linking the humanitarian response to resilience and recovery. All of the response plans make reference to the long-standing nature of the crises, to complexity or to governance weaknesses. At the same time, there is only limited in-depth analysis of the issues, and few comprehensive strategies for addressing such linkages programmatically, although all 6 HRP's do contain some approaches to build longer-term capacity. These are often fragmented, however, and there is no mention made of the policy environments in which such reforms need to take place. Management information indicates that an increasing number of HRP's - in countries such as Afghanistan, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Myanmar and Somalia - are explicitly linking to development frameworks.	
Element 3: The critical assumptions that underpin sustainability form part of the approved monitoring and evaluation plan.	0	No clear or discrete monitoring and evaluation for HRP's exist, and Operational Peer Reviews do not systematically cover aspects of sustainability (though recovery and resilience is, for example, addressed within the Philippines OPR).	
Element 4: Where shifts in policy and legislation will be required these reform processes are addressed (within the intervention plan) directly and in a time sensitive manner.	2	Management information indicates that as part of its Grand Bargain commitments, UNOCHA has committed to increase efforts to support the development of multi year plans in appropriate contexts, and to enhance work with development actors for improved linkages to transition.	
Overall Score:	1.5	Survey data finds 48/84 (57%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether it links its interventions in the country to resilience/recovery/development, where feasible.	
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

MI 5.7: Institutional procedures (including systems for engaging staff, procuring project inputs, disbursing payment, logistical arrangements etc.) positively support speed of implementation

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Internal standards are set to track the speed of implementation	2	<p>Whilst corporate commitments exist in the current Strategic Plan to ‘eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic processes’ to ensure ‘nimble and effective coordination’, the main internal standards to track speed of implementation are reflected in OCHA’s Management Results framework (relating to establishment of new OCHA offices with minimum staffing capacity in emergencies; deployment of surge capacity; CERF resources deployed). The Strategic Results Framework contains indicators on speed in relation to CBPFs and issuing of first reports in relation to emergencies. No organisational benchmarks are in place to measure performance on speed of implementation.</p> <p>Documentary and interview evidence finds that procedural delays have hindered the speed of implementation in many cases. OCHA’s Management Results reporting records specific problems with the new administrative system (Umoja) that hindered speed of implementation, such as in the case of CERF. In interviews staff referred to many problems associated with the introduction of the new system. The Functional Review comments on the poor efficiency and effectiveness of funding disbursements. ‘Delays in funding, and the administrative burden of receiving funding through OCHA, specifically through Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPF), is a high-priority area that should be investigated.’</p> <p>Survey data finds 52/111 (47%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether its bureaucratic procedures (including systems for engaging staff, procuring project inputs, disbursing payment, logistical arrangements etc.) do not cause delays in implementation for humanitarian partners.</p> <p>There is considerable disagreement within UNOCHA on the causes of common institutional bottlenecks. Some suggest the administrative systems are at fault, while others suggest that the problem is at a higher, management level.</p>	
Element 2: Organisation benchmarks (internally and externally) its performance on speed of implementation across different operating contexts	0		
Element 3: Evidence that procedural delays have not hindered speed of implementation across interventions reviewed	1		
Element 4: Evidence that any common institutional bottlenecks in speed of implementation identified and actions taken leading to an improvement	1		
Overall Score:	1		
Overall Rating:	Highly unsatisfactory		High confidence

KPI 6: Working in coherent partnerships directed at leveraging / ensuring relevance and catalytic use of resources

Overall KPI Score	3.32	Overall KPI Rating	Highly Satisfactory
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MI 6.1: Planning, programming and approval procedures enable agility in partnerships when conditions change

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: Mechanisms in place to allow programmatic changes and adjustments when conditions change	2	UNOCHA's core role in the humanitarian system is founded on agility in planning and operations. Accordingly, corporate documents make strong statements of intent to support agility in these areas. UNOCHA coordinates the process of humanitarian assessment and response strategies and brings partners together to develop regular updates.	4, 5, 6, 11, 16, 18, 20, 30, 39, 40, 43, 44, 63, 87, 88, 96
Element 2: Mechanisms in place to allow the flexible use of programming funds as conditions change (budget revision or similar)	2	The CERF and the country based pooled funds enable flexible funding to the humanitarian community focusing on the achievement of collective outcomes through a coordinated response. While there have been concerns about disbursement rates in the past, efforts have been made to address the issues identified and management results demonstrate improvements. However UNOCHA is constrained within CBPFs though its requirement to use UNDP administrative systems, which can limit its flexibility at ground level, and partners have commented on bureaucratic delays with CBPF funding.	
Element 3: Institutional procedures for revisions permit changes to be made at country/regional/HQ level within a limited timeframe (less than three months)	2	UNOCHA coordinates regular updates on the humanitarian crises and responses, which are published on ReliefWeb. Both the CERF and the CBPFs enable flexible responses to changing circumstances in crises, although evaluations of the previous CHF found finds a time- and process-heavy approach; and that of the former ERF mixed performance.	

Element 4: Evidence that regular review points between partners support joint identification and interpretation of changes in conditions	4	UNOCHA brings stakeholders in the humanitarian community together to review changes in conditions and changes in responses. Updates and monitoring reports on responses are published regularly on ReliefWeb., UNOCHA plays a lead role in the Operational Peer Reviews, which assess the joint response to Level 3 crises. Efforts have been made to identify common issues and to provide guidance on addressing these.	
Element 5: Evidence that any common institutional bottlenecks in procedures identified and action taken leading to an improvement	2	Survey data finds 61/84 (72%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether its staff can make the critical strategic or programming decisions locally in the country. 58/84 (69%) of total respondents rated UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether it adapts or amends interventions swiftly as the humanitarian context in the country changes.	
Overall Score:	2.4		
Overall Rating:	Satisfactory		High confidence

MI 6.2: Partnerships based on an explicit statement of comparative advantage e.g. technical knowledge, convening power/partnerships, policy dialogue/advocacy

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Corporate documentation contains clear and explicit statement on the comparative advantage that the organisation is intending to bring to a given partnership	4	<p>UNOCHA's corporate documentation clearly sets out the organisation's comparative advantage, linked to a clear understanding of its mandate. This statement outlines UNOCHA's role as a service provider to the wider humanitarian system.</p> <p>There is clear evidence in some areas of UNOCHA's successful deployment of its comparative advantage, for example through its policy analysis and advocacy work. Its work in Syria provides an example here, and an analysis of partnership MOUs and Joint Action Plans with the Government of Turkey, Organisation for Islamic Co-operation and League of Arab States finds these dimensions of comparative advantage are clearly reflected. However, the lack of a cohesive management vision means that UNOCHA's comparative advantages are differently interpreted and deployed by different areas of the organisation, with resources and competencies accordingly experiencing duplication and overlap internally.</p>	1, 2, 10, 11, 30
Element 2: Statement of comparative advantage is linked to clear evidence of organisational capacities and competencies as it relates to the partnership	4	<p>There are a number of areas where UNOCHA has invested resources in line with its comparative advantage, including: hosting both the IASC secretariat and the Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team, both working to improve the effectiveness of joint humanitarian responses; providing information services, such as the Financial Tracking Service and work to establish the Humanitarian Data Exchange in the Hague. Uses of its convening power include the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit; Humanitarian Networks and Partnership Week, which expanded to over 800 participants in 2016, World Humanitarian Day and the annual Global Humanitarian Policy Forum. Also the development of the Global Pre-positioning strategy. Knowledge production include the annual Global Humanitarian Overview reports and the World Humanitarian Data and Trends series. UNOCHA also manages the Virtual OSOCC, which was used by over 116 teams for example in the recent Nepal earthquake.</p>	
Element 3: Evidence that resources/ competencies needed for intervention area(s) are aligned to the perceived comparative advantage	3		

<p>Element 4: Comparative advantage is reflected in the resources (people, information, knowledge, physical resources, networks) that each partner is able (and willing) to bring to the partnership</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>Resource mobilization has raised over \$1 billion through the Central Emergency Response Fund and Country Based Pooled Funds in 2015.</p> <p>There have been some concerns raised about the relationship between UNHCR and UNOCHA, where further clarification about each organisation’s comparative advantage is required. Interviews suggested that the relationship had been problematic and that the 2014 MOU had failed to resolve issues. These concerns were reflected in an evaluation of UNOCHA’s response to the Syria crisis.</p>	
<p>Overall Score:</p>	<p>3.5</p>	<p>More broadly, UNOCHA has not yet conducted explicit overarching analysis on the engagement of new players within the humanitarian system, such as China, or the private sector (though as part of leadup and during the World Humanitarian Summit, OCHA’s efforts on working with private sector resulted in private sector-related initiatives being launched at the Summit, including partnerships for humanitarian cash transfers, the launch of connectivity charters and the Connecting Business initiative).</p> <p>Survey data found that 64/84 (76 %) of total respondents rated UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether its interventions in the country are based on a clear understanding of its role as a service provider to the wider humanitarian community.</p>	
<p>Overall Rating:</p>	<p>Highly satisfactory</p>		<p>High confidence</p>

MI 6.3: Clear adherence to the commitment in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation on the use of country systems - Not applicable

MI 6.4: Strategies or designs identify synergies, to encourage leverage/catalytic use of resources and avoid fragmentation

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Strategies or designs clearly recognise the importance of synergies and leverage	4	UNOCHA's mandate provides the organisation with the remit to create synergies and reduce duplication. At strategic level, UNOCHA chairs a range of inter-agency fora, including the Emergency Directors Group (EDG) and hosts the IASC Secretariat as well as the CERF Secretariat and the Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT). Efforts to create synergies are also reflected at country level, for example in UNOCHA's role in facilitating Humanitarian Needs Overviews and Response Plans. At country level, UN OCHA heads of offices (or deputies) now chair inter-cluster coordination groups.	1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 18, 20, 39, 40, 43, 44, 58, 63, 65-70, 87, 88, 89, 91
Element 2: Strategies or designs contain clear statements of how duplication/fragmentation will be avoided based on realistic assessment of comparative advantages	4	Analyses of HNOs and HRP (see detailed analysis in MIs 5.1-5.6) demonstrates that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The cluster approach is used consistently and the strategies assessed all recognise the importance of synergies. The consistent use of the cluster approach provides a clear basis for avoiding fragmentation and are all based on a realistic assessment of comparative advantage. The objectives in the plans in the majority of cases link to longer-term objectives, showing where support will add most value to wider change, although there was one case where this was not stated. The plan objectives in the majority of case contain clear links to resilience efforts, showing how leverage will be ensured, although there was one case where this was not stated. 	
Element 3: Strategies or designs contain clear statement of where an intervention will add the most value to a wider change.	3		
Element 4: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how leverage will be ensured	3	The plans in the majority of cases included statements on how interventions will be used catalytically to stimulate wider change, although again there was one case where this was not covered.	

Element 5: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how resources will be used catalytically to stimulate wider change	3	<p>Survey data found that 93/111 (84%) of total respondents rated UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether it prioritises working in synergy/partnerships with the wider humanitarian community as part of its business practice.</p> <p>Survey data finds 58/84 (69%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on its co-ordination of humanitarian partners to make sure that funding for humanitarian activities in the country are coherent and not fragmented.</p>	
Overall Score:	3.4		
Overall Rating:	Highly satisfactory		High confidence

MI 6.5 Key business practices (planning, design, implementation, monitoring and reporting) coordinated with other relevant partners (donors, UN agencies, etc.) as appropriate.

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Evidence that the organisation has participated in joint planning exercises, such as the UNDAF	4	<p>UNOCHA participates in a range of joint planning and analysis exercises, including HNOs and HRPs. UNOCHA does not implement separately but seeks to support humanitarian actors in areas where it has a comparative advantage, such as compiling and analysing information and negotiating on behalf of its partners. UNOCHA’s analytical information, such as that produced for the Syria crisis, has provided a platform for dialogue and joint planning/implementation. There is evidence in the analysis of the HRPs that UNOCHA, working with partners, identifies information gaps and develops strategies to address these, with all of the HRPs including analysis of existing information, further information needs (such as on IDPs) and strategies for addressing these needs.</p> <p>UNOCHA plays a coordinating role in monitoring and reporting processes, through Operational Peer Reviews (OPRs), and Inter Agency Humanitarian Evaluations, on which there is agreement that performance has improved in recent years. There is evidence in all of the HNOs and HRPs analysed that UNOCHA actively complements the interventions of partners through taking the lead on information analysis and communication.</p> <p>Survey data also finds that 72/111 (65%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether it ensures that its bureaucratic procedures (planning, programming, administrative, monitoring and reporting) are synergised with those of its partners (for example, donors, UN agencies).</p>	2, 16, 22, 87
Element 2: Evidence that the organisation has aligned its programme activities with joint planning instruments, such as UNDAF	4		
Element 3: Evidence that the organisation has participated in opportunities for joint programming where these exist	4		
Element 4: Evidence that the organisation has participated in joint monitoring and reporting processes with key partners (donor, UN etc)	4		
Element 5: Evidence of the identification of shared information gaps with partners and strategies developed to address these	4		
Element 6: Evidence of participation in the joint planning, management and delivery of evaluation activities	4		
Overall Score:	4		
Overall Rating:	Highly satisfactory	High confidence	

MI 6.6: Key information (analysis, budgeting, management, results etc.) shared with strategic/implementation partners on an ongoing basis

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Clear corporate statement on transparency of information	0	<p>According to the Publish What You Fund Transparency Index, UNOCHA does not have a corporate statement on transparency of information. UNOCHA has signed up to IATI, but its 2016 rating report records a decline in performance, from fair to poor.</p> <p>The Aid Transparency Tracker records mixed performance when it comes to making formation available in line with IATI guidance. Issues have been raised about the accuracy and quality of the information that is shared. Some OPRs also challenge the quality and timeliness of the information produced. For example: in the CAR report, the OPR points to the lack of a framework to inform the overall response or means to collect results to be able accurately and regularly report on the collective effort.</p> <p>Survey data finds 68/89 (76%) of respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether information on budgets and financial resources are easily available to partners (financial transparency).</p>	1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 18, 20, 30, 62, 63
Element 2: The organisation has signed up to the International Aid Transparency Initiative	4		
Element 3: Information is available on analysis, budgeting, management in line with the guidance provided by the International Aid Transparency Initiative	1		
Element 4: Evidence that partner queries on analysis, budgeting, management and results are responded to in a timely fashion	No evidence		
Element 5: Evidence that information shared is accurate and of good quality.	2		
Overall Score:	1.75		
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

MI 6.7: Clear standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiaries implemented

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Explicit statement available on standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiary populations e.g. Accountability to Affected Populations	4	UNOCHA's commitments to AAP are reflected in its current Strategic Plan, with a detailed statement in the annex on cross-cutting issues, outlining the need to include affected populations in planning and decision-making, monitoring and reviews. UNOCHA also hosts the IASC Secretariat, which has issued a wide range of guidance tools on AAP.	9, 39, 45, 59, 87, 91
Element 2: Guidance for staff is available on the implementation of the procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	4	There is clear guidance for staff on how these commitments should be reflected in all aspects of programme design, implementation and monitoring, and training on AAP has been made available. Guidance for developing strategic response plans, for CBPFs and the application format for the CERF include explicit instructions on ensuring accountability to beneficiaries.	
Element 3: Training has been conducted on the implementation of procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	4	There is only limited evidence that approval mechanisms explicitly include the requirement for AAP. While guidance and the programming tools provide clear guidance on AAP, there is no evidence of their inclusion in approval mechanisms, and staff indicated that these commitments are not always followed through consistently.	
Element 4: Programming tools explicitly contain the requirement to implement procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	4	The guidance for OPRs and evaluations of responses both include explicit statements on the need to assess AAP. Survey data finds 73/111 (66%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether it integrates Accountability to Affected Populations concerns fully into its interventions.	
Element 5: Approval mechanisms explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries will be addressed within the intervention	2		
Element 6: Monitoring and evaluation procedures explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries have been addressed	4		

within the intervention			
Overall Score:	3.67		
Overall Rating:	Highly satisfactory		High confidence

MI 6.8: Participation with national and other partners in mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: Evidence of participation in joint performance reviews of interventions e.g. joint assessments	4	<p>UNOCHA plays a lead role in the Transformative Agenda and the UNOCHA-hosted Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT), has led a programme of Operational Peer Reviews (OPRs). The OPRs are carried out by teams that draw on all of the main humanitarian agencies, including UNOCHA and assess management in leadership, implementation of the humanitarian programme cycle, coordination and accountability to the affected population.</p> <p>UNOCHA also co-ordinates the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations on behalf of the humanitarian community. These have been significantly improved in recent years, with a more systematised approach and clear quality standards (see KPI 8 below). However, the 'mandatory' requirement for an IAHE of Level 3 emergencies has recently been removed from the Humanitarian Programme Cycle.</p> <p>Both the OPRs and the evaluations assess progress against commitments and contain clear statements of the organisations' contributions to progress. UNOCHA also conducts extensive partner satisfaction surveys, including of national governments, to assess perceptions of its support and services.</p>	
Element 2: Evidence of participation in multi-stakeholder dialogue around joint sectoral or normative commitments	4		
Element 3: Evidence of engagement in the production of joint progress statements in the implementation of commitments e.g. joint assessment reports	4		
Element 4: Documentation arising from mutual progress assessments contains clear statement of the organisation's contribution, agreed by all partners	4		
Element 5: Surveys or other methods applied to assess partner perception of progress	4		
Overall Score:	4		
Overall Rating:	Highly satisfactory		High confidence

MI 6.9: Deployment of knowledge base to support programming adjustments, policy dialogue and/or advocacy

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Statement in corporate documentation explicitly recognises the organisation’s role in knowledge production	4	Deployment of knowledge is a major substantive area of work for UNOCHA as part of its humanitarian co-ordination and advocacy role. The Strategic Plan includes clear statements on knowledge production in a number of two key areas: the development of common situational awareness; and, interoperability in humanitarian responses.	2, 63, 71, 72, 73
Element 2: Evidence of knowledge products produced and utilised by partners to inform action	4	There are many examples of how UNOCHA effectively takes this area of work forward both globally and in specific contexts. This includes the production of the Global Humanitarian Overview, which forms the basis for consolidated appeals to support people affected by disaster and conflict.	
Element 3: Knowledge products generated and applied to inform advocacy at country, regional or global level.	4	In terms of advocacy, one of the major areas of success noted by the Syria evaluation of UNOCHA’s performance is information management as part of advocacy. UNOCHA made a key contribution to securing Security Council resolutions on access through the production of ‘new and innovative products’ on humanitarian access, and besieged and hard-to-reach populations.	
Element 4: Evidence that knowledge products generated are timely/perceived as timely by partners	4		
Element 5: Evidence that knowledge products are perceived as high quality by partners	4	The editorial operation of ReliefWeb has been moved to bases in Nairobi and Bangkok (in addition to New York HQs), allowing 24/7 coverage. The Financial Tracking Service provides real-time global data to track finances against the HRPs. Survey data finds 68/84 (81%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether it its knowledge products (e.g. Humanitarian Needs Overviews and Response Plans) are produced in a sufficiently timely way to inform humanitarian responses in the country.	
Element 6: Evidence that knowledge products are produced in a format that supports their utility to partners.	3		
Overall Score:	3.83	There are several examples of where UNOCHA’s analytical work has led to change, including: Saving Lives Today and Tomorrow, which looked at preventative work and a more sustainable approach to humanitarian action; Leaving No one Behind, on the need to link emergency efforts with the SDGs; and, World Humanitarian Data in Trends, identified issues such as longer emergencies and the increasing costs of programmes.	
Overall Rating:	Highly satisfactory		High confidence

Performance Area: Performance Management

Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson-learning

KPI 7: Strong and transparent results focus, explicitly geared to function

Overall KPI Score

1.44

Overall KPI Rating

Unsatisfactory

MI 7.1: Leadership ensures application of an organisation-wide RBM approach

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Corporate commitment to a results culture is made clear in strategic planning documents	2	<p>Past evaluations of UNOCHA have highlighted weaknesses in the organisation’s approach to results based management, and leadership gaps in setting both an RBM agenda and a results culture within the organization. The 2014-2017 Strategic Framework however saw a comprehensive results-based management approach adopted, including a new suite of global and field-level indicator results frameworks, aligned to the two-year planning cycle adopted under the previous Strategic Plan. Clear guidance and tools are available for staff in the form of the Strategic Indicator compendia, which address country, regional and HQ levels. Annual reporting requirements require managers to present their results against corporate targets.</p> <p>Resources are committed to the RBM system through UNOCHA’s Strategic Planning, Evaluation and Guidance function, which takes the lead on both developing and implementing the results system, as well as managing UNOCHA’s evaluation function. SPEGS has conducted training across many UNOCHA staff on results based approaches.</p> <p>However, interviews found weak management and staff ownership of the commitment to RBM approaches, with results reporting proving challenging in both reporting cycles so far. Management do not appear to consistently ‘own’ results reporting, and have not taken a strong lead in ensuring that performance information is a) generated, b) reliable and c) reported.</p>	1, 2, 31, 33, 38
Element 2: Clear requirements/incentives in place for the use of an RBM approach in planning and programming	0		
Element 3: Guidance for setting results targets and develop indicators is clear and accessible to all staff	3		
Element 4: Tools and methods for measuring and managing results are available	2		
Element 5: Adequate resources are allocated to the RBM system	1		
Element 6: All relevant staff are trained in RBM approaches and method	3		
Overall Score:	1.83		
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

MI 7.2. Corporate strategies, including country strategies, based on a sound RBM focus and logic

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Organisation-wide plans and strategies include results frameworks	2	<p>The strategic results architecture of UNOCHA is strong; however, there are challenges in the extent to which it is corporately ‘owned’ and understood.</p> <p>Organisation-wide plans and strategies include clear results framework, with the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan accompanying the Strategic Plan and Results Framework. Clear linkages are set out between the strategic layers of the RBM system, with regional and country offices developing four-year Results Frameworks aligned with the higher-level corporate results architecture. A sample of workplans reviewed finds appropriate indicators selected from the Strategic Indicator Compendium for country, regional and HQ reporting.</p>	1, 2, 3, 11, 30, 31, 33, 38, 43
Element 2: Clear linkages exist between the different layers of the results framework, from project through to country and corporate level	2	<p>Technical weaknesses include targets and indicators which rely heavily on perception data to be gathered from survey. Causal pathways are mixed, with some gaps in the upwards logic. Indicator relevance is also mixed, with some clearly relevant and others lacking a clear link to the intended target. Overall, however, stakeholders agree that this architecture represents a major step forward for UNOCHA in the strategic planning period.</p> <p>However, interview and survey data finds weak corporate engagement with the RBM system, with some managers welcoming the opportunity to report on results, and others considering reporting on corporate results to be an unwelcome distraction from their ‘real business’. Significant challenges have also arisen in data quality and reliability, considered by some managers to be due to low field-level capacity and expertise in RBM.</p>	
Element 3: An annual report on performance is discussed with the governing bodies	2	<p>Annual results reports are produced and discussed with ODSG, albeit with significant delays in generation due to challenges in acquiring adequately reliable data from across UNOCHA. An attempt to generate a Performance Report in 2015 prove challenging, and the exercise was not continued into 2016. A projected mid-term review of the Strategic Framework did not take place.</p>	

Element 4: Corporate strategies are updated regularly	1	<p>Strategies at country level are regularly updated as humanitarian needs change and evolve.</p> <p>Strategic results for 2015, when compared against those for 2014, show progression on 57/65 indicators. However some indicators where progress has declined are strategically significant, e.g. 1.2.1 <i>Percentage of humanitarian coordinators satisfied with OCHA's support to their leadership</i>, which declined from 83% in 2014 to 65% in 2015; 6.0.1. <i>Percentage of Humanitarian Coordinators that are satisfied with OCHA's support to improve humanitarian access</i> (declined from 80% in 2014 to 50% in 2015); and 6.0.2 <i>Percentage of Humanitarian Coordinators that are satisfied with OCHA's support to protection coordination</i>, declined from 75% in 2014 to 69% in 2015. 7.0.1 <i>Percentage of priority countries where humanitarian partners are satisfied with UNOCHA's support to preparedness</i>, declined from 94% in 2014 to 86% in 2015. 9.0.1 <i>Number of international actors reporting and coordinating their emergency response through OCHA managed coordination platforms</i> – declined from 126 in 2014 to 73 in 2015. Whilst some variations in reporting are explained, others, including these strategically important ones, are not.</p>	
Element 5: The annual corporate reports show progress over time and notes areas of strong performance as well as deviations between planned and actual results	2		
Overall Score:	1.8	Survey data finds 80/111 (72%) respondents rating UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether prioritises a results-based approach – for example when planning and implementing humanitarian operations.	
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

MI 7.3: Results targets based on a sound evidence base and logic

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Targets and indicators are adequate to capture causal pathways between interventions and the outcomes that contribute to higher order objectives	2	The Strategic Framework presents a sound results logic, though many of its targets and indicators rely on perception data to be gathered from survey. Causal pathways are mixed, with some clear upwards logic, and some uncertain e.g. under Strategic Outcomes 4 and 5.	1, 5, 6, 9, 18, 31, 37, 38
Element 2: Indicators are relevant to the expected result to enable measurement of the degree of goal achievement	2	Indicator relevance is also mixed, with some clearly relevant and others lacking a clear link to the intended target e.g. Strategic Outcome 4, Subordinate Outcome 1, 'More decisive and strategic humanitarian country teams are promoted', whose sole indicator is (4.1.1) is <i>'Percentage of countries with an OCHA office where more than half of partners report using the humanitarian response plan as a guide to plan and prioritize their organizational activities'</i> . Similarly Strategic Outcome 5, subordinate outcome 3, 'Multilateral funding mechanisms promote stronger co-ordination' whose indicator is <i>'percentage of country based pooled funds disbursed to national implementing partners'</i> .	
Element 3: Development of baselines are mandatory for new Interventions	1		
Element 4: Results targets are regularly reviewed and adjusted when needed	0		
Overall Score:	1.25	Most (though not all) of the corporate Strategic and Management results have baselines available though these are not required for country-level interventions. Corporate results targets have not been reviewed since their development for the current Strategic Framework.	
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

MI 7.4: Monitoring systems generate high quality and useful performance data

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : The corporate monitoring system is adequately resourced	2	UNOCHA's corporate monitoring system is operated through the Strategic Planning, Evaluation and Guidance Section. The section has adequate resources centrally, though UNOCHA does not have dedicated monitoring staff at field level.	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 15, 19, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46
Element 2: Monitoring systems generate data at output and outcome level of the results chain	1	Monitoring systems take the form of corporate reporting on an annual basis, rather than regular performance reporting. Data produced therefore corresponds to corporate indicators, with the limitations in the results chain described above. However, quality and reliability of data is a recognised challenge.	
Element 3: Reporting structures are clear	1	Reporting structures are not fully clear, with responsibility for results reporting sitting in theory with Heads of Sections, but in practice often delegated. At field level, there is no clear role or function which holds responsibility for reporting on results, and management do not appear to take a consistently strong lead in requiring reporting.	
Element 4: Reporting processes ensure timely data for key corporate reporting, and planning	1	The timeliness of reporting processes has struggled with a lack of capacity across UNOCHA as well as a perception, reported by many staff in interview, of monitoring and results reporting falling well outside their 'core business. Data quality and reliability concerns, and reluctance from some field offices, has resulted in delays to the issuing of annual results reporting.	
Element 5: A system for ensuring data quality exists	1	SPEGS is tasked to ensure data quality and has prepared extensive guidance material. However, ensuring the quality and reliability of data from all of UNOCHA's field and regional offices, as well from HQ, is a major task, and stretches the resources of SPEGS considerably. Regional Offices do not play a quality assurance function.	
		Whilst the data produced does, on the evidence of the corporate results reporting, adequately reflect corporate results, it suffers from quality and reliability concerns.	

Element 6: Data adequately captures key corporate results	2	Survey data finds 66/111 (59%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether its monitoring systems produce reliable and useful performance data.	
Overall Score:	1.33		
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

MI 7.5: Performance data transparently applied in planning and decision-making

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : Planning documents are clearly based on performance data	1	The Strategic Plan does not raise the issue of the use of performance data for decision making and programme design, and there is no explicit guidance to staff to this effect. Adjustments to interventions are mainly made on the basis on changing humanitarian needs, rather than on the basis of performance reporting, in keeping with UNOCHA’s comparatively young performance management system. The annual results report provides an opportunity to review progress and implement course correction where necessary, but evidence from interviews indicates that these opportunities are not generally taken, other than examples available from OPT, Syria and Sahel, where analysis of qualitative monitoring data was used as the basis to revise planning. Whilst the commitment to a mid term review of the Strategic Plan is made in documentation, this has not taken place to date. Performance data, being generated in only limited form and comparatively late in relation to the reporting period, is not systematically applied in dialogue with partners, with OCHA’s generation of contextual data mainly serving this purpose. Survey data finds 52/84 (62%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether it uses monitoring information to inform planning and decision-making in the country.	1, 3, 11, 20, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 38, 42, 46
Element 2: Proposed adjustments to interventions are clearly informed by performance data	1		
Element 3: At corporate level, management regularly reviews corporate performance data and makes adjustments as appropriate	1		
Element 4: Performance data support dialogue in partnerships at global, regional and country level	1		
Overall Score:	1		
Overall Rating:	Highly Unsatisfactory		High confidence

KPI 8: Evidence based planning and programming applied

Overall KPI Score

1.53

Overall KPI Rating

Unsatisfactory

MI 8.1: A corporate independent evaluation function exists

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: The evaluation function is independent from other management functions such as planning and managing development assistance (<i>operational independence</i>)	0	UNOCHA's evaluation function is considered by the Joint Inspection Unit to classify as 'an embedded evaluation function of a department, office and programme in the UN Secretariat'. As such, it is not considered an independent function. It is sited as part of the Strategic Planning, Evaluation and Guidance Section, and as such is not independent of management. The Chief of the Evaluation Unit reports to the Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator and Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs through the Chief of the Strategic Planning, Evaluation and Guidance Section. The Chief of the of the Evaluation Unit does not have the authority to issue reports without clearance from the Under-Secretary-General. The Evaluation Office sets evaluation plans for UNOCHA, though these have not in recent year been implemented. Budget lines are set by management, meaning no budgetary independence, with evaluations funded from donor contributions rather than core resources. Staff currently describe the 'evaluation climate' for evaluation of UNOCHA's work as uncondusive, with 'little space' available for independent evaluation, in particular following a challenging and extended process of evaluation of the Syria regional crisis. Evaluations are however – as in the case of the Syria evaluation – submitted for consideration at the highest levels of UNOCHA, including the Under Secretary General where appropriate.	1, 2, 7, 13, 14, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 42, 43, 46, 86
Element 2: The Head of evaluation reports directly to the Governing Body of the organisation (<i>Structural independence</i>)	0		
Element 3: The evaluation office has full discretion in deciding the evaluation programme	1		
Element 4: A separate budget line (approved by the Governing Body) ensures <i>budgetary independence</i>	0		
Element 5: The central evaluation programme is fully funded by core funds	0		

Element 6: Evaluations are submitted directly for consideration at the appropriate level of decision-making pertaining to the subject of evaluation	4	Behavioural independence experienced challenges during the Syria evaluation, with a complex and extended process raising concerns about its independence and impartiality. These were eventually resolved, but raises significant questions about UNOCHA's openness to external scrutiny in relation to its activities (rather than its organisational arrangements, which have been assessed by the Functional Review).	
Element 7: Evaluators are able to conduct their work throughout the evaluation without undue interference by those involved in implementing the unit of analysis being evaluated. (<i>Behavioural independence</i>)	2		
Overall Score:	1	In terms of externally-mandated evaluations, UNOCHA also leads on Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations. UNOCHA chairs the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group and has issued Inter Agency Humanitarian Evaluation guidelines.	High confidence
Overall Rating:	Highly unsatisfactory		

MI 8.2: Consistent, independent evaluation of results (coverage)

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1 : An evaluation policy describes the principles to ensure coverage, quality and use of findings, including in decentralised evaluations	2	UNOCHA's Policy Instruction on evaluation issued in 2010, and a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan covers the period 2014-2017. An updated Evaluation Policy exists but this is on hold because of the Functional Review.	2, 9, 10, 19, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 37, 38, 39, 41, 43, 86
Element 2: The policy/an evaluation manual guides the implementation of the different categories of evaluations, such as strategic, thematic, corporate level evaluations, as well as decentralized evaluations	2	The 2014-2017 Monitoring and Evaluation Plan commits to a 'high-evaluative coverage' of the Strategic Plan 2014-17. The proposed types of evaluations are set out. In terms of internal evaluations, commitments are made to at least one field response evaluation by end of period, and at least one strategic/thematic evaluation per year until 2017, though these commitments have yet to be delivered on. The proportionality of the intended evaluative coverage to UNOCHA's Programme of Work, or to its key priorities, is not explicit.	
Element 3: A prioritized and funded evaluation plan covering the organisation's planning and budgeting cycle is available	1	Annual plans for evaluation were available to 2015, but these have not been implemented in full and the 'evaluative climate' within OCHA is currently considered to be very low, with evaluations of UNOCHA's work currently on hold.	
Element 4: The annual evaluation plan presents a systematic and periodic coverage of the organisations' Interventions, reflecting key priorities	0	Evaluations of the CERF and CBPFs take place in accordance with externally-mandated requirements, from the UN General Assembly in the case of the CERF, and in consultation with the IASC Working Group in the case of the CBPFs. However, a recent re-issuance of the IAHE guidance removed the mandatory requirement for evaluations of Level 3 activities, stating that this 'may' be triggered – effectively removing the mandatory requirement for evaluation. Evaluation Office was not consulted or included in this change.	
Element 5: Evidence from sample countries demonstrate that the policy is being implemented	0	Survey data finds 82/111 (74%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether it undertakes sufficient evaluations and reviews of its interventions in the country.	
Overall Score:	1	Survey data finds 59/111 (53%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether it performs an effective role in coordinating and leading inter-agency humanitarian evaluations.	
Overall Rating:	Highly unsatisfactory		High confidence

MI 8.3: Systems applied to ensure the quality of evaluations

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: Evaluations are based on design, planning and implementation processes that are inherently quality oriented	4	<p>UNOCHA has in place quality assurance processes for its internal evaluations, which aim to ensure that the design, planning and implementation of evaluations are oriented to quality standards. These are directed at 'OCHA managers and staff conducting or managing an evaluation, as well as by evaluation professionals contracted by OCHA to conduct evaluative work'. IAHE evaluations follow agreed set procedures for design, planning and management.</p> <p>The quality standards include guidance on methodology and a clear statement on expected standards. UNOCHA has few recent independent evaluations (see KPIs 9-12 below) but those reviewed show mostly credible methodological designs, with some shortcomings in terms of justification for methods identified; consistent use of evaluation criteria; and explicit rationales for sampling. Methodological limitations and concerns are presented only variably, with few evaluations explaining the effects of methodological limitations on the resulting analysis and findings. IAHE evaluations offer greater systematisation here, with clear methodological statements, including limitations and concerns, resulting in more complete and balanced evaluation reports.</p> <p>The Quality Assurance guidelines are applied by UNOCHA's evaluation managers for its internal evaluations. They enable quality assessment of Terms of Reference, Inception Reports, Evaluation Reports, as well as the integration of gender and gender mainstreaming into evaluations. However, with evaluations of UNOCHA's own work effectively now suspended, they are not currently in use. For IAHE processes, quality standards are applied through defined procedures and guidance, which are co-ordinated by UNOCHA.</p>	11, 98
Element 2: Evaluations use appropriate methodologies for data-collection, analysis and interpretation	3		
Element 3: Evaluation reports present in a complete and balanced way the evidence, findings, conclusions, and where relevant, recommendations	3		
Element 4: The methodology presented includes the methodological limitations and concerns	2		
Element 5: A process exists to ensure the quality of all evaluations, including decentralized evaluations	2		
Overall Score:	2.8		
Overall Rating:	Satisfactory		

MI 8.4: Mandatory demonstration of the evidence base to design new interventions

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: A formal requirement exists to demonstrate how lessons from past interventions have been taken into account in the design of new interventions	0	<p>Although evaluative evidence in relation to UNOCHA’s interventions is slim, a comparatively extensive evidence base exists from Operational Peer Reviews conducted through the STAIT team. However, in keeping with UNOCHA’s comparatively young results management system, no formal requirements exist to demonstrate how lessons learned from past interventions have been taken into account for new initiatives, and no formal feedback loops or incentives exist to feed lessons learned into design beyond informal knowledge transfer.</p> <p>The only evidence of lesson-learning from past interventions to inform new initiatives is through informal knowledge exchange.</p> <p>The number of designs which build on lessons from evaluations is made public through corporate reporting against the indicator above.</p>	12, 35, 36, 97
Element 2: Clear feedback loops exist to feed lessons into new interventions design	0		
Element 3: There is evidence that lessons from past interventions have informed new interventions.	1		
Element 4: Incentives exist to apply lessons learnt to new interventions	0		
Element 5: The number/share of new operations designs that draw on lessons from evaluative approaches is made public	4		
Overall Score:	1		
Overall Rating:	Highly unsatisfactory		Medium confidence

MI 8.5: Poorly performing interventions proactively identified, tracked and addressed

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: A system exists to identify poorly performing interventions	0	<p>For UNOCHA’s own initiatives implemented, perhaps due to the relatively recent introduction of the RBM system, no formal systems exist to identify areas of poor performance. Within the pooled funds, CBPF guidance contains a section on <i>performance reporting requirements</i>, though sanctions listed mainly relate to financial rather than operational delivery risks.</p> <p>Corporate reporting mechanisms, as reported under KPI6, are limited, and formal systems for real-time monitoring of interventions do not exist, other than through oversight by management. Systems for managing poor performance are informalised rather than formal, with management reviewing activities on a regular basis. Responsibilities are accordingly not clearly defined.</p> <p>Survey data finds 49/111 (44%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether it consistently identifies which interventions are under-performing.</p> <p>Survey data also finds 44/111 (40%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as ‘excellent, very good or fairly good’ on whether it identifies and addresses any areas of under-performance, for example through technical support or changing staffing if necessary.</p>	9, 26, 28, 38, 45
Element 2: Regular reporting tracks the status and evolution of poorly performing interventions	0		
Element 3: A process for addressing the poor performance exists, with evidence of its use	0		
Element 4: The process clearly delineates the responsibility to take action	0		
Overall Score:	0		
Overall Rating:	Highly unsatisfactory	Medium confidence	

MI 8.6: Clear accountability system ensures responses and follow-up to and use of evaluation recommendations

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: Evaluation reports include a management response (or has one attached or associated with it)	4	<p>Guidelines for evaluation reports include a requirement to provide a management response, and outline the protocol for responding to evaluation recommendations. Of seven evaluations reviewed, all have a management response developed, although not necessarily publicly available. Of these Management Response Plans, all contain a clear action plan with responsible units identified, and a timeline for key recommendations.</p> <p>The implementation-tracking process is supported by a database of all recommendations. Under its Management Results Framework, UNOCHA is committed to increasing its implementation rate to 80 per cent by the end of 2015. This was achieved in 2015. A specific strategic result also references the Percentage of Humanitarian Country Teams that implemented the recommendations of operational peer reviews and inter-agency humanitarian evaluations. Only 20% was achieved here in 2015, which references the Philippines, compared to a target of 75% in the same year. No separate annual report is issued on the status of use and implementation of evaluation recommendations, with this being subsumed into corporate reporting.</p> <p>Although not management responses to evaluations, Operational Peer Reviews, managed by UNOCHA include Action Plans with desired outcomes, responsibilities and status updates which serve effectively as management responses. Narrative reports on achievement since the OPR are also available e.g. in the case of Yemen and the Central African Republic.</p>	4, 5, 7, 13, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 38, 45, 92, 96
Element 2: Management responses include an action plan and /or agreement clearly stating responsibilities and accountabilities	4		
Element 3: A timeline for implementation of key recommendations is proposed	4		
Element 4: A system exists to regularly track status of implementation	4		
Element 5: An annual report on the status of use and implementation of evaluation recommendations is made public	1		
Overall Score:	3.4		
Overall Rating:	Highly satisfactory		High confidence

MI 8.7: Uptake of lessons learned and best practices from evaluations

Element	Score	Narrative	Source Documents
Element 1: A complete and current repository of evaluations and their recommendations is available for use	2	<p>A repository of UNOCHA's internal evaluations and IAHEs is available online, which includes their recommendations. No formal system exists for distilling and disseminating lessons learned, however. Dissemination mechanisms mainly take the form of evaluation publication, as well as workshops and launches where appropriate.</p> <p>No formal system exists to track the uptake of lessons learned, though lessons learned from OPRs are deployed as management tools to improve humanitarian co-ordination and leadership at country level. A Learning and Knowledge Management Board has recently been established to ensure greater coherence in learning, including a Learning Platform.</p> <p>No corporate policy exists on the disclosure of information.</p> <p>Survey data also finds 60/111 (54%) of total respondents rating UNOCHA as 'excellent, very good or fairly good' on whether it learns lessons from previous experience, rather than repeating the same mistakes.</p>	2, 3, 13, 14, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35, 38, 39, 42, 44, 45, 92
Element 2: A mechanism for distilling and disseminating lessons learned internally exists	0		
Element 3: A dissemination mechanism to partners, peers and other stakeholders is available and employed	3		
Element 4: A system is available and used to track the uptake of lessons learned	2		
Element 6: Evidence is available that lessons learned and good practices are being applied	2		
Element 7: A corporate policy for Disclosure of information exists and is also applied to evaluations	0		
Overall Score:	1.5		
Overall Rating:	Unsatisfactory		High confidence

Performance Area: Results

Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way

KPI 9: Achievement of development and humanitarian objectives and results e.g. at the institutional/corporate wide level, at the regional/country level, and contribution to normative and cross-cutting goals

Overall KPI Score	n/a	Overall KPI Rating	Satisfactory
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MI 9.1: Interventions assessed as having achieved their stated development and/or humanitarian objectives and results e.g. at the institutional/corporate wide level, at the regional/country level, and contribution to normative and cross-cutting goals.

Rating	Narrative	Source Documents
<p>Highly satisfactory</p> <p><i>All or almost all intended significant development, normative and/or humanitarian objectives at the output and outcome level</i></p>	<p>Seven evaluations and two internal reports report on <i>achievement against objectives</i>. Of these:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 internal report found that the intervention fully achieved its objectives • 5 evaluations and one internal report found that more than half of intended objectives achieved • 2 evaluations found that half or less than half of intended objectives were achieved. <p>Key achievements included :Contributions to UN Security Council Resolutions on access in the Syria case; improved prioritization, strategic planning and strengthening coordination at the country level (Syria, CHFs); humanitarian advocacy and resource mobilisation (Syria and the CERF); the provision of funding for particular underfunded crises and clusters (CERF); increasing UN agencies' ability to respond in the field (Syria and CERF); and improved co-ordination of military and civil defence assets, usage of armed escorts and deconfliction (civil-military co-ordination).</p> <p>The ERF evaluation found that, whilst ERFs made positive contributions to the effectiveness of humanitarian programming and leadership at the country level, they were not able to achieve their objective of being a catalytic instrument to mobilize resources, in part due to their relatively small size and project-by-project basis. The Preparedness evaluation found that UNOCHA had made only slow and preliminary progress to date in achieving the three preparedness objectives stated in the 2010–2013 Strategic Framework.</p>	<p>21, 22, 35, 39, 40 42, 44, 47, 54, 63</p>
		High confidence

MI 9.2: Interventions assessed as having realised the expected positive benefits for target group members

Rating	Narrative	Source Documents
<p>Highly satisfactory</p> <p><i>Interventions have resulted in widespread and significant positive changes experienced by target group members as measured using either quantitative or qualitative methods. (These benefits may include the avoidance or reduction of negative effects of a sudden onset or protracted emergency)</i></p>	<p>UNOCHA's co-ordination mandate and its role as a service provider to the humanitarian community, rather than as an agency specialising in direct delivery to affected populations, affects the nature of the results information available. Its most immediate 'beneficiaries', in accordance with its co-ordination mandate and role as a service provider, are the humanitarian community, host governments, donors, Member States and other partners. Little robust data is available from evaluations here. Management reporting on results for 2015 have been applied as mitigation, and interview and survey data will also be applied.</p> <p>Key results are identified as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The contributions by UNOCHA, including the concept of 'arbitrary denial', to the passing of UN Security Council resolutions on cross-border access during the Syria crisis, expanded access to groups in need significantly • Advocacy by the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (also the Head of UNOCHA) during the Syria crisis on behalf of people trapped by the fighting helped mobilise the international response to reach people in need • CERF has facilitated the ability of UN agencies to respond to new crises by providing reliable funding even for low-profile crises • The ERF mechanism has filled critical gaps across a broad range of activities including: Rapid on-set flooding, Responding to conflict situations that involve nutrition and access to water, Responding to unforeseen IDP situations, Small scale emergencies, Providing emergency clinics in conflict areas, Accessing restricted areas • CHF recorded contributions to the collective humanitarian response included: being entirely needs oriented; allowing for programming coverage in insecure areas inaccessible to UN or INGO personnel; contributing to increased participation, coordination and information sharing; strengthening the effectiveness of humanitarian response through greater targeting and improved project proposals and ensuring better implementation and reporting <p>In broad terms, the inter-agency evaluation included (Typhoon Haiyan response) finds that the response (to which UNOCHA contributed) met its targets in realising positive benefits for target groups in terms of improving household food consumption, contributing to increased consumption levels/reducing acute malnutrition, though gains in protection and water and sanitation are unclear.</p>	<p>21, 22, 39, 40, 42, 44, 47, 63</p> <p>High confidence</p>

MI 9.3: Interventions assessed as having contributed to significant changes in national development policies and programs (policy and capacity impacts), or needed system reforms

Rating	Narrative	Source Documents
<p>Satisfactory</p> <p><i>Interventions have made a substantial contribution to either re-orienting or sustaining effective national policies and programmes in a given sector or area of development disaster preparedness, emergency response or rehabilitation</i></p>	<p>Evaluations find mixed evidence here, with the evaluation of Preparedness finding UNOCHA had improved the baseline preparedness status of the countries it had worked in; and the Syria evaluation finding successful efforts to bring together key Member States to build consensus around key humanitarian advocacy issues. On the other hand the evaluation of the response to Typhoon Haiyan found insufficient adaptation of the international response to play a complementary role in a middle income country with strong disaster management capacity; and the evaluation of the ERFs found that these did not play a major role in the development of national response strategies.</p> <p>Other examples of successful influencing are reflected in a summary mapping of MOUs (March 2016), which lists achievements to date including ownership of the humanitarian agenda within some relevant government departments and entry points established in others, and the development of joint plans of action. Examples include increased ownership of the humanitarian agenda of the Department of Political Affairs within the Africa Union Commission; Joint Plans of Action between OCHA and the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation and the Southern African Development Community; and supporting Turkey as a global humanitarian leader.</p>	<p>44, 47, 54, 66, 70</p> <p>High Confidence</p>

MI 9.4: Interventions assessed as having helped improve gender equality and the empowerment of women

Rating	Narrative	Source Documents
<p>Satisfactory</p> <p><i>Interventions achieve a majority (more than 50%) of their stated objectives</i></p>	<p>Whilst management information finds that internal organisational targets for gender were met in 2014, evaluative evidence – which mostly pre- assessed dates the UNSWAP assessment – finds only limited consideration of gender overall. The evaluation of UNOCHA’s role in preparedness found that some actions had been taken to mainstream gender into preparedness activities, but this focused mostly on natural disasters and hazards, rather than political crisis or conflict and the evaluation of CHF’s found gender well-mainstreamed into CHF management. However, evaluations of the CERF and ERF raised concerns about the extent to which gender was integrated into these mechanisms.</p> <p>Management information provides more updated information, with results including: the integration of gender-equality perspectives into the Humanitarian Programme Cycle; the operation of the Gender Standby Capacity (GenCap) inter-agency mechanism, with UNOCHA hosting the bulk of GenCap advisers in the field in 2014 and 2015; the inclusion of gender equality indicators in Humanitarian Response Plans; and a pilot project on senior female humanitarian leadership. A management update indicates that deepening Humanitarian Co-ordinators’ focus on gender was a key deliverable for 2015, with 89% of Humanitarian Coordinator/Emergency Response Co-ordinator compacts including a gender component, up from 70% in 2014. UNOCHA also co-leads the humanitarian work stream in the Secretary General’s campaign on Every Women Every Child with other partners (UNFPA, WHO and UNICEF).</p>	<p>39, 40, 44, 54, 81, 82</p> <p>Medium confidence</p>

MI 9.5: Interventions assessed as having helped improve environmental sustainability/helped tackle the effects of climate change

Rating	Narrative	Source Documents
<p>Highly unsatisfactory</p> <p><i>Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote environmental sustainability and help tackle climate change. In addition changes resulting from interventions are not environmentally sustainable/do not contribute to tackling climate change.</i></p>	<p>Only one evaluation reports on <i>environmental sustainability / climate change</i>. This finds that the issue is not systematically mainstreamed into CHF activity.</p>	<p>39</p> <p>Little to no confidence</p>

MI 9.6: Interventions assessed as having helped improve good governance

Rating	Narrative	Source Documents
	No evidence was available against this indicator	

KPI 10: Relevance of interventions to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and extent to which the multilateral organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate

Overall KPI Score	n/a	Overall KPI Rating	Satisfactory
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MI 10.1: Interventions assessed as having responded to the needs/priorities of target groups

Rating	Narrative	Source Documents
<p>Satisfactory</p> <p><i>Interventions are designed to take into account the needs of the target group as identified through a situation or problem analysis (including needs assessment for relief operations) and the resulting activities are designed to meet the needs of the target group</i></p>	<p>Findings against this indicator are broadly positive: the Syria, Preparedness and ERF evaluations find positively on relevance. In Syria, UNOCHA, through its work on enhancing access and supporting UN Security Council resolutions, providing major gains to those most in need. The ERF evaluation finds that the ERF is relevant to its NGO and UN partners, and government stakeholders alike, filling a gap that can enable NGOs to respond rapidly to needs. The evaluation of UNOCHA's role in preparedness finds positively in terms of relevance to national priorities and adopting a government-centred approach. Management information also reports that the target for strategic response plans developed involving consultations with affected communities (in 9 countries), a factor that supports relevance, was exceeded in 2014 and 2015.</p> <p>Two evaluations raise questions about relevance: The CERF's facilitating expansion of coverage/adaptation to context through funding different areas is praised, but its repeated application to response activities in the same set of countries, and its lack of qualitative changes in coverage, raise questions about its relevance. The Inter-agency evaluation for Typhoon Haiyan found a need for greater adaptation from response to early recovery, although coverage was adequate to meet the needs of affected communities.</p>	<p>High confidence</p>

MI 10.2: Interventions assessed as having helped contribute to the realisation of national development goals and objectives

Rating	Narrative	Source Documents
<p>Unsatisfactory</p> <p><i>Interventions have contributed only partially to the achievement of specific national development goals or to meeting humanitarian relief objectives agreed to with the humanitarian community</i></p>	<p>Evidence is limited against this indicator, with only two evaluations commenting. Findings are varied: the limited scale of the ERFs has prevented any significant contribution to national response strategies, whilst in the Philippines, the inter-agency response to Typhoon Haiyan, of which UNOCHA formed part, contributed to the immediate priorities of the national response, though there were differences of interpretation in terms of recovery, resilience and development objectives.</p>	<p>35, 44, 47</p> <p>Little to no confidence</p>

MI 10.3: Results assessed as having been delivered as part of a coherent response to an identified problem

Rating	Narrative	Source Documents
<p>Highly satisfactory</p> <p><i>The organisation consistently achieved a high level of partnership in implementing its interventions</i></p>	<p>Given UNOCHA’s central mandate for co-ordination, unsurprisingly all seven evaluations report on coherence. Findings are largely positive, with evaluations of the pooled funds and CERF evaluations all finding that each mechanism functions well as part of an overall suite of response mechanisms at the country level, and supporting coherence.</p> <p>Concerns raised relate to parallel structures in the case of Typhoon Haiyan; and to unclear roles in the Preparedness evaluation. The Syria evaluation finds that UNOCHA has struggled to fulfil its traditional coordination function in the Syrian humanitarian crisis, due partly to the attitude of the Syrian Government, which did not accept UNOCHA as a coordinating entity of humanitarian aid, but also to a focus on access and other global priorities, sometimes at the extent of providing the normal operational co-ordination products to partners.</p> <p>OPRs also report a range of coherence-related concerns. They identify disjointed leadership (Yemen) though leadership was praised in the Syria and Philippines OPRs; and a lack of a consistent “whole-of-system” access strategy (Yemen) with the scope for UNOCHA to take on a more proactive role (Syria). They also find confused application of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle which detracted from the response (CAR); a need a clear distinction between the political and humanitarian roles of the UN (Yemen); a need for closer linkage of the strategic and operational levels of the humanitarian response (Yemen); and a requirement for better strategic direction Mechanism (Yemen, CAR, and the Philippines). UNOCHA is explicitly recommended to clarify its structure, roles and responsibilities to support a cohesive collective response in CAR. Management responses commit to addressing all these issues.</p>	<p>35, 39, 40, 47, 54, 63, 87</p> <p>High confidence</p>

KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently

Overall KPI Score	n/a	Overall KPI Rating	Unsatisfactory
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MI 11.1: Interventions assessed as resource/cost efficient

Rating	Narrative	Source Documents
<p>Unsatisfactory</p> <p><i>Interventions do not have credible, reliable information on the costs of activities and inputs and therefore no data is available on cost/resource efficiency</i></p>	<p>There is only limited evidence in the evaluations available, with a focus mainly on efficient management, rather than the efficient use of resources.</p> <p>In the six evaluations identified there is mixed evidence of <i>resource and cost-efficiency</i>. The evaluation of UNOCHA's role in civil-military co-ordination found that UNOCHA has established more streamlined processes for military and civil defence assets, which has led to more efficient use of these in emergency settings. Whilst the CERF evaluation comments that 'the CERF transaction costs are lower, or at worst no higher, than other funding sources, the ERF evaluation points out that the structure and staffing of ERF is not flexible enough to ensure a cost-effective management and performance of the Fund and raises questions about the transaction costs involved in pooled funds, including CHF, at country level. The evaluation of the ERFs finds that the limited resources available lowers efficiency. Mixed efficiency is found in the Preparedness evaluation, varying across regions but with greater cost-efficiency since the introduction of the more systematic Minimum Preparedness Package.</p> <p>The Syria evaluation has found that tensions between UNHCR and UNOCHA in terms of the co-ordination remit affected efficiency. 'Despite a relatively amicable relationship at the start of the crisis, the perceived expansion of OCHA's role and the IASC in refugee-hosting countries led to disharmony. This has not helped in the efficient management of the response'.</p> <p>Finally, management information indicates that the CERF has made efforts to improve efficiency: a reduction of the UN Secretariat Programme Support Cost (PSC) by one-third from 3 to 2 per cent for CERF has been approved and will take effect on 1 June 2016. This will free up approximately \$4 million of CERF funds annually on current funding levels.</p>	<p>35, 39, 40, 47, 54, 63, 87</p>
		Medium confidence

MI 11.2: Implementation and results assessed as having been achieved on time (given the context, in the case of humanitarian programming)

Rating		Source Documents
<p>Unsatisfactory</p> <p><i>Less than half of intended objectives are achieved on time but interventions have been adjusted to take account of difficulties encountered and can be expected to improve the pace of achievement in the future. In the case of humanitarian programming, there was a legitimate explanation for delays</i></p>	<p>Whilst assessments of the CERF come to positive conclusions about timeliness, other assessments find a mixed picture of how quickly UNOCHA has been able to respond.</p> <p>In the four evaluations where there was evidence on timeliness, there was mixed evidence.</p> <p>The CERF is assessed positively in terms of <i>timeliness</i>, as is the delivery of assistance within the response to Typhoon Haiyan. However, whilst timeliness of the ERF process is assessed as superior to virtually all other humanitarian financing mechanisms, the several-week period from the identification of the problem to project approval, compromises its ability to be a rapid follow-on mechanism. The CHF evaluation raises concerns in relation to timeliness, in relation to a time- and process-heavy approach.</p> <p>In Syria, ‘the picture appears mixed with regard to timeliness.’ Offices in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey only became fully fledged in 2014—some 2.5 years into the crisis.... The fluidity in staff appointments and movements was within OCHA’s control...OCHA recognized the need to scale up in the Syria crisis early and planned for this appropriately. Somehow this was not evenly translated into practice until quite late on, with the majority of offices only being properly configured in 2014.’</p> <p>These findings are echoed by the OPR from CAR, which finds the CERF application process to be lengthy, taking an average of 9 days from the receipt of the proposal package for the projects to be approved for the first allocation and 10 days for the second allocation. It took another 18 days and 9 days for funds to be disbursed to agencies for the first and second allocations respectively. The CHF in CAR encountered similarly, with NGOs reporting the process to be long and cumbersome.</p>	<p>39, 40, 44, 63</p> <p>Medium confidence</p>

KPI 12: Sustainability of results			
Overall KPI Score	n/a	Overall KPI Rating	Unsatisfactory

MI 12.1: Benefits assessed as continuing or likely to continue after project or program completion or there are effective measures to link the humanitarian relief operations, to recover, resilience eventually, to longer-term developmental results

Rating	Narrative	Source Documents
<p>Highly unsatisfactory</p> <p><i>Evaluations assess as likely that the intervention will result in continued benefits for the target group after completion. For humanitarian relief operations, the strategic and operational measures to link relief to rehabilitation, reconstruction and, eventually, development are credible. Further, they are likely to succeed in securing continuing benefits for target group</i></p>	<p>There is limited evidence within the evaluations of links to <i>recovery, resilience or development</i>; and what is available finds variable performance where this is appropriate. This finding is consistent with that for MI 5.6 about the linkages between humanitarian interventions and resilience/ recovery.</p> <p>Positively, the evaluation of the CHF's found an increased tendency to integrate components of resilience programming in humanitarian response rather than fund stand-alone resilience projects. The Preparedness evaluation also found that, since the preparedness concept is closely linked to resilience, where gains had taken hold at national level, e.g. in Indonesia, benefits were likely to continue to support resilience-building.</p> <p>However, the evaluation of the response to Typhoon Haiyan found that different views between agencies and with the government on the boundaries and linkages between emergency relief, early recovery and recovery, all contributed to a difficult process of transition from relief to recovery programming. The ERF evaluation also found that at present the mechanism is only making minimal contributions to resilience and disaster preparedness, due to the demand for more traditional emergency responses and the relatively small size of ERFs in general.</p>	<p>47, 44, 39, 54</p>
		<p>Medium confidence</p>

MI 12.2: Interventions/activities assessed as having built sufficient institutional and/or community capacity for sustainability, or have been absorbed by government

Rating		Source Documents
<p>Satisfactory</p> <p><i>Interventions may have contributed to strengthening institutional and/or community capacity but with limited success</i></p>	<p>Little evidence is available here, since three evaluations assess pooled fund instruments themselves, rather than the results of the funded initiatives. The ERF evaluation points out that the current ERF model does not permit capacity building for NGO applicants (though it has made a limited but noticeable contribution to strengthening coordination and leadership of the humanitarian system at country level).</p> <p>In the response to Typhoon Haiyan, with highly capacitated national systems, the evaluation is clear that the more salient issue is the need to understand and take account of the international community's complementary role in a middle income country with an established albeit stretched government disaster management system. The preparedness evaluation finds that where UNOCHA has a close and longstanding working relationships with governments (e.g., Indonesia and the Philippines), improvements have been absorbed into government systems.</p>	44, 47, 54
		Little to no confidence

MI 12.3: Interventions/activities assessed as having strengthened the enabling environment for development

Rating		Source Documents
<p>Satisfactory</p> <p><i>Interventions have made a notable contribution to changes in the enabling environment for development.</i></p>	<p>Again, although the evidence is limited, there are examples where UNOCHA work has contributed to strengthening the enabling environment for development. This examples are also consistent with the evidence for MIs 3.2 and 5.2 of the effectiveness of UNOCHA's work globally.</p> <p>The few findings available are positive: the CERF evaluation finds that the CERF has increased UN agencies ability to respond in the field, and to respond to new crises. The CHF evaluation found some of its key contributions to be enhanced coordination through CHF partnerships and the establishment of networks. The evaluation of UNOCHA' role in Civil-Military co-ordination finds that UNOCHA has helped to create stronger civil-military coordination guidelines and policies, and enhanced dialogue, advocacy and training; and the Preparedness evaluation that UNOCHA's work has started, in some countries, to have facilitated faster and better-coordinated responses.</p>	35, 39, 42, 54
		Little to no confidence

Annex 2: List of documents analysed for UNOCHA

2. a) Bibliography

Full name of document
UNOCHA (2014), <i>2014 UNOCHA Year in Review</i>
CERF (2016), <i>Application template and guidance for CERF applications</i>
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IASC (2016), <i>IASC Transformative Agenda: A Review of Review and Their Follow Up</i>
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UNOCHA (2015), <i>Effective Co-ordination: Putting people at the centre of humanitarian responses</i>
UNOCHA (2015), <i>Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund, Global Synthesis Report</i>
UNOCHA (2015), <i>Evaluation of the Plan of Action between Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) and UNOCHA 2013-2015</i>
UNOCHA (2013), <i>Emergency Response Fund Annual Report: Product Guidance and Reporting Template Outline</i>
UNOCHA (2013), <i>Emergency Response Fund Project Monitoring Report Template</i>
UNOCHA (2016), <i>Evaluation of OCHA response to the Syria crisis</i>
UNOCHA (2013), <i>Evaluation of UNOCHA's role in preparedness</i>
UNOCHA (2011), <i>Evaluation Synthesis Report, 2011</i>
UNOCHA, (2014) <i>Financial Plan 2014 & 2015</i>

Full name of document
UNOCHA (2011), <i>Five Year evaluation of the CERF Synthesis report</i>
UNOCHA (2012), <i>Gender Equality Policy 2012-2015</i>
UNOCHA (2012), <i>Gender Toolkit</i>
UNOCHA (2016), <i>Gender Policy Instruction 2016-2020</i>
UNOCHA (2016), <i>Global Humanitarian Overview 2016</i>
UNOCHA (2015), <i>Global Humanitarian Overview 2015</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>Guidelines for Country Based Pooled Funds</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>Haiti Emergency Relief Response Fund, 2014 Annual Report</i>
UNOCHA (2016), <i>Humanitarian Requirements Document Ethiopia</i>
UNOCHA (2015), <i>Humanitarian Needs Overview and Response Plan Afghanistan</i>
UNOCHA (2015), <i>Humanitarian Needs Overview and Response Plan Iraq</i>
UNOCHA (2015), <i>Humanitarian Needs Overview and Response Plan Nigeria</i>
UNOCHA (2015), <i>Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia</i>
UNOCHA (2016), <i>Humanitarian Needs Overview and Response Plan South Sudan</i>
UNOCHA (2012), <i>Internal Control Framework</i>
UNOCHA (2012), <i>Internally-Mandated Evaluation of UNOCHA's Role in Civil-Military Coordination and Management Response Plan</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluations Steering Committee, Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis</i>
UNOCHA (2016), <i>Interoffice Memorandum: Decision on approval of list of corporate priority partners (Member States and Regional Organisations) for 2016-2017</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>Management Plan 2014-2017</i>
UNOCHA (2012), <i>Management Response and Follow up to Evaluations</i>
UNOCHA (2014) <i>Management Response Plan to Evaluation of UNOCHA's Role and Activities in Preparedness</i>
UNOCHA (2013), <i>Management Response Plan to the Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds</i>

Full name of document
UNOCHA (2016) <i>Management results – 2015</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 2014-2017</i>
UNOCHA (2016), <i>Multi-year agreements 2016 – core and earmarked funding</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>OCHA Evaluation Quality Assurance Guidelines</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>Operational Peer Reviews, Action Plan Updates/Narrative Reports – Sudan, Yemen, Central African Republic, Iraq, Niger, South Sudan</i>
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UNOCHA (2015), <i>Organisation Chart (plus PowerPoint presentation)</i>
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UNOCHA (2012), <i>Policy Instruction: Evaluations</i>
UNOCHA (2016), <i>posters on action/donor support: Yemen, the Sahel</i>
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UNOCHA (2013), <i>Plan of Action between League of Arab States and UNOCHA 2013-2015</i>
UNOCHA (2013), <i>Plan of Action between Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) and UNOCHA 2013-2015</i>
UNOCHA (2015), <i>Progress Report, Gender Action Plan (June 2014-May 2015)</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific Work Plan 2014</i>
UNOCHA (2012), <i>Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa 2014-2015 (website) http://www.unocha.org/romena/</i>
UNOCHA (2012), <i>Review of Organisation of Islamic Co-operation-OCHA Plan of Action for 2012-14.</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>Saudi Humanitarian Fund for Iraq: First Progress Report</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>Strategic Framework 2014 – 2017, Country Office Results + Country Office Indicator Compendium</i>
UNOCHA (2016), <i>Strategic Results – 2015</i>
UNOCHA (2014) <i>Strategic Framework 2014-2017, Management Results 2014-2015 + Management Indicator Compendium</i>
UNOCHA (2016), <i>Summary mapping of MOUs</i>

Full name of document
UNOCHA (2014), <i>Surge Capacity</i> , Overview of 2014
UNOCHA (2016), <i>The Clusters</i> (Image)
UNOCHA (2013), <i>The Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) Final Report</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNDAC Selection Criteria</i> , Mission Table and Concept note
UNOCHA, (2014) <i>UNOCHA in 2014 & 2015</i> , Plan and Budget
UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNOCHA Strategic Framework 2014-2017</i> , Overview of Indicators
UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNOCHA Strategic Framework 2014-2017</i> , Regional Office Results 2014-2015 + Regional Office Indicator Compendium
UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNOCHA Strategic Framework 2014-2017</i> , Strategic Results 2014-2015 + Strategic Indicator Compendium
UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNOCHA Strategic Plan 2014 – 2017</i>
UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNSWAP</i>
UN-SWAP (2015), <i>UN-SWAP report 2015</i>
UNOCHA (2013), <i>World Humanitarian Data and Trends 2013</i>

2. b) List of documents numbered as source material for Document Review

Document number:	Full name of document:
1	UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNOCHA Strategic Plan 2014 – 2017</i>
2	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Annual Report 2014</i>
3	IASC (2015), <i>Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at Country Level</i>
4	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Strategic Framework 2014 – 2017</i> , Country Office Results + Country Office Indicator Compendium
5	UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNOCHA Strategic Framework 2014-2017</i> , Regional Office Results 2014-2015 + Regional Office Indicator Compendium
6	UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNOCHA Strategic Framework 2014-2017</i> , Overview of Indicators
7	UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNOCHA Strategic Framework 2014-2017</i> , Strategic Results 2014-2015 + Strategic Indicator Compendium
8	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Surge Capacity</i> , Overview of 2014
9	CERF (2015), <i>CERF Performance Framework Country Indicators 2015</i>
10	UNOCHA (2014), <i>2014 UNOCHA Year in Review</i>
11	UNOCHA, (2014) <i>UNOCHA in 2014 & 2015</i> , Plan and Budget
12	UNOCHA, (2014) <i>Financial Plan 2014 & 2015</i>
13	UNOCHA (2012), <i>Policy Instruction: Evaluations</i>
14	UNOCHA (2012), <i>Gender Equality Policy 2012-2015</i>
15	UNOCHA (2012), <i>Gender Toolkit</i>
16	UNOCHA (2014), <i>On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) Guidelines</i>
17	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations</i>
18	FAO (2014), <i>Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific Strategy 2014-15</i>
19	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific Work Plan 2014</i>
20	UNOCHA (2012), Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa 2014-2015 (website) http://www.unocha.org/romena/
21	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Haiti Emergency Relief Response Fund</i> , 2014 Annual Report


Document number:	Full name of document:
22	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Afghanistan Common Humanitarian Fund</i> , Annual Report 2014
23	UNOCHA (2015), Organisation Chart (plus PowerPoint presentation)
24	UNOCHA (2016), The Clusters (Image)
25	UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNDAC Selection Criteria</i> , Mission Table and Concept note
26	UNOCHA (2013). <i>Emergency Response Fund Project Monitoring Report Template</i>
27	UNOCHA (2013), <i>Emergency Response Fund Annual Report: Product Guidance and Reporting Template Outline</i>
28	CERF (2015), <i>CERF Risk Action Plan - Semi-Annual Update April 2015</i>
29	UNOCHA (2013), <i>Management Response Plan to the Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds</i>
30	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Management Plan 2014-2017</i>
31	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 2014-2017</i>
32	UNOCHA (2014) <i>Strategic Framework 2014-2017</i> , Management Results 2014-2015 + Management Indicator Compendium
33	UNOCHA (2012), <i>Management Response and Follow up to Evaluations</i>
34	UNOCHA (2014) <i>Management Response Plan to Evaluation of UNOCHA's Role and Activities in Preparedness</i>
35	UNOCHA (2012), <i>Internally-Mandated Evaluation of UNOCHA's Role in Civil-Military Coordination and Management Response Plan</i>
36	UNOCHA (2012), <i>Access Monitoring & Reporting Framework</i>
37	CERF (2012), <i>CERF Secretariat Response to OIOS Risk Assessment</i>
38	UNOCHA (2012), <i>Biennial Evaluation Report 2011-12</i>
39	UNOCHA (2015), <i>Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund</i> , Global Synthesis Report
40	UNOCHA (2011), <i>Five Year evaluation of the CERF Synthesis report</i>
41	UNOCHA (2014), <i>ECHO six-pillar assessment of UNOCHA</i>
42	CERF (2013), <i>Review of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) Performance and Accountability Framework</i>

Document number:	Full name of document:
43	OIOS (2013), <i>Evaluation of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services</i>
44	UNICHA (2013), <i>The Global Evaluation of Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) Final Report</i>
45	UNOCHA (2011), <i>Evaluation Synthesis Report, 2011</i>
46	UNOCHA (2014), <i>UNSWAP</i>
47	IASC (2014), <i>Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines</i>
48	UNOCHA (2015), <i>Global Humanitarian Overview 2015</i>
49	UNOCHA (2013), <i>World Humanitarian Data and Trends 2013</i>
50	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluations Steering Committee, Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis</i>
51	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Guidelines for Country Based Pooled Funds</i>
52	CERF (2016), <i>Application template and guidance for CERF applications</i>
53	ODSG (2015), <i>Monthly Budget and Income Status Report 29 April 2015</i>
54	UNOCHA (2013), <i>Evaluation of UNOCHA's role in preparedness</i>
55	UNOCHA (2012), <i>Internal Control Framework</i>
56	UNOCHA (2015), <i>Effective Co-ordination: Putting people at the centre of humanitarian responses</i>
57	ODSG (2015), <i>Chair's Summary: ODSG High Level Meeting, Copenhagen, Denmark, June 2015</i>
58	IASC (2016), <i>IASC Transformative Agenda: A Review of Review and Their Follow Up</i>
59	IASC (2014), <i>Operational Peer Review - Yemen</i>
60	IASC (2014), <i>Operational Peer Review - Philippines</i>
61	IASC (2014), <i>Operational Peer Review - Syria</i>
62	IASC (2015), <i>Operational Peer Review – Central African Republic</i>
63	UNOCHA (2016), <i>Evaluation of OCHA response to the Syria crisis</i>

Document number:	Full name of document:
64	UNOCHA (2016), <i>Interoffice Memorandum: Decision on approval of list of corporate priority partners (Member States and Regional Organisations) for 2016-2017</i>
65	UNOCHA (2012), <i>Review of Organisation of Islamic Co-operation-OCHA Plan of Action for 2012-14.</i>
66	UNOCHA (2016), <i>Summary mapping of MOUs</i>
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68	UNOCHA (2013), <i>Plan of Action between Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) and UNOCHA 2013-2015</i>
69	UNOCHA (2015), <i>Plan of Action between Organisation for Islamic Co-operation and UNOCHA 2015-2016</i>
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76	UNOCHA (2015), <i>Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia</i>
77	UNOCHA (2016), <i>Humanitarian Requirements Document Ethiopia</i>
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79	UNOCHA (2015), <i>Humanitarian Needs Overview and Response Plan Afghanistan</i>
80	UNOCHA (2016), <i>Participatory Gender Audit</i>
81	UNOCHA (2015), <i>Progress Report, Gender Action Plan (June 2014-May 2015)</i>
82	UN-SWAP (2015), <i>UN-SWAP report 2015</i>
83	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Call to Action on protection from Gender Based Violence (GBV) in emergencies</i>

Document number:	Full name of document:
84	UNOCHA (2016), <i>Gender Policy Instruction 2016-2020</i>
85	UNEP (2015), <i>Terms of Reference, Gender Focal Points</i>
86	IASC (2015), <i>Humanitarian Programme Cycle Reference Module (versions 1.0, 2.0)</i>
87	CERF (2016), <i>CERF and the Grand Bargain: Briefing Note</i>
88	CERF (2016), <i>Partnerships in Humanitarian Action: Briefing Note</i>
89	CERF (2016), <i>Delivering CERF-funded humanitarian action with partners: partnership map</i>
90	UNOCHA (2016), <i>Budget and financial situation: Background paper for ODSG High Level Meeting, July 2016</i>
91	STAIT (2014), <i>Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team: Mission Report, Sudan, Chad, Pakistan, Central African Republic</i>
92	UNOCHA (2014), <i>Operational Peer Reviews, Action Plan Updates/Narrative Reports – Sudan, Yemen, Central African Republic, Iraq, Niger, South Sudan</i>
93	UNOCHA (2016), <i>Multi-year agreements 2016 – core and earmarked funding</i>
94	UNOCHA (2016), <i>posters on action/donor support: Yemen, the Sahel,</i>
95	UNOCHA (2015), <i>Building inter-agency field leaders pilot programme: Implementation methodology and revised implementation methodology</i>
96	UNOCHA (2016) <i>Management results - 2015</i>
97	UNOCHA (2016), <i>Strategic Results – 2015</i>
98	UNOCHA (2014), <i>OCHA Evaluation Quality Assurance Guidelines</i>




Annex 3: Process map of the MOPAN 3.0 assessment of UNOCHA



Annex 4: Results of the MOPAN survey of UNOCHA Partners

An Evidence Stream for the MOPAN 3.0 assessment of UNOCHA, 2016

Total number of responses for the UNOCHA Survey: 111




Respondents who identified their geographical focus as "global" were not asked the questions which were only relevant to respondents with a specific country focus. This will be highlighted for the individual questions below.


Staffing

How well do you think UNOCHA performs in the areas below?


It has sufficient staffing based in in the country to ensure field effectiveness




It has demonstrated sufficient surge capacity to address humanitarian need in a timely fashion in in the country.



Its staff are sufficiently senior/experienced to work successfully on humanitarian issues in in the country.



Its staff can make the critical strategic or programming decisions locally in the country




Respondents who identified their geographical focus as "global" were not asked to answer these four questions since it is only relevant to respondents with a specific country focus.


Managing financial resources

How well do you think UNOCHA performs in relation to the statements below.


It communicates openly the criteria for allocating financial resources (transparency).




It provides reliable information on how much and when financial allocations and disbursement will happen (predictability).



It co-operates with development or humanitarian partners to make sure that financial co-operation is coherent and not fragmented.



It has enough flexible (i.e. non-earmarked) financial resources to enable it to pursue the goals and targeted results set out in its Strategic Plan 2014-2019.




Respondents who identified their geographical focus as "global" were not asked to answer the last three questions since it is only relevant to respondents with a specific country focus.


Interventions (programmes, projects, normative work)

How well do you think UNOCHA performs in relation to the areas below


Its activities support the national government's disaster response/management/preparedness plans in the country.




It provides useful and timely context analysis to support the humanitarian response in the country.



Its interventions in the country are based on a clear understanding of its role as a service provider to the wider humanitarian community.




It adapts or amends interventions swiftly as the humanitarian context in the country changes.




Respondents who identified their geographical focus as "global" were not asked to answer these four questions since it is only relevant to respondents with a specific country focus.


Its interventions in the country are based on realistic assessments of national / regional capacities, including government, civil society and other actors for humanitarian action.




Its interventions have successfully improved humanitarian leadership capacity in the country.



Its interventions appropriately identify and manage risk within the context of the country e.g. in pooled funds.




It integrates Accountability to Affected Populations concerns fully into its interventions.



Respondents who identified their geographical focus as "global" were not asked to answer the first three questions since it is only relevant to respondents with a specific country focus.

Where feasible it links its interventions in the country to resilience/recovery/development.

UNOCHA




Respondents who identified their geographical focus as "global" were not asked to answer this question since it is only relevant to respondents with a specific country focus.


Interventions (Cross cutting issues) part 1

How familiar are you with each of the following?


UNOCHA's 2012-2015 Policy Instruction on Gender.




UNOCHA's efforts to ensure that environmental concerns are integrated into humanitarian action UNOCHA.



UNOCHA's efforts to ensure that interventions address wider systemic factors that give rise to humanitarian emergencies (good governance).




UNOCHA's work on Protection, including its engagement with the Protection cluster and ProCap project.




Interventions (Cross cutting issues) part 2

How well do you think UNOCHA performs in relation to the priorities/areas stated below


It promotes gender equality in all relevant areas of its work.




It promotes environmental sustainability and addresses climate change in all relevant areas of its work.



It promotes the principles of good governance in all relevant areas of its work (for example, reduced inequality, access to justice for all, impartial public administration, being accountable and inclusive at all levels).



It promotes the realisation of child and human rights in all relevant areas of its work.




Respondents who identified in 'Interventions (Cross cutting issues), part 1 that they know almost nothing or have never heard about the priority/area, have not been asked to answer these four questions since it is only relevant to respondents with at least a little knowledge about it.


Managing relationships

How well do you think UNOCHA performs in relation to each of these areas?


It prioritises working in synergy/partnerships with the wider humanitarian community as part of its business practice.




Its chairing of Inter-Cluster co-ordination groups in the country is effective.



It shares key information (analysis, budgeting, management, results) with humanitarian partners on an ongoing basis.




It ensures that its bureaucratic procedures (planning, programming, administrative, monitoring and reporting) are synergised with those of its partners (for example, donors, UN agencies).




Respondents who identified their geographical focus as "global" were not asked to answer the top right sided question since it is only relevant to respondents with a specific country focus.


Its knowledge products (e.g. Humanitarian Needs Overviews and Response Plans) are produced in a sufficiently timely way to inform humanitarian responses in the country.




Its knowledge products (e.g. Humanitarian Needs Overviews and Response Plans) are produced in a sufficiently timely way to inform humanitarian responses in the country.



It conducts mutual assessments of progress (e.g. Operational Peer Reviews) in the country with national/regional partners.



Its bureaucratic procedures (including systems for engaging staff, procuring project inputs, disbursing payment, logistical arrangements etc.) do not cause delays in implementation for humanitarian partners.




Respondents who identified their geographical focus as "global" were not asked to answer the first three questions since it is only relevant to respondents with a specific country focus.


Performance management, part 1

How well do you think UNOCHA performs in relation to the areas below?


It prioritises a results-based approach – for example when planning and implementing humanitarian operations.




The indicators in the Strategic Indicator Compendium are relevant and appropriate for UNOCHA's country level work.




Clear guidance is available for how targets at country level should be set.



UNOCHA's monitoring systems produce reliable and useful performance data.



UNOCHA uses monitoring information to inform planning and decision-making in the country.




Respondents who identified their geographical focus as "global" were not asked to answer this question since it is only relevant to respondents with a specific country focus.


Performance management, part 2

How well do you think UNOCHA performs in relation to the areas below?


It performs an effective role in coordinating and leading inter-agency humanitarian evaluations.




It undertakes sufficient evaluations and reviews of its interventions in the country.



All its new intervention designs include a statement of the evidence base (what has been learned from past interventions).




It consistently identifies which interventions are under-performing.



Respondents who identified their geographical focus as "global" were not asked to answer the two top questions since it is only relevant to respondents with a specific country focus.

It identifies and addresses any areas of under-performance, for example through technical support or changing staffing if necessary.



It learns lessons from previous experience, rather than repeating the same mistakes.

