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MOPAN Assessments

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

2019 Performance Assessment
Preface

ABOUT MOPAN

The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) comprises 19 countries\(^1\) that share a common interest in assessing the effectiveness of the major multilateral organisations they fund. These include United Nations agencies, international financial institutions and global funds. The Network generates, collects, analyses and presents relevant and credible information on their organisational and development effectiveness. This knowledge base is intended to contribute to organisational learning within and among the organisations, their direct clients and partners, and other stakeholders. Network members use the reports for their own accountability needs and as a source of input for strategic decision-making.

MOPAN 3.0, first applied in 2015-16, is the latest operational and methodological iteration of how the Network assesses organisations. It builds on the former version, the Common Approach, which the Network implemented from 2009 through 2014. In 2019, MOPAN members agreed to a change in the rating scale, with the overall framework unchanged. To distinguish the new approach from the initial one, the methodology applied in 2019 is called MOPAN 3.0* (see Chapter 1, Introduction to this assessment).

In 2019, MOPAN assessed five organisations, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The other four are:

- CGIAR
- Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (MLF)
- United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)
- United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

Operating principles

MOPAN generates assessments that are credible, fair and accurate. Credibility is ensured through an impartial, systematic and rigorous approach. MOPAN seeks an appropriate balance between coverage and depth of information from a variety of sources and through multiple streams of evidence. The Network gives priority to quality of information over quantity and uses structured tools for enquiry and analysis. An audit trail of findings ensures transparency. MOPAN applies efficient measures of assessment practice through building layers of data, with a view to limiting the burden on organisations assessed. A focus on organisational learning aims to ensure utility of the findings by multiple stakeholders.

Objectives of the MOPAN methodology

MOPAN seeks to provide a diagnostic assessment, or snapshot, of an organisation. It tells the story of an organisation’s current performance. MOPAN is guided by framing questions which serve to understand the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of multilateral organisations, while also garnering a sense of the sustainability of their results. The empirical design of MOPAN is based on a theory of change.

The methodology’s key elements include a set of five performance areas against which the assessment takes place. The first four cover strategic, operational, relationship and performance management. The fifth area englobes the organisation’s contribution to development, humanitarian and normative results. These areas are captured in the

\(^1\) Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.
MOPAN indicator framework against which performance is measured using three evidence streams – a document review, surveys, and interviews and consultations – brought together in a combined approach.

A MOPAN assessment is not an external audit of an organisation, nor is it an institutional evaluation. MOPAN does not comprehensively assess all operations or all processes of an organisation, nor can it provide a definitive picture of all the organisation's achievements and performance during the time period of the assessment. Neither does MOPAN offer comprehensive documentation or analysis of ongoing organisational reform processes.

Acknowledgements

The MOPAN assessment was finalised under the overall strategic guidance of Suzanne Steensen, Head of the MOPAN Secretariat. It was prepared under the responsibility of Samer Hachem, Senior Advisor, and Mitch Levine, Policy Analyst.

The assessment was conducted with support from IOD PARC, an independent consultancy specialised in assessing performance and managing change in the field of international development. Mark Singleton served as Team Lead for the assessment of UNCTAD, with support from Dorothy Lucks and Jenny Geppert, under the overall leadership of Julian Gayfer.

The external partner survey was administered by Cristina Serra Vallejo from the MOPAN Secretariat, who, together with Emna Ben Khedher and Miguel Bragagnolo also supported the finalisation of the report. Jill Gaston edited the report, and Andrew Esson provided layout and graphic design.

MOPAN is grateful to its Steering Committee representatives for supporting the assessment of UNCTAD. Finally, MOPAN would like to convey appreciation to UNCTAD Secretariat management and staff for their input and comments at various stages, in particular those staff members who internally co-ordinated the process and provided substantive feedback on the final draft report. We are particularly grateful to Ms. Isabelle Durant, Deputy Secretary-General, for her constant engagement during the assessment, and Ms. Nishta Keeble, for acting as the focal point on behalf of the UNCTAD secretariat.
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<th>Score</th>
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# Acronyms and abbreviations

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<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>ALDC</td>
<td>Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASYCUDA</td>
<td>Automated System for Customs Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGDS</td>
<td>Division on Globalisation and Development Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAE</td>
<td>Division on Investment and Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DITC</td>
<td>Division on International Trade and Commodities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMFAS</td>
<td>Debt Management and Financial Analysis System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSG</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTL</td>
<td>Division on Technology and Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Evaluation and Monitoring Unit</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEEW</td>
<td>Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEWE</td>
<td>Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IATI</td>
<td>International Aid Transparency Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMDIS</td>
<td>Integrated Monitoring and Document Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIU</td>
<td>Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPI</td>
<td>Key performance indicator</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least developed country</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLDC</td>
<td>Landlocked developing country</td>
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<td>MI</td>
<td>Micro-indicator</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPAN</td>
<td>Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>UN Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<td>OSG</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regular budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-based management</td>
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<td>RMS</td>
<td>Resources Management Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAH</td>
<td>Sexual exploitation and abuse, and sexual harassment</td>
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<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Small island developing state</td>
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<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Technical co-operation</td>
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<td>TCS</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDB</td>
<td>Trade and Development Board</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN Women</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-SWAP</td>
<td>UN System-wide Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XB</td>
<td>Extrabudgetary</td>
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</tbody>
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Executive summary

In 2019, the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) assessed the technical co-operation pillar of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In accordance with the agreement reached between MOPAN and the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, and at the request of the Group of 77 and China, the consensus-building pillar and the research and analysis pillar have been left out of the scope of the assessment. This is the first MOPAN assessment of UNCTAD.

The assessment addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours pertinent to technical co-operation (TC), as evident within and pertaining to the snapshot period of January 2017 to mid-2019. The MOPAN scoring and rating system for organisational effectiveness (Key performance indicators [KPIs] 1-8) has been applied to the TC pillar only, in accordance with the adjusted scope of the assessment. For organisational results (KPIs 9-12), no rating or scoring was applied, as UNCTAD’s results are a composite of all three pillars: technical co-operation, research and analysis, and consensus building. Instead, the report narrates themes and challenges relating to TC results emerging from external independent evaluations, audits and reviews from 2013 till late-2019.

It should be noted that findings from this assessment, including at a programme and project level, are only valid within the technical co-operation (TC) pillar. The two other pillars of UNCTAD, while interlinked with technical co-operation, do not function in the same way and have not been subject to any form of review by MOPAN, in the context of this assessment. To extend an opinion of TC effectiveness across the organisation would therefore be inappropriate.

CONTEXT

In 1964, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly established UNCTAD as one of its subsidiary organ. The organisation’s mission is to promote international trade, especially with a view to accelerating economic development, particularly of developing countries, as well as to promote policy analysis, facilitate consensus building and offer technical co-operation. UNCTAD is mandated to assist developing countries and countries with economies in transition in integrating beneficially into the global economy, in support of inclusive and sustainable growth and development. UNCTAD fulfils this mandate through three closely interlinked functions or pillars: (i) providing a forum for intergovernmental deliberations (the consensus-building pillar); (ii) undertaking research, policy analysis and data collection to inform these deliberations (the research and analysis pillar); and (iii) providing technical assistance to developing countries.

The UNCTAD secretariat is an entity within the UN Secretariat. It reports to the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council but has its own separate governing body, the Trade and Development Board, a permanent subsidiary organ of UNCTAD. Structurally, the UNCTAD secretariat operates under UN Secretariat regulations and rules, management frameworks, and processes. UNCTAD is a non-resident agency.

UNCTAD is an entity driven by member states. Its mandate is negotiated and agreed during its quadrennial conferences, where member states convene, discuss and set the priorities for the next four years across a vast and growing set of trade and development challenges. The mandate is then operationalised and implemented between conferences. The Nairobi Maafikiano is the name given to the outcome document adopted at the 14th session of UNCTAD. The secretariat is funded through the UN regular budget. In addition, UNCTAD’s TC activities are financed through (i) extrabudgetary contributions for trust funds (90.4% of total extrabudgetary funding); and (ii) the UN Regular Programme of Technical Cooperation, the UN Development Account, and “Delivering as One” trust funds (9.6%).
KEY FINDINGS

UNCTAD is strongly committed to implementing its mandate to support the least developed countries and economies in transition in the realm of trade and development. UNCTAD is one of few organisations within the UN with robust and in-depth expertise on trade and development issues and on how these impact developing countries and countries in transition.

UNCTAD’s technical co-operation is an integral part of the organisation and interlinked with its two other pillars. Drawing on robust economic data and analysis, UNCTAD’s knowledge, expertise and technical assistance are viewed positively by member states. Generally speaking, national ownership is strong. UNCTAD enjoys solid support from member states for its TC products – not only the major programmes ASYCUDA\(^2\) and DMFAS,\(^3\) but also others such as e-commerce and the digital economy, trade and transport facilitation, and business and investment facilitation. These interventions have demonstrated positive results, and the fact that many have become (partly) self-financed is evidence of strong performance.

Within UNCTAD, technical co-operation is de facto decentralised. Divisions, branches and sections have autonomy to engage with partners, mobilise resources and implement activities. Consequently, different operating models at the divisional level have evolved over time and co-exist alongside each other, with the Technical Cooperation Section of the Office of the Secretary-General (OSG) more in an enabling than a steering capacity. The operating model does not actively encourage more strategic internal and external co-ordination. Instead, much is left to staff members’ individual networks. While this may create opportunities and responsiveness at a project, programme or section level, it also obscures vision and strategic approaches.

Due to a lack of consensus among member states, the last time UNCTAD’s corporate TC strategy was formally adopted was in 2003. At present, UNCTAD lacks an up-to-date corporate TC strategy, comprehensive TC oversight mechanisms and other tools, such as a TC fundraising strategy, and a TC external relations and partnerships strategy. Constrained by human and financial resources, but also by a lack of prioritisation, UNCTAD’s technical co-operation is unable to meet growing demand in various innovative “high potential” areas.

Because UNCTAD is a member states-driven organisation, and because of the different contexts and dynamics of its member states, demand for UNCTAD’s technical co-operation is becoming increasingly diverse. While efforts to streamline and prioritise these products may meet approval from some member states, others may resist, pointing to their particular needs. Thus, prioritising certain products over others has proven challenging, causing further fragmentation of the TC portfolio. Meanwhile, TC implementation depends first and foremost on the availability of extrabudgetary funding. The leadership is navigating between different interests, externally as well as internally. External risks as well as opportunities to reposition UNCTAD, build strategic partnerships and strengthen its niche have so-far not triggered secretariat-wide strategic responses.

The assessment identifies three strengths of UNCTAD’s technical co-operation:

1. **UNCTAD is one of few agencies mandated to address trade and development.** It provides relevant, specific expertise that would otherwise not be easily available to its prioritised member states, the least developed countries. Its staff are dedicated to UNCTAD’s mandate.

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2. The Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) programme is an integrated customs management system for international trade and transport operations in a modern automated environment.

3. The Debt Management and Financial Analysis System (DMFAS) programme provides technical co-operation and advisory service in the area of debt management.
2. **UNCTAD is highly regarded by its development partners.** Member states’ governments appreciate UNCTAD’s sincerity and responsiveness to their demands and needs, as is witnessed through the sometimes decades-long relationships in TC delivery. Besides constantly updating and innovating its longstanding programmes ASYCUDA, DMFAS and others, UNCTAD is also adding valuable contributions to innovative TC niche areas, such as e-commerce and the digital economy, bio-trade, and financing for development.

3. **Generally, UNCTAD’s technical co-operation interventions are regarded as relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable.** UNCTAD delivers results that contribute towards institutional and policy change and engages with partners to encourage the uptake of TC support. Working with a relatively small TC budget, UNCTAD has proven to be cost-efficient in most areas, thanks to its careful management of available funds and tight financial control.

The assessment also finds three major areas for improvement:

1. **Two main programmes, ASYCUDA and DMFAS represent close to 60% of UNCTAD’s technical co-operation, but the remainder is highly fragmented.** This has evolved autonomously as a consequence of the de facto decentralised operating model. Because oversight is conducted at the divisional level, rather than the secretariat level, strategic corporate-level co-ordination and decision-making for technical co-operation is implicit, rather than systematic and robust. Tools and mechanisms for such co-ordination are in place but not used to their full potential.

2. **There is a growing mismatch between member states’ demands and UNCTAD’s supply capabilities.** An explanatory factor is the absence of a secretariat-wide, integrated, future-facing technical co-operation strategy that sets the direction for fundraising, partnership and external relations, and could support prioritisation across the secretariat.

3. **Until recently, results-based management was largely missing at the outcome level for technical co-operation.** Although important steps have been taken to enhance results-based management, within UNCTAD’s TC pillar there is no holistic approach to tracking performance, identifying poor performance or overseeing deviations from planned results in TC interventions. Cross-cutting themes are only partially addressed.

**METHODS OF ANALYSIS**

The MOPAN 3.0* methodology entails a framework of 12 key performance indicators and associated micro-indicators. It comprises standards that characterise an effective multilateral organisation. The methodology, including recent updates and any adaptations for this particular assessment, is further explained in Section 1.4 of this report.

The assessment of performance covers UNCTAD’s headquarters and regional and country field presence. As mentioned above, it addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours pertinent to technical co-operation during the period January 2017 to mid-2019. It relies on three lines of evidence: a review of 187 selected documents out of a total of 561 recorded documents (some dating back to 2013), interviews with 69 staff members at UNCTAD’s headquarters in Geneva and remote interviews with staff based in New York and Addis Ababa carried out between September and November 2019, and 65 responses to the external partners survey carried out among external partners in 12 countries between mid-October and early November 2019.

MOPAN conducted the assessment with support from IOD PARC, a consulting company located in the United Kingdom that specialises in results-based performance assessment in international development.
How to read these charts

- **Micro-indicator**
- **Key Performance Indicator**

**Changes to MOPAN rating system (MOPAN 3.0+ scales)**

The 2019 Assessment Cycle under MOPAN 3.0+ includes a notable change on how ratings (and their corresponding colours) are applied based on the scores at MI and KPI level. Compared to previous cycles, the threshold for a rating has been raised to reflect the increasing demands for organisational performance in the multilateral system. The underlying scores and approach to scoring are unaffected. Further information can be found in Chapter 1, Section 1.4 Methodology changes in the 2019 Cycle.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PERFORMANCE RATING SUMMARY FOR UNCTAD (MOPAN 3.0* – new rating scale system)

1. Organisational architecture and financial framework

2. Cross-cutting issues

3. Operating model and resources support, relevance and agility

4. Cost and value consciousness, financial transparency

5. Operational planning and intervention design support, relevance and agility

6. Works in coherent partnerships

7. Strong and transparent results focus, explicitly geared to function

8. Evidence-based planning and programming applied

1.1 Long-term vision

1.2 Organisational architecture

1.3 Financial framework

2.1 Effective management intervention

2.2 Evidence-based planning and programming

2.3 Evidence-based targets

3.1 Resources aligned to function

3.2 Resource mobilisation

3.3 Decentralised decision making

4.1 Decision making

4.2 Disbursement

4.3 Results-based budgeting

4.4 International audit standards

4.5 Control mechanisms

4.6 Anti-fraud procedures

5.1 Alignment

5.2 Context analysis

5.3 Capacity analysis

5.4 Risk management

5.5 Cross cutting

5.6 Sustainability

5.7 Implementation speed

5.8 Accountability to beneficiaries

6.1 Agility

6.2 Comparative advantage

6.3 Use country systems

6.4 Synergies

6.5 Partner co-ordination

6.6 Information sharing

6.7 Accountability to beneficiaries

6.8 Post assessments

6.9 Knowledge

6.10 Performance

7.1 RBM applied

7.2 RBM in strategies

7.3 Evidence-based targets

7.4 Effective monitoring Systems

7.5 Performance data applied

7.6 Strategic management

8.1 Evaluation function

8.2 Evaluation coverage

8.3 Evaluation quality

8.4 Evidence-based design

8.5 Poor performance tracked

8.6 Follow-up systems

8.7 Uptake of lessons

10.1 Long-term vision

10.2 Organisational architecture

10.3 Financial framework

PERFORMANCE RATING SUMMARY FOR UNCTAD (MOPAN 3.0* – new rating scale system)

How to read these charts

Micro-indicator

Key Performance Indicator

Highly satisfactory
(3.51-4.00)

Satisfactory
(2.51-3.50)

Unsatisfactory
(1.51-2.50)

Highly unsatisfactory
(0-1.50)

No evidence / Not applicable
1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This report assesses the technical co-operation (TC) pillar of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In accordance with the agreement reached between MOPAN and the Secretary General of UNCTAD, and at the request of the Group of 77 and China, the consensus-building pillar, the research and analysis pillar, and the UNCTAD governance structure have been left out of the scope of the UNCTAD MOPAN assessment process. Given that UNCTAD’s three pillars form an organic whole and are inherently interlinked, for the purposes of understanding the context in which the organisation operates, the assessment team considered, but did not assess, the intergovernmental machinery and the research and analysis pillar.

The assessment of organisational effectiveness covers UNCTAD’s headquarters and regional and country field engagement. It addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours pertinent to technical co-operation, as evident within and pertaining to the snapshot period of January 2017 to mid-2019. The MOPAN scoring and rating system for organisational effectiveness (Key performance indicators [KPIs] 1-8) has been applied, in accordance with the adjusted scope of the assessment.

This report has three chapters and three annexes. Chapter 1 introduces UNCTAD and the assessment process. Chapter 2 presents the main findings of the assessment in relation to each performance area. Chapter 3 provides the conclusions of the assessment. Annex 1 summarises the evidence gathered against each indicator with the detailed scores, where relevant. Annex 2 lists the documents used for the analysis. Finally, Annex 3 provides an overview of the results of MOPAN’s partner survey.

1.2. UNCTAD AT A GLANCE

**Mission and mandate:** Established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1964, UNCTAD is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. Its mission is to promote international trade, especially with a view to accelerating economic development, particularly of developing countries, as well as to provide policy analysis, facilitate consensus building and offer technical cooperation. It does so through informing national and international policies, while giving priority consideration for the needs and interests of developing countries. Within the United Nations (UN) system, it is the focal point for the integrated treatment of trade and interrelated issues in the areas of investment, finance and technology as key drivers of the inclusive, equitable global economic environment for sustainable development.

UNCTAD is responsible for assisting developing countries, especially the least developed countries (LDCs), and countries with economies in transition in integrating beneficially into the global economy, in support of inclusive and sustainable growth and development. Its mandate derives from the priorities established in relevant General Assembly resolutions and decisions, including the quadrennial sessions of UNCTAD.

UNCTAD is mandated to “strategically position itself by applying three principles: comparative advantage; differentiation of its work with respect to other organisations; and complementarity so as to put the organisation’s strengths to the best use to address – [through its three pillars] – the needs and priorities of developing countries for sustainable development and strengthening their role in the global economy.” UNCTAD’s thematic focus is to build
productive capacity to transform economies; promote a development focus and more efficient markets; and to tackle vulnerabilities, build resilience and strengthen multilateralism. UNCTAD gives priority to Africa, LDCs, landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), small island developing states (SIDS) and other vulnerable and small economies, as per its mandate. In doing so, it is expected to give due account to cross-cutting issues, mainstream gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE), sustainable development and productive employment, strengthened engagement with government and all relevant stakeholders, and enhanced organisational efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability.

UNCTAD fulfils this mandate through three closely interlinked functions or pillars:

- providing a forum for intergovernmental deliberations (the consensus-building pillar)
- undertaking research, policy analysis and data collection to inform these deliberations (the research and analysis pillar)
- providing technical assistance to developing countries (the technical co-operation pillar).

Through its work to promote development-centred globalisation, UNCTAD helps to implement the global development agenda, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third United Nations Conference on Financing for Development and, as appropriate, the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. It assists developing countries in meeting their development goals, including poverty eradication, improving the well-being of citizens, and addressing the opportunities and challenges created by globalisation.

**Governance:** The UNCTAD secretariat is an entity within the UN Secretariat. It reports to the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council but has its own separate governing body – the Trade and Development Board (TDB), a permanent subsidiary organ of UNCTAD. The UNCTAD quadrennial conference sets the work programme of the UNCTAD secretariat, while the TDB oversees the work of the secretariat between quadrennial sessions. The secretariat operates through UNCTAD’s three main pillars of work, institutionalised through the UNCTAD XII Accra Accord.

Structurally, the UNCTAD secretariat operates under UN Secretariat regulations and rules, management frameworks, and processes. While the UNCTAD secretariat workplan is developed in Geneva, it is approved and resourced by the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly in New York. The UNCTAD secretariat’s Proposed Programme and Budget is submitted to member states as part of the consolidated UN Secretariat Proposed Budget.

**Organisational structure:** The Secretary-General, assisted by a Deputy Secretary-General, heads the UNCTAD secretariat in Geneva. The secretariat’s organisational structure can broadly be described as the Office of the Secretary-General (OSG) that provides executive direction and oversight; five substantive divisions that implement subprogrammes of work; and two programme support services: the Intergovernmental Support Service and the Resources Management Service (RMS – responsible for the budget and project financing, human resources, information technology, and oversight focal point). The five substantive divisions are:

- Division on Globalisation and Development Strategies (DGDS)
- Division on Investment and Enterprise (DIAE)
- Division on International Trade and Commodities (DITC)
- Division on Technology and Logistics (DTL)
- Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes (ALDC).
The organisational structure varies from division to division. In addition, the secretariat comprises programme support services reporting directly to the OSG of UNCTAD as with the regional office in Addis Ababa, the New York office, the Communications, Information and Outreach Section, the Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (EMU), and the Technical Cooperation Section (TCS).

UNCTAD is a non-resident agency. As of 31 August 2019, the secretariat employed 484 staff, of whom 354 are covered through regular budget funding, 108 through extrabudgetary funding and 22 through temporary short-term funds to replace staff on sick leave and maternity leave. Almost all staff are based in Geneva; only five staff members are based in the New York and Addis Ababa offices.

**Strategy:** UNCTAD’s mandate is operationalised and updated during its quadrennial conferences, where member states convene, discuss and set the priorities for the next four years, across a vast and growing set of trade and development challenges. The Nairobi Maafikiano is the name given to the outcome document adopted at the 14th session of UNCTAD (UNCTAD XIV). The Maafikiano is further operationalised in UNCTAD’s biennial programme and budget documents.

**Finances:** The secretariat is funded through the UN regular budget. In addition, UNCTAD’s TC activities are financed through (i) extrabudgetary contributions for trust funds by individual governments, the European Commission, the United Nations system and other international organisations, and private and public sectors; and (ii) the UN Regular Programme of Technical Cooperation and the Development Account. In 2018, contributions by developing countries accounted for 50% of total extrabudgetary contributions to UNCTAD trust funds.

Like all UN Secretariat entities, UNCTAD’s regular budget is under increasing pressure due to budget cuts and contribution shortfalls, causing a liquidity crisis within the UN. Over the years, despite expanding demands for its services from member states, the regular budget contributions have experienced a gradual decline, mostly through a reduction in staff posts. Recruitment for regular budget-funded posts was temporarily frozen from February – December 2019. Recent years have therefore seen a decline in regular budget-funded posts, with 25 posts abolished since 2013. The overall resources proposed for 2018-19 were USD 138.06 million, reflecting a net decrease of USD 363 100 (or 0.3%) compared with the appropriation for 2016-17. For 2020, the overall regular budget resource proposal is of USD 67.7 million with over 90% of these resources budgeted for post requirements (USD 61.8 million) and the rest (USD 5.9 million) for non-post resource requirements. This proposal entails a further reduction of USD 683 000 compared to 2019. Whilst extrabudgetary funding for TC has grown from almost USD 14m in 1999 to almost USD 44m in 2019, funding patterns have shown to be erratic.7

UNCTAD has also taken measures to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse, and sexual harassment (see Box 1.1 for further details).

7. TD/8/WP/297 Review of the technical cooperation activities of UNCTAD and their financing (September 2019).
1. INTRODUCTION

Box 1.1. Preventing sexual exploitation and abuse, and sexual harassment

The rules and regulations of the UN Secretariat govern UNCTAD’s management of the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, and sexual harassment (SEAH). UNCTAD refers to the 2003 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on “Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse” as a guiding document. Further, UNCTAD is aligned with the five-step measures that Secretary-General Guterres has unveiled for the UN Secretariat relating to response and zero-tolerance, reporting and support, investigation capacity, leadership, and victim and witness protection.

UNCTAD’s Annual Report 2018 states the organisation is aligning itself with UN Secretariat-wide measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse, including an annual declaration to its governing board. UNCTAD’s strategy is to place the emphasis on prevention through awareness-raising and on-line training. UNCTAD requires all staff to undertake mandatory SEAH training, which is run by the United Nations Office at Geneva. Staff are also encouraged to participate in optional gender and ethics courses. UNCTAD ensures that all UN Secretariat policies are widely disseminated to all staff and made available through the intranet.

During senior management meetings and at town hall meetings, UNCTAD’s leadership communicates its commitment to prevent SEAH. The UNCTAD Secretary-General actively promotes the UN’s commitment to zero tolerance of sexual harassment and repeatedly underlines that harassment of any type is against the values and principles of the UN. At a town hall meeting in July 2019, The UNCTAD Secretary-General committed to reducing harassment and raising staff awareness of the actions that are being taken by UNCTAD. SEAH has become a more open subject at UNCTAD, supported by continuous reminders from the OSG/RMS. UNCTAD has introduced the Safe Corner concept to support the SEAH initiatives. This will initially be a digital space where staff can raise issues and will eventually be managed as a physical space as well. The Deputy Secretary-General is the focal point, supported by staff representatives at each level.

If harassment occurs, the available policies provide the means for intervention on informal and formal levels. Where appropriate, the ombudsman plays an important role in informal conflict resolution through facilitating mediated discussions where the parties are provided more confidential, neutral and impartial space to review the situation and develop options to correct it.

8. The 2019 MOPAN assessment does not assess organisations’ performance with regard to preventing and responding to sexual exploitation and abuse, and sexual harassment (SEAH). However, this topic will become an area of assessment in MOPAN starting 2020; indicators are under development at the time of writing. In the meantime, the assessment team simply collected key facts related to SEAH safeguards for information, based on documentation provided by the organisation. The assessments team did not verify the actual implementation of the instruments outlined therein or analyse their effectiveness. Insights were gathered from the following sources: key informant interviews and consultations with UNCTAD staff, UNCTAD intranet and main documentation including; Management of Reports and Allegations Involving UN Personnel in Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions, letter to Counsellor Mr. Edouard Jay outlining UNCTAD policy on sexual exploitation and abuse of authority in the workplace (2018), Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (2003) and Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (UN website).
1.3. TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION PILLAR AT A GLANCE

Although technical co-operation (TC) was not part of UNCTAD’s core mandate at its establishment in 1964, it soon became an area of interest, as the proceedings of UNCTAD II and III Conferences illustrate. Since then, the UNCTAD Conferences have set thematic priorities that orient the content and determine the scope of UNCTAD’s assistance. In parallel with these mandates, the TC strategy adopted by the Trade and Development Board in 2003 continues to set the overarching goals, the conceptual framework and the operational modalities.

UNCTAD’s TC is based on four principles: (i) demand-driven; (ii) embracing country ownership; (iii) transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and accountability; and (iv) geographically balanced implementation, with priority given to LDCs, LLDCs, SIDSs and fragile and conflict-affected states.

At UNCTAD, the management of TC is de facto decentralised. Substantive divisions have autonomy to set division-level strategies. They each engage with partners, identify interventions, mobilise resources and implement activities. Consequently, different operating models for TC exist alongside each other. TCS, located in the OSG, has a back-office support and co-ordination function for trust fund-related TC and an oversight role for UN Development Account projects.

UNCTAD documentation points to TC expenditures dating back to as early as 1972. Expenditures have grown from USD 1.4 million in 1972 to USD 20 million in 1993, up to USD 43.7 million in 2018. TC is largely funded through extrabudgetary sources (91%). Projects are either fully or partially self-financed, or externally funded. Funding for TC is provided through extrabudgetary funding of trust funds, the UN Regular Programme of Technical Cooperation and Development Account, and the United Nations “Delivering as One” funding mechanisms. Voluntary funding to trust funds is the principal funding source; the contribution to the trust funds from developing and transition countries rose from 43% in 2017 to 50% in 2018.9

In December 2018, over 80 sources of funding contributed to 249 TC projects. At the same point in time, the two main programmes of UNCTAD, ASYCUDA10 and DMFAS11 (see Boxes 1.2 and 1.3) accounted for about 58% of total expenditures (USD 25.5 million). They are financed mainly by domestic contributions from beneficiary member states and from proceeds of loans or grants from international financial institutions. In that same year, MOPAN members contributed USD 9.8 million (or 28.9% of the total amount) to the trust funds, other member states contributed USD 0.97 million (2.9%), while the UN system, other international organisations and private and public sources contributed USD 7.3 million (21.6%). With some exceptions, projects are mostly small in size and short in duration. The average expenditure per project per year is approximately USD 170 000.

9. TD/B/WP/297 Review of the technical cooperation activities of UNCTAD and their financing (September 2019)
10. Automated System for Customs Data
1. INTRODUCTION

Box 1.2. The ASYCUDA programme

The Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) is a computerised customs management system which covers most foreign trade procedures. The system handles manifests and customs declarations, customs tariff, taxation and accounting procedures, and transit and suspense procedures. It generates trade data that can be used for statistical economic analysis. The ASYCUDA software is developed in Geneva by UNCTAD.

The ASYCUDA software operates on various types of hardware in a client/server environment. Transaction and control data are stored on a relational database management system. It takes into account all international codes and standards relevant to customs processing as established by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the World Customs Organization and the UN. ASYCUDA can be configured to suit national characteristics.

The ASYCUDA programme is directed at reforming the customs clearance process. It aims at speeding up customs clearance, increasing customs revenue, and producing reliable and timely trade and fiscal statistics to assist in the economic planning process. Several ASYCUDA user countries have requested UNCTAD to extend ASYCUDA to build their Single Window system for trade; henceforth, ASYCUDA automation of processes now encompasses more and more government agency procedures outside customs, such as agriculture, health, exemptions and bureau of standards.

The ASYCUDA implementation strategy aims to ensure the full transfer of know-how in order to make for national long-term sustainability. At the same time, it requires strong national commitment at all levels, and it provides for continuous progress evaluation. Project activities consist of an assessment phase, a pilot phase and a rollout phase. The first two phases have a minimum duration of 18 months and will only succeed with strong political commitment and support from the highest levels and with the full-time availability of a competent and motivated multi-skilled national team of customs and technical staff.

The impact of ASYCUDA projects can be assessed through the increase in customs revenues, the availability of reliable trade statistics and the reduction in average clearance time. In some countries, the results are less impressive, mainly because of resistance to the in-depth reforms of the customs system that the implementation of the programme requires.

The ASYCUDA programme began in 1981. Overall, there are now more than 100 countries worldwide that have adopted the ASYCUDA programme, most of which are using or migrating to the latest version of ASYCUDA. With 51 operational projects, including 7 regional and interregional projects, ASYCUDA is by far the single largest TC programme in UNCTAD, with 47% of UNCTAD expenditures as of end-2018.

The technical development of ASYCUDA is made possible by a team of internationally recruited staff and contributions from other UN agencies, the European Union, the World Bank, the World Customs Organization, as well as from Australia, France, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

12. For more information, see www.asycuda.org.
The Debt Management and Financial Analysis System (DMFAS) programme provides TC and advisory services in the area of debt management. Its overall objective is to strengthen the capacity of developing countries and countries with economies in transition to manage their debt in an effective and sustainable way, in support of poverty reduction, development and good governance.

The current strategic plan of the DMFAS programme focuses on delivering technical assistance in its areas of comparative advantage. These are the downstream areas of debt management, considered as being the foundations for its effectiveness.

The first version of DMFAS was released in 1983. Since its inception, the programme has provided country assistance to 108 institutions in 70 developing countries, through tailor-made technical assistance projects. At the end of 2018, 84 institutions in 57 countries actively used the DMFAS software for their day-to-day debt management operations. Concrete and sustainable results include improved debt coverage, enhanced transparency and reporting, better operational risk management and greater integration with public finance management.

The core activities of the DMFAS programme are financed through a multi-donor multi-year central trust fund. Currently, the programme’s donors include Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland as well as the European Union. The DMFAS programme also generates a part of its resources from cost-sharing with beneficiaries. Institutions using the DMFAS programme support the financing of the programme by paying an annual maintenance fee and a one-off development contribution.

At present, UNCTAD’s largest TC project is the Angola: Train for Trade II project (see Box 1.4). It is the first multi-annual, multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder project and also the first of its kind in terms of the depth of internal cross-divisional collaboration. Led by the ALDC division, the project brings together experts from branches in three of the four other divisions.

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13. For more information, see https://unctad.org/divs/gds/dmfas/Pages/default.aspx.
1. INTRODUCTION

Box 1.4. The Angola Train for Trade II project

The EU-UNCTAD joint Programme for Angola: Train for Trade II is a component of the overall Projeto de Apoio ao Comércio (ACOM), aiming at strengthening Angola’s institutional and human resources capacity for economic diversification. UNCTAD provides ACOM’s training and capacity-building activities, as well as study tours for Angolan partners, as a way to strengthen the country’s capacity in policy formulation and implementation.

Led by UNCTAD’s ALDC division, and in close partnership with three other UNCTAD divisions (DITC, DTL and DIAE), UNCTAD’s contribution to ACOM – known as the Angola project – focuses on seven key areas: commercial diplomacy; Angola Green Export Review; trade facilitation; transport and logistics; investment policy review; creative economies; and Empretec (i.e. support to the development of an entrepreneurship policy and training for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises). The USD 5 million project is expected to last 57 months, from May 2017 till February 2022.

The Angola project is the first of its kind within UNCTAD, marking a shift from a single-project approach to a multi-annual, multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder programme approach. UNCTAD undertook a joint needs assessment mission that drew on previous research and analysis and included wide and robust consultation with government institutions and the EU. The involvement of various national stakeholders and relevant ministries in the design and implementation of the project has brought policy and institutional co-ordination to the fore. This important contribution is helping to strengthen agreed project components through the approach validated in the project’s Action Plan.

The project builds on the government’s strategic framework. Each component has a full logical framework, based on the needs assessed by each of the divisions, including gender targets and gender disaggregated data points. The framework also includes a table of operational, strategic and political risks, mitigation actions, and risk tracking.

The success of the Angola project has triggered requests from other member states for similar cross-cutting country projects and programmes.

Most funding for TC is earmarked; few donors provide predictable annual contributions regulated by a co-operation agreement signed between the donor and UNCTAD. Funding for UNCTAD’s TC is unstable and unpredictable (see Figure 1.1). In most cases, there is a mismatch between demand and supply. In 2013, contributions amounted to USD 31 million. Compared with 2017, in 2018 TC funding decreased by 3% to USD 34 million. Compared with 2016, in 2018 extrabudgetary funding decreased by 20% (from USD 40 million), while total expenditure for TC rose to USD 44 million. According to UNCTAD’s latest figures, 2019 showed an increase in extrabudgetary-contributions to almost USD 44 million.

UNCTAD’s TC covers a range of topics, grouped into 28 Toolbox products. All of these are aimed at assisting countries in putting in place policies, regulations and institutional frameworks and in mobilising the resources needed to fulfil the ambitions of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, specific to trade and development. The Toolbox contains information about the TC products, as well as guidance on how to submit a request for TC. The TC products range from reviews, guides and policy advice to training and provision of information technology software. These are spread over the five divisions as follows: two for GDS (including DMFAS); eight for DIAE; nine for DITC; six for DTL (including ASYCUDA); and three for ALDC.
UNCTAD distinguishes between country, regional and interregional-level projects. The latter are thematic projects implemented in beneficiary countries which cover more than one geographical region. In 2018, 46% of expenditures went to LDCs. About half of the expenditures on regional and country-level projects was spent in Africa. In 2018, 51% of project expenditure was on country-level projects; regional and interregional-level projects accounted for 16% and 33%, respectively.

Most of UNCTAD’s TC is implemented by UNCTAD itself, often supported by consultants, in partnership with member states’ governments. Some interventions are implemented in partnership with other agencies that provide trade-related technical assistance. Implementation is primarily determined by the availability of extrabudgetary funding, largely earmarked by donors for specific Toolbox products and/or countries. Demand from member states outweights supply considerably. Requests for which no funding has yet been secured by the member state or UNCTAD remain pending.
1.4. THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Assessment framework
This MOPAN assessment covers the period from 2017 to mid-2019 in line with the MOPAN 3.0* methodology, which can be found on MOPAN’s website. The assessment addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours, as well as results achieved. It focuses on the five performance areas presented in Box 1.5. The first four relate to organisational effectiveness, and each has two key performance indicators (KPIs). The fifth performance area relates to effectiveness of development, humanitarian and normative work, and comprises four KPIs.

Box 1.5. Performance areas and key performance indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Performance area</th>
<th>Key performance indicator (KPI)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisational effectiveness</td>
<td>Strategic management</td>
<td>KPI 1: The organisational architecture and the financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operational management</td>
<td>KPI 3: The operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relationship management</td>
<td>KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPI 6: Partnership working is coherent and directed at leveraging and/or ensuring relevance and the catalytic use of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance management</td>
<td>KPI 7: The focus on results is strong, transparent and explicitly geared towards function</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPI 8: The organisation applies evidence-based planning and programming</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development/humanitarian effectiveness</td>
<td>Results</td>
<td>KPI 9: Development and humanitarian objectives are achieved, and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPI 10: Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>KPI 11: Results are delivered efficiently</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KPI 12: Results are sustainable</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


15. The MOPAN indicator framework was developed by MOPAN’s Technical Working Group and draws on international standards and reference points, as described in Annex C of the Methodology Manual.
Methodology changes in the 2019 Cycle

As part of MOPAN’s efforts to ensure its assessments remain relevant to stakeholders and aligned to international best practice, the MOPAN methodology is always evolving. Lessons from each assessment cycle inform the next, and work is always being undertaken to explore how best to cover salient issues. In addition to relatively minor lessons learned from the 2017-18 Cycle conducted under the MOPAN 3.0 methodology, the MOPAN 3.0* methodology applied for the 2019 Assessment Cycle includes two notable changes.

The first is on how ratings (and their corresponding colours) are applied based on the scores at micro-indicator (MI) and KPI levels. Compared to previous cycles, the threshold for a rating has been raised to reflect the increasing demands for organisational performance in the multilateral system. The underlying scores and approach to scoring are unaffected.

The second is that organisations had greater flexibility in selecting relevant partners and countries for the survey line of evidence. This approach allows for a more relevant sampling of organisations’ external partners and geographic coverage.

Applying the MOPAN methodology to UNCTAD

This performance assessment was conducted between late August and mid-December 2019 by the independent assessment team, supported by the MOPAN Secretariat and engaging with UNCTAD through close collaboration with the UNCTAD MOPAN focal point.

This assessment addresses the TC pillar work of UNCTAD only. Noting that the execution of TC is dependent on the core internal organisational systems and processes of UNCTAD, the assessors engaged with the five substantive divisions that manage the TC work and the support services/units that receive extrabudgetary financing to enable this work.

The assessment of performance covers UNCTAD as an organisation (i.e. Geneva headquarters and the offices in New York and Addis Ababa). The MOPAN methodology was applied with some minor adjustments in indicator application or interpretation to reflect the realities of UNCTAD’s mandate and operating systems pertaining to TC (see also Annex 1):

- **MI 2.1a-2.1d (with implications on MI 5.5, 9.4-9.7):** The four cross-cutting issues in the MOPAN methodology – gender equality and the empowerment of women, environmental sustainability and climate change, good governance, and human rights – were maintained. Good governance was interpreted as policies and practices that promote economic governance as a cross-cutting issue across all TC programmes and projects. No further cross-cutting issues were added.

- **MI 3.3. Aid reallocation/programming decisions responsive to need can be made at a decentralised level:** In view of UNCTAD’s organisational structure (i.e. a non-resident agency with no operational field level offices), “decentralised level” was understood in terms of the Divisional level.

- **MI 6.7. Clear standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiaries exist:** Given that accountability to beneficiaries is often understood in the context of humanitarian and development assistance involving direct contact between the international organisation and beneficiaries, it was decided to exclude this micro-indicator from the assessment framework.

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16. For example, previously if all elements for a MI were scored a 2 and only one was scored a 3 (averaging above 2.01 at the MI level), this would have been rated Satisfactory. Now, more than half of the elements need to score 3, averaging above 2.51, to achieve the same rating. More details on scoring and rating scales can be found in Annex 1.

17. This increased flexibility was enabled by a streamlined data collection process for the partner survey, which was carried out directly by the MOPAN Secretariat, rather than an external service provider, for the first time in the 2019 Cycle.
1. INTRODUCTION

With respect to organisational effectiveness, the assessment did not undertake an in-depth, individual review of all TC programmes. Rather, the review focused on organisational arrangements for the TC programmes. In addition, a purposeful sample of 57 TC projects implemented in the same sample of twelve countries selected for the partner survey were reviewed, to understand how UNCTAD’s operational policies and procedures are implemented. These countries are Albania, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, and Zambia. They map the regions of Africa, Central America, South and Central Asia, and Europe. Each country has a sizeable TC portfolio (over USD 1 million); combined, the projects cover 11 different thematic priority areas.

The assessment of organisational effectiveness configured around the organisation that enables and delivers UNCTAD’s TC work covers UNCTAD’s headquarters and regional and country field engagement. It addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours as evident within and pertaining to the period of January 2017-mid-2019.

The MOPAN scoring and rating system has been applied with some limitations for organisational effectiveness (KPIs 1-8). No rating or scoring was however applied for results (KPIs 9-12), as UNCTAD’s results are a composite of all three pillars: TC, research and analysis, and consensus building. Instead, the report narrates themes and challenges relating to TC results emerging from external independent evaluations, audits and reviews from 2013 till now.

**Lines of evidence**

This assessment relies on three lines of evidence: a document review, a partner survey, and staff interviews and consultations. The assessment team collected and reviewed a significant body of evidence, using an iterative process with parallel data collection across three lines of evidence:

- **A document review.** The document review was conducted from September to November 2019. The assessment team extracted relevant evidence from a selected 187 documents out of a total of 561 recorded documents, all of which were screened for applicability, and UNCTAD’s intranet website, containing additional information relevant to the assessment.

- **An online survey.** To ensure that the overall group of countries in which the partner survey was to be conducted was well tailored to UNCTAD, the assessment team in collaboration with UNCTAD identified 12 countries: Albania, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, and Zambia. The partner survey was adapted in accordance with the adjusted scope of the assessment and conducted between 15 October and 6 November 2019. Out of a total population of 206 recipients, 65 survey responses were returned from 11 countries, giving a response rate of 32%. The results of the partner survey can be found in Annex 3.

- **Interviews and consultations.** Four visits to the UNCTAD headquarters in Geneva were conducted between September and November 2019. The first visit was held on 11-13 September and involved the Assessment Team Lead and the MOPAN Secretariat lead for the UNCTAD assessment. It focused on finalising and expediting the detailed arrangements for the partner survey and the interviews and consultations. It also targeted filling any specific gaps identified on document collection and on contextual understanding in respect to the UNCTAD organisation and on the MOPAN assessment. The second visit took place on 30 September-4 October and involved a first round of staff interviews targeting the performance areas of strategic management, operational management, relationship management and performance management (KPIs 1-8). A third visit on 14-18 October focused on initial fact-checking and supplementary targeted interviews. During this visit, the assessment team shared preliminary observations on emerging findings with the OSG. On 25-26 November, the Assessment Team Lead accompanied by the MOPAN Secretariat paid a final visit to share and discuss the skeleton (draft) high-level
assessment reached by the assessment team with the OSG. All discussions helped shape a nuanced position on identified strengths and areas for improvement, as reflected in this assessment report.

A total of 69 interviews and consultations were undertaken, at UNCTAD headquarters level and remotely at country/regional level. Interviews and consultations helped to deepen, corroborate or refute findings emerging from the document review, give updates on ongoing reform agendas, identify trends, provide context to validate or refute observations, generate new evidence and seek out explanations (why and how). For all interviews and consultations, a semi-structured framework was applied, covering the main areas for assessment. Findings have been anonymised and are non-attributable.

General information about the sequence and details related to these evidence lines, the overall analysis, and the scoring and rating process as applied to UNCTAD can be found in the MOPAN 3.0* methodology.

Limitations
The assessment process was notably different from other MOPAN assessments in terms of density (4 months as opposed to 12). To mitigate related potential limitations, engagement with UNCTAD during and after data collection was more frequent and more intense than usual (i.e. three rounds of interviews instead of one, and 187 documents extracted out of a total of 561, multiple interactions with the organisation, including two rounds of discussion on preliminary and high-level findings – drafted at a time when evidence was still being extracted - as well as two rounds of review of the draft report). Because of the density of the assessment process, the scoring system was applied directly at MI level for KPIs 1-8 with particular attention given on the narrative text to ensure clarity of scoring.

It should be noted that findings from this assessment, including at a programme and project level, are only valid within the TC pillar. The two other pillars of UNCTAD, while interlinked with TC, do not function in the same way and have not been subject to any form of review. To extend an opinion of TC effectiveness across the organisation would therefore be inappropriate.
2. DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF UNCTAD’S PERFORMANCE
Chapter 2. Detailed assessment of UNCTAD’s performance

The performance is assessed on four dimensions of organisational effectiveness – strategic, operational, relationship and performance management – and on the results achieved by the organisation. These findings are constructed against the organisation’s own strategic plan and performance indicators.

In this way, organisational effectiveness relates to a blended assessment of intent, effort and response. Organisational intent is expressed through commitments, strategies, policies and plans. The organisational effort is that which the organisation puts behind a particular agenda for performance and improvement including guidance issued. The organisational response is its reaction to the effects of this effort in relation to changing organisational direction, practice and behaviour.

Organisational effectiveness is juxtaposed alongside development effectiveness. The latter refers to the extent to which the organisation is making a difference in ways that reflect its strategic objectives and mandate.

2.1. ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

PERFORMANCE AREA: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities.

The long-term vision of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is laid out in its mandate. Technical co-operation (TC) is one of UNCTAD’s three pillars and closely interlinks with the consensus-building and research and analysis pillars. At UNCTAD, TC is de facto decentralised; the five divisions maintain a high level of autonomy with respect to the way they organise and manage TC. Consequently, different operating models have evolved over time and co-exist alongside each other. UNCTAD does not have a strategic level TC steering committee of sorts. Although interdivisional collaboration is actively encouraged, it is not yet self-evident throughout TC.

TC is largely funded through extrabudgetary sources. It is fragmented and grouped into as many as 28 “products”. The two main programmes, ASYCUDA and DMFAS, accounted for 58% of TC expenditures as of December 2018. The remainder of the TC pillar consists of small size projects, with a short lifespan, and fragmented across themes and countries.

As a non-resident agency, UNCTAD recognises the need for strong co-operation with other agencies. The degree to which UNCTAD works closely with them varies considerably, depending on how each division, branch, section and individual staff member approach collaboration.
At UNCTAD, member states play a key role in determining global priorities and pillar work streams. However, neither member states nor the secretariat have set clear, strategic priorities between UNCTAD’s three pillars, or within the TC pillar. Whereas TC is in principle meant to be driven by member states’ demands, in practice, in many cases, donor funding availability determines the extent to which demand can be met. UNCTAD lacks both an up-to-date TC strategy and a TC fundraising strategy.

As regards mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues, enhancing economic good governance is a critical programmatic area and implicit in relation to UNCTAD’s mandate. UNCTAD’s efforts in this regard are well-appreciated by member states. Over the past years, UNCTAD has made notable progress in developing policy to mainstream gender equality and women’s empowerment in TC. Policies, systems, processes and capabilities have been developed in this regard. Progress on gender within UNCTAD has been acknowledged by the Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations and reflected in the annual UN System-wide Action Plan reports. This cannot be said for two other cross-cutting items in TC, namely environmental sustainability and climate change, and respect for human rights. Despite UNCTAD’s recognition of human rights as a priority cross-cutting issue, and its growing effort to highlight the nexus between the trade and climate change, there is no evidence of secretariat-wide adoption and integration of these considerations in UNCTAD’s TC.

**KPI 1: The organisational architecture and the financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results.**

This KPI focuses on the extent to which UNCTAD has articulated a coherent and strategic vision on how and for what purpose it has organised its resources to deliver both long- and short-term results in TC.

**UNCTAD updates the long-term vision laid out in its mandate during quadrennial conferences,** most recently with the UNCTAD XIV Nairobi Maafikiano outcome document. Through these, member states task the UNCTAD secretariat to operate across a vast and growing set of ambitious trade and development challenges. The Maafikiano – similar to previous outcome documents – identifies no less than 110 priorities.

**UNCTAD aligns its TC to relevant wider normative frameworks pertinent to its mandate,** including *inter alia* the Agenda 2030, the Istanbul Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011-2020, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, the Vienna Programme of Action for landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) for the Decade 2014-2024, and the Small Island Developing Countries Accelerated Modalities of Action (Samoa Pathway). UNCTAD leads the UN Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity. UNCTAD reports annually to member states on expenditures against the Sustainable Development Goals.

**At UNCTAD, TC is de facto decentralised; the five divisional directors maintain a high level of autonomy** with respect to the way they organise and manage TC. Divisions, branches and sections approach TC from their own thematic angles and have developed, to a greater or lesser extent, division-, branch- and even section-level TC strategies, with corresponding priorities, results frameworks, selection criteria and management arrangements. Consequently, different operating models have evolved over time and co-exist alongside each other, with the Technical Cooperation Section (TCS) of the OSG more in an enabling than a steering capacity.

**Interdivisional co-operation is a persistent challenge within the secretariat.** Whereas one would expect the hybrid organisational structure and thematic interlinkages to encourage co-operation, in practice this is not a given. UNCTAD does not have a strategic level TC steering committee of sorts. Nor is there a cross-divisional project appraisal committee, where project proposals prepared at the divisional level are discussed more broadly, weighed and decided upon. The Project Review Committee, originally designed to take on a cross-divisional co-ordination role, has not yet reached its full potential. It does not convene regularly, and its membership fluctuates. The level of
co-operation between sections, branches and divisions varies from project to project. It is undertaken mostly at an operational project/programme level, with different sections and branches contributing to each other’s TC projects. While OSG’s incremental efforts to promote interdivisional collaboration are noteworthy, much still depends on the personal networks and initiative of staff members.

The TC pillar suffers from resource shortages as well as competing priorities, generating fragmentation. At UNCTAD, member states have a major role in determining work plans. Demand for TC is in particular growing, often in response to work carried out in UNCTAD’s two other pillars, as shown for example by the grouping into no less than 28 Toolbox products. Consequently, although budgets are adequately prepared and planned, resources are spread too thinly across a growing number of workstreams. Putting aside the two major programmes ASYCUDA and DMFAS, TC projects are generally speaking small in size, with a short lifespan. In December 2018, over 80 sources of funding (USD 34 million) contributed to no less than 249 projects in more than 90 countries.

It is in many cases donor funding availability that ultimately determines the extent to which demand can be met for TC. UNCTAD prioritises LDCs, LLDCs and SIDSs, but also responds to MICs and countries in transition. At the same time, member states have also set a very high number of thematic priorities for TC. Combined, this leads to a wide range of priorities that cannot be all fulfilled with available resources. However, neither member states nor the secretariat have set clear mechanisms for arbitrating these priorities within the TC pillar. In practice, donor preferences therefore tend to influence implementation priorities quite heavily, thus limiting the share of TC spending in the least developed countries (LDCs), LLDCs and especially small island developing states (SIDS).

UNCTAD lacks an up-to-date TC strategy that could support answering these challenges. The most recent secretariat-wide strategy on TC was adopted in 2003 and consists of guiding principles. Despite adding new mandated areas to UNCTAD’s TC pillar, the TC strategy has not been updated to align with outcome documents and does not provide any mechanism for arbitrating competing priorities. The Maafikiano provides policy overview but not a clearly defined strategy on TC operationalising the mandate in terms of intended results.

KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels.

This KPI looks at the articulation and positioning within UNCTAD’s structures and mechanisms of the cross-cutting priorities to which the organisation is committed in pursuit of its strategic objectives through TC.

While enhancing good economic governance is a critical programmatic area and implicit in relation to UNCTAD’s mandate, the secretariat does not have a clear definition or explicit economic governance strategy or business processes in place. Still, many TC programmes and projects do include an explicit objective to improve economic policy and strengthen the capacity of relevant government institutions. UNCTAD events and training also include a focus on improving economic governance, and staff regard this objective as a sine qua non. UNCTAD’s partners appreciate UNCTAD’s TC assistance in this regard.

Over the past years, UNCTAD has made notable progress in developing and implementing a policy to mainstream gender equality and women’s empowerment in TC. A gender strategy, developed in 2011, will be updated with a view to incorporate the 2020 UNCTAD XV conference outcomes. In 2016, gender became an explicit component in the design and screening of new TC interventions. All new interventions are now assessed by the gender focal points as part of the formal secretariat-wide approval process. Guidance, including a checklist for gender mainstreaming, has been developed and made available through the secretariat’s intranet. In its gender parity strategy, UNCTAD commits itself inter alia to review all UNCTAD’s technical assistance programmes and mainstream gender in them. UNCTAD identified two gender equality and women’s empowerment goals in its 2018-19 biennium
programme and budget proposal. Organisationally, a gender task force (i.e. a network of gender focal points within each division) has been established to reinforce and broaden the scope of UNCTAD's activities for women's economic empowerment. It is chaired by the DSG but meets irregularly. The gender parity strategy 2018-21 sets targets in priority areas of human resource management. UN Women has commended UNCTAD for its continuous efforts to strengthen gender equality and women's empowerment, both in TC activities and within the secretariat itself. This is corroborated by evidence from evaluations that demonstrate a solid commitment to improving gender outcomes. However, there is less evidence of impact on gender equality, and continued reference to the need to strengthen gender mainstreaming and training. Still, the overall trajectory appears to be positive.

**There is no evidence of secretariat-wide adoption and integration of environmental sustainability and climate change considerations in UNCTAD's TC.** Although UNCTAD is showing a growing interest in environmental sustainability and climate change and is engaged in a number of TC projects to that effect, processes and mechanisms to incorporate these considerations throughout the project cycle are lacking. There are however numerous efforts recorded at the corporate level to comply with environmental sustainability and to highlight the nexus between trade and climate change.

Similarly, with regard to human rights, although the Maafikiano does identify human rights as a priority cross-cutting issue, this has not been operationalised. Human rights are included in due diligence requirements and in the terms of references of external evaluations, and some isolated examples of projects that explicitly address human rights do exist. However, there is no evidence of secretariat-wide adoption and integration of human rights considerations in UNCTAD's TC with also lack of processes and mechanisms to incorporate these considerations throughout the project cycle. Staff have not been trained, nor has any bespoke guidance for UNCTAD staff been developed.

**Figure 2.1. Cross-cutting issues**

![Figure 2.1. Cross-cutting issues](image)

PERFORMANCE AREA: OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance, agility and accountability.

With only two presences outside Geneva and few project staff posted in the field, UNCTAD’s overall operating model is Geneva-based and driven. Following budget cuts, since 2013, UNCTAD has lost 25 regular budget established posts, bringing the number of regular posts down from 400 in 2013 to 375 in 2020. In addition, there are 108 extrabudgetary-funded staff in temporary posts, 80% of which are under contract for the ASYCUDA and DMFAS programmes, both of which have dedicated project management units. In many other cases, projects are delivered by UNCTAD staff, alongside other duties.

Changes to the internal structure are subject to approval by member states. UNCTAD reports and external evaluations point to a need for enhanced resourcing of UNCTAD’s TC pillar. Over the years, UNCTAD’s organisational structures have largely remained untouched. Staff mobility is low, and staff positions are static. The lack of resources and recent budget cuts hamper UNCTAD’s ability to respond to changes in demand from member states, for instance in the realm of e-commerce and the digital economy.

UNCTAD does not have a fundraising strategy that is closely and explicitly aligned to the priorities of the Nairobi Maafikiano and subsequent programme and budget proposals. Efforts are being made to diversify funding, also from non-traditional sources, but so far these have not been very successful. Despite its potential in the particular context of trade and development, private sector funding is not being pursued by the secretariat. UNCTAD’s vulnerability is well-recognised, but secretariat-wide action has thus far been ad hoc.

Though oversight mechanisms are in place, TCS is insufficiently able to leverage its role on overall co-ordination of projects and programmes. The de facto decentralised structure and work processes have encouraged the delegation of decision-making authority for TC projects to directors, branch heads and project managers. All aspects of UNCTAD’s human resource management are governed by UN Secretariat regulations and rules. The recently introduced management information system or “dashboard” has enhanced transparency and efficiency.

In keeping with the de facto decentralised structure and work processes, fundraising is mostly undertaken at the divisional, rather than the secretariat level. Although UNCTAD has a clearly defined targeting policy, in practice, prioritisation and implementation are wholly dependent on the availability of extrabudgetary, often earmarked, donor funding.

As a UN Secretariat entity, UNCTAD operates within UN Secretariat regulations and rules, and it applies these rigorously and efficiently. There is a robust control framework in place. UNCTAD monitors implementation of audit recommendations through its MIS dashboard on a two-monthly basis. It has an excellent track record of full implementation of OIOS recommendations.
KPI 3: The operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility.

This KPI focuses on how key operational functions (e.g. human resources, resource generation and programming) are continuously geared to support strategic direction and deliver results in TC.

With only two presences outside Geneva and few project staff posted in the field, the overall operating model is Geneva-based and driven. UN member states are the driving force behind UNCTAD’s priorities and pillar work streams. Member states also determine the size of the regular budget and are the main sponsors of extrabudgetary-funded TC interventions.

Overall UNCTAD’s staff are highly dedicated to UNCTAD’s mandate. They are responsive to member states’ demands for TC and collaborate closely with member states to find the necessary resources.

However, structural funding gaps in recent years constrain UNCTAD’s capacity to deliver on TC. Due to recent budget constraints at the UN Secretariat, UNCTAD lost 20 regular budget-established posts out of 400 since 2013, and 5 more posts are proposed to be abolished, bringing the number of regular posts to 375 in 2020. In addition to regular posts, 108 extrabudgetary-funded UNCTAD staff in temporary posts work exclusively on TC. 80% are under contract with the ASYCUDA and DMFAS programmes, both of which have dedicated project management units. In many other cases, TC projects are delivered by regular budget-funded UNCTAD staff, alongside other duties, compounding constraints.

Over the years, UNCTAD’s organisational structures have largely remained untouched. Staff mobility is low, both within the secretariat and outside. There are no records of any recent internal restructuring of the organisation. At the divisional level, staff positions are static. The lack of resources and recent budget cuts hamper UNCTAD’s ability to respond to change.

UNCTAD does not have a fundraising strategy that is closely and explicitly aligned to the priorities of the Nairobi Maafikiano and subsequent programme and budget proposals. As in the case of TC planning and programming, fundraising is de facto decentralised and insufficiently co-ordinated. Fundraising is undertaken at the section, branch and division levels, as well as at the Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) and Secretary-General level, based on inputs provided by divisions. Excluding ASYCUDA and DMFAS, two programmes which have been at the heart of UNCTAD’s TC for the past three decades, the lack of a relevant, up-to-date and strategically aligned fundraising strategy has given rise to a partially fragmented TC portfolio and to a large number of ad hoc, small and short-term projects, rather than longer-term programmes. Efforts are being made to diversify funding, including from non-traditional sources, but these have not been very successful. A proposal for a fundraising strategy was put forward in 2013, but member states did not succeed in reaching consensus. Despite its potential in the particular context of trade and development, private sector funding is not being pursued by the secretariat and is therefore negligible. UNCTAD’s vulnerability is well-recognised, but secretariat-wide action has thus far been limited and ad hoc.

Although some positive steps have been taken in recent years, TCS is insufficiently able to leverage its role on overall co-ordination of projects and programmes, due in part to staff shortages. TCS collects data about donor priorities and has organised a number of match-making initiatives, bringing donors and UNCTAD staff together to identify funding opportunities but this has yet to alter the ad-hoc nature of fundraising for TC. The secretariat has introduced standardised, automated project approval systems that have contributed to greater transparency and accountability that facilitate TCS role. However, the decentralised operating model has encouraged the delegation of decision-making authority for TC projects to directors, branch heads and project managers, with TCS in an enabling rather than steering role.
As part of the UN Secretariat, all aspects of UNCTAD’s human resource management, including performance assessments, are governed by UN Secretariat regulations and rules. All UNCTAD staff members are subject to performance evaluations. The system is in place, and performance is monitored closely on a monthly basis by the Resources Management Service (RMS) through the recently introduced management information dashboard. There is a backlog in E-performance assessments, despite RMS issuing timely reminders. As for consultants, performance appraisals are carried out at the end of the assignment, for internal use only. These assessments are not shared with the consultant. E-performance is one input for staff promotion decisions. UNCTAD follows the UN Secretariat rules, regulations and guidance on staff disagreements and complaints regarding performance assessments, as well as other grievance instances; this is done on a case-by-case basis. Because UNCTAD has very limited financial resources for staff training opportunities, it relies on other, informal ways to improve TC-relevant skills among staff, e.g. on results-based management and on designing and implementing UN Development Account projects.

KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability

This KPI examines how UNCTAD uses its external and internal control mechanisms to meet the standards it sets on financial management and transparency, as applied to TC.

UNCTAD has a clearly defined and publicly available policy on which priority countries it seeks to serve through its TC pillar, namely African countries, LDCs, LLDCs and SIDSs. It has also created a separate Trust Fund for LDCs, which allows contributions to be made for the benefit of LDCs. The majority of resources are directed towards the above categories of countries, either directly or through inter-regional programmes. However, targeting is broad; in reality, prioritisation and implementation is wholly dependent on the availability of extrabudgetary funding, of which over 90% are provided by bilateral donors and is often earmarked.

In keeping with the de facto decentralised structure and work processes and because of UNCTAD’s reliance on earmarked extrabudgetary (XB) funding, there does not appear to be an explicit secretariat-wide organisational statement or policy that clearly defines criteria for allocating TC resources to partners. On average, TC expenditure on LDCs in the period between 2015 and 2018 accounted for 47.3% of the total; approximately one-third of this involved LDCs’ participation in regional and inter-regional projects. In terms of thematic priorities, UNCTAD’s TC Toolbox identifies no less than 28 different products. Besides these, UNCTAD also supports occasional requests for TC assistance that are not part of the Toolbox (in 2018: 4% of total expenditures).
As a UN Secretariat entity, UNCTAD operates within UN Secretariat regulations and rules, and it applies these rigorously and efficiently. Disbursements are based on extrabudgetary fund availability and are subject to project-level contractual arrangements with donors. RMS is in charge of and monitors disbursements, reporting on a monthly basis to divisions and to the OSG on trust fund management and management information. Since its introduction in 2018, the management information system (known as the dashboard) has contributed considerably to greater transparency and accountability.

**TC budgets are developed on a per project basis and not on a pillar or divisional basis.** Because the subprogramme and budget proposals do not include extrabudgetary-funded TC interventions, the overall organisational budget does not align financial resources with strategic results in the TC pillar. Despite its improvements in some areas, staff experience difficulties in using the UN management information system Umoja to track performance at the activity level and instead have developed their own parallel system. Pending further rollouts of Umoja functionalities, UNCTAD does not currently have an information technology system to support the tracking of expenditure to results. There is financial information available on variance but performance management in TC is weak.

**Internal control has been greatly strengthened in recent years.** UNCTAD is subject to the UN Secretariat’s internal control mechanisms. There is a robust control framework in place for operational and financial risk management, internal audit and safeguards. UNCTAD monitors implementation of audit recommendations through its MIS dashboard on a 2-monthly basis. It has an excellent track record of full implementation of OIOS recommendations. Staff members at all levels are expected to become familiar with the contents of the Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework and to comply with its guidance and principles. Guidelines have been distributed to all UNCTAD staff. Anti-Fraud and Ethics training courses are available and mandatory for all staff. In practice, however, less than 10% were registered as having followed these.

**PERFORMANCE AREA: RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT**

*Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, to leverage effective solutions and to maximise results (in line with Busan Partnerships commitments).*

On the whole, TC projects are driven by demand from member states, centre on national governments and are developed in partnership with the clients. Member states consider technical assistance interventions as highly relevant.

Context analysis and partner capacity analysis are now mandatory elements of the appraisal process of new requests for TC, and UNCTAD has developed guidelines on what is needed. In practice, the depth of the analysis differs from project to project.

Risk management for TC is an emergent practice at UNCTAD. Analysis of project documents found limited evidence of a risk framework, identification or consideration of risk in the project descriptions and logframes.
Not all cross-cutting issues are addressed systematically. Many TC interventions aim to strengthen existing national systems. Sustainability – in the sense that the benefits of the project are expected to continue after its completion – is part of the project document design template. In practice, achievements of sustainable results are mixed.

UNCTAD’s institutional procedures are efficient and allow for swift action. The introduction and use of the management information system dashboard has increased internal efficiency, transparency and communication.

Projects and programmes are largely decentralised and managed in a flexible way. This allows the organisation to adapt to context changes, although being a non-resident agency does have an effect on UNCTAD’s agility to respond timely to unforeseen developments. The very nature of UNCTAD’s TC is to put in place or strengthen country systems, in accordance with the common principles listed in the Busan partnership document. There is evidence that diagnosis of country systems is part of the screening process of new requests, and the majority of projects seek to ensure full ownership by member states and to transfer capacity to countries.

With respect to both internal and external synergies, UNCTAD’s efforts are noted, but remain a work in progress. As a non-resident agency, partnerships are vitally important. UNCTAD’s leadership of the United Nations Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity is an important vehicle, as well as the work undertaken by UNCTAD’s regional presence in Addis Ababa and New York. Although UNCTAD’s engagement on UN reforms and the UNSDCF is noteworthy, realignment of work programmes and processes is insufficiently recognised as a key priority throughout the secretariat. UNCTAD’s current level of engagement does not match the organisation’s ambitions or growing demand.

KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships.

This KPI focuses on the scope and robustness of UNCTAD’s processes and practices in support of timely, flexible and responsive planning and intervention design for TC.

On the whole, TC projects are member state demand-driven, national government-centric and developed in partnership with the clients, and the relevance of technical assistance interventions is rated highly. UNCTAD has hitherto participated or is still actively participating in the formulation of 37 Common Country Analysis as well as related narrative parts of UNSDCFs during the design phase. Although UNCTAD does not have country strategies itself, its TC member states must articulate how the organisation’s TC would contribute to their national development strategies. The large percentage of locally (self-) funded projects under ASYCUDA and DMFAS are an indication of successful alignment of TC to the needs and priorities of the member states.

Context analysis and partner capacity analysis are compulsory elements of the appraisal process of new requests for TC, and guidelines on what is needed have been developed. In practice, the depth of the analysis differs from project to project. A basic capacity analysis is required as part of the stakeholder analysis and is one of the ten “Minimum Requirements” for results-based management. Although respondents to the partner survey spoke appreciatively of these, the review of a sample of documents of projects carried out in the surveyed countries shows a mixed picture. In some cases, context analysis was included; in others, especially the older projects, this was not the case. There was limited evidence of reflection points with partners.

Risk management for TC is an emergent practice at UNCTAD. At the level of TC interventions, risk assessments are required; however, these are not broken down into the four risk categories (operational, strategic, political and reputational). Interviews indicate that ensuring staff comply with UN rules and regulations is a work in progress; until recently, no such system existed. Survey respondents appreciate UNCTAD’s risk management, with 90% giving positive ratings. This is in contrast with the analysis from the project sample from the same countries, where only limited evidence was found of a risk framework, identification or consideration of risk in the project descriptions and logframes.
Not all cross-cutting issues are addressed systematically. With the exception of economic governance, which is integral to most TC interventions, and of gender mainstreaming, there is little evidence to suggest that other cross-cutting issues (environmental sustainability and climate change, and respect for human rights) are consistently included in the design of TC interventions.

Many TC interventions aim to strengthen existing national systems. Sustainability – in the sense that the benefits of the project are expected to continue after its completion – is part of the project document design template. In practice, results are mixed. Evaluations found evidence of good practice or some likelihood of sustainability of the TC interventions they had examined. Nevertheless, stronger national ownership and engagement, as well as a programmatic rather than project approach, were recommended. Moreover, sustainability pathways are not clearly articulated in project documents; nor were they clearly expressed by staff during interviews. Given the large number of one-off interventions, sustainability is not always an integral consideration in project design.

UNCTAD’s institutional procedures are efficient and allow for swift action; still, UN Secretariat processes and instruments are not always well appreciated by staff. Umoja is seen as cumbersome and rigid, despite recent improvements. The introduction and use of the UNCTAD’s management information dashboard has increased internal efficiency, transparency and communication. Seventy per cent of partners state that organisational procedures do not cause delays.
KPI 6: Partnership working is coherent and directed at leveraging and/or ensuring relevance and the catalytic use of resources.

This KPI looks at how UNCTAD engages in TC partnerships to maximise the effect of its investment resources and its wider engagement.

Projects and programmes are largely decentralised and managed in a flexible way. This allows UNCTAD to adapt to context changes, provided of course that these changes are observed and addressed in a timely manner. Generally speaking, the fact that UNCTAD is a non-resident agency does affect its agility, in the sense that where it does not have staff on the ground, it is less able to anticipate or respond in a timely manner to unforeseen events. Besides ensuring that the necessary secretariat-wide mechanisms are in place, agility in TC also depends on the extent to which individual staff members pro-actively manage their portfolio.

UNCTAD’s TC is expected to be based on its comparative advantage, differentiation of its work with respect to other organisations and complementarity. The appraisal process now includes a mandatory section on complementarity; before 2016, this was not always clearly stated. Member states see UNCTAD as the key UN agency on its mandated themes and topics, although in some cases the potential risk of overlap with other UN entities, such as the International Trade Centre or the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, is present. Survey responses show high levels of appreciation for UNCTAD’s staff, skills and products, including TC and knowledge products. This is corroborated by evidence from across the five subprogramme evaluations. Most programmes and projects are demand-driven; others are partly donor-driven, in the sense that earmarked funding criteria determine which countries are eligible for TC support and which ones are not.

The very nature of UNCTAD’s work is to put in place or strengthen country systems, in accordance with the common principles listed in the Busan partnership document. There is evidence that diagnosis of country systems is part of the screening process of new requests, and the majority of projects seek to ensure full ownership by member states and to transfer capacity to countries.

The level and depth of cross-divisional co-ordination and collaboration vary significantly. This is pointed to by findings in independent external evaluations but also corroborated by staff perceptions. This is despite the considerable effort by the OSG to encourage interdivisional collaboration as a way to leverage expertise and avoid fragmentation.

Although engagement on UN reforms and the UNSDCFs is noteworthy, the realignment of work programmes and processes is insufficiently prioritised throughout the secretariat. With respect to external synergies, as a non-resident agency, partnerships are vitally important. Interviewees point out that the UNCTAD secretariat has been involved in the UN Development System Reform process from the very start. UNCTAD’s leadership of the United Nations Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity is a particularly important vehicle, as well as the work undertaken by UNCTAD’s regional presence in Addis Ababa and New York office. Also, despite limited staff capacity, the secretariat engages in 37 United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks/UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNDAFs/UNSDCFs). Nevertheless, the effort remains inadequately resourced to match UNCTAD’s ambitions or growing demand.
UNCTAD is not a signatory to the International Aid Transparency Initiative; however, it does provide transparent information about budgets and posts during management briefings with member states. Moreover, The Technical Cooperation Section reports annually to the Trade and Development Board, providing detailed overviews of TC activities and their financing. There is evidence that joint progress assessments of TC do occur, though not in all cases.

Knowledge products are an important part of UNCTAD’s work in general, as well as products of the TC pillar itself. Member states participating in the partner survey show high levels of appreciation for UNCTAD’s knowledge products, with over 90% of respondents stating that they are (very) useful to their work.

PERFORMANCE AREA: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson learning.

UNCTAD’s approach to results-based management (RBM) demonstrates strong leadership from the OSG and improvement since 2016. There is evident effort and time dedicated to the implementation of an RBM system, which is gaining traction.

Corporate strategies are updated every four years following the Conference. While secretariat-wide plans include results frameworks, they tend to have an output focus or are too broad for satisfactory understanding of TC performance. The UNCTAD annual reports tend to focus on outputs, often as highlights or case studies, rather than providing overall TC programme performance analysis. Annual TCS reporting to the Working Party, linked to the Technical Cooperation Toolbox logframe indicators, focuses on achievements and less so on reflection on achievements or progress against objectives.

Further, there is a disconnect in practice between the systems to collect data, the data collection itself and the ability to meaningfully use the data. The decentralised nature of UNCTAD means that there are many approaches to performance management, some quite strong and others less so, but no holistic approach to tracking performance, identifying poor performance or overseeing deviations from planned results. However, thematic rationalisation of the TC Toolbox products to reduce fragmentation and remain current may support programming and funding approaches aligned with the mandate.

UNCTAD’s Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (EMU) is small but effective and is functionally and behaviourally independent. Still, it does need to consider perceptions of its structural independence. UNCTAD has a sound evaluation policy and evidence of use, and systems and tools are evident to ensure the quality of evaluations. Though at the project level for evaluations that fall outside EMU’s mandate, quality is self-managed unless support is sought from EMU. There are not strong organisational feedback loops for TC programmes and projects to ensure that lessons from past interventions are included in new designs. Some TC examples of using lessons learned in designing new interventions exist; though this is not yet standard practice and is often informal.

Subprogramme evaluations within the EMU-managed evaluation plan include clear accountability measures and report on the status of implementation of recommendations. Other than a financial tracking system, there is no organisational-level tracking of projects to identify poor performance. EMU systematically distils and publicly shares lessons from their managed evaluations, though it has no system to track uptake of lessons learned.
KPI 7: The focus on results is strong, transparent and explicitly geared towards function

This KPI looks at how UNCTAD transparently interprets and delivers an organisation-wide focus on results with respect to TC.

UNCTAD’s approach to RBM demonstrates strong leadership from the OSG and has improved since 2016. These leadership commitments are followed through as action items, and requirements are communicated to staff through OSG memos and systems improvements. In addition to improved systems, UNCTAD has developed tools, guidance and training to support staff throughout the planning and programming cycle. There is evident effort and time dedicated to the implementation of an RBM system, which is gaining traction.

While organisation-wide plans include results frameworks, they tend to have an output focus or are too broad for satisfactory understanding of TC performance. The TC Toolbox Results Framework allows more meaningful measurement of TC performance, though it is yet to be fully systematised.

Corporate strategies are updated after every quadrennial conference. Biennial programme plans, that include strategy and measurements against results targets for previous years, are updated every two years. From 2020 onwards, the biennial plans will be updated every year. The annual Review of TC Activities and Their Financing reports for the Working Party on the Strategic Framework and the Programme Budget do not describe deviations between planned and actual results.

The UNCTAD annual reports tend to focus on outputs, often as highlights or case studies, rather than providing overall TC programme performance analysis. The annual “Review of the technical cooperation activities of UNCTAD and their financing” reports for the Working Party on the Strategic Framework and the Programme Budget do not describe deviations between planned and actual results. Overall, the system for identifying performance deviation is weak.

There is a disconnect in practice between the systems to collect data, the data collection itself and the ability to meaningfully use the data. UNCTAD uses the Integrated Monitoring and Document Information System (IMDIS) to report to the UN Secretariat against the outcomes described in the programme plan and budget. As reporting is at branch level, TC outcomes are reported under the overall branch outcome-level indicator. As the TC Toolbox Results Framework is yet to be fully systematised, there remain gaps in data collection and understanding of results. UNCTAD is working to address these issues through the development of more detailed branch-level logframes linked to the TC activities.

Figure 2.5. Results-based management

The decentralised nature of UNCTAD means that there are many approaches to performance management. Some are quite strong and others less so, but there is no holistic approach to performance tracking, identification of poor performance or oversight of deviations from planned results. This is partly due to the delay in the roll-out of the Umoja 2 “Strategic Planning, Budgeting and Performance Management” solution.

Ongoing thematic rationalisation of the TC Toolbox products to reduce fragmentation and remain current may support programming and funding approaches aligned with the mandate. Ultimately, planning documents such as the programme plan and budget for the biennium, while informed by IMDIS performance data and reporting against outcome targets, are largely based on member states’ decisions related to the mandate and demand.

KPI 8: The organisation applies evidence-based planning and programming

This KPI focuses on the evaluation function and its positioning within UNCTAD’s structures, attention to quality, accountability and putting learning into practice, as applied to TC.

UNCTAD’s Evaluation and Monitoring Unit is small but effective. It is functionally and behaviourally independent. However, it needs to consider perceptions of its structural independence. Despite funding and capacity constraints, between 2016 and 2019 EMU successfully managed an annual evaluation plan of one to nine independent external evaluations per year; these are mostly Development Account evaluations and one subprogramme evaluation. EMU is also mandated to manage evaluations of technical co-operation projects over USD 1 million and of projects where donors specifically require independent evaluations. It also supports projects where the project manager seeks the lead of EMU (for both independent and self-evaluations). At the programme and project level, there is clear policy guidance on independence and application in EMU-managed independent technical co-operation project and programme evaluations. However, there is less clear evidence about how this policy is applied by divisions and programmes for independent evaluations that are not included in the EMU evaluation plan, though the likelihood of these is low. Although the precise amount of self-evaluations is not recorded, most technical co-operation evaluations would be self-evaluations by the project manager.

UNCTAD has a sound evaluation policy and evidence of use, including an evaluation plan that is developed in consultation with governing bodies. In addition to the evaluation policy, UNCTAD draws on the 2016 Norms and Standards for Evaluation outlined by the United Nations Evaluation Group. However, not all programme and project evaluations fall under UNCTAD’s evaluation plan as self-evaluation is a management function. Until the introduction of the robust online Trust Fund Document Approval process in 2018, EMU has had less visibility of the nature and timing of project evaluations.

Systems and tools are evident to ensure the quality of evaluations, though at the project level quality for evaluations outside EMU’s mandate is self-managed, unless support is sought from EMU. Evaluations are based on processes that are quality oriented. They are guided by the Evaluation Policy and the updated 2016 Norms and Standards for Evaluation outlined by the United Nations Evaluation Group. Evaluations of Development Account projects are guided by a dedicated set of framework and guidelines, but the UNCTAD Evaluation Policy has primacy over these. In addition, quality in programme and project-level independent and self-evaluations is supported by the Project Managers Handbook, which links to evaluation policies and guidelines, the participatory self-evaluation guide for project managers and an evaluation report template. By their nature, project and programme independent evaluations that are not within the EMU mandate and self-evaluations do not fall under the purview of EMU following the Trust Fund Document Review process – unless the programme manager or officer requests support in the development of a detailed evaluation plan or for the report.
There are not strong organisational feedback loops to ensure that lessons from past interventions are included in new designs nor strong demonstration of this in practice. The organisation has no formal requirement to demonstrate how lessons from past interventions have been considered in the design of new interventions. However, lessons learned are one of UNCTAD’s ten minimum requirements for RBM. At the project level, there is one clear, though limited, feedback loop to feed budget lessons from previous projects into new intervention designs. Some TC examples do suggest the collection, consideration and/or use of lessons learned in designing new interventions; though this is not yet standard practice throughout TC and is often informal – relying on institutional memory.

Subprogramme evaluations within the EMU-managed evaluation plan include clear accountability systems and report the status of implementation of recommendations. Accountability systems at the programme and project level are less clear. There is no evident system within TC to respond to evaluation findings or to use evaluation results at the programme and project level.

EMU systematically distils and publicly shares lessons from their managed evaluations, though there is no system to track uptake lessons learned either from EMU evaluations or at the programme and project level. In order to support the use of evaluation lessons, the organisation has a complete and publicly available repository of EMU managed evaluations. However, UNCTAD does not have a full repository of evaluations conducted by its programmes and projects – particularly self-evaluations.
2.2. DEVELOPMENT/HUMANITARIAN EFFECTIVENESS

PERFORMANCE AREA: RESULTS
Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way.

UNCTAD’s TC projects and programmes, as evidenced through evaluations, other results reports and independent assessments, have attained a satisfactory level of results in relation to their stated development objectives. There is strong evidence that UNCTAD’s interventions are targeted towards the needs and priorities of the partner countries. Evaluations consistently assess the relevance of programmes and projects as high or very high. Overall, the main TC flagship programmes are evaluated as being well aligned to national development objectives and having high relevance, effectiveness and efficiency in relation to improved governance.

Evaluations consistently assess UNCTAD’s initiatives as efficient. This is largely reported to be as a result of careful management of available funds and tight financial controls. The main cost component in relation to TC is staffing and, in general, the technical staffing is assessed as being efficiently applied to work programmes to generate results. However, there was some indication of potential duplication of project activities between divisions. Moreover, many UN Development Account evaluations indicate that a lack of resources has had an impact on implementation and the level of results achieved.

The evaluation results demonstrate that UNCTAD delivers results that contribute towards institutional and policy change, using collaboration to engage partners and to encourage the uptake of TC support. Evaluations do raise concerns regarding the relatively short period of intervention, resources spread too thinly to create sufficient momentum for sustainable change, and the need for greater connection with other initiatives and partners. In addition, evaluation recommendations suggest placing more attention on developing exit strategies in programme and project design.

KPI 9: Development and humanitarian objectives are achieved, and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals.

This KPI examines the nature and scale of the TC results UNCTAD is achieving against the targets it sets and its expectations on making a difference.

UNCTAD’s TC projects and programmes, as evidenced through evaluations, other results reports and independent assessments, have attained a satisfactory level of results in relation to their stated development objectives. UNCTAD’s target groups pertain to Conference member states and particularly to priority countries, LDCs, LLDCs, SIDSs and fragile and conflict-affected states. Therefore, the results assessment for each subprogramme largely focuses on the extent to which member states have been supported with TC priorities. Overall, the five subprogramme evaluations demonstrate positive performance in relation to the stated targets in terms of country coverage, including the extent to which projects have covered the prime target countries. For instance, the evaluation of subprogramme 3 (Division on International Trade and Commodities [DITC]) demonstrated that TC initiatives in advisory services, training courses, seminars and field projects have covered the targeted 41 countries of which 16 (39%) are from the UNCTAD priority countries.

Overall, the main TC flagship programmes are evaluated as having high relevance, effectiveness and efficiency in relation to improved governance. Member countries provide positive feedback on these programmes and attest that they remain in the most part flexible to their needs and contexts. UNCTAD interventions, particularly the larger programmes that absorb the most financing, are generally evaluated as satisfactory, including by the countries. These programmes, as well as some of the evaluated projects, have been assessed as contributing to significant changes in development policies and programmes or leading to system reforms. For specific projects, the relevance and
effectiveness are also evaluated as satisfactory and in some cases highly satisfactory. However, most evaluations note that the evidence in relation to results has been more related to generation of outputs rather than outcomes; therefore, it is difficult to assess the extent to which initiatives contribute to longer-term goals. This is consistently reflected in the evaluation recommendations for more attention to tracking progress towards longer-term benefits.

**UNCTAD’s results in relation to gender are improving but environmental sustainability and tackling the effects of climate change are not strongly evident across most evaluations.** Yet, there are examples where UNCTAD has developed knowledge products in partnership with other agencies or provided support for environmental initiatives.

**KPI 10: Projects and programmes are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate.**

This KPI centres on the relevance of UNCTAD’s TC engagement given the needs and priorities of its partner countries and its results focus.

**There is strong evidence that UNCTAD’s interventions are targeted towards the needs and priorities of the partner countries.** As noted in KPI 9, when considering whether UNCTAD responds to the needs of target groups, the organisation’s mandate related to supporting member states as the prime target group needs to be considered.

**Evaluations consistently assess the programme and project’s relevance as high or very high.** The evaluations provide clear justification of relevance and note the good level of country partner engagement in the projects as evidence in this regard. However, there is less evidence of the extent to which the initiatives supported by UNCTAD contribute to the realisation of national goals.

The larger programmes (ASYCUDA and DMFAS) with relatively large self-financing are clearly aligned to national interests and in general are noted as related to clear national development objectives. The evaluations point to some investments arising from other processes such as replication of good practices (i.e. supply-driven), or linked to availability of donor support (donor-driven), rather than being country initiated.

**Problem analyses referred to in the design documents seem to contribute to the delivery of coherent projects.** UNCTAD’s engagement in the UNDAF/UNSDCF process is seen as contributing to coherence at country level in line with the One UN approach. Yet, for some of the smaller projects, that are part of the “product toolkit” of UNCTAD or where there are multi-country capacity development offerings by UNCTAD, the rationale for engagement was documented as a country’s response to opportunities offered, rather than as a strategic response by UNCTAD to national development goals and objectives.

**KPI 11: Results are delivered efficiently.**

This KPI looks at the extent to which UNCTAD is meeting its own aims and standards on delivering TC results efficiently.

**Evaluations consistently assess UNCTAD’s initiatives as efficient.** This is largely reported to be as a result of careful management of available funds and tight financial controls. UNCTAD makes efforts to replicate good results across member countries, enhancing efficiency of original investments. The subprogramme evaluations conclude that resources are used efficiently within each subprogramme. Both of the TC flagship programmes ASYCUDA and DMFAS are assessed as being efficient due to the small size of the core team and the broad reach and documented positive results for each programme. Similarly, the work in relation to e-commerce and the digital economy and other information and communications technology products has been assessed as increasing efficiency for member states.
The main cost component in relation to TC is staffing and in general, the technical staffing is assessed as being efficiently applied to work programmes to generate results. However, there was some indication of potential duplication of project activities between divisions that could be addressed, e.g. between the ALDC and DITC, as noted in the subprogramme evaluation for ALDC. Furthermore, a common weakness identified in projects is the extent to which resources, particularly for technical staff and for capacity development support, are spread too thinly across different countries, thereby effecting the required level of depth to influence change.

Many UN Development Account evaluations indicate that a lack of resources has had an impact on implementation and the level of results achieved. This was a particular concern raised in the Accelerating Progress for West African Countries project, where the participants were too few per country and the extent of training provided was assessed as insufficient to achieve the expected outcomes. The evidence from project evaluations indicates that budget-neutral project extensions are frequent. While these are often valid and related to country context, the delays are not well documented or analysed.

**KPI 12: Results are sustainable.**

This KPI looks at the degree to which UNCTAD successfully delivers TC results that are sustainable in the longer term.

The evaluation results demonstrate that UNCTAD delivers results that contribute towards institutional and policy change. The ASYCUDA and DMFAS evaluations in particular note the extent to which respective member states contribute their own resources to implementation and continuation of operations and how these operations result in broader policy and institutional change; although the results are variable. It is also difficult to assess the extent to which UNCTAD’s capacity building activities have actually resulted in increased and sustained capacities. Evaluations continue to recommend more effort to build and sustain capacity.

Evaluations often refer to the strength of UNCTAD in using collaboration to engage partners and to encourage the uptake of TC support; they also suggest placing more attention on developing exit strategies in programme and project design. For instance, one Development Account project engaged with business schools globally in partnership with Empretec and the Sustainable Stock Exchange to embed social impact investment in the development activities of 270 business schools. The investment in capacity development is seen to contribute to sustainable outcomes, where knowledge and capacity have been built. All of the 12 project evaluations reviewed, as well as the annual evaluation summary reviews and subprogramme evaluations, questioned the sustainability of the initiatives. The evaluators raised concerns regarding the relatively short period of intervention, resources spread too thinly to create sufficient momentum for sustainable change, and the need for greater connection with other initiatives and partners.
3. OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF UNCTAD
Chapter 3. Overall performance of UNCTAD

The performance conclusions first consider four key attributes of an effective organisation: (i) whether it understands future needs and demands; (ii) whether it is organised and makes use of its assets and comparative advantages; (iii) whether it has mandate-oriented systems, planning and operations; and (iv) whether it makes consistent developments according to its resource level and operational context. The journey of the organisation is then mapped against previous external assessments of UNCTAD.

Lastly, the assessment report presents the key findings: the observed strengths and areas for improvement.

3.1. CURRENT STANDING AGAINST THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE ORGANISATION

Is UNCTAD’s technical co-operation future-facing?

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is strongly committed to implement its mandate to support least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), small island developing states (SIDS) and fragile and conflict-affected states in the realm of trade and development. LLDC member states view UNCTAD’s knowledge, expertise and technical assistance positively, including its ability to respond to member states’ demands. Member states are united in their call on UNCTAD to engage more in technical co-operation (TC). During quadrennial conferences and meetings of the Trade and Development Board and Working Party, member states repeatedly stress this integral part of UNCTAD’s mandate, pointing to its specialised know-how and proven track record.

However, like all UN Secretariat entities, UNCTAD’s regular budget is under increasing pressure due to budget cuts and contribution shortfalls. It has experienced a gradual decline in recent years, mostly through a reduction in staff posts. Funding for UNCTAD’s technical co-operation, most of which is earmarked, has been unstable and unpredictable, even if showing a positive trend over the past 20 years. At the same time, because of the different contexts and dynamics of its member states, demand for UNCTAD’s technical co-operation is becoming even more diverse. All combined, the structural mismatch between demand and funding remains salient, and UNCTAD is still unable to meet growing demand in various innovative areas through its technical co-operation.

Notwithstanding some promising initiatives, such external risks, as well as opportunities to reposition UNCTAD, build strategic partnerships and strengthen its niche, have so far not triggered secretariat-wide responses.

An important weakness of UNCTAD’s TC decentralised operating model is that it is incomplete: it does not include a common corporate TC strategy, TC oversight mechanisms, or other TC tools, such as a fundraising strategy, and an external relations and partnerships strategy. While the model may create opportunities and responsiveness at a project, programme or section level, this weakness constrains strategic approaches and prioritisation. There have been attempts to strengthen relations with donors and partners, but this is largely done on a supply-driven project-by-project approach. UNCTAD does not have an empowered co-ordination entity for TC external relations. Rather, fundraising is undertaken by thematic experts and, on occasion, by senior management. As a result, it is dispersed across the organisation, efforts are less focused and even duplicated, and transaction and opportunity costs are probably higher than if a more centralised model were used.

Also, in such times of resource unpredictability and of a growing focus on national and regional priorities, determining and strengthening one’s niche and engaging in strategic partnerships are vital. UNCTAD’s leadership of the Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity offers great potential for a more strategic focus. There are also isolated cases whereby parts of UNCTAD are taking on a pro-active role, such as in the E-Commerce and Digital
Economy section which has successfully developed effective inter-agency co-operation. However, there was not strong evidence of an organisation-wide analysis of UNCTAD’s comparative advantage over and above Toolbox products and projects. This suggests that UNCTAD does not seem to be placing sufficient priority on gearing up for these higher-profile strategic roles. External evaluations on comparative advantage have highlighted the need for greater focus. Some recommendations are now – gradually – being picked up.

Is UNCTAD’s technical co-operation making best use of what it has?
The operating model whereby technical co-operation is \textit{de facto} decentralised has advantages and disadvantages. Divisions, branches and sections have autonomy to engage with partners, mobilise resources and implement activities. The fact that UNCTAD’s technical co-operation is built on and draws from robust economic data and analysis is a strength. Thematic experts are often involved in all three pillars of UNCTAD’s work: technical co-operation, research and analysis, and consensus building. This helps assure quality and encourages the transfer of knowledge through projects. However, because the already limited staff capacity is dispersed, upscaling of technical co-operation is not always possible. Moreover, the operating model does not actively encourage more strategic internal and external co-ordination. Cross-divisional collaboration is undertaken mostly at an operational project and programme level, with different sections and branches contributing to each other’s interventions. Functional and personal relationships, rather than the organisational structure, are the main driver.

The abundance of priorities set by member states, combined with a lack of predictable funding and the decentralised operating model’s characteristics, has led to a proliferation of small interventions and a partially fragmented TC portfolio. While overall evaluations of UNCTAD’s TC interventions, and particularly its main programmes, are positive, this fragmentation combined with the absence of a common corporate strategy limits the potential of UNCTAD’s technical co-operation to increase its strategic focus on areas of comparative advantage and niches of innovation.

There is evidence of carefully orchestrated efforts to introduce and streamline secretariat-wide systems for technical co-operation, including a stronger focus on results-based management and upstream quality assurance, as well as more efficient fundraising. However, despite best efforts, the Technical Co-operation Section and other staff overseeing technical co-operation in the Office of the Secretary-General are yet to perform a more strategic, standards-setting, planning and co-ordination, and quality assurance role. There is, as of yet, no strategic-level decision-making body on technical co-operation, as opposed to the research and analysis pillar. The Project Review Committee’s potential has yet to be realised to the extent intended.

The Angola project – a multidisciplinary, multi-product and country-focused programme, co-ordinated by the geographically structured Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes – operates distinctly compared to other projects, which are more thematic or sectoral in nature. It is a unique pilot programme that the secretariat now wishes to replicate elsewhere. For that to happen, though, UNCTAD will need to profoundly adjust its current operating model for TC.

Is UNCTAD’s technical co-operation a well-oiled machine?
Member states clearly support UNCTAD’s TC interventions, and the organisation has made commendable efforts during recent years to streamline and strengthen TC work processes and systems, including the centrally co-ordinated electronic approval system; however, there is still a long way to go. The structural mismatch between demand for and funding of technical co-operation has not yet led to a secretariat-wide response. Rather, divisions are operating independently, moving in different directions and engaging in an internal as well as external competition for project funding. With some exceptions, partnerships are not considered more strategically.

Overall, beyond meeting its obligations as part of the United Nations (UN) Secretariat, UNCTAD has not articulated a vision or strategy of its own towards organisational effectiveness. Instead, and in line with the \textit{de facto} decentralised
operating model for technical co-operation, divisions have, to a greater or lesser extent, articulated mission statements, strategies, approaches and operating guidelines themselves. Consequently, UNCTAD does not yet convey strong corporate communication about its technical co-operation pillar.

Internal results-based management (RBM) processes for technical co-operation are now largely established and systematised, and a recently introduced management information system has notably improved transparency and tracking of resources. Parts of Umoja 2 are now functional, and this has enhanced organisational transparency. Still, there is insufficient attention to and reporting on outcomes. Lacking unearmarked resources of its own, UNCTAD chose to wait for the roll-out of UN Secretariat’s Umoja 2 modules for system-wide improvements in this area.

Finally, while there are strong interlinkages between the three pillars and within TC itself, with some notable exceptions, solid evidence of a well-established learning culture is lacking. In such a culture, lessons are learned from evaluations and a results-focused monitoring looks beyond activities and outputs as a way to inform next planning phases.

Is UNCTAD’s technical co-operation making a difference?

UNCTAD is one of few organisations within the UN with robust and in-depth expertise on trade and development issues and on how these impact developing countries and countries in transition. It enjoys strong support from member states for its TC products — not only the major flagship programmes ASYCUDA and DMFAS, but also others such as e-commerce and the digital economy. These interventions have demonstrated positive results, and the fact that many of these have become (partly) self-financed is evidence of solid performance. External evaluations are also positive about effects and sustainability.

UNCTAD’s TC interventions, and particularly the main programmes, generally attain a satisfactory level of results in relation to their stated development objectives, and are assessed as relevant to the needs and priorities of the partner countries. In addition, drawing on UNCTAD’s own innovative research and intergovernmental discussions, new topics have arisen in which UNCTAD has developed expertise and a willingness to assist member states by way of technical co-operation.

Overall, there is evidence that UNCTAD’s technical co-operation is making a difference for many member states. The main questions this assessment raises are around the missed opportunities, in terms of organisational effectiveness, for making an even greater difference in the future.

3.2. PERFORMANCE JOURNEY

In the past, the Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations and the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) have assessed parts of the organisation and subprogrammes. This is UNCTAD’s first MOPAN assessment, albeit partial, and, to our knowledge, the first time UNCTAD’s technical co-operation pillar has been assessed against such a comprehensive set of organisational performance indicators.

From a performance journey perspective, it is important to underline once again that UNCTAD’s technical co-operation is an integral part of the organisation and interlinked with its two other pillars. Its technical co-operation pillar is responsive to member states’ demands, but implementation depends first and foremost on extrabudgetary funding from member states and the European Union, with relatively small amounts coming from other sources such as the UN and the private sector.

During the past 50 years, technical co-operation has grown in terms of expenditures, thematic scope, geographical coverage and number of projects. Technical co-operation covers a range of topics, grouped into no less than 28 Toolbox products, ranging from reviews, guides and policy advice to training and provision of information technology software. Technical co-operation is government-centric. Most of UNCTAD’s technical co-operation is implemented by
UNCTAD itself, in partnership with member states’ governments. Some interventions are implemented in partnership with other agencies.

Quadrennial conference outcome documents such as the Nairobi Maafikiano direct UNCTAD’s work, including its TC. The plethora of stated objectives in these documents has traditionally limited UNCTAD’s ability to prioritise, in turn contributing to a proliferation of fragmented interventions that are generally small in size, are short in duration and involve projects, rather than programmes.

Because technical co-operation is de facto decentralised within UNCTAD, diverse approaches have been able to evolve and now co-exist side-by-side. This is reflected not only in different articulations of UNCTAD’s mission statement, but also in varied approaches to branch-level and division-level results frameworks; implementation modalities; project management tools and instruments; and monitoring, reporting and (self-) evaluations systems. These multi-faceted approaches have created a lack of clarity, visibility and a strategic pathway for UNCTAD. Consequently, efforts are dispersed, affecting efficiency and effectiveness. Major programmes are undoubtedly valuable but not well branded or badged; thus, UNCTAD’s important role in promoting international trade and accelerating economic development, particularly of developing countries, through its technical co-operation, is still not clear.

Attempts to develop a more uniform approach to technical co-operation, including a corresponding set of tools and instruments, are fairly recent. Since 2016, new templates for TC planning, in-house RBM training and support, and a growing attention to gender equality have been introduced. Since 2018, a corporate management information system (the dashboard) is in use, which has improved transparency and oversight. Still, such secretariat-wide initiatives are slow to get off the ground, and staff buy-in is not self-evident. The initiatives are being rolled out tentatively – tailored to the organisation’s operating model and business culture –, leading to an uneven response to strategic matters. There is evidence of emergent “ink spots” of improved practice among some sections and branches, which implicitly may serve as precedent for others, but significant gaps remain.

Efforts to adopt a more comprehensive, programmatic and multi-year approach to technical co-operation, such as the Angola project, are likely to encourage multi-sectoral, multidisciplinary and multi-agency co-ordination and collaboration. In order to be successful, innovative organisational designs, including joint planning and execution, will be needed.

Most importantly, the absence of a secretariat-wide TC strategy that sets clear priorities and parameters is impairing UNCTAD’s ability to pro-actively strengthen its niche. No matter how effective the individual interventions may be, the current dispersal of TC interventions across 28 products (and more, since 4% of expenditures are spent outside the prioritised products) means that scarce resources and fundraising efforts are de facto scattered, with sub-optimal results. Lack of focus not only hampers decisions on priorities and resource (re-)allocation across the organisation for technical co-operation, it can also reduce visibility as well as the development of a secretariat-wide partnership strategy that is more aligned with the 2030 Agenda and UN reforms, as well as global trends and needs.

Strengthening the secretariat-wide response to these issues is all the more important that, if only illustrated by demands from its member states, UNCTAD has a strategic global role to play, and with increasing rather than decreasing relevance, “to address the needs and priorities of developing countries for sustainable development and strengthening their role in the global economy”18 in particular through its technical co-operation pillar.

Boxes 3.1 and 3.2 present strengths and weaknesses identified in this MOPAN assessment of UNCTAD’s technical-co-operation.

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18. UNCTAD XIV Nairobi Maafikiano paragraphs 11 (2016)
Box 3.1. Main strengths identified in the MOPAN 2019 assessment of technical co-operation

- A key asset, UNCTAD’s staff are highly dedicated to the organisation’s mandate aimed at bolstering the position of LDCs, LLDCs, SIDSs and other vulnerable and small economies. They spare no effort to respond to member states’ demands for technical co-operation and collaborate closely with member states to find the necessary resources.

- Trade and development are deeply intertwined, and expertise is scarce. UNCTAD is one of few agencies mandated to address these. It provides highly relevant, specific expertise that would otherwise not be easily available to LDCs, LLDCs, SIDSs and other vulnerable and small economies.

- The interlinkages between the research and analysis pillar and the technical co-operation pillar has meant that UNCTAD’s technical co-operation is grounded in robust, evidence-based empirical data.

- Besides constantly updating and innovating its longstanding programmes ASYCUDA, DMFAS and others, UNCTAD is also adding valuable contributions to innovative technical co-operation niche areas, such as e-commerce and the digital economy, bio-trade, and financing for development.

- UNCTAD is highly regarded by its development partners. Member states’ governments appreciate UNCTAD’s sincerity and responsiveness to their demands and needs, as is witnessed through the sometimes decades-long relationships in delivery of technical co-operation.

- UNCTAD works with a relatively small TC budget and has proven to be cost-efficient in most areas, thanks to its careful management of available funds and tight financial control.

- Evidence from external evaluations and audits is generally positive on relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. UNCTAD delivers results that contribute towards institutional and policy change, engaging with partners to encourage the uptake of technical co-operation support.

Box 3.2. Main areas of improvement identified in the MOPAN 2019 assessment of technical co-operation

- With the exception of its two main programmes, technical co-operation is fragmented across many small-size projects, with a short lifespan. This has evolved autonomously as a consequence of the de facto decentralised operating model.

- There is a growing mismatch between member states’ demands and UNCTAD’s supply capabilities. An explanatory factor is the absence of a secretariat-wide, integrated, future-facing technical co-operation strategy that sets the direction for external relations and partnerships, and could support prioritisation across the secretariat.

- Because oversight is mostly conducted at the divisional rather than the secretariat level, strategic corporate-level co-ordination and decision-making of technical co-operation is implicit, rather than systematic and robust. Tools and mechanisms are in place but not used to their full potential.

- Cross-cutting themes are only partially addressed. Economic governance is implicitly in-built. Systems to enhance gender equality and women’s empowerment are falling into place, but this is not yet reflected in substantive terms. Conversely, human rights as well as environmental sustainability and climate change are only sporadically addressed in UNCTAD’s technical co-operation.

- Until recently, results-based management was largely missing from the outcome level. Although important steps have been taken to enhance RBM, within UNCTAD there is no holistic approach to performance tracking, identification of poor performance or oversight of deviations from planned results.
ANNEXES
Annex 1. Performance ratings and evidence table

Methodology for scoring and rating

The approach to scoring and rating under MOPAN 3.0* is described in the 2019 Methodology Manual. It draws from the OECD Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide (OECD/EU/JRC, 2008). The approach uses a rating scale that has been adjusted from previous MOPAN assessments. Each rating, ranging from highly unsatisfactory to highly satisfactory, represents the averaged numerical score attributed to each element, micro-indicator (MI) and key performance indicator (KPI). However, the threshold for each rating has been raised by 0.5 points compared to assessments prior to 2019.

In this assessment, in line with the 2019 Methodology Manual, each of the key performance indicators (KPIs) is rated according to the following rating scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Range</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.51-4.00</td>
<td>Highly satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.51-3.50</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.51-2.50</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00-1.50</td>
<td>Highly unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the 12 KPIs contains a number of micro-indicators (MIs), which vary in number. The KPI rating is calculated by taking the average of the ratings of its constituent MIs.

For KPI 1-8, the MIs are made up of elements representing international best practice. The number of elements also varies. As mentioned in the Introduction section, one of the implications of the exceptional density of this assessment has been a scoring at MI level rather than detailed scoring by element. The narrative for each text MI has however carefully been reviewed to ensure full clarity in scoring in accordance to the good practice promoted by elements.

For KPIs 9-12, the rating of MIs is based on thresholds defined in the methodology, rather than on elements. As mentioned in the Introduction section, no rating or scoring was applied for KPIs 9-12 in this assessment.

A score of “N/E” means “no evidence” and indicates that the assessment team could not find any evidence but was not confident of whether or not there was evidence to be found. The team assumes that “no evidence” does not necessarily mean that the element is not present (which would result in a zero score).

Elements rated N/E are excluded from any calculation of the average. A significant number of N/E scores in a report indicates an assessment limitation (see the Limitations section at the beginning of the report).

A note indicating “N/A” means that an element is considered to be “not applicable”. This usually owes to the organisation’s specific nature.
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI 1: The organisational architecture and financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results</th>
<th>KPI score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>2.25</td>
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UNCTAD’s long-term vision is laid out in its mandate, which is updated during quadrennial conferences, most recently with the UNCTAD XIV Nairobi Maafikiano outcome document. Through these, member states task the UNCTAD secretariat to operate across a vast and growing set of ambitious trade and development challenges. UNCTAD fulfils its mandate through three closely interlinked functions or pillars, covering four broad cross-cutting themes and five subprogrammes and building on six geographical priority principles. The Maafikiano – similar to previous outcome documents – identifies no less than 110 priorities.

Technical co-operation (TC) is one of UNCTAD’s three pillars. Due to a lack of consensus among member states, the last secretariat-wide strategy on TC was adopted in 2003 and consists of guiding principles. It has not been updated to align with outcome documents. The Maafikiano provides policy overview but not a clearly defined strategy on TC operationalising the mandate in terms of intended results. At UNCTAD, TC is de facto decentralised; the five divisional directors maintain a high level of autonomy with respect to the way they strategise, operationalise, process and organise TC. Consequently, different operating models have evolved over time and co-exist alongside each other, with Technical Cooperation Section (TCS) of the Office of the Secretary-General (OSG) more in an enabling than a steering capacity. Inter-divisional co-operation is a persistent challenge within the secretariat. While OSG’s incremental efforts to promote interdivisional collaboration are noteworthy, in practice, much still depends on the personal networks and initiative of staff members.

The degree to which UNCTAD engages in strong co-operation with other agencies varies considerably, again depending on how each division, branch, section and individual staff member approach this. As a non-resident agency, UNCTAD acknowledges the need for strong co-operation with other agencies. It aligns its TC to relevant wider normative frameworks pertinent to its mandate, including inter alia the Agenda 2030 and the Istanbul Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011-2020, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development and the Vienna Programme of Action for LLDCs for the Decade 2014–2024; and the Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of Action (Samoa Pathway). UNCTAD leads the UN Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity. TC projects and programmes support and strengthen national policy frameworks that incorporate normative frameworks. Despite limited staff capacity, the secretariat engages in 37 UNDAFs (now known as UNSDCFs). UNCTAD reports annually to member states on expenditures against the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

At UNCTAD, member states play a key role in determining work plans. Neither member states nor the secretariat have set clear, strategic priorities between UNCTAD’s three pillars, or within the TC pillar. UNCTAD faces mounting pressure to deliver more results with less resources. Demand for its TC is growing, often as the result of engagement in the context of UNTAD’s consensus-building pillar and research and analysis pillar. Consequently, although budgets are adequately prepared and planned, in practice, resources are spread too thinly across a growing number of workstreams. Accordingly, the TC pillar suffers from resource shortages as well as competing priorities. While ideally demand-driven, in practice, TC relies heavily on earmarked donor funding in accordance with donor priorities.

UNCTAD lacks a secretariat-wide fundraising strategy; previous attempts to address this were not met with consensus among member states. TC is highly fragmented. It is grouped into 28 “products” and is largely funded through extrabudgetary (XB) sources (90.4%). Projects are (partially) self-financed or externally funded. XB funding has been erratic. The two main programmes,ASYCUDA and DMFAS, account for 58% of the expenses, and slightly less than half of the projects. Generally speaking, projects are small in size, with a short lifespan. In December 2018, over 80 sources of funding (USD 34 million) contributed to no less than 249 projects in over a hundred countries.
MI 1.1: Strategic plan and intended results based on a clear long-term vision and analysis of comparative advantage

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
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<td>Overall MI score</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Element 1: A publicly available Strategic Plan (or equivalent) contains a long-term vision

Element 2: The vision is based on a clear analysis and articulation of comparative advantage

Element 3: A strategic plan operationalises the vision, including defining intended results

Element 4: The Strategic Plan is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source document</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MI 1.1 Analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNCTAD was established to promote an inclusive global economy, through informing national and international policies, while giving priority consideration for the needs and interests of developing countries.

UNCTAD’s strategic priorities are determined by member states and reflected in the quadrennial conference outcome documents, including the Accra Accord (2008), the Doha Mandate (2012) and most recently the Nairobi Maafikiano (2016). The Nairobi Maafikiano is the outcome document of the 14th session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 2016 and frames the agenda for UNCTAD work over a four-year period until 2020. It sets out a work programme that builds on the Doha Mandate and updates the thematic and priority areas of UNCTAD’s work.

These quadrennial outcome documents direct UNCTAD’s TC to work on a vast number of thematic priorities, across a large geographic scope. In the Maafikiano, in keeping with previous outcome documents, member states call on UNCTAD to concentrate on four broad cross-cutting themes, while also contributing to the implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of relevant global conferences. At the same time, it should also strengthen its role as focal point within the UN for the integrated treatment of trade and development in the areas of finance, technology, investment and sustainable development. Geographically, it should focus on the least developed countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), small island developing states (SIDSs), and other vulnerable and small economies, while also giving attention to the needs of middle-income countries. Altogether, this amounts to 110 priorities.

There are five subprogrammes: (i) Globalisation and Development Strategies; (ii) Investment and Enterprise; (iii) International Trade and Commodities; (iv) Technology and Logistics; and (v) Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes. Each subprogramme is led by a division within the secretariat. For each subprogramme, the strategic framework outlines a general strategy to achieve the subprogramme's objectives. These strategies do not specify actions for TC.

The most recent secretariat-wide TC strategy of UNCTAD was adopted in 2003 and is annexed to the Trade and Development Board’s decision 478 (L) of October 2003. The strategy sets the scope, guiding principles and objectives of UNCTAD TC activities. Six key principles characterise the 2003 strategy:

- focus on long-term, sustainable capacity development
- strengthened links between analytical work and TC activities
- emphasis on ownership by beneficiaries and demand-driven operations
- priority for activities in favour of LDCs and countries with particular needs and weaknesses
- increased co-operation with other international organisations
- strengthened governance and co-ordination, including improved monitoring and evaluation of projects.

1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 36
UNCTAD’s TC should be demand-driven; embracing country ownership; based on principles of transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and accountability; and implemented in a geographically balanced manner; with priority given to LDCs, LLDCs, SIDSs and fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAs). Since 2003, these principles have been consistently reiterated and have driven the composition of UNCTAD’s TC portfolio.

The Working Party on the Strategic Framework and the Programme Budget is the mechanism for consultations among member states on all issues regarding TC and for interactive debate among the secretariat, potential beneficiaries and donors. It meets every year in September to discuss TC matters and submits a draft decision for adoption by the Trade and Development Board. The deliberations of the Working Party are based on information prepared by the secretariat every year and contained in three documents: (i) the review of the TC activities of UNCTAD; (ii) summary of activities undertaken in a given year and (iii) statistical tables.

Since 2003, the TC strategy has not been updated to ensure consistency with policy developments within UNCTAD. While the strategic priorities for the organisation are set every four years by the outcome document of the quadrennial ministerial conference, neither member states nor the secretariat’s management have set clear, strategic priorities between UNCTAD’s three pillars, nor have they articulated a regularly updated and aligned TC strategy.

The 2003 strategy does not contain a clearly articulated and operationalised long-term vision, nor does it articulate or operationalise UNCTAD’s comparative advantages, also in light of the ongoing UN reform. It was not until September 2019, at the 78th Session of the Working Party, in consideration of the ongoing UN development system reform, that member states charged UNCTAD’s secretariat with developing a new TC strategy for presentation in early 2020.

Consequently, set against the elements’ benchmarks, the MI is assessed as unsatisfactory.

**MI 1.1 Evidence confidence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 1.2: Organisational architecture congruent with a clear long-term vision and associated operating model</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Element 1: The organisational architecture is congruent with the strategic plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 2: The operating model supports implementation of the strategic plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 3: The operating model is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 4: The operating model allows for strong co-operation across the organisation and with other agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 5: The operating model clearly delineates responsibilities for results</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MI 1.2 Analysis

UNCTAD is a permanent intergovernmental body established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1964. Its headquarters are located in Geneva, Switzerland, and it has two small offices in New York and Addis Ababa. UNCTAD is part of the UN Secretariat. Between quadrennial conferences, the Trade and Development Board oversees the activities of the organisation. It meets in Geneva in a regular session and up to three times a year in executive sessions to deal with urgent policy issues, as well as management and institutional matters. The Working Party on the Strategic Framework and the Programme Budget reviews UNCTAD’s communication strategy, publications programme, TC activities and programme of work.

In undertaking its programme of work, including TC, UNCTAD is organised into five divisions, each responsible for one of the five subprogrammes, namely:

- Subprogramme 1: Division for Globalisation, Interdependence and Development
- Subprogramme 2: Division for Investment and Enterprise
- Subprogramme 3: Division for International Trade and Commodities
- Subprogramme 4: Division for Technology and Logistics
- Subprogramme 5: Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes.

The structural arrangements of UNCTAD are directly aligned with these five subprogrammes, and all five contribute substantially to outputs in all three pillars.

In addition, there are programme support services that support these divisions to achieve their goals:

- the Intergovernmental Support Service
- the Technical Cooperation Section (TCS), managing project databases and providing co-ordination of TC activities
- the Resources Management Service (RMS), responsible for the management of budget, finance, information technology and human resources
- the Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (EMU)
- the Communications, Information and Outreach Section.

Within the Office of the Secretary-General (OSG), there are also UNCTAD offices in New York and Addis Ababa. The five substantive divisions and the programme support services report directly to the OSG as do the New York office and the regional office in Addis Ababa.

At UNCTAD, the management of TC is de facto decentralised. While the 2003 TC strategy does not call for a decentralised operating model per se, this has evolved and been maintained over the years. Substantive divisions have autonomy to set division-level strategies. They each engage with partners, identify interventions, mobilise resources and implement activities. Consequently, different operating models for TC exist alongside each other.

TCS, located in the OSG, has a back-office support and co-ordination function for trust fund-related TC and an oversight role for UN Development Account projects. The OSG, represented by TCS, is involved in the review of new project proposals through a centrally co-ordinated electronic approval system, together with RMS, EMU, the gender advisor and the legal advisor. Secretariat-wide co-ordination of TC does take place and is being increasingly streamlined in a number of areas.

The operating model is reviewed every two years, as part of the Strategic Framework. Over the years, the organisational architecture has largely been maintained. TC is mostly managed by Geneva-based staff, often alongside other duties in the two other pillars of UNCTAD. In many cases, implementation is undertaken by UNCTAD’s regular budget-funded staff, complemented
by XB-funded project staff, and/or consultants and contractors on temporary assignments. In a few cases, dedicated project management units have been established (ASYCUDA, DMFAS) with mostly XB-funded staff.

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Secretariat-wide, cross-divisional collaboration and co-ordination has been a persistent challenge for UNCTAD. UNCTAD recognises that interdivisional co-operation, which builds on the strength and expertise of different divisions, is important for the effective delivery of TC activities. Recently, the OSG has embarked on an organisation-wide effort to move from a division-based approach to management to a horizontal, task-based approach in certain areas, notably by creating cross-divisional working groups on statistical co-ordination, gender, financing for development and South-South co-operation.

Nevertheless, other than biannual management retreats and the Divisional Chiefs of Staff meetings chaired by the OSG Chief of Staff, we did not find compelling evidence of a structural, secretariat-wide and systematic approach to cross-divisional collaboration at directors level, in contrast to, for example, the research and analysis pillar. In practice, in TC, the level of co-operation between sections, branches and divisions varies considerably from project to project. It is undertaken mostly at an operational project/programme level, with different sections and branches contributing to each other’s interventions. Much depends on the staff’s own professional networks, experience and preferences.

The Project Review Committee is the secretariat’s main mechanism to enhance interdivisional co-operation and ensure the coherence of UNCTAD’s technical assistance. In practice, however, it does not perform this role in the way it was intended. It meets rarely and at irregular intervals. In 2018, the Committee held one face-to-face meeting to review the strategy for further deploying the results-based management framework for TC, the terms of reference of the Project Review Committee and the request database. The Project Review Committee could, in principle, perform a more strategic oversight role, if its terms of reference (TORs) were revised and it convened more regularly.

The de facto decentralised operating model allows for project- and programme-level co-ordination with other agencies. The degree to which UNCTAD engages in strong co-operation with other agencies varies considerably, again depending on how each division, branch, section and individual staff member approach this. The “eTrade for all” initiative stands out as a positive example of inter-agency co-operation, building on the principles of complementarity and comparative advantage.

Meanwhile, at the secretariat level, UNCTAD contributes to ongoing reform initiatives and system-wide efforts to strengthen inter-agency co-ordination. UNCTAD leads the United Nations Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity in delivering operational activities “as one” at the country level, in collaboration with UNIDO, UNDP, ITC, FAO, WTO, UNEP, ILO, UNOPS and the five regional commissions. At the country level, TCS has driven efforts to contribute to 37 United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCF, formerly known as UNDAF).

**MI 1.2 Evidence confidence**

High confidence
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 1.3: Strategic plan supports the implementation of wider normative frameworks and associated results, including Agenda 2030 and others where applicable (e.g. the quadrennial comprehensive policy review (QCPR), replenishment commitments, or other resource and results reviews)</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>3.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Element 1:** The strategic plan is aligned to wider normative frameworks and associated results, including Agenda 2030, and others, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)

**Element 2:** The strategic plan includes clear results for normative frameworks, including Agenda 2030, and others, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)

**Element 3:** A system to track normative results is in place for Agenda 2030, and any other relevant frameworks, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)

**Element 4:** The organisation’s accountability for achieving normative results, including those of Agenda 2030, and any other relevant frameworks, such as the SDGs and their targets and indicators, the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable), is clearly established

**Element 5:** Progress on implementation on an aggregated level is published at least annually

**MI 1.3 Analysis**

UNCTAD aligns its subprogrammes to relevant wider normative frameworks. For each of the five subprogrammes (i.e. covering all three pillars), the 2020 programme budget summarises the specific SDGs with which the objectives, and therefore the deliverables, of the respective subprogrammes are aligned. UNCTAD’s TC is particularly relevant to three SDGs, namely Goal 8 on decent work and economic growth; Goal 9 on industry, innovation and infrastructure; and Goal 17 on partnerships for the Goals.

The objectives of the subprogrammes are also aligned with numerous other relevant agendas, including the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011-2020 (the Istanbul Programme of Action), Agenda 2063 of the African Union, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development and of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development, the outcomes and the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action of the World Summit on the Information Society, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, the Vienna Programme of Action for Landlocked Developing Countries for the Decade 2014–2024, the Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, the SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway and the results of the 24th and previous sessions of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Despite not having a comprehensive, up-to-date TC strategic plan, UNCTAD does acknowledge and respond to normative frameworks at the divisional level to a large extent. In this regard, UNCTAD sees TC as an important vehicle in assisting developing countries to achieve the SDGs as well as the objectives in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development.

**Source document**

1, 2, 23, 27, 37, 50, 51, 63, 83, 93, 155
In January 2017, UNCTAD established an interdivisional working group on the 2015-post development agenda and sustainable development objectives. Out of 17 SDGs, UNCTAD identified 7 as primary targets. Programme/project managers were required to identify primary and secondary SDGs in their project proposals and explain what has to happen for their work to contribute to the SDGs. The 2017 UNCTAD annual report was also updated to reflect its contribution to the SDGs.

The TC Toolbox links UNCTAD’s TC products directly to the SDGs and operationalises the strategy along with the objectives and indicators in the programme budgets. UNCTAD reports on its progress in mainstreaming SDGs in its TC activities on an annual basis. Results frameworks pertaining to TC have been developed at the product level that align the results of each product with the SDGs of focus and the targets under these Goals. At the project level, project officers are required to mainstream the SDGs into projects by describing how projects contribute to achieving the Goals; specifying relevant targets under the SDGs; using the findings of voluntary national reviews (on progress on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda) in project documents whenever such information is available; and ensuring that the SDGs of focus in the results framework match those selected for the product.

The two major programmes ASYCUDA and DMFAS in particular support national policy frameworks that incorporate global norms and standards. TCS works with UNDAF/UNSDCF processes that support normative frameworks. Project frameworks acknowledge 2030 Agenda indicators and targets. As per UN Secretariat requirements, TCS reports on expenditure against the SDGs within the annual Review of TC Activities and Their Financing, but not on results.

MI 1.3 Evidence confidence  
High confidence

MI 1.4: Financial Framework (e.g. division between core and non-core resources) supports mandate implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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</table>

Element 1: Financial and budgetary planning ensures that all priority areas have adequate funding in the short term or are at least given clear priority in cases where funding is very limited

3

Element 2: A single integrated budgetary framework ensures transparency

3

Element 3: The financial framework is reviewed regularly by the governing bodies

3

Element 4: Funding windows or other incentives in place to encourage donors to provide more flexible/un-earmarked funding at global and country levels

1

Element 5: Policies/measures are in place to ensure that earmarked funds are targeted at priority areas

1

MI 1.4 Analysis

UNCTAD is financed through assessed contributions as part of the United Nations Secretariat and extrabudgetary or voluntary contributions from member states and other donors. All regular budget resources are approved at the level of subprogrammes. Post resources are approved in given categories and grades, while non-post resources are approved by budget class and budget line. Once the regular budget is approved, there is limited discretion for the UNCTAD secretariat on the usage of these resources. The regular budget is complemented by extrabudgetary resources financed mainly through voluntary contributions. These contributions are mainly demand-driven and therefore earmarked for individual projects and activities.
The Proposed Programme and Budget documents describe the proposed programme plan for the following year/biennium and programme performance for the previous year/biennium. The documents outline the proposed post and non-post resource requirements by subprogramme as well as the organisational structure and post distribution and a summary of proposed changes in established and temporary posts by component and subprogramme.

The prerogatives to consider any administrative and budgetary matters is solely with the Fifth Committee and the relevant subsidiary organs, while other committees and organs are restricted to their specific substantive, sectoral or regional expertise. The Trade and Development Board falls under the category of other intergovernmental organs and therefore its involvement in budgetary matters is restricted to the consideration of the programme of work.

TC activities of UNCTAD and their financing are reviewed annually by the Working Party on the Strategic Framework and the Programme Budget of the Trade and Development Board.

TC is largely funded through XB sources (90.4%). Projects are (partially) self-financed or externally funded. Funding for TC is provided through extrabudgetary funding of trust funds, the United Nations Regular Programme of Technical Cooperation and the Development Account (8.7%), and the United Nations “Delivering as One” funding mechanisms (1%). Voluntary funding to trust funds is the principal funding source; the contribution to the trust funds from developing and transition countries rose from 43% in 2017 to 50% in 2018.

In December 2018, over 80 sources of funding contributed to 249 TC projects. In December 2018, the two major programmes of UNCTAD, ASYCUDA and DMFAS, accounted for about 56% of total expenditures (USD 25.5 million) and were financed mainly by direct contribution from the respective member states and from proceeds of loans or grants from international financial institutions. In 2018, MOPAN members contributed USD 9.8 million (28.9%) to the trust funds, other member states contributed USD 0.97 million (2.9%), while the UN system, other international organisations and private and public sources contributed USD 7.3 million (21.6%).

Whereas demand for TC is growing, contributions to trust funds for TC show an erratic and unpredictable pattern. In 2013, contributions amounted to USD 31 million. Compared with 2017, in 2018 TC funding decreased by 3% to USD 34 million. Compared with 2016, extrabudgetary funding decreased by 20% (from USD 40 million in 2018), while total expenditure for TC rose to USD 44 million. Conversely, 2019 saw an increase in funds, rising to almost USD 44m. Resource shortages, including in terms of staff, reduce UNCTAD’s ability to respond to all requests. Many developing countries use self-funding options to benefit from TC. However, limited financial resources in other developing countries and vulnerable countries such as the least developed countries mean they continue to rely on the support of development partners to finance TC projects.

UNCTAD has categorised its TC activities over the past few years through the development and update of the TC Toolbox, which currently features a diverse portfolio of 28 TC products, reflecting the broad demand by member states and challenges in bringing greater focus. Although donors are encouraged to make unearmarked multi-year contributions, including contributions to the multi-donor thematic trust funds, in practice, this rarely happens. Currently, most of the trust fund contributions are tightly earmarked by single contributors for specific projects. Few donors provide predictable annual contributions regulated by a co-operation agreement signed between the donor and UNCTAD. A few trust funds established in UNCTAD share the features of multi-donor thematic funds, such as co-mingled contributions, greater flexibility in fund allocation and consolidated reports.
TC is not only demand-driven; it is also supply-driven and (donor) funding-driven. Reports from the research and analysis pillar as well as discussions in the consensus-building pillar tend to trigger new insights and demands. Nevertheless, TC requests remain pending until funding is sourced.

At a time when XB resources are unpredictable and largely earmarked, UNCTAD faces mounting pressure to deliver more results and, at the same time, to meet increasing demand from countries for support in implementing the new development agenda. Although these circumstances call for a concerted, focused fundraising strategy for TC, UNCTAD has thus far been lacking one. Previous attempts to address this were not met with consensus among member states.

**KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI score</th>
<th>MI 1.4 Evidence confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>High confidence</td>
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</table>

Over the past years, UNCTAD has made notable progress in developing policy to mainstream gender equality and women's empowerment in TC. A gender strategy, developed in 2011, will be updated with a view to incorporate the 2020 UNCTAD XV conference outcomes. UNCTAD identified two goals for gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) in the 2018-19 biennium programme and budget proposal. Organisational, a gender task force (network of gender focal points within each division) has been established to reinforce and broaden the scope of UNCTAD's activities for women's economic empowerment.

The gender parity strategy 2018-21 sets gender targets in priority areas of human resource management. In 2016, gender became an explicit component in the design and screening of new TC interventions. Results on the ground are yet to flourish, but the overall trajectory seems positive.

This cannot be said for two other cross-cutting items in TC, namely environmental sustainability and climate change, and respect for human rights. Whereas UNCTAD is showing a growing interest in environmental sustainability and climate change and is engaged in a number of TC projects to that effect, there is no evidence of secretariat-wide adoption and integration of environmental sustainability and climate change considerations into UNCTAD's TC. Processes and mechanisms to incorporate these considerations throughout the project cycle are lacking. Similarly, with regard to human rights, although the Maafikiano does identify human rights as a priority cross-cutting issue, this has not been operationalised. While human rights are included in due diligence requirements and some isolated examples of projects that explicitly address human rights do exist, there is no evidence of secretariat-wide adoption and integration of human rights considerations in UNCTAD's TC. Processes and mechanisms to incorporate these considerations throughout the project cycle are lacking. Staff have not been trained, nor has any bespoke guidance for UNCTAD staff been developed.

While enhancing economic good governance is a critical programmatic area and implicit in relation to UNCTAD's mandate, the secretariat has no clear definition or explicit economic governance strategy or business processes in place. Still, many TC programmes and projects do include an explicit objective to improve economic policy and strengthen the capacity of relevant government institutions. At the level of the five subprogrammes, but more so at the level of individual projects and programmes, indicators of enhanced economic governance capacity are included in plans and reported against. UNCTAD events and training also include a focus on improving economic governance, and staff regard this objective as a *sine qua non*. UNCTAD's partners appreciate UNCTAD's assistance in this regard.
MI 2.1 Corporate/sectoral and country strategies to respond to and/or reflect the intended results of normative frameworks for cross-cutting issues

MI 2.1a: Gender equality and the empowerment of women

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>3.00</td>
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</table>

Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on gender equality available and showing evidence of use

Element 2: Gender equality indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation’s strategic plan and corporate objectives

Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect gender equality indicators and targets

Element 4: Gender screening checklists or similar tools used for all new Interventions

Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address gender issues

Element 6: Capacity development of staff on gender is underway or has been conducted

MI 2.1a Analysis

Over the past years, UNCTAD has made notable progress in developing policy aimed to promote mainstreaming of gender equality and women’s empowerment in TC, a development that is recognised by the Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations (JIU) and UN Women through the UN-System-Wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (GEEW) exercise.

The Nairobi Maaikiano and subsequent strategic frameworks state that UNCTAD will continue efforts in all its work to mainstream cross-cutting issues of gender equality and the empowerment of women, and the promotion of sustainable development and full and productive employment. Leadership and executive management are very engaged and committed. A gender strategy was developed in 2011 covering six areas of UN-SWAP policy. This was complemented by UNCTAD’s gender parity strategy 2018-21. The gender strategy will be updated with a view to incorporate the 2020 UNCTAD XV conference outcomes.

In 2016, gender became an explicit component in the design and screening of new TC interventions. All new interventions are now assessed by the gender focal points as part of the formal secretariat-wide approval process. Guidance, including a checklist for gender mainstreaming, has been developed and made available through the secretariat’s intranet. In its gender parity strategy, UNCTAD commits itself inter alia to review all UNCTAD’s technical assistance programme and mainstream gender in them.

Substantively, UNCTAD has identified two GEEW goals in the 2018-19 biennium programme and budget proposal, namely: improvement in the mainstreaming of gender perspective into the work of UNCTAD; and increased number of initiatives mainstreaming a gender perspective into the work of UNCTAD.
Organisationally, UNCTAD has appointed gender focal points within each division. In March 2018, the Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) created a special Gender Task Force, building on the work of the pre-existing Network of Gender Focal Points. Its purpose is to reinforce and broaden the scope of UNCTAD’s activities for women’s economic empowerment through trade, investment, innovation, technology and all other areas under the three pillars of work of UNCTAD. The Task Force emphasises the importance of cross-institutional and cross-divisional implementation of gender-mainstreaming aspects. It is chaired by the DSG and meets at irregular intervals, as a result of which momentum at the operational level is said to have decreased.

The gender parity strategy 2018-21 sets targets in priority areas of human resource management. Presently, there is a mandatory training on gender; standards of practice regarding recruitment and gender; and a deliberate policy to establish a conducive enabling environment that promotes internal mobility opportunities, flexible working arrangements, and capacity building and training for female employees. An online training module on Trade and Gender developed together with UN Women in 2017 is still active and available for all UN staff through the UN Women Training Centre. In collaboration with the ILO Training Centre in Turin, Italy, a training session on gender mainstreaming in publications and TC projects was held in February 2017 for TC Gender Focal Points. Funding for tailored in-person training, however, is very limited.

Progress on gender within UNCTAD has been acknowledged by the JIU and reflected in the annual UN-SWAP reports. UN Women has commended UNCTAD for its continuous efforts to strengthen gender equality and women’s empowerment, both in TC activities and within the secretariat itself, e.g. by adopting the UNCTAD gender parity strategy 2018-21. The 2018 UN-SWAP report appreciates a consistent trend of satisfactory performance across various indicators: policy and planning, gender responsive performance management, results-based management, oversight and coherence. In other areas, such as human and financial resource management, organisational culture, and capacity assessments, UNCTAD was seen as approaching the requirements. This is corroborated by evidence from evaluations, that demonstrate a solid commitment to improving gender outcomes.

There is less evidence of impact on gender equality and continued reference to the need to strengthen gender mainstreaming and training, however. The independent external evaluation of subprogramme 5, in 2018, recommended that UNCTAD and the division should increase current efforts and integrate human rights and gender equality issues into interventions, to better deliver on the mandates and commitments of the United Nation. In a similar vein, the 2018 synthesis of subprogramme evaluations concluded that “with the exception of the trade and gender programme under subprogramme 3, the integration of gender and human rights considerations in UNCTAD programmes and projects has been weak”. It should be noted that these subprogramme evaluations span from 2013 to 2018, but the overall trajectory is positive.

Survey responses indicate that 41% of member states are (very) familiar with UNCTAD’s stance on gender equality and empowerments of women; 59% knew little to nothing about it.

**MI 2.1a Evidence confidence**  
High confidence
**MI 2.1b: Environmental Sustainability and climate change**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall MI rating</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall MI score</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on environmental sustainability and climate change available and showing evidence of use

Element 2: Environmental sustainability/ climate change indicators and targets are fully integrated into the organisation’s strategic plan and corporate objectives

Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect environmental sustainability and climate change indicators and targets

Element 4: Environmental screening checklists / impact assessments used for all new interventions

Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address environmental sustainability and climate change issues

Element 6: Capacity development of staff on environmental sustainability and climate change is underway or has taken place

### MI 2.1b Analysis

From a policy perspective, the Nairobi Maafikiano explicitly states the importance of “integrating (economic, social and) environmental dimensions of sustainable development and creating an enabling environment at all levels for inclusive development” (pp. 2-3). It recognises all the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, including, *inter alia*, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, as set out in principle 7 thereof. For the 2018-19 programme and budget biennium, subprogramme 3 identifies as one of its objectives, “enhanced design and implementation by developing countries […] according to their needs, of trade, environment and sustainable development objectives and creative economy strategies at all levels.” Aside from these high-level commitments, there is no dedicated policy on environmental sustainability and climate change for TC.

UNCTAD is showing a growing interest in climate change and trade, as witnessed during the Trade, Climate Change and SDG week that UNCTAD organised in September 2019. Interviewees also point to numerous efforts recorded at the corporate level to comply with environmental sustainability and to highlight the nexus between trade and climate change, which fall beyond the scope of this assessment.

In terms of TC, one of UNCTAD’s TC Toolbox products is “Sustainable Trade and the Environment”, managed by the Division for International Trade and Commodities (subprogramme 3).

At the project level, there are an increasing number of projects that focus on environmental sustainability and climate change. One major initiative is the BioTrade approach that was developed to consider the implementation of the BioTrade Initiative that has been promoting sustainable BioTrade in support of the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity. This has resulted in a range of projects and policy initiatives. However, there is no evidence to show that environmental sustainability and climate change are being mainstreamed in UNCTAD’s TC.

Source document: 1, 8, 22
Although the Maafikiano regards environmental sustainability and climate change as an important cross-cutting issue, within TC, this has not yet been operationalised in terms of specific guidance to TC interventions, nor has it been given the same weight and attention as, for example, gender equality. While UNCTAD’s project screening checklist and project management handbook do make reference to ensuring alignment with SDGs, there is no evidence that UNCTAD’s TC guidelines, systems and tools address the issue of sustainable development and climate change in any explicit manner. Processes and mechanisms to incorporate these considerations throughout the project cycle are lacking. Staff have not been trained, nor has any bespoke guidance for UNCTAD staff been developed.

Survey responses indicate that member states are not that familiar with UNCTAD’s stance on environmental sustainability and climate change. One-third of the respondents claimed to know it well or by a fair amount; two-thirds knew little to nothing about it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 2.1b Evidence confidence</th>
<th>High confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MI 2.1c Good governance (peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, reduced inequality, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels)</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on the principles of good governance and effective institutions available and showing evidence of use

Element 2: Indicators and targets related to the principles of good governance and effective institutions are integrated into the organisation’s strategic plan and corporate objectives

Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect the principles of good governance and effective institutions

Element 4: New interventions are assessed for relevant governance/institutional effectiveness issues

Element 5: Human and financial resources are available to address the principles of good governance and issues related to effective institutions

Element 6: Capacity development of staff on the principles of good governance and effective institutions is underway or has taken place

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 2.1c Analysis</th>
<th>Source document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In accordance with the Inception Report, it was agreed to interpret this cross-cutting issue as “policies / practices that promote economic governance as a cross-cutting issue across all TC programmes and projects”. Enhancing economic good governance is a critical programmatic area and implicit in relation to UNCTAD’s mandate. The Nairobi Maafikiano as well as subsequent programme and budget proposals states that UNCTAD will “[g]ive due account to cross-cutting issues such as good governance at all levels…and an overall commitment to just and democratic societies, which are essential to all countries to attain sustainable and equitable growth and development” (p. 4). The TC Toolbox results frameworks also explicitly reference the goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda directly linked to UNCTAD’s core mandate: SDGs 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16 and 17. In addition, they describe the long-term impact of “[t]ackling vulnerabilities, improving resilience; fostering economic efficiency, improving governance”.</td>
<td>1, 8, 22, 27, 45</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Arguably, therefore, the main objective and raison d’être of UNCTAD’s TC is to enhance economic governance by putting in place or strengthening country systems, in accordance with the common principles listed in the Busan partnership document, namely national ownership of development priorities; a focus on results; recognition of the diversity and complementarity of development partners; transparency and shared responsibility.

Nevertheless, UNCTAD does not apply a clear definition or explicit economic governance strategy, which interviewees attribute to the controversial debate between member states surrounding the concept of good (economic) governance. Interviews demonstrated that while economic governance is at the heart of much of what UNCTAD does, it is not framed as such. Interviews also suggested that different perspectives coexisting within an organisation were to be expected, given the think tank role of UNCTAD, although some staff raised concerns that the sometimes contradictory or controversial materials being presented by the organisation might undermine UNCTAD’s overall voice.

Although the project clearance checklist for all new TC interventions does not specify governance, many TC programmes and projects in fact do include an explicit objective to improve economic policy and strengthen the capacity of relevant government institutions. For instance, the DMFAS programme’s long-term objective (impact) is one whereby “[g]overnments manage their debt effectively and sustainably, in support of poverty reduction, development and good governance” (p. 15). Short-term outputs are described in terms of “increased institutional capacity of countries to enhance their accounting and reporting, corporate transparency, governance and accountability” (p. 27).

At the level of the five subprogrammes, but more so at the level of individual projects and programmes, indicators of enhanced economic governance capacity are included in plans and reported against.

Staff regard supporting and strengthening economic governance as a given part of the work; therefore, no specific resources are dedicated to it. UNCTAD events and training also include a focus on improving governance.

Despite the fact that UNCTAD’s economic governance policy and strategy are implicit, rather than explicit, survey responses indicate that member states are familiar with it: 54% of the respondents claimed to know it well or by a fair amount; 37% knew a little to almost nothing, and 5% had not heard of it yet.

**MI 2.1c Evidence confidence**

| 1, 8, 22, 27, 45 | High confidence |
### MI 2.1d: Human rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dedicated policy statement on human rights issues available and showing evidence of use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Human rights indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation’s strategic plan and corporate objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect human rights indicators and targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Human rights screening checklists or similar tools used for all new interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address human rights issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Capacity development of staff on human rights is underway or has been conducted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MI 2.1d Analysis

As in the case of other cross-cutting issues, the Nairobi Maafikiano and subsequent programme and budget proposals identify human rights as a priority cross-cutting issue: “[g]ive due account to cross-cutting issues such as good governance at all levels, freedom, peace and security, respect for human rights, including the right to development, gender equality and women’s empowerment, youth and an overall commitment to just and democratic societies, which are essential to all countries to attain sustainable and equitable growth and development” (Nairobi Maafikiano, p. 4).

As an entity within the UN Secretariat, UNCTAD is guided by the UN Secretariat’s policies and standards with regard to respect for human rights. Judging by the documentation and interview results, there is little evidence to show that this has been explicitly operationalised within UNCTAD’s TC. The theme is addressed in the questionnaire in UNCTAD’s Due Diligence framework to assess whether a potential partner may have been complicit in human rights abuses, uses/tolerates forced or compulsory child labour, or has had any violations of the ten principles of the UN Global Compact. There are some isolated examples of partnerships that are related to human rights issues. From the sample of projects considered, one project aimed to improve human rights standards.

In 2017, UNCTAD’s Evaluation and Monitoring Unit supported the integration of gender and human rights into the revisions (pending approval) for the 2011 UNCTAD evaluation policy in line with the 2016 revised UN Evaluations group norms and standards as well as the principles of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Still, in its 2016-17 biennial evaluation assessment, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) identified gaps in the areas of integrating human rights standards into evaluation practice. Moreover, the project clearance checklist makes no reference to human rights.

The “UN and Human Rights” is a mandatory course for all UN Secretariat staff members and is available in Inspira.

Survey responses indicate that member states are least familiar with UNCTAD’s policy and strategy on respect for human rights: 29% of the respondents claimed to know it well or by a fair amount; 42% knew a little to almost nothing, and 29% had not heard of it.

### MI 2.1d Evidence confidence

High confidence
OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance agility and accountability.

KPI 3: The operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility

<table>
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<tr>
<th>KPI score</th>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
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With only two presences outside Geneva and few project staff posted in the field, the overall operating model is Geneva-based and driven. UN member states are the driving force behind UNCTAD’s priorities and pillar work streams. Member states also determine the size of the regular budget and are the main sponsors of XB-funded TC interventions.

In recent years, UNCTAD faced structural funding gaps and declining resources. Recent budget constraints at the UN Secretariat have compounded matters further. As a result, since 2013, UNCTAD lost 20 RB established posts, and five more posts are proposed to be abolished, bringing the number of regular posts from 400 in 2013 to 375 in 2020. In addition, there are 108 XB-funded staff in temporary posts. These XB-funded staff work exclusively on TC. Eighty per cent are under contract for the ASYCUDA and DMFAS programmes, both of which have dedicated project management units. In many other cases, projects are delivered by UNCTAD staff, alongside other duties.

Over the years, UNCTAD’s organisational structures have largely remained untouched. Staff mobility is low, both within the secretariat and outside. There are no records of any recent internal restructuring of the organisation. At the divisional level, staff positions are static. The lack of resources and recent budget cuts hamper UNCTAD’s ability to respond to change.

UNCTAD does not have a fundraising strategy that is closely and explicitly aligned to the priorities of the Nairobi Maafikiano and subsequent programme and budget proposals. As in the case of TC planning and programming, fundraising is de facto decentralised and insufficiently co-ordinated. Excluding ASYCUDA and DMFAS, two programmes which have been at the heart of UNCTAD’s TC for the past three decades, the lack of a relevant, up-to-date and strategically aligned fundraising strategy has given rise to a partially fragmented TC portfolio and to a large number of ad hoc, small and short-term projects, rather than longer-term programmes. Despite its potential in the particular context of trade and development, private sector funding is not being pursued by the secretariat and is therefore negligible. UNCTAD’s vulnerability is well-recognised, but secretariat-wide action has thus far been ad hoc.

Although some positive steps have been taken in recent years, TCS is insufficiently able to leverage its role on overall co-ordination of projects and programmes, due in part to staff shortages. The decentralised operating model has encouraged the delegation of decision-making authority for TC projects to directors, branch heads and project managers. The secretariat has introduced standardised, automated project approval systems that have contributed to greater transparency and accountability. Still, secretariat-wide strategic level oversight mechanisms are either lacking or under-performing.

As part of the UN Secretariat, all aspects of UNCTAD’s human resource management, including performance assessments, are governed by UN Secretariat regulations and rules. All UNCTAD staff members are subject to performance evaluations. The system is in place, and performance is monitored closely on a monthly basis by the Resources Management Service (RMS) through the recently introduced management information system or “dashboard”. There is a backlog in E-performance assessments, despite RMS issuing timely reminders. As for consultants, performance appraisals are carried out at the end of the assignment, for internal use only. These assessments are not shared with the consultant. E-performance is one input for staff promotion decisions. UNCTAD follows the UN Secretariat rules, regulations and guidance, on staff disagreements and complaints regarding performance assessments, as well as other grievance instances; this is done on a case-by-case basis. Because UNCTAD has very limited financial resources for staff training opportunities, it relies on other, informal ways to improve TC-relevant skills among staff, e.g. on results-based management and on designing and implementing UN Development Account projects.
ANNEX 1

MI 3.1: Organisational structures and staffing ensure that human and financial resources are continuously aligned and adjusted to key functions

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<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
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<td>Overall MI score</td>
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Element 1: Staffing is aligned with, or being reorganised to, requirements set out in the current Strategic Plan

Element 2: Resource allocations across functions are aligned to current organisational priorities and goals, as set out in the current Strategic Plan

Element 3: Internal restructuring exercises have a clear purpose and intent, aligned to the priorities of the current Strategic Plan

MI 3.1 Analysis

With only two small presences outside Geneva and few project staff posted in the field, the overall operating model is Geneva-based and driven. UN member states are the driving force behind UNCTAD’s priorities and pillar work streams. Member states also determine the size of the regular budget and are the main sponsors of XB-funded TC interventions. Member states have a great deal of influence on the size and composition of UNCTAD’s human resources. Grade levels are bound by the budget cycle, which is determined by member states in New York. Even slight changes to the functional title must be reported to and approved by member states.

The programme and budget biennium proposals provide an overall orientation for UNCTAD’s strategic objectives and align resources to functions. UNCTAD’s regular budget is largely spent on staff (91%) and operational expenses such as travel costs. In recent years, UNCTAD has faced structural funding gaps and declining resources. Recent budget constraints at the UN Secretariat have compounded matters further. As a result, since 2013, UNCTAD lost 20 RB established posts, and five more posts are proposed to be abolished, bringing the number of regular posts from 400 in 2013 to 375 in 2020.

In addition, there are 108 XB-funded UNCTAD staff in temporary posts, 80% of which are under contract for the ASYCUDA and DMFAS programmes, both of which have dedicated project management units. In many other cases, projects are delivered by UNCTAD staff, alongside other duties.

UNCTAD’s staff are highly dedicated to deliver against UNCTAD’s mandate aimed at bolstering the position of LDCs, LLDCs, SIDSS and other vulnerable and small economies in the global economy. Interviews showed that they spare no effort to respond to member states’ demands for TC and collaborate closely with member states to find the necessary resources.

Changes to the internal structure are subject to approval by member states. UNCTAD reports and external evaluations point to a need for enhanced resourcing of UNCTAD’s TC pillar. For instance, the 2017 stocktaking exercise of the implementation of the Nairobi Maafikiano put forward a set of recommendations to realign UNCTAD’s organisational structure, including inter alia:

- Shifting from division-based to task-based management, as a means to begin building greater institutional cohesion and to strengthen cross-divisional collaboration.
- Examining existing staffing capacity in light of the support needed for UNCTAD priorities.
- Institutionalising support to strategic partnerships, including realigning the function of the TC Service to manage UNCTAD-wide relationships with external partners and other United Nations entities and to support rapid response on the ground.

Source document: 2, 8, 68, 91, 173
- Improving efficiency in programme delivery. In line with paragraph 14(d) of the Nairobi Maafikiano, UNCTAD shall create a standing Senior Management Team, supported by a management working group to develop proposals for: (i) streamlining and cutting red tape in administrative processes such as human resource management, procurement, etc.; (ii) observing strict adherence to results-based management, principles, particularly in TC activities; and (iii) reporting as needed through informal briefings.

Over the years, UNCTAD’s organisational structures have largely remained static. Interviews and staffing data indicate that staff mobility within UNCTAD is low. We did not find evidence of any recent internal restructuring of the organisation. The lack of resources and recent budget cuts hamper UNCTAD’s ability to respond to change. Whereas directors are authorised to re-allocate staff capacity across their own divisional priorities, in practice, this is done flexibly without formalising positions for unforeseen or emergent needs, pending decision to formally seek approval of member states. XB enables flexibility through hiring of temporary staff and consultants.

It was demonstrated during interviews that staff were not confident that UNCTAD was sufficiently positioning itself to meet emerging needs and deliver new products, such as E-Commerce and the Digital Economy, Delivering as One/UNSDCF, and TC in the ALDC Division.

**MI 3.1 Evidence confidence**

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<th>Score</th>
<th>High confidence</th>
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**MI 3.2: Resource mobilisation efforts consistent with the core mandate and strategic priorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Element 1**: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support explicitly aligned to current strategic plan
- **Element 2**: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support reflects recognition of need to diversify the funding base, particularly in relation to the private sector
- **Element 3**: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support seeks multi-year funding within mandate and strategic priorities
- **Element 4**: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support prioritises the raising of domestic resources from partner countries/institutions, aligned to goals and objectives of the Strategic Plan/relevant country plan
- **Element 5**: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support contains clear targets, monitoring and reporting mechanisms geared to the Strategic Plan or equivalent

**MI 3.2 Analysis**

The current TC strategy of UNCTAD was adopted in 2003. As in the case of TC planning and programming, fundraising is *de facto* decentralised, with sections and branches trying to mobilise funds from member states and others, in some cases very successfully, in others less so. The two largest TC programmes, ASYCUDA and DMFAS, have successfully mobilised domestic resources as well as donor funding, meaning that for the majority of TC projects, resource mobilisation has proven satisfactory.

The secretariat does not have an up-to-date corporate fundraising strategy. Attempts were made in 2013 with a non-paper and a concept note for a funding mechanism for pending TC requests (2016), but a consensus was not achieved by member states for approval by the Trade and Development Board. As a result, UNCTAD does not yet have a fundraising strategy that is closely and explicitly aligned to the priorities of the Nairobi Maafikiano and subsequent programme and budget proposals.
In December 2018, over 80 sources of funding contributed to 249 TC interventions. In December 2018, ASYCUDA and DMFAS accounted for about 56% of total expenditures (USD 25.5 million) and were financed mainly by direct contribution from the respective member states and from proceeds of loans or grants from international financial institutions. Compared with 2017, in 2018 TC funding decreased by 3% to USD 34 million. Compared with 2016, extrabudgetary funding decreased by 20% (from USD 40 million in 2018), while total expenditure for TC rose to USD 44 million. The average expenditure per project per year is approximately USD 170 000.

Currently, most of the trust fund contributions are tightly earmarked by single contributors for specific projects. Only a few trust funds established in UNCTAD share the features of multi-donor thematic funds, such as co-mingled contributions, greater flexibility in fund allocation and consolidated reports. At present, only a few donors provide predictable annual contributions regulated by a co-operation agreement signed between the donor and UNCTAD. In the context of the structural shortage of donor funding, fundraising, especially for TC projects in the LDCs, is an ongoing theme at meetings of the Working Party. At the 78th session, delegates and representatives of regional groups expressed concerns about the lack of funding support to the multi-donor trust fund for the LDCs in the past few years. UNCTAD continuously invites member states to make more predictable and flexible multi-year contributions, including to the new multi-donor trust fund on trade and productive capacity, to scale up activities under the UNCTAD-led United Nations Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity.

Excluding ASYCUDA and DMFAS, two programmes which have been at the heart of UNCTAD’s TC for the past three decades and which account for the majority of TC activities, the lack of a relevant, up-to-date and strategically aligned fundraising strategy has given rise to a partially fragmented TC portfolio and to a large number of ad hoc, small and short-term projects, rather than longer-term programmes.

While fundraising is acknowledged as a corporate priority and recommended as such by OIOS and external evaluations, particularly for multi-year funds, it has not yet been elevated to the extent needed. For instance, the synthesis of five subprogramme evaluations states that “recommendations on fundraising were fairly convergent in identifying a need for UNCTAD to have a systematic and targeted resources mobilisation strategy or plan to better meet increasing requests for TC. The plan should cover different funding sources, including the private sector, and country-level mechanisms.” Weaknesses identified included the need for: (i) improving communications and dissemination of UNCTAD products, including the UNCTAD website, and enhancing use of new communication tools and products; and (ii) generally increasing the visibility of UNCTAD, especially at the national and regional levels.

An internal SharePoint database is in place to make the entering and updating of (official) requests from beneficiary countries easier and more accessible. For certain programmes (e.g. DMFAS), donor advisory groups have been established that meet on a regular basis. Whenever project managers are raising funds, internal guidelines stipulate that TCS should be informed when negotiations or contacts have reached a stage where funding seems a real possibility.

Donor mapping and matchmaking is done at various levels in the secretariat, but in an uncoordinated manner. The Secretary-General and DSG engage in fundraising efforts, drawing on information from divisions. Efforts are being made to diversify the funding base and obtain multi-year, unearmarked funding, including the DSG’s visits to donor headquarters, but so far with limited success. Evidence from interviews point to an urgent need for a corporate, secretariat-wide approach to fundraising, involving appropriate staff training and a well-focused communications strategy.
UNCTAD’s ability to receive funding from private entities is regulated by United Nations financial regulations and rules, the UN Secretary-General’s bulletin on the acceptance of pro bono goods and services, and the Guidelines on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Sector (20 November 2009). UNCTAD may accept voluntary contributions, gifts or donations from a private entity, provided that the independence, impartiality and reputation of UNCTAD are not affected. Thus, in accordance with United Nations financial regulation 3.11, a contribution may be accepted, provided that the purposes of the contribution are consistent with the policies, aims and activities of the United Nations, and that the contribution does not create an additional direct or indirect financial liability for the United Nations.

In practice, however, despite its potential in the particular context of trade and development, private sector funding is negligible. Documentary evidence suggests that UNCTAD is not keen on exploring this avenue; according to the proceedings of the 78th Working Party session (2019), the DSG noted that “there might be some associated challenges with regard to mobilising funds from the private sector, such as the mismatch between the interests of the private sector and the nature of UNCTAD TC, which was focused on government policies and legal and regulatory frameworks. UNCTAD could approach the private sector with regard to some TC programmes, but it was not necessary to devise a strategy for mobilising funds from the private sector.”

The new UNCTAD request database compiles the formal requests for TC that have been received since 1 January 2013 and cleared by the UNCTAD secretariat. It serves as an information platform for all stakeholders and aims to enhance the transparency on UNCTAD TC and facilitate funds mobilisation. The request database is updated regularly. In 2019, out of a total USD 106 million required for 317 TC requests, only 25% (USD 26.7 million) had been secured.

UNCTAD’s vulnerability is well-recognised by the secretariat, but secretariat-wide action to address this has thus far been inconsistent. All in all, despite a satisfactory performance of the two main programmes, ASYCUDA and DMFAS, this leads to an unsatisfactory score for this MI.

### MI 3.2 Evidence confidence

**MI 3.3: Aid reallocation/programming decisions responsive to need can be made at a decentralised level**

**Score**

**Overall MI rating**  
Satisfactory

**Overall MI score**  
3.00

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element 1: An organisation-wide policy or guidelines exist which describe the delegation of decision-making authorities at different levels within the organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Element 2: (If the first criterion is met) The policy/guidelines or other documents provide evidence of a sufficient level of decision-making autonomy available at the country level (or other decentralised level as appropriate) regarding aid reallocation/programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 3: Evaluations or other reports contain evidence that reallocation/programming decisions have been made to positive effect at country or other local level, as appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 4: The organisation has made efforts to improve or sustain the delegation of decision-making on aid allocation/programming to the country or other relevant levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 1

**MI 3.3 Analysis**

Within UNCTAD, there are lines of delegation and responsibility in the executive, corporate and substantive divisions. The head of RMS derives his managerial certifying authority for resources management – including XB-funding – from the head of UNCTAD.

In the area of TC, *de facto* decentralisation has encouraged delegation of decision-making authority to project managers to leverage resources if and when necessary. UNCTAD’s TC project approval and reporting processes illustrate how the main TC decisions are decentralised, with adequate due diligence processes. Programme managers are accountable for the delivery of TC outputs and results contained in the strategic framework and programme budget, and often undertake fundraising for their projects.

All requests for TC are stored in a centralised request database, accessible online. Once a decision is taken to proceed with the request and funding has been secured, it is processed internally through a transparent “Trust Fund Management System” that was introduced in 2016.

Subsequently, in 2018, UNCTAD launched the automated Trust Fund Document Approval system to streamline the review and approval processes of all project documents, memoranda of understanding and agreements. The system provides visibility for project review by key stakeholders, namely:

- the project officer – who is in charge of the inception and the implementation of the project
- the project manager – who ensures that the presented project is in line with the divisional plan and supports the implementation the monitoring and reporting
- the gender focal point – who ensures that the presented project document is in line with the gender mainstreaming strategy
- the director – who ensures that the project is relevant, supports the overall organisation mandate and is aligned to the organisational objectives
- the legal and finance teams – both of which ensure the compliance to the UN Rules and Financial Regulations and Policies
- the TC and evaluation teams – both of which ensure the compliance with TC guidance, objectives, reporting, and result-based frameworks and guidelines.

Once the strategic, programmatic, legal and financial approvals have been granted, the final approval and signature lies with the Head of Resources Management Service, as the sole official within the organisation with delegated authority to enter into agreements on behalf of UNCTAD.

Since its introduction, this approval process has, according to interviewees, strengthened transparency, accessibility of information, quality of proposals and timeliness. However, TCS cannot leverage its role on overall co-ordination of projects and programmes, due to staff shortages.

**MI 3.3 Evidence confidence**

High confidence
### MI 3.4: HR systems and policies performance based and geared to the achievement of results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Element 1: A system is in place which requires the performance assessment of all staff, including senior staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 2: There is evidence that the performance assessment system is systematically and implemented by the organisation across all staff and to the required frequency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 3: The performance assessment system is clearly linked to organisational improvement, particularly the achievement of corporate objectives, and to demonstrate ability to work with other agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 4: The performance assessment of staff is applied in decision-making relating to promotion, incentives, rewards, sanctions, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 5: A clear process is in place to manage disagreement and complaints relating to staff performance assessments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### MI 3.4 Analysis

As part of the UN Secretariat, all aspects of UNCTAD’s human resource management, including performance assessments, are governed by UN Secretariat regulations and rules.

All UNCTAD staff members, including staff on temporary (XB-funded) posts, are subject to performance evaluations. There are mid-point and end-of-cycle evaluations using an automated e-performance system (E-pas), available on UNCTAD’s intranet. Performance progress and compliance is linked to the UNCTAD’s management information systems known as the dashboard. Performance is monitored closely, and users can see E-performance document status by division on a monthly basis. There has been a backlog in E-pas compliance for quite some time. The HR section sends regular reminders, and the dashboard has contributed to greater transparency.

As for consultants, performance appraisals are carried out at the end of the assignment, for internal use only. These assessments are not shared with the consultants. E-performance is one input for staff promotion decisions. UNCTAD follows the UN Secretariat guidance, rules and regulations on staff disagreements and complaints regarding performance assessments, as well as other grievance instances; this is done on a case-by-case basis.

A 2017 OIOS audit on the use of consultants and individual contractors at the UNCTAD assessed the adequacy and effectiveness of governance, risk management and control processes over the recruitment and use of contractors/consultants. The audit found that there were satisfactory arrangements to ensure that engagements were temporary in nature, that there were adequate controls to ensure that terms of reference for consultants had specific and measurable deliverables and that selections were based on established criteria. However, controls relating to competitive selection, verification of credentials, monitoring of payments and tracking of unsatisfactory performance/prevention of rehiring needed to be strengthened. UNCTAD accepted all related recommendations and took adequate measures.

UNCTAD has very limited financial resources to provide training opportunities and allow for staff mobility. Instead, it has sought other ways to refresh and renew staff skills, including facilitating requests for outside activities such as teaching at tertiary institutions; facilitating requests for sabbaticals/studies; facilitating TC with educational institutions for capacity building, training...
and implementation of technical projects; facilitating inter-divisional discussions on key research topics; research seminars; on-the-job training for staff on results-based management; and facilitating training on the UN Development Account to strengthen the capacity of UNCTAD staff in designing and implementing Development Account projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 3.4 Evidence confidence</th>
<th>High confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability</td>
<td>KPI score 3.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNCTAD has a clearly defined and publicly available policy on which priority countries it seeks to serve through its TC pillar, namely LDCs, LLDCs, Africa and SIDSs. This is where the majority of resources are directed, either directly or through interregional programmes. However, targeting is broad; in reality, prioritisation and implementation is wholly dependent on the availability of funding, of which over 90% are provided by bilateral donors and is often earmarked. There does not appear to be an explicit secretariat-wide organisational statement or policy that clearly defines criteria for allocating resources to partners. On average, expenditure on LDCs in the period between 2015 and 2018 accounted for 47.3% of the total; approximately one-third of this involved LDC participation in regional and interregional projects. In terms of thematic priorities, UNCTAD’s TC Toolbox identifies no less than 28 different products.

As a UN Secretariat entity, UNCTAD operates within UN Secretariat regulations and rules, and it applies these rigorously and efficiently. Disbursements are based on XB fund availability and is subject to project-level contractual arrangements with donors. RMS is in charge of and monitors disbursements, reporting to divisions and the OSG on a monthly basis on trust fund management and management information. Since its introduction in 2018, the management information system (the dashboard) has contributed considerably to greater transparency and accountability.

TC budgets are developed on a per project basis and not on a pillar or divisional basis. Because the subprogramme and budget proposals do not include XB-funded TC interventions, the overall organisational budget does not align financial resources with strategic results in the TC pillar. Despite its improvements in some areas, staff experience difficulties in using Umoja to track performance at the activity level and instead have developed their own parallel system. Pending further rollouts of Umoja functionalities, UNCTAD does not currently have an information technology system to support the tracking of expenditure to results.

UNCTAD is subject to the UN Secretariat’s control. Internal control has been greatly strengthened in recent years. There is a robust control framework in place, including internal and external oversight and other mechanisms. UNCTAD monitors implementation of audit recommendations through its MIS dashboard on a two-monthly basis. It has an excellent track record of full implementation of OIOS recommendations.

Staff members at all levels are expected to become familiar with the contents of the Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework and to comply with the guidance and principles established therein. Guidelines have been distributed to all staff. Anti-Fraud and Ethics training courses are available and mandatory for all UN Secretariat staff. In practice, however, less than 10% were registered as having followed these.
MI 4.1: Transparent decision-making for resource allocation, consistent with strategic priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Element 1: An explicit organisational statement or policy exists which clearly defines criteria for allocating resources to partners

Element 2: The criteria reflect targeting to the highest priority themes/countries/areas of intervention as set out in the current strategic plan

Element 3: The organisational policy or statement is regularly reviewed and updated

Element 4: The organisational statement or policy is publicly available

MI 4.1 Analysis

The UNCTAD mandate forms the basis for all its work, including TC. UNCTAD has a clearly defined and publicly available policy on how its TC is determined, and which priority countries it seeks to serve through its TC pillar. Basic principles of UNCTAD TC are that it is demand-driven, embraces country ownership, and is transparent, efficient, effective and implemented in a geographically balanced manner.

TC targets all developing countries, in particular LDCs, Africa, LLDCs, SIDSs and other vulnerable and small economies. In practice, this is where the majority of resources are directed, either directly or through interregional programmes. However, targeting is broad; in practice, prioritisation and implementation are wholly dependent on the availability of funding, of which over 90% are provided by bilateral donors and often earmarked. Interviews indicated that, whereas UNCTAD keeps track of where demand is coming from and how this evolves, this does not necessarily translate into strategic choices. Instead, donor priorities, rather than UNCTAD’s or targeted member states’ priorities, ultimately determine where and how much TC is delivered.

Based on documentation and interviews, and in light of the de facto decentralised structure and work processes, there does not appear to be an explicit secretariat-wide organisational statement or policy that clearly defines criteria for allocating resources to partners. Further, interviews suggest that there is not a formalised approach and instead each division has developed its own. Once a decision is taken to proceed with the request, it is processed internally through a transparent trust fund management system that was introduced in 2016. Noting that UNCTAD’s mandate is very broad, practically all requests from member states for TC are registered in the TC database. Most interviewees note that donor preferences and priorities also directed funding allocation to countries or to specific thematic areas.

Between 2015 and 2018, UNCTAD expended the highest proportion of funds in the LDCs (47.3%) and Africa (34.4%) noting that there would be some cross-over between the two categories. Approximately one-third of this involved LDC participation in regional and interregional projects. Average overall expenditure between 2015 and 2018 was as follows: 34.4% to Africa, 16.5% to Asia and the Pacific, 11.3% to Latin America and the Caribbean, 5.5% to Europe and 0.3% to North America; 32% were spent on interregional TC. Of the 2018 expenses on TC, 22.3% were spent on low-income countries, 13.9% on lower-middle-income countries, 12.2% on upper-middle-income countries, 2.8% on high-income countries, 16% on regional TC interventions and 32.8% on interregional TC interventions. This pattern of expenditure has been consistent since 2015, though expenditure in Asia and the Pacific has steadily increased, and there was a USD 2 million increase for Africa between 2015 and 2016.
In terms of thematic priorities, UNCTAD's TC Toolbox identifies 28 different products. Besides these, UNCTAD also supports occasional requests for TC assistance that are not part of the Toolbox (in 2018, 4% of total expenditures). The Toolbox is reviewed every two years. In the absence of specific allocation criteria, proxy information to describe where the resources are allocated show that in 2018, ASYCUDA and DMFAS combined were responsible for 58% of total expenditures (47% and 11%, respectively). They are followed by business facilitation (6.35%), E-Commerce and the Digital Economy (5.26%), and competition and consumer protection policies and frameworks (4.36%), which, combined, accounted for 16% of total UNCTAD TC delivery.

In sum, the TC policy and criteria are clearly defined and available, and the Toolbox, reflecting these, is regularly updated. In practice, however, funding availability, rather than specific selection criteria, is the actual driver of TC.

### MI 4.1 Evidence confidence

**Score**

**Satisfactory**

**Element 1:** The institution sets clear targets for disbursement

**Element 2:** Financial information indicates that planned disbursements were met within institutionally agreed margins

**Element 3:** Clear explanations are available in relation to any variances

**Element 4:** Variances relate to external factors rather than internal procedural blockages

### MI 4.2 Analysis

The secretariat does not set clear targets for disbursement. Rather, disbursement is responsive to context and resources, consequently firm targets are not expected to apply. Disbursement is based on XB fund availability. Nonetheless, once plans for disbursement have been approved, they occur efficiently and within agreed margins.

Depending on the donor, different requirements apply. Here, too, UNCTAD operates within UN Secretariat regulations and rules, and it applies these rigorously and efficiently. For example, the average request completion time by type of service and client for the period January-June 2019 was a mere 1.7 days. Since the introduction of the dashboard, and with the improvements made to Umoja, the average number of days for completion of payment requests in the automated TC Trust Fund Documents System went down from 27.4 days in 2018 to 20.8 days in 2019.

RMS is in charge and monitors disbursements and reporting to divisions and to the OSG on a monthly basis through the Dashboards on Trust Fund Management and Management Information. Since its introduction in 2018, the dashboard has contributed significantly to greater transparency and accountability. Interviewees point to improvements in shortening deadlines, as well as access to financial data for project officers and managers. There is quarterly monitoring against progress using financial data. TCS monitors expenditures and may discuss with the directors if there are any issues with implementation. Additionally, for UN Development Account projects, there is an annual report submitted each year to UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

There is financial information available on variance, but TC performance management in terms of tracking of achievements at output and outcome levels is weak. Variances to timely disbursement often relate to external factors, e.g. realities on the ground that affect the planning and implementation of TC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 4.3: Principles of results-based budgeting applied</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall MI rating</strong></td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall MI score</strong></td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Element 1:</strong> The most recent organisational budget clearly aligns financial resources with strategic objectives/intended results of the current Strategic Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Element 2:</strong> A budget document is available which provides clear costings for the achievement of each management result</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Element 3:</strong> Systems are available and used to track costs from activity through to result (outcome)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Element 4:</strong> There is evidence of improved costing of management and development results in budget documents reviewed over time (evidence of building a better system)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MI 4.3 Analysis**

This MI has been interpreted at the TC project level.

Because the subprogramme and budget proposals do not include XB-funded TC interventions, the overall organisational budget does not align financial resources with strategic results in the TC pillar. Instead, TC budgets are developed on a per project basis.

Following an OIOS audit of UNCTAD, selected projects in the Division of Investment and Enterprise (in 2017), UNCTAD reviewed the TC submission templates and revised the project clearance checklist to ensure that the applicable budgetary methodology is followed. With regard to new requests for TC, project officers were henceforth required to provide a cost estimate/budget for each request. Results-based budgeting principles are not yet being applied to the budgets for TC in compliance with UN Secretariat regulations.

Despite improvements to Umoja in some areas, staff experience difficulties in using the platform to track TC performance from activity through to result (outcome). In response, most interviewees have developed their own parallel system to track the performance of their project(s). From 2020 onwards, the UN is moving to an annual planning and budgeting cycle which is intended to improve flexibility and accountability for results, also at the project level. Due to a lack of resources and delays in the roll-out of the (UN Secretariat-wide system) Umoja 2 functionalities that should allow for an integrated results-based budgeting and performance tracking for TC interventions, for the time being, UNCTAD does not have an information technology system available to support the tracking of expenditure to results. The finance section within RMS monitors expenditures on a monthly basis in an Excel programme and shares these with the divisions at least once a month.

**MI 4.3 Evidence confidence**

Medium confidence

Source document: 20, 23, 155
ANNEX 1

MI 4.4: External audit or other external reviews certifies the meeting of international standards at all levels, including with respect to internal audit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Element 1: External audit conducted which complies with international standards
- Element 2: Most recent external audit confirms compliance with international standards across functions
- Element 3: Management response is available to external audit
- Element 4: Management response provides clear action plan for addressing any gaps or weaknesses identified by external audit
- Element 5: Internal audit functions meet international standards, including for independence
- Element 6: Internal audit reports are publicly available

**MI 4.4 Analysis**

UNCTAD states that it is committed to evaluation as a key enabler in a culture of accountability. As a member of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), it contributes to the full implementation of evaluation norms and standards.

At the organisational level, UNCTAD is subject to a robust system of internal and external oversight, including external audits by the UN Board of Auditors (BoA), an audit body composed of three supreme national audit bodies on a rotational basis that exercises external audit mainly of a financial nature. UNCTAD’s internal audits are conducted by the OIOS and the Internal Audit Division, which provides the functions of audit and carries out audits in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. Audits by OIOS are conducted independently of UNCTAD, though within the UN system they are considered to be internal audits. OIOS undertakes two to three audits a year, based on its own risk assessment. Since November 2013, OIOS has completed nine internal audits of UNCTAD, though these have a broader focus than TC. OIOS has only completed two external evaluations of UNCTAD in the same time period, a programme evaluation of the research and analysis pillar in 2015 and the follow-up review in 2018.

JIU is the only independent external oversight body of the UN system and the only entity mandated with conducting inspections, evaluations and investigations system-wide. JIU conducted its most recent UNCTAD-specific review of the management and organisation in 2012. UNCTAD’s management response is publicly available as a report to the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board. JIU also engages with UNCTAD when evaluating system-wide thematic issues. Given the broad-scale nature of the reports and recommendations, there is not a direct management response from UNCTAD to these.

There is a progress tracking system for OIOS recommendations and JIU recommendations within the MIS dashboard. For external evaluations that form part of the annual evaluation plan, responses to recommendations and actions are formally reported to the Working Party. Updates on audits are also reported to the Working Party.

UNCTAD monitors implementation of audit recommendations through its MIS dashboard on a two-monthly basis. UNCTAD has a track record of full implementation of OIOS recommendations, with 100% in 2017 and 2018, and has consistently met the 80% implementation requirement over recent years.
OIOS reports on evaluations/audits of various UNCTAD functions and management units are available on the OIOS website but could not be located on the UNCTAD website.

**MI 4.4 Evidence confidence**
High confidence

**MI 4.5: Issues or concerns raised by internal control mechanisms (operational and financial risk management, internal audit, safeguards etc.) adequately addressed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MI 4.5 Analysis**

Internal control has been greatly strengthened in recent years. There is a robust control framework in place, including internal and external oversight, financial and conflict of interest disclosure requirements, whistle-blower protection and other mechanisms detailed in the Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework of the United Nations Secretariat. These are communicated to UNCTAD staff through intranet, town hall meetings and induction meetings for new recruits with RMS staff. Staff can – and in many cases must – follow online training courses; Anti-Fraud and Ethics training courses are available and mandatory for all UN Secretariat staff.

UNCTAD has a track record of full implementation of OIOS recommendations, with 100% in 2017 and 2018, and has consistently met the 80% implementation requirement over recent years. UNCTAD tracks implementation rates on the MIS dashboard and sends monthly updates of progress that identify timeframes and responsible parties.

OIOS also tracks implementation rates of recommendations and the information is publicly available online: https://oios.un.org/sites/oios.un.org/files/web_impl_rate_ied.pdf. During sessions of the Working Party, the DSG of UNCTAD briefs member states on the status of implementation of the recommendations of the OIOS on the audit of the Intergovernmental Support Service of UNCTAD.

UNCTAD is obliged to report cases of fraud to the UN Comptroller and to OIOS immediately and in the year-end exercise. The head of RMS reports directly to the Secretary-General. Investigations are conducted by OIOS and reported upon by the UN Secretariat’s comptroller office.

Management responses to OIOS audits include a memorandum from the UNCTAD DSG outlining any issues and a table of audit recommendations, acceptance by UNCTAD (yes/no), the title of the responsible individual, the implementation date and UNCTAD comments. In a reviewed example, the implementation dates ranged from within 1 month to 14 months from the final audit report.

**MI 4.5 Evidence confidence**
High confidence
MI 4.6: Policies and procedures effectively prevent, detect, investigate and sanction cases of fraud, corruption and other financial irregularities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MI 4.6 Analysis</td>
<td>Source document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 1: A clear policy/guidelines on fraud, corruption and any other financial irregularities is available and made public</td>
<td>The UN Secretariat documents ST/IC/2016/25 on anti-fraud and anti-corruption and ST AI/2017/1 on unsatisfactory conduct, investigations and the disciplinary process, as well as the UN Secretariat’s Guidebook on Ethics, provide guidance to staff members and other UN personnel, whose duty it is to report any and all possible cases of fraudulent acts. These guidelines have been distributed to all staff through a bespoke Information Circular on Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework of the UN Secretariat. Other methods such as push notifications, banners and on-the-job training are also applied to raise attention to anti-fraud and anti-corruption policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 2: The policy/guidelines clearly define the roles of management and staff in implementing/complying with the guidelines</td>
<td>Staff members at all levels are expected to become familiar with the contents of the Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework and to comply with the guidance and principles established therein. Staff can – and in many cases must – follow online training courses; Anti-Fraud and Ethics training courses are available and mandatory for all UN Secretariat staff. In practice, however, it would seem that few staff actually take part: as at October 2019, the rate of formal internal training though the United Nations Office at Geneva on Preventing Fraud and Corruption at the United Nations stood at 45 staff (9.9%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 3: Staff training/awareness-raising has been conducted in relation to the policy/guidelines</td>
<td>In the event of fraud cases, these are reported to the DSG, to the UN Comptroller’s office and to OIOS immediately, and in the year end exercise. Investigations are conducted by OIOS. The Comptroller’s office at the UN headquarters issues a public report on disciplinary cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 4: There is evidence of policy/guidelines implementation, e.g. through regular monitoring and reporting to the Governing Body</td>
<td>MI 4.6 Evidence confidence High confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 5: There are channels/mechanisms in place for reporting suspicion of misuse of funds (e.g. anonymous reporting channels and “whistle-blower” protection policy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 6: Annual reporting on cases of fraud, corruption and other irregularities, including actions taken, ensures that they are made public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall MI rating: Satisfactory

Overall MI score: 3.00
RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT
Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, to leverage effective solutions and to maximise results (in line with Busan Partnerships commitments).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships</th>
<th>KPI score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the whole, TC interventions are member state demand-driven, national government-centric and developed in partnership with the clients. UNCTAD has hitherto participated, or is still actively participating, in the formulation of 37 Common Country Analysis as well as related narrative parts of UNSDFs during the design phase. Although UNCTAD does not have country strategies itself, its TC member states must articulate how UNCTAD’s TC would contribute to their national development strategies. The large percentage of locally (self-) funded projects under ASYCUDA and DMFAS are an indication of successful alignment of TC to the needs and priorities of the member states. Evaluations show that under each subprogramme, UNCTAD’s TC meets the needs of its target constituents. The relevance of technical assistance interventions is rated highly.

Context analysis and partner capacity analysis are compulsory elements of the appraisal process of new requests for TC, and guidelines on what is needed, have been developed. A basic capacity analysis is required as part of the stakeholder analysis and is one of the ten minimum requirements for results-based management. In practice, the depth of the analysis differs from project to project. Although respondents to the partner survey spoke appreciatively of these, the review of a sample of 60 documents of projects carried out in the surveyed countries shows a mixed picture. In some cases, context analysis was included; in others, especially the older projects, this was not the case. There was limited evidence of reflection points with partners.

Risk management for TC is an emergent practice at UNCTAD. At the level of TC interventions, risk assessments are required; however, these are not broken down into the four risk categories (operational, strategic, political and reputational). Interviews indicate that ensuring that staff comply with UN rules and regulations is a work in progress; until recently, no such system existed. Survey respondents appreciate UNCTAD’s risk management, with 90% giving positive ratings. This is in contrast with the analysis from the project sample from the same countries, where only limited evidence was found of a risk framework, identification or consideration of risk in the project descriptions and logframes.

With the exception of economic governance, which is integral to most TC interventions, and gender mainstreaming, there is little evidence to suggest that other cross-cutting issues (environmental sustainability and climate change, and respect for human rights) are consistently included in the design of TC interventions.

Many TC interventions aim to strengthen existing national systems. Sustainability – in the sense that the benefits of the project are expected to continue after its completion – is part of the project document design template. In practice, results are mixed. While evaluations found evidence of good practice or some likelihood of sustainability of the TC interventions they had examined, stronger national ownership and engagement, as well as adopting a programmatic rather than project approach, were nevertheless recommended. Moreover, sustainability pathways are not clearly articulated in project documents; nor were they clearly expressed by staff during interviews. Given the large number of one-off interventions, sustainability is not always an integral consideration in project design.

UNCTAD’s institutional procedures are efficient and allow for swift action. Still, UN Secretariat processes and instruments are not always well appreciated by staff. Umoja is seen as cumbersome and rigid, despite recent improvements. The introduction and use of the dashboard, UNCTAD’s management information system, has increased internal efficiency, transparency and communication. Seventy per cent of implementing partners state that organisational procedures do not cause them delays.
### MI 5.1: Interventions aligned with national/regional priorities and intended national/regional results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Element 1:** Reviewed country or regional strategies make reference to national/regional strategies or objectives

**Element 2:** Reviewed country strategies or regional strategies link the results statements to national or regional goals

**Element 3:** Structures and incentives in place for technical staff that allow investment of time and effort in alignment process

### MI 5.1 Analysis

On the whole, interventions are member state demand-driven, national government-centric and developed in partnership with the clients. UNCTAD states that its operations delivered in the context of the UNDAFs and their successor, the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNCSDFs) are aligned with national strategic objectives of member states. UNCTAD actively participates in the formulation of several Common Country Analysis (CCAs) as well as related narrative parts of these UNSDCFs during the design phase. Evidently, working closely in the context of CCAs and UNCSDFs has the potential for a strong alignment with national priorities. In the Development Account-funded projects, national priorities are well considered. However, these constitute only a small percentage of the overall TC resources.

UNCTAD does not create standalone country strategies though project objectives are expected to align with government requests/requirements. For example, the Angola Train for Trade II programme clearly references the government’s strategic framework relevant to the initiative. Since 2016, the appraisal of new requests for TC explicitly requires member states to articulate how UNCTAD TC would contribute to their national development strategies. Prior to that, this was not the case.

The high percentage of locally (self-) funded projects under ASYCUDA and DMFAS are an indication of successful alignment of TC to the needs and priorities of the member states. About 70% of ASYCUDA projects are now funded out of national budget; the remaining 30% are contributed by donors (World Bank, European Union, GIZ and others). This trend is increasing.

Evaluations show that under each subprogramme, UNCTAD products – including TC – meet the needs of its target constituents. The relevance of technical assistance interventions in particular was rated highly. For instance, a survey conducted for the evaluation of subprogramme 2 found that 93% of respondents from the LDCs, SIDSs, LLDCs and other structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies indicated that technical assistance implemented under this subprogramme was “well adapted to their particular situation and needs”. The evaluation of subprogramme 5 noted that its programme portfolio could be rebalanced towards increased TC, in order to better meet the needs and expectations of its stakeholders.

Survey responses suggest that TC projects are designed and implemented to fit with national programmes; two-thirds of respondents give UNCTAD either a very good or excellent score. Based on the review of a sample of TC projects in the surveyed countries, many of which pre-date the 2016 requirement, the evidence is mixed, with some projects explicitly referencing national strategies and goals, and others less so.

### MI 5.1 Evidence confidence

19, 20-22, 68, 93, 94, 96, 101-125, 129-134, 137-141, 178, 181-186

**High confidence**
### MI 5.2: Contextual analysis (shared where possible) applied to shape the intervention designs and implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Element 1:</td>
<td>Intervention designs contain a clear statement that positions the intervention within the operating context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 2:</td>
<td>Context statement has been developed jointly with partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 3:</td>
<td>Context analysis contains reference to gender issues, where relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 4:</td>
<td>Context analysis contains reference to environmental sustainability and climate change issues, where relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 5:</td>
<td>Context analysis contains reference to governance issues, including conflict and fragility, where relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 6:</td>
<td>Evidence of reflection points with partner(s) that take note of any significant changes in context</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Score**

- **Overall MI rating:** Satisfactory
- **Overall MI score:** 3.00

### MI 5.2 Analysis

As part of the project appraisal process, UNCTAD has established procedures for all new TC requests to ensure that context is analysed and that capacity needs and gaps are identified. Interviews highlighted that such analysis is usually undertaken in close collaboration with member states requesting TC assistance.

As part of the design phase, the standardised, secretariat-wide project template requires that an analysis is carried out of the core problems addressed by the project, the effects and root causes of these problems including a problem tree, and sustainable solutions to address the root causes. The analysis should draw on findings and recommendations from UNCTAD’s research and consensus-building work. In cases where research and analysis products have been produced, this contributes to a strong understanding of context. UNCTAD’s revised guidelines on results-based management for TC provide further details on how to conduct both the problem analysis and the stakeholder analysis.

Gender-disaggregated data should also be used if available. In that regard, UNCTAD’s Checklist for Mainstreaming Gender Equality in TC projects is a helpful tool to assess gender mainstreaming potential and examine points of gender mainstreaming at various stages of the project cycle: project analysis (including gender assessment/differential impacts on women and men and use of gender disaggregated data), definition of the logframe (including gender issues and gender sensitive indicators and baseline), budget, stakeholder’s participation, risk analysis, project monitoring and evaluation (including self-monitoring, progress and final reports, and external evaluations). With the exception of economic governance, there is little evidence to suggest that other cross-cutting issues (environmental sustainability and climate change, and respect for human rights) are consistently included in the context analysis of TC interventions.

The Angola Train for Trade II project provides a good practice example of project design. UNCTAD undertook a needs assessment mission that drew on previous research and analysis and included wide and robust consultation with government institutions. It identified five to six broad components and developed the project in line with the principles of results-based management (RBM). Each component has a full logical framework, based on the needs assessment carried out by each of the divisions. The logframes considered risk and assumptions and supported strategy development. As part of project implementation, UNCTAD keeps track of these risks and collects evidence of changes and potential impacts that interventions have on these.
Survey results show high levels of appreciation for how projects are designed. Respondents generally agree that interventions are tailored to the needs of the local context and are adaptive to changes therein, although scores from Angolan respondents are lower. The depth of the analysis differs from project to project. The review of a sample of documents of projects carried out in the surveyed countries shows a mixed picture. In some cases, context analysis was included or previously assessed as part of a research and analysis product (e.g. competition and consumer protection, investment policy reviews). Moreover, in the case of DMFAS project documents that were reviewed, the oftentimes longstanding country involvement has contributed to a solid understanding of local context. UNSDCF/UNDAF projects and UN Development Account projects also tend to include well-described context analyses. In others, especially the older projects included in the sample, this was not the case. There was limited evidence of reflection points with partners.

MI 5.2 Evidence confidence

MI 5.3: Capacity analysis informs intervention design and implementation, and strategies to address any weakness found are employed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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</table>

Element 1: Intervention designs contain a clear statement of capacities of key national implementing partners

Element 2: Capacity analysis considers resources, strategy, culture, staff, systems and processes, structure and performance

Element 3: Capacity analysis statement has been developed jointly where feasible

Element 4: Capacity analysis statement includes clear strategies for addressing any weaknesses, with a view to sustainability

Element 5: Evidence of regular and resourced reflection points with partner(s) that take note of any significant changes in the wider institutional setting that affect capacity

MI 5.3 Analysis

A basic capacity analysis is required as part of the stakeholder analysis and is one of the ten minimum requirements for results-based management. The project document template and project clearance checklist include a Stakeholder Analysis Table, describing the stakeholders (national, regional and/or institutional type and level of involvement in the project (direct/indirect, etc.); their main activities; needs/capacity gaps; and expected benefits from co-ordination with stakeholders. As part of this exercise, project officers must include main actors and other UN institutions – including the UN Country Team, to ensure that there is no duplication of other projects and to highlight potential areas of collaboration.

In addition, the organisation has developed guidelines for UNCTAD project managers to assess capacity of implementing partners. This is essentially a screening tool to quickly assess each candidate’s appropriateness and capacity in four functional areas to implement a proposed project: project management; technical skills and resources; financial management; and administrative capacities. These guidelines are not referenced in the project management handbook nor in the Project Clearance Checklist but can be found on the UNCTAD intranet page for Project Documents along with the Due Diligence Checklist.
Once again, survey respondents are generally positive about UNCTAD’s capacity assessments, with two-thirds giving a score of very good to excellent. Meanwhile, the review of a sample of projects suggest that although project documents will describe the issue (requirements) and what is needed to address it (objective of the project), they do not systematically include a detailed capacity assessment of government partners, nor of the private sector and civil society. In some cases (Angola and Zambia), a detailed, consultative needs assessment is the first step of project implementation. For the Enhanced Integrated Framework Ethiopia and Rwanda E-Commerce and the Digital Economy projects, the detailed capacity assessment is the main project deliverable. In other projects (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Turkmenistan), there was no reference to a capacity assessment having been conducted. Interviewees point out that changing conditions on the ground have an impact on actual capacity, which is not always factored into the (remote) design. Having staff based in the field allows for ongoing dialogue with partner agencies and a more realistic assessment of their capacities.

Based on the project sample, the extent to which the project documents have indeed been developed jointly with the partners is not clear. Moreover, no evidence was found of regular and resourced reflection points.

### MI 5.3 Evidence confidence

High confidence

### MI 5.4: Detailed risk (strategic, political, reputational, operational) management strategies ensure the identification, mitigation, monitoring and reporting of risks

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<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
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</table>

**Element 1:** Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for operational risk

**Element 2:** Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for strategic risk

**Element 3:** Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for political risk

**Element 4:** Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for reputational risk

**Element 5:** Risks are routinely monitored and reflected upon by the partnership

**Element 6:** Risk mitigation actions taken by the partnership are documented and communicated

### MI 5.4 Analysis

Risk management is an emergent practice for TC at UNCTAD. At the UN Secretariat level, UNCTAD is actively participating in the ongoing discussions led by the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC) for the development of a UN-Secretariat-wide Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) policy framework, methodology and tools which will see implementation in the course of 2020. Recently, UNCTAD has developed Due Diligence Guidelines for Partnerships to ensure a more coherent and streamlined approach on due diligence standards and procedure.

At the level of TC interventions, the project document template now also includes a requirement for the assessment of risk. However, these are not broken down into the four risk categories (operational, strategic, political, reputational). The project clearance checklist also includes risk analysis and potential mitigation actions to be put in place for all project planning. Interviews indicate that ensuring that staff comply with UN rules and regulations is a work in progress; until recently, no such system existed. Project Officers and now being taught to carry out the due diligence process prior to signing an agreement.
Survey respondents appreciate UNCTAD's risk management, with 90% giving positive ratings. This is in contrast with the analysis from the project sample from the same countries, where only limited evidence was found of a risk framework, identification or consideration of risk in the project descriptions, nor in the limited number of logframes or monitoring and evaluation plans available for review. Some project documents included a list of potential risks, without adding mitigation or monitoring requirements. The Angola Train for Trade II project includes a risk table of operational, strategic and political risks, mitigation actions, and risk tracking. The DMFAS project in Bangladesh describes risks and assumptions, which are included in the project logframe. Where there is no, or only limited risk management/monitoring described in the design, issues and solutions are reported as they arise in progress reporting for most projects.

**MI 5.4 Evidence confidence**

**MI 5.5: Intervention designs include the analysis of cross-cutting issues (as defined in KPI 2)**

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<tr>
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</table>

- Element 1: Intervention design documentation includes the requirement to analyse cross-cutting issues
- Element 2: Guidelines are available for staff on the implementation of the relevant guidelines
- Element 3: Approval procedures require the assessment of the extent to which cross-cutting issues have been integrated in the design
- Element 4: Intervention designs include the analysis of gender issues
- Element 5: Intervention designs include the analysis of environmental sustainability and climate change issues
- Element 6: Intervention designs include the analysis of good governance issues
- Element 7: Intervention designs include the analysis of human rights issues
- Element 8: Plans for intervention monitoring and evaluation include attention to cross-cutting issues

**MI 5.5 Analysis**

As described under MI 5.2 and KPI 2, the project appraisal process now requires the analysis of gender equality and women's empowerment considerations, and guidelines and checklists are in place. This marks a significant improvement for the secretariat, compared with the situation in the first half of this decade.

UNCTAD's Checklist for Mainstreaming Gender Equality in TC projects enables project officers and managers to assess gender mainstreaming potential and examine points of gender mainstreaming at various stages of the project cycle: project analysis (including gender assessment/differential impacts on women and men and use of gender disaggregated data), definition of the logframe (including gender issues and gender sensitive indicators and baseline), budget, stakeholder's participation, risk analysis, Project monitoring and evaluation (including self-monitoring, progress and final reports, and external evaluation).

With the exception of economic governance, which is integral to most TC interventions, there is little evidence to suggest that other cross-cutting issues (environmental sustainability and climate change, and respect for human rights) are consistently included in the design of TC interventions.
Plans for monitoring and evaluation increasingly pay attention to gender and economic governance, but insufficiently to environmental and human rights considerations.

Survey responses show that stakeholders have limited familiarity with UNCTAD’s cross-cutting strategies, with the exception of economic governance, and also limited visibility on how these may or may not affect performance. On reviewing the sample of documents of projects being implemented in the surveyed countries, we see that gender is rarely mentioned in project documents. In the more recent Angola Train for Trade II project, there is evidence of gender targets and gender disaggregated data points in the project logframe. Environmental sustainability was found in the case of the Zambia UNSDCF project, and as an output in the Rwanda UNSDCF project and the Angola Train for Trade II project.

**MI 5.5 Evidence confidence**

**MI 5.6: Intervention designs include detailed and realistic measures to ensure sustainability (as defined in KPI 12)**

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<tr>
<th>Score</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unsatisfactory</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.00</strong></td>
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**Element 1:** Intervention designs include statement of critical aspects of sustainability, including; institutional framework, resources and human capacity, social behaviour, technical developments and trade, as appropriate

**Element 2:** Key elements of the enabling policy and legal environment that are required to sustain expected benefits from a successful intervention are defined in the design

**Element 3:** The critical assumptions that underpin sustainability form part of the approved monitoring and evaluation plan

**Element 4:** Where shifts in policy and legislation will be required these reform processes are addressed (within the intervention plan) directly and in a time sensitive manner

**MI 5.6 Analysis**

TC interventions vary in quality and approach, ranging from one-off interventions in traditional areas like training courses and workshops, to long-term relationships (ASYCUDA, DMFAS). Many TC interventions aim to strengthen existing national systems. Sustainability – in the sense that the benefits of the project are expected to continue after its completion – is addressed in the project document design template: “The document describes measures that should be in place for the project to continue delivering benefits after implementation (sustainability measures)”. In practice, results are mixed. The evaluation of subprogramme 4 (Technology and Logistics) identified several good practices related to incorporating institutional sustainability considerations into TC activities. These include Train for Trade alumni networks, the focus on organisational strengthening of national trade facilitation committees, as well as the ASYCUDA approach to building institutional capacity, for example, by supporting the set-up of training centres. However, the same evaluation also identified a key challenge regarding the sustainability of ASYCUDA, in that it relies on strictly earmarked extrabudgetary resources, which could not be utilised for necessary investments in software development and upgrades, essential for meeting the evolving technological needs of countries in the longer term. This illustrates a recurrent challenge to UNCTAD’s efforts to achieve sustainable results, namely the lack of (unearmarked) resources.
Other evaluations found evidence of some likelihood of sustainability of the TC interventions they had examined. However, to better enable sustainability of results and to respond to the sustainability concerns of donors, strong national ownership and engagement, as well as adopting a programmatic rather than project approach, were recommended. Aftercare support and follow-up reviews (after a number of years) to assess policy implementation could also contribute to sustainability of results, for which extrabudgetary resources would be required.

Sustainability pathways are not clearly articulated in project documents; nor were they clearly expressed by staff during interviews. Given the large number of one-off interventions, sustainability is not always seen an integral consideration in project design.

Nevertheless, respondents to the partner survey speak favourably of the attention given to sustainability during the design stages, with more than 90% stating that UNCTAD’s TC interventions are designed and implemented to sustain effect over time. Again, this would appear to contrast with the findings of the project sample review which point out that statements of sustainability are generally not explicit in the project documents or are quite lightly considered in terms of whether the proposed initiative is itself sustainable without further funding. There was some evidence of political issues as a risk to sustainability. There are notable shortcomings in the inclusion of sustainability in monitoring and evaluation frameworks, including of UNDAF-related projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 5.6 Evidence confidence</th>
<th>High confidence</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 5.7: Institutional procedures (including systems for engaging staff, procuring project inputs, disbursing payment, logistical arrangements etc.) positively support speed of implementation</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>3.00</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element 1: Internal standards are set to track the speed of implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Element 2: The organisation benchmarks (internally and externally) its performance on speed of implementation across different operating contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 3: Evidence that procedural delays have not hindered speed of implementation across interventions reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 4: Evidence that any common institutional bottlenecks in speed of implementation identified and actions taken leading to an improvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 5.7 Analysis</th>
<th>Source document</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Like other entities of the UN Secretariat, UNCTAD follows UN Secretariat business processes and uses its tools, including Umoja. Based on documentation and interview responses, it would appear that UNCTAD’s institutional procedures are efficient and allow for swift action. For instance, on grants management (i.e. any activity linked to management and support of the projects or grants funded by XB resources), the average request completion by type of service and client (in days) during the period January-June 2019 was 1.7 days for financial transactions. Another example is the drop in the average number of days for completion of requests in the Trust Fund Documents System from 27.4 days in 2018 to 20.8 days in 2019. UNCTAD has fully delegated authority to manage consultants and processes consultancies within 10 days on average.</td>
<td>79, 101-125, 129-134, 137-141, 178, 181-184, 186, 187</td>
</tr>
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Nonetheless, UN Secretariat processes and instruments are not always well appreciated by staff. Umoja is seen as cumbersome and rigid, despite recent improvements. The financial administration is viewed as setting unrealistic demands that not all projects can meet (e.g. participants must have a bank account), leading to unnecessary efficiency losses. As a UN Secretariat entity, UNCTAD is not tailored to deliver projects in difficult conditions.

The introduction and use of the MIS Dashboard, UNCTAD’s management information system, has increased internal efficiency, transparency and communication. The monthly dashboard updates include information on regular budget post and non-post resources and expenditure rates, issues with funding/cash availability against margins, and supporting information/action points so that divisions can carefully plan expenditure or recruitment. These form the basis for discussion between the head of RMS, divisional directors and the OSG around resource use and allocation. Moreover, RMS, which does the monitoring on expenditure, project ending, etc., provides bi-monthly reports to Project Officers, or more often if required.

Partner survey responses suggest there is general appreciation for timely implementation, with nearly 70% of respondents stating that organisational procedures do not cause delays for implementing partners.

### MI 5.7 Evidence confidence

**High confidence**

### KPI 6: Partnership working is coherent and directed at leveraging and/or ensuring relevance and the catalytic use of resources

**KPI score**

| Satisfactory | 2.75 |

Projects and programmes are largely decentralised and managed in a flexible way. This has the potential advantage to be flexible to context changes, provided of course that these changes are observed and addressed in a timely manner. Generally speaking, the fact that UNCTAD is a non-resident agency does affect its agility, in the sense that where it does not have staff on the ground, it is less able to anticipate or respond in a timely manner to unforeseen events. Besides ensuring that the necessary secretariat-wide mechanisms are in place, agility in TC also depends on the extent to which individual staff members pro-actively manage their portfolio. The Project Review Committee’s Terms of Reference include a monitoring oversight role; in practice, this is hardly the case. Instead, monitoring is largely dealt with at the divisional level.

UNCTAD’s TC is expected to be based on its comparative advantage; differentiation of its work with respect to other organisations; and complementarity. Member states see UNCTAD as the key UN agency on its mandated themes and topics. Survey responses show high levels of appreciation for UNCTAD’s staff, skills and products, including TC and knowledge products. This is corroborated by evidence from across the five subprogramme evaluations. Most programmes and projects are demand-driven; others are partly donor-driven, in the sense that earmarked funding criteria determine which countries are eligible for TC support and which ones are not.

The very nature of UNCTAD’s work is to put in place or strengthen country systems, in accordance with the common principles listed in the Busan partnership document. There is evidence that diagnosis of country systems is part of the screening process of new requests, and the majority of projects seek to ensure full ownership of member states and transfer capacity to countries.

Notwithstanding considerable effort by the OSG to encourage interdivisional collaboration, as a way to leverage expertise and avoid fragmentation, staff perceptions of the level and depth of cross-divisional co-ordination and collaboration vary significantly. This is corroborated by findings in independent external evaluations. With respect to external synergies, as a non-resident agency, partnerships are vitally important. Interviewees point out that the UNCTAD secretariat has been involved in the UN Development System Reform process from the very start. UNCTAD’s leadership of the United Nations Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity is a particularly important vehicle, as well as the work undertaken by UNCTAD’s regional presence in Addis Ababa and New York. UNCTAD’s engagement on the UNSDCFs is noteworthy but insufficiently resourced to actually match its ambitions or growing demand.
UNCTAD is not a signatory to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI); however, it does provide transparent information about budgets and posts during management briefings with member states. Moreover, the TC Section reports annually to the Trade and Development Board, providing detailed Reviews of TC Activities and Their Financing and associated annexes. There is evidence that joint progress assessments of TC do occur, though not in all cases.

Knowledge products are an important part of UNCTAD’s work in general, as well as products of the TC pillar itself. Member states participating in the partner survey show high levels of appreciation for UNCTAD’s knowledge products, with over 90% of respondents stating that they are (very) useful to their work.

### MI 6.1: Planning, programming and approval procedures enable agility in partnerships when conditions change

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<th>Overall MI rating</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall MI score</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.00</strong></td>
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**Element 1:** Mechanisms in place to allow programmatic changes and adjustments when conditions change

**Element 2:** Mechanisms in place to allow the flexible use of programming funds as conditions change (budget revision or similar)

**Element 3:** Institutional procedures for revisions permit changes to be made at country/regional/ HQ level within a limited timeframe (less than three months)

**Element 4:** Evidence that regular review points between partners support joint identification and interpretation of changes in conditions

**Element 5:** Evidence that any common institutional bottlenecks in procedures identified and action taken leading to an improvement

**MI 6.1 Analysis**

This MI looks at overall mechanisms and institutional-level procedures (elements 1-2-3-5) as well as a project-level review.

At the institutional level, UNCTAD applies UN Secretariat regulations and rules, policies and practices to its financial framework, rigorously and efficiently. The introduction of the dashboard has enhanced transparency and accountability. By collating and sharing timely data, project officers and managers are now in a better position to make timely programmatic and budgetary changes if and when the need arises.

Projects and programmes are largely decentralised and managed in a flexible way. On TC, as stated before (MI 3.1), directors are authorised to re-allocate staff capacity across their own divisional priorities. In practice, this is done flexibly without formalising positions for unforeseen or emergent needs, pending decision to formally seek approval of member states. The Project Review Committee’s Terms of Reference include a monitoring oversight role; in practice, this is hardly the case. Instead, monitoring is largely dealt with at the divisional level.

At the project level, UNCTAD has adequate mechanisms in place to monitor expenditure on a regular basis (monthly or more often, if required) and take corrective measures if needed. Project budget revisions are subject to the particular case-by-case arrangements with the project’s donor(s); in some cases, these are flexible, in others less so.
Generally speaking, the fact that UNCTAD is a non-resident agency does affect its agility, in the sense that where it does not have staff on the ground, it is less able to anticipate or respond in a timely manner to unforeseen events. In practice, responses have proven to be very project specific. On the one hand, we saw evidence of project officers and project managers having developed highly effective, project-specific mechanisms to track progress, on a daily basis even, allowing them to take corrective measures if and when necessary. In another case, the project officer and manager were much less informed about progress and contextual dynamics, instead relying on the regional office in Addis Ababa to address some of the implementation challenges in a reactive manner. Thus, aside from ensuring that the necessary secretariat-wide mechanisms are in place, agility in TC also depends on the extent to which individual staff members pro-actively manage their portfolio. The overall impression was that in the majority of cases, performance monitoring and agility was satisfactory.

There was little evidence to demonstrate regular review points between partners.

### MI 6.1 Evidence confidence

| Score       | Medium confidence |

### MI 6.2: Partnerships based on an explicit statement of comparative advantage e.g. technical knowledge, convening power/partnerships, policy dialogue/advocacy

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<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
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<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
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| Element 1: Corporate documentation contains clear and explicit statement on the comparative advantage that the organisation is intending to bring to a given partnership |

| Element 2: Statement of comparative advantage is linked to clear evidence of organisational capacities and competencies as it relates to the partnership |

| Element 3: The organisation aligns its resources/ competencies to its perceived comparative advantage |

| Element 4: Evidence that comparative advantage is deployed in partnerships to positive effect |

### MI 6.2 Analysis

As noted above (MI 1.1), UNCTAD’s TC must meet the following criteria: comparative advantage; differentiation of its work with respect to other organisations; and complementarity. Besides these, it must also be demand-driven, embrace country ownership, be based on principles of transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, and reflect geographical priorities.

The project document and clearance templates include a compulsory section on UNCTAD’s comparative advantage and value added. Moreover, UNCTAD is seen as the key UN agency on its mandated themes and topics and well-respected as such by member states that seek its support. Survey responses show high levels of appreciation for UNCTAD’s staff, skills and products, including TC and knowledge products. This is corroborated by evidence from across the five subprogramme evaluations, which found that UNCTAD programmes of work under each subprogramme was well aligned to the secretariat’s mandates and that there was evidence that UNCTAD products meet the needs of its target constituents, some better than others. The relevance of technical assistance interventions in particular was rated highly.
A good example of a project’s comparative advantage and pro-active collaboration was visible in the eTrade for All project, where UNCTAD has played a key role in bringing together approximately 30 agencies in a market platform. It allows requesters to see which partner is the most relevant for them, encourages transparency between the agencies about their areas of specialisation and areas of alignment, and reduces duplication. UNCTAD serves as the co-ordinator of the eTrade for All initiative though does not brand it as an UNCTAD product.

Most programmes and projects are demand-driven and illustrate how member states regard UNCTAD’s relative capabilities. Others are partly donor-driven, in the sense that earmarked funding criteria determine which countries are eligible for TC support and which ones are not. Based on the analysis of a sample of projects in the partner survey countries, we noted that a comparative advantage was more likely to be stated explicitly when a donor demanded one to justify UNCTAD’s value.

**MI 6.2 Evidence confidence**

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<tr>
<th>MI 6.2</th>
<th>Evidence confidence</th>
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<tr>
<td>High confidence</td>
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**MI 6.3: Clear adherence to the commitment in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation on use of country systems**

**Score**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
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<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
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**Element 1:** Clear statement on set of expectations for how the organisation will seek to deliver on the Busan commitment/QCPR statement (as appropriate) on use of country systems within a given time period

**Element 2:** Internal processes (in collaboration with partners) to diagnose the condition of country systems

**Element 3:** Clear procedures for how organisation to respond to address (with partners) concerns identified in country systems

**Element 4:** Reasons for non-use of country systems clearly and transparently communicated

**Element 5:** Internal structures and incentives supportive of greater use of country systems

**Element 6:** Monitoring of the organisation trend on use of country systems and the associated scale of investments being made in strengthening country systems

**MI 6.3 Analysis**

Although UNCTAD does not have a very explicit policy statement on the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation’s commitment on the use of country systems, UNCTAD does work in the context of the Busan framework.

The very nature of UNCTAD’s work is to put in place or strengthen country systems, in accordance with the common principles listed in the Busan partnership document, namely national ownership of development priorities; a focus on results; recognition of the diversity and complementarity of development partners; transparency; and shared responsibility. UNCTAD’s Trade and Development Board has recognised the importance of following these common principles when implementing its TC projects, and the principles underpinning UNCTAD’s TC are aligned with the Busan framework.

Diagnosis of country systems forms part of the screening process of new requests, under the heading “stakeholder capacity analysis”. Moreover, some projects either have the diagnosis of country systems as their objective (e.g. investment policy reviews) or undertake such a diagnosis as the first part of the project, in order to better customise/tailor the design of the activities, e.g. ASYCUDA and DMFAS. Where available, UNCTAD’s TC draws on in-depth country analysis undertaken in the context of the research and analysis pillar.
ASYCUDA has been used by UNCTAD as means to an end, with UNCTAD supporting member states to implement a standardised system, provided they adopt the standards that come with it. ASYCUDA aims to ensure full ownership by member states of the automated customs system and sovereignty over customs data and to transfer capacity to countries. National teams implement, while UNCTAD provides advice. ASYCUDA logframes are customised to meet the characteristics and conditions in each country.

The analysis of the sample of projects shows that while projects are supporting governments at their request, there is little direct information about working with partner systems, though there is clear intent for co-operative delivery and working with government partners. In most cases, a new UNCTAD-developed system is either being introduced or upgraded. There were also cases whereby studies were conducted to assist with mainstreaming trade into national development strategies or to assist with the development of national strategies. There were also cases showing evidence of using/strengthening partner systems or capacity to use partner systems.

**MI 6.3 Evidence confidence**

Medium confidence

**MI 6.4: Strategies or designs identify synergies, to encourage leverage/catalytic use of resources and avoid fragmentation**

**Overall MI rating**

Unsatisfactory

**Overall MI score**

2.00

Element 1: Strategies or designs clearly recognise the importance of synergies and leverage

Element 2: Strategies or designs contain clear statements of how duplication/fragmentation will be avoided based on realistic assessment of comparative advantages

Element 3: Strategies or designs contain clear statement of where an intervention will add the most value to a wider change

Element 4: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how leverage will be ensured

Element 5: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how resources will be used catalytically to stimulate wider change

**MI 6.4 Analysis**

This MI is interpreted in terms of internal synergies, with MI 6.5 and 6.6. assessing external synergies and business practices.

As described above in MI 1.2, secretariat-wide, cross-divisional collaboration and co-ordination has been a recurrent theme for UNCTAD.

UNCTAD recognises that interdivisional co-operation, which builds on the strength and expertise of different divisions, is important for the effective delivery of TC activities. Recently, the secretariat has embarked on an organisation-wide effort to move from a division-based approach to management to a horizontal, task-based approach, notably by creating cross-divisional working groups on statistical co-ordination, gender, financing for development and South-South co-operation. In its 2018 Annual Report, the secretariat reported on a number of cross-divisional initiatives in different areas. There are now interdivisional working groups such as statistics and gender. Another example is the Train for Trade II project in Angola.

Through the Office of the Secretary-General and the TC Section, the secretariat is making efforts to move to a more horizontal, task-based approach to leverage resources and knowledge. Various initiatives, including biannual management retreats and the Chiefs meetings chaired by the OSG Chief of Staff, town hall meetings and others, are undertaken in a step-by-step fashion. On TC
particularly, we did not find evidence of a structural, secretariat-wide and systematic approach to
cross-divisional collaboration at directors level, similar to, for example, the research and analysis
pillar. In practice, in TC, the level of co-operation between sections, branches and divisions varies
from project to project. It is undertaken mostly at an operational project/programme level, with
different sections and branches contributing to each other’s interventions. The UN Development
Account projects, on the other hand, which account for less than 9% of the overall TC expenditures,
are deliberately designed and selected to strengthen inter-divisional collaboration.

Evidence from staff interviews shows there are considerably diverging views within the secretariat
about the level and depth of cross-divisional co-ordination and collaboration, as a way to leverage
expertise and avoid fragmentation. It would appear that the extent to which synergies are achieved
depends largely on the people in charge of the project and how effectively they mobilise others.
Much depends on the staff’s own professional networks, experience and preferences.

External evaluations also point out that “there remains scope to strengthen synergistic efforts,
including through interdivisional and external collaboration”. The synthesis findings of the five
subprogramme evaluations states that the evaluations observed that limited collaboration, for
example on research outputs, affected the resonance of UNCTAD messaging and suggested that
there is merit in building a culture of coherent messaging and collaborative functioning across
divisions.

On internal collaborations, substantive responsibility for a subprogramme is largely vested in one
of the divisions of UNCTAD but achieving the objective of each subprogramme is an organisational
responsibility. Nonetheless, all evaluations noted that divisions work fairly independently, within
an “institutional culture of siloed functioning” (subprogramme 3). As a consequence, “synergies
are not systematically exploited” (subprogramme 1), there appears to be discordant messaging
(subprogramme 3), there is evidence of “avoidable duplication” (subprogramme 5) and follow-up
support following conclusion of a project that could be provided by another part of UNCTAD is
limited (subprogramme 2).” Similarly, remarks made by representatives of some regional groups,
“encouraging the secretariat to further strengthen interdivisional and inter-agency co-operation
for increased coherence and impact and the sharing of best practices when delivering technical
assistance, taking into account the mandate of UNCTAD and the outcome of its internal task forces”,
suggest that performance in this area is not yet satisfactory.

We did not find evidence of a clear statement of how resources will be used catalytically to stimulate
wider change (see also KPI 12 on sustainability of results).

**MI 6.4 Evidence confidence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 6.4 Evidence confidence</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High confidence</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 6.5: Key business practices (planning, design, implementation, monitoring and reporting) co-ordinated with other relevant partners (donors, UN agencies, etc.)</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Element 1: Evidence that the organisation has participated in joint planning exercises, such as the
UNSDCF

Element 2: Evidence that the organisation has aligned its programme activities with joint planning
instruments, such as UNDAF / UNSDCF

Element 3: Evidence that the organisation has participated in opportunities for joint programming
where these exist
Element 4: Evidence that the organisation has participated in joint monitoring and reporting processes with key partners (donor, UN, etc.)

Element 5: Evidence of the identification of shared information gaps with partners and strategies developed to address these

Element 6: Evidence of participation in the joint planning, management and delivery of evaluation activities

**MI 6.5 Analysis**

As a non-resident agency, partnerships are vitally important. Interviewees point out that the UNCTAD secretariat has been involved in the UN Development System Reform process from the very start and at all levels, including the OSG, the TCS and the New York office. It has actively participated in a number of work streams. For instance, UNCTAD currently contributes to 37 UNDAFs/UNSDCFs through its leadership of the United Nations Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity, composed of 15 agencies of the United Nations development system. Led by UNCTAD, the Cluster is developing joint operations with the following agencies: FAO, ITC, ILO, UNDP, UNEP, UNIDO, UNOPS, WTO and the five UN Regional Commissions. The Cluster has been instrumental in increasing the UNCTAD footprint in United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks and co-ordinating with other agencies at the country level. It should be noted that there is no budget or secretariat available to run the Cluster.

UNCTAD reports that, since 2016, it has deepened its engagement with United Nations development system entities, including the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Sustainable Development Group and the regional commissions. It has also strengthened its participation in the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Forum on Financing for Development, the Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for Sustainable Development, the high-level political forum on sustainable development, the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the regional forums on sustainable development.

The opening of a regional presence in Addis Ababa, along with the advocacy and engagement undertaken by the New York office, have made a positive contribution to UNCTAD's positioning vis-à-vis other agencies within and outside the UN. Interviewees emphasise that much more will be needed in order to better position UNCTAD towards other UN agencies and non-UN stakeholders and leverage its expertise. In terms of UNCTAD's engagement on the UNSDCF, it should be noted that the in-house capacity involved (one full-time equivalent) is very limited and that the work itself is not mainstreamed within divisions. Despite the limited resources, UNCTAD does carry out joint monitoring in some cases. However, demand far exceeds available capacity; in order to meet its own objectives in this regard, more capacity within the OSG and secretariat-wide engagement of staff will be necessary.

External evaluations recognise UNCTAD's efforts in this regard. For example, the evaluation of subprogramme 5 stated that “UNCTAD was disadvantaged by not having ears to the ground, networks, relationships and consultations. UNCTAD in general, and ALDC in particular, had undertaken a number of steps to promote collaboration and partnerships, yet much remains to be done, including developing an overarching road map of partnerships at the institutional level. There is also a need to increase incentives for staff to actively seek collaboration… with other United Nations entities. In line with ongoing United Nations reform efforts, an effort should be made to increase the presence of UNCTAD on United Nations country teams in all countries in which UNCTAD carries out substantial work.”

**Source document**

2, 8, 9, 68, 79, 83, 84, 101-125, 129-134, 127-141, 178, 181-184, 186
The same evaluation observed overlap between UNCTAD’s subprogramme 5 and the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, which supports the implementation of the Istanbul Programme of Action and covers much of the same substantive areas as subprogramme 5. The two organisational units are of approximately the same size. UNCTAD has technical capacity yet lacks a significant presence in New York, necessary for greater policy impacts; the Office of the High Representative has such a presence yet lacks technical capacity.

Regarding evidence of participation in the joint planning, management and delivery of evaluation activities, all four UNDAF/UNSDCF projects that were analysed as part of the project portfolio sample, include evidence of contribution to a joint report but not of collaboration in the reporting process. A number of other projects describe co-ordination measures with other agencies (both UN and complementary donor agency projects) to deliver the project.

**MI 6.6: Key information (analysis, budgeting, management, results etc.) shared with strategic/implementation partners on an ongoing basis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Element 1: Information on the organisation’s website is easily accessible and current

Element 2: The organisation has signed up to the International Aid Transparency Initiative

Element 3: Accurate information is available on analysis, budgeting, management and is in line with IATI guidelines

Element 4: Evidence that partner queries on analysis, budgeting, management and results are responded to in a timely fashion

Element 5: Evidence that information shared is accurate and of good quality

**MI 6.6 Analysis**

UNCTAD is not a signatory to the IATI; however, UNCTAD states that it will follow directives from the UN Secretariat on IATI. It appears that Umoja Extension 2 will follow IATI reporting guidelines.

UNCTAD provides transparent information about budgets and posts during management briefings with member states. Under the UNSDCFs, UNCTAD engages in joint monitoring and assessments, the results of which are shared on UN-INFO, visible to all parties.

The TC Section reports annually to the Trade and Development Board, providing detailed Reviews of TC Activities and Their Financing and associated annexes.

At the programme and project level, reporting is based on agreement with funding agencies, and the level of reporting varies according to the need of the donor. Based on an analysis of the sample of projects, typically project reporting is to donors and follows donor requirements. This can be quarterly, bi-annually or annually. There is strong evidence of progress reporting. Depth of information provided is sufficient to understand project progress. Progress reports are in different formats for reporting requirements of the specific project/donor. Some reports include budget information, and both financial and results reporting are publicly available for some projects. Reporting is done in the national language.
### MI 6.7: Clear standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiaries implemented

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explicit statement available on standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiary populations e.g. Accountability to Affected Populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Guidance for staff is available on the implementation of the procedures for accountability to beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Training has been conducted on the implementation of procedures for accountability to beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Programming tools explicitly contain the requirement to implement procedures for accountability to beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Approval mechanisms explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries will be addressed within the intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation procedures explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries have been addressed within the intervention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MI 6.7 Analysis

Source document

### MI 6.7 Evidence confidence

Not applicable

### MI 6.8: Participation with national and other partners in mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Evidence of participation in joint performance reviews of interventions e.g. joint assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Evidence of participation in multi-stakeholder dialogue around joint sectoral or normative commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Evidence of engagement in the production of joint progress statements in the implementation of commitments e.g. joint assessment reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Documentation arising from mutual progress assessments contains clear statement of the organisation’s contribution, agreed by all partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Surveys or other methods applied to assess partner perception of progress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MI 6.8: Source document

Satisfactory

### MI 6.8: Score

3.00
**MI 6.8 Analysis**

Development Account projects, though less than 10% of projects, require joint assessments of progress. The Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (EMU) has developed guidelines for participatory self-evaluation for project managers; nevertheless, given its limited capacity, it has no way of tracking whether joint evaluations have been conducted or not. Interviews suggest that joint progress assessments of TC do occur, though not in all cases. EMU is not always informed about self-evaluations that are conducted jointly with other entities.

Almost 90% of partner survey respondents state that mutual assessments of progress with national and regional partners are undertaken in a more than satisfactory manner. Looking at the limited evidence that emerged from the analysis of the sample of projects, we observed that all UNDAF/UNSDCF projects have evidence of contribution to a joint report but no available evidence of collaboration in the reporting process. There was one example of a government partner providing monitoring data and another of a government partner contributing to monitoring. We also saw evidence of a government partner establishing a technical and financial monitoring system to generate progress reports and safeguard controls (Angola), of participant feedback/surveys, of in-country monitoring, and of a planned joint evaluation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 6.8 Evidence confidence</th>
<th>Little to no confidence</th>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 6.9: Deployment of knowledge base to support programming adjustments, policy dialogue and/or advocacy</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>3.00</td>
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</table>

  **Element 1:** Statement in corporate documentation explicitly recognises the organisation’s role in knowledge production

  **Element 2:** Evidence of knowledge products produced and utilised by partners to inform action

  **Element 3:** Knowledge products generated and applied to inform advocacy at country, regional or global level

  **Element 4:** Evidence that knowledge products generated are timely/perceived as timely by partners

  **Element 5:** Evidence that knowledge products are perceived as high quality by partners

  **Element 6:** Evidence that knowledge products are produced in a format that supports their utility to partners

**MI 6.9 Analysis**

Seen from an organisational level, “knowledge products” include research and flagship reports, which trigger demand for and help inform design and implementation of TC projects. Seen from a purely TC perspective, knowledge products include items from the UNCTAD Toolbox such as Investment Policy Reviews, Trade Policy Framework Reviews and any other knowledge products that are generated by a project. For example, the diagnostic trade integration study with regard to the Djibouti–Ethiopia corridor led by ALDC was one of the major provisions of TC in the undertaking of the project. Ethiopia had used the diagnostic trade integration study to mainstream trade into its five-year national plan. In addition, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation had used this study to develop its programme for country partnership in Ethiopia, and the World Bank had referred to the study for policy formulations in Ethiopia.
Evaluations point to the interconnectivity between knowledge products generated in the research and analysis pillar and in TC: “Subprogramme 5 is essentially following a ripple-effect strategy whereby research, which lies at the core of the strategy, is used as the impact that generates waves, creating awareness for change, which in turn lead to demand for TC and, together, research and TC lead to debates, to the evolution of new norms and new consensus and to new policies.”

Member states participating in the partner survey show high levels of appreciation for UNCTAD’s knowledge products, with over 90% of respondents stating that they are (very) useful to their work.

**MI 6.9 Evidence confidence**

| MI 6.9 Evidence confidence | Little to no confidence |

**PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT**

*Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson-learning.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI 7: The focus on results is strong, transparent and explicitly geared towards function</th>
<th>KPI score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>2.20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

UNCTAD’s approach to RBM demonstrates strong leadership from the OSG and improvement since 2016. There is evident effort and time dedicated to the implementation of an RBM system, which is gaining traction. While organisation-wide plans include results frameworks, they tend to have an output focus or are too broad for satisfactory understanding of TC performance. The TC Toolbox Results Framework allows more meaningful measurement of TC performance, though is yet to be fully systematised. Further, there is a disconnect in practice between the systems to collect data, the data collection itself and the ability to meaningfully use the data. UNCTAD is working to address these issues through the development of more detailed branch-level logframes that link all three pillars of UNCTAD’s work. The decentralised nature of UNCTAD TC means that there are many approaches to performance management, some quite strong and others less so, but no holistic approach to performance tracking, identification of poor performance or oversight of deviations from planned results. This is partly due to the delay in the roll-out of the Umoja 2 “Strategic Planning, Budgeting and Performance Management” solution. Ultimately, planning documents such as the programme plan and budget for the biennium, while informed by the Integrated Monitoring and Document Information System (IMDIS) performance data and reporting against outcome targets, are largely based on member states’ decisions related to the mandate and demand.

**MI 7.1: Leadership ensures application of an organisation-wide RBM approach**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 7.1: Leadership ensures application of an organisation-wide RBM approach</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Element 1: Corporate commitment to a results culture is made clear in strategic planning documents

Element 2: Clear requirements/incentives in place for the use of an RBM approach in planning and programming

Element 3: Guidance for setting results targets and developing indicators is clear and accessible to all staff

Element 4: Tools and methods for measuring and managing results are available

Element 5: Adequate resources are allocated to the RBM system

Element 6: All relevant staff are trained in RBM approaches and methods
**MI 7.1 Analysis**

There is clear corporate commitment to a results culture in strategic planning documents. From the highest level in the Nairobi Maafikiano, to the Programme Plans and Budget for the Biennium (though not in the Annual Programme Plan and Budget 2020), to the Annual Reviews of TC Strategy and Their Financing document, the commitment to RBM and the ongoing improvement of RBM within the organisation is clear.

These commitments are followed through as action items, and requirements are communicated to staff through OSG memos and systems improvements. There have been substantial efforts to embed RBM approaches throughout the planning and programming cycle. There are clear requirements in place for the use of an RBM approach in planning and programming. These include the UNCTAD ten minimum requirements for RBM in TC, first launched in July 2016 as a one-year pilot and refined in 2017. There is a standard template for project documents aligned to the ten requirements (developed in 2016 and revised in 2018), for which there is a matching approval checklist. The online co-ordinated review process of all new (and repeated) projects, known as the Trust Fund Document Approval process, launched in 2018, provides oversight of the application of RBM processes at the design stage. Approval is granted by five operational parties including TCS, EMU, RMS, Legal and the gender focal point. The online system replaces an email approach to project review; it is transparent, efficient and facilitates accountability.

There is clear guidance for setting results targets and indicators that have been developed for staff. These include the ten minimum requirements for RBM, the Project Manager Handbook, the RBM for TC Guidelines (revised version, 2016) and within the revised version the project document template and the checklist.

Tools and methods are available for staff to use, and there has been an increase in tools and methods for measuring and managing results. The RBM framework for TC projects and programmes was introduced in 2016 as the TC Toolbox Results Framework, which provides base-level logical frameworks for 28 (originally 29) TC programmes. For each TC programme, there is a description of the main activities and outputs, and the medium- to long-term expected results of these activities and outputs. Each programme is also linked to the UNCTAD “SDGs of focus”. A frequently-asked-questions guide was developed to support staff understanding of the Toolbox approach. The programme-level results frameworks can be tailored for individual projects and to the needs and circumstances of the project beneficiaries. The RBM for TC guidelines provide further direction and practical tools and examples to managers for planning results-oriented projects. They are based on UNCTAD’s minimum requirements for RBM for TC, which all projects that are part of a larger programme or over USD 30 000 should meet. Results frameworks are currently being developed at section and branch levels that look beyond activity planning and outputs and that link TC to the other two pillars of work.

Organisational-level resource allocations for TC RBM are limited to staffing for TCS, supported by an organisation-wide programme officer for RBM and the EMU. In TCS there are five staff who, among other duties, support RBM through the Trust Fund Document Review Process and the Development Account process. In EMU, there are two full-time-equivalent staff who cover both evaluations and the monitoring function. The OSG has a programme officer dedicated to RBM and where required has also engaged temporary staff to support the development of programme-level RBM frameworks. Considering the scope of the organisation, much has been done with a limited number of staff. Some aspects that would support an RBM approach remain unfunded such as a results tracking system. Aside from these allocations, programmes and projects generally allocate budgets for RBM where there is external evaluation or include it as project management, though this may be marginal.

**Source document**

1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 51, 94, 95, 96, 155, 169
In 2017, UNCTAD developed an in-house RBM training programme for staff, aligning themselves with the UN Secretary-General’s plans for management reform through strengthening staff capacities in results planning, budgeting and reporting. The UNCTAD RBM workshops ‘aim to increase staff capacity to apply RBM principles in the context of their work and to strengthen the organisational culture for RBM’. The workshops aim to ensure consistency of the definition of results, particularly for outcomes and impact, and to develop indicators at project, programme, branch and divisional levels enabling the organisation to respond better to member states’ requirements for accountability. The OSG delivered the first training session under the programme to management staff in December 2017. In 2018, over 40% of UNCTAD branches, representing all five subprogrammes, received results-based management training. In 2019, the OSG estimated that 75% of staff had received training. In addition, the two major TC programmes, ASYCUDA and DMFAS (in particular), had embedded RBM approaches in their work prior to the roll-out of the RBM training programme enabling the OSG to prioritise other sections of the organisation.

### MI 7.1 Evidence confidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Overall MI score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High confidence</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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</table>

### MI 7.2: Corporate strategies, including country strategies, based on a sound RBM focus and logic

Element 1: Organisation-wide plans and strategies include results frameworks

Element 2: Clear linkages exist between the different layers of the results framework, from project through to country and corporate level

Element 3: An annual report on performance is discussed with the governing bodies

Element 4: Corporate strategies are updated regularly

Element 5: The annual corporate reports show progress over time and note areas of strong performance as well as deviations between planned and actual results

### MI 7.2 Analysis

The Programme Plan and Budget for the Biennium documents include a logframe approach for results measurement as does the Proposed Programme Budget for 2020. These are high-level objectives, outcomes and outputs for each subprogramme. However, evaluability assessments of the subprogrammes noted weaknesses in these results frameworks as they did not support assessment of impact and were largely output focused. Four action lines described in the Nairobi Maafikiano (building productive capacity to transform economies; promoting a development focus and more efficient markets; tackling vulnerabilities, building resilience; and strengthening multilateralism and finding common solutions) are translated into higher-level impacts in the TC Toolbox. At programme and project level, some good practices of results-based planning were evident such as the use of effectiveness indicators to develop the DMFAS Strategic Plan 2016-2019, and the E-Commerce and Digital Economy Programme Workplan 2020-2023.

Data collected against the indicators in the logframes for TC Toolbox programmes are reported by programme managers:

- at the project level, through the annual reporting to TCS (or more frequently if required by the donor) (all result levels)
- at the aggregate/branch-level, through the corporate monitoring system (IMDIS), against the overall branch-level indicators defined in the Programme Plan (outcome level indicators).
Key reporting mechanisms to governing bodies are: (a) annual reporting to the Working Party on the Strategic Framework and Programme Budget through the “Review of the technical cooperation activities of UNCTAD and their financing”; (b) annual UNCTAD organisation-wide reporting that include results from IMDIS; and (c) the semi-annual United Nations Secretariat-wide reporting through IMDIS, from which, at the end of each biennium, a report is extracted by the Department of Management of the UN Secretariat to produce the Secretary-General's Programme Performance Report for consideration by member states in New York (for the 2018-19 biennium, annual reporting in anticipation of the introduction of Umoja 2). Reporting against the Programme Plan indicators is enforced, but as the indicators are broad some of the detail is lost.

TC programme results are reported to the Working Party in Annex 1 of the annual Review of TC Activities and Their Financing. The document outlines results against the four higher order themes, under which are listed the relevant Toolbox programmes (including description of relevant projects), including: development context (linked to mandate), programme objectives, outputs, results and impacts. The report focuses on achievements and less so on reflection on achievements or progress against objectives. Further, there is not yet systematic reporting against every indicator in the Toolbox logframes.

The externally facing UNCTAD annual reports are less informative from a performance management perspective. They provide an overview and example of projects, linking output-level results for highlight programmes/initiatives to SDGs, rather than presenting an analysis of results.

Some programmes compensate by issuing additional results reporting, for example the TC programme results for Train for Trade, DMFAS and EMPRETEC on UNCTAD’s SDG Pulse website, the annual report of DMFAS or the compendium of case studies for ASYCUDA.

Corporate strategies are updated every four years following the conference. Biennial programme plans, that include strategy and measurements against results targets for previous years, are updated every two years. From 2020 onwards, the programme plans will be updated every year. Review of TC Activities and Their Financing reports do not describe deviations between planned and actual results.

Overall the system for identifying performance deviation is weak.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 7.2 Evidence confidence</th>
<th>High confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MI 7.3: Results targets set based on a sound evidence base and logic</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Element 1: Targets and indicators are adequate to capture causal pathways between interventions and the outcomes that contribute to higher order objectives

Element 2: Indicators are relevant to the expected result to enable measurement of the degree of goal achievement

Element 3: Development of baselines are mandatory for new interventions

Element 4: Results targets are regularly reviewed and adjusted when needed
The synthesis of subprogramme evaluations note that the United Nations Secretariat biennial programme plan that sets out the results framework for each programme and subprogramme is not a useful management tool, as the performance indicators do not satisfactorily measure achievements and do not facilitate improved management of outputs nor tracking of results.

At the programme level, the TC Toolbox Result Framework captures activities, outputs, outcomes and impact and links higher-level results to the SDGs. For each result level, key assumptions and indicators of progress are described. Indicators are relevant to the expected results, though interviews indicate that it can be difficult to extrapolate from the outputs to higher-level results in practice. Targets (as in a specific number or percentage) are not described but, as the framework is generic and intended to be applicable to different country contexts, specified targets are less applicable.

At the project-level, there is guidance in the project document template and the Project Clearance Checklist to support the development of indicators to capture causal pathways and measure results. Alternatively, Development Account or donor templates may be used – with the expectation that they meet the ten minimum requirements. Links to the UNCTAD Strategic Framework or the programme-level results framework (typically in the TC Toolbox Results Framework) are expected to be included under the appropriate level of results. At branch/programme and project levels, some good and emerging practices of results-based management were evident such as for the DMFAS Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, the E-Commerce and Digital Economy Programme Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, the inclusion of the ASYCUDA logical framework in the draft ASYCUDA project document template (2019), and the Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy for the Trade Facilitation section; and less evident in others. Overall, it appears to be improving, but indicators and targets have tended to be more output-based in the past and there is still a strong focus on deliverables (outputs) in higher-level reporting in the programme plans and budgets.

In 2018-19, UNCTAD had been drafting detailed branch-level logframes for TC for each division that also show the linkages with the other two pillars (research and consensus building). The indicators therein can be aggregated from project to programme to branch to division to UNCTAD level and mapped against the SDGs. This initiative aims to support more comprehensive reporting and to ensure greater reporting rates against the Toolbox indicators.

Evidence does not show much focus on baselines. The TC RBM guidelines suggest that over time, as measurement data on the indicators become available, baseline and target values should be added. The DMFAS Monitoring and Evaluation Framework also recommends the establishment of baselines, where feasible.

Based on interviews, the commitment to tracking targets and indicators depends on the initiatives of individual managers and resources available to dedicate to RBM. There was evidence of strong results reporting provided during interviews for some projects and also evidence that time and resource constraints meant a focus on “doing the work” and prioritising implementation over RBM.

**MI 7.3 Evidence confidence**

Medium confidence
MI 7.4: Monitoring systems generate high quality and useful performance data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 7.4 Analysis</th>
<th>Source document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD uses IMDIS to report to the UN Secretariat against the outcomes described in the Programme Plan and Budgets. As reporting is at branch level, TC outcomes are reported under the overall branch outcome-level indicator. Therefore, the reporting is not comprehensive and does not provide a satisfactory picture of TC outcomes. Until 2018, IMDIS reporting was on an annual basis, though more regular reporting was encouraged. At the end of each biennium, a report is extracted by the Department of Management of the UN Secretariat to produce the Secretary-General’s Programme Performance Report for consideration by member states in New York. IMDIS reporting is now solely annual in anticipation of the Umoja 2 roll-out, and there was a simplified programme performance monitoring and reporting process in place for the 2018-19 biennium. IMDIS will be replaced by the Umoja 2 “Strategic Planning, Budgeting and Performance Management” module as the main performance and monitoring function. To support data quality, the EMU team of two people reviews inputs to IMDIS.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TCS manages annual reporting of TC activities to the Working Party on the Strategic Framework and Budget and relies on an Excel database to collect and collate information. TCS also reviews and assures the quality of the inputs from projects, though for the scope of UNCTAD projects and their other responsibilities, they are under-resourced for this function. Annual project reporting requirements to TCS are described in the project document along with the results framework against which data is to be collected. These frameworks are reviewed by TCS during project approval to ensure alignment with the TC Toolbox. Quality of monitoring data varies. At the project and division levels, monitoring is done on a case-by-case basis. In some divisions and programmes/projects, this is robust. Interviewees note that data collection and monitoring is ongoing at divisional level, though is done differently across levels and not well captured secretariat-wide. Reporting is required, but this is not integrated or easily compiled to provide organisation-wide reporting of performance. This is done manually rather than systematically. The organisation has identified this as the main weakness of the UNCTAD RBM Framework and, in 2017, explored several information technology-based solutions to address this. However, the UN Secretariat requested that UNCTAD wait for the UN-wide roll-out of Umoja 2 as that would address project management and tracking. However, implementation of Umoja 2 has been delayed, and UNCTAD is currently seeking alternative interim solutions.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 7.4 Evidence confidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High confidence</td>
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### MI 7.5: Performance data transparently applied in planning and decision-making

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<tr>
<th>Score</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Overall MI rating</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Overall MI score</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **Element 1:** Planning documents are clearly based on performance data
- **Element 2:** Proposed adjustments to interventions are clearly informed by performance data
- **Element 3:** At corporate level, management regularly reviews corporate performance data and makes adjustments as appropriate
- **Element 4:** Performance data support dialogue in partnerships at global, regional and country level

**MI 7.5 Analysis**

Ultimately, planning documents such as the programme plan and budget for the biennium, while informed by IMDIS performance data and reporting against outcome targets, are largely based on member states’ decisions related to the mandate and demand. This demand may be further supported by information and products provided by UNCTAD such as the annual Review of TC Activities and their Financing, but fundamentally the TC programme is demand-driven in line with the mandate rather than performance based.

The use of performance data in the adjustment of interventions varies. However, one emerging area linked to planning may be the biennial refinement and thematic rationalisation of the TC Toolbox products. Since the introduction of the TC Toolbox in 2016, and following completion of the pilot in 2017, every two years UNCTAD seeks to rationalise the products to reduce fragmentation, to remain current and to support programming and funding approaches aligned with the mandate.

At the programme level, such as on the DMFAS programme, there is evidence that strategic planning is based on both constituent priorities and informed by the latest innovation, good practice, needs to support programme evolution and feedback from key stakeholders at other agencies. The Empretec programme uses participant feedback to refine interventions. While positive, these are programme-driven rather than organisationally-driven.

**MI 7.5 Evidence confidence**

Medium confidence

**KPI 8: The organisation applies evidence-based planning and programming**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory 2.29</td>
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</table>

With only two full-time equivalent posts, UNCTAD’s Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (EMU) is small but effective. It is a functionally and behaviourally independent evaluation function. However, it needs to consider perceptions of its structural independence.

At the programme and project level, while there is clear policy guidance on independence and application in EMU-managed independent technical co-operation project and programme evaluations, there is less clear evidence about how this policy is applied by divisions and programmes for independent evaluations that are not included in the EMU evaluation plan, though the likelihood of these is low. Most TC evaluations would be a self-evaluation by the project manager.

UNCTAD has a sound evaluation policy and evidence of use by EMU, including an evaluation plan that is developed in consultation with governing bodies, though due to funding constraints additions to the plan can be more based on donor requirements than strategic. EMU also manages evaluations of technical co-operation projects over USD 1 million, and of projects that donors have specified requirement for independent evaluation, as well as of projects where the project manager seeks the lead of EMU (for both independent and self-evaluations). Using the Trust Fund Document Approval process, EMU keeps track of projects that envisage an independent evaluation and follow-up with project officers accordingly. The introduction in 2018 of the robust...
online Trust Fund Document Approval process has improved EMU’s visibility of the nature and timing of project evaluations. Systems and tools to ensure the quality of evaluations are evident. For the few independent evaluations that do not fall into the evaluation plan and for self-evaluations, quality is self-managed unless support is sought from EMU.

There are not strong organisational feedback loops to ensure that lessons from past technical co-operation interventions are included in new designs. There are some technical co-operation examples of using lessons learned in designing new interventions; though this is not yet standard practice and is often informal. Other than a financial tracking system, there is no organisational-level tracking of projects to identify poor performance. However, this will be improved with the introduction of Umoja 2. For subprogramme evaluations included within the EMU-managed evaluation plan, there are clear accountability systems in place and reporting of status of implementation of recommendations. Accountability systems at the programme and project level is less clear.

There is no evident system within technical co-operation to use evaluation results at the programme and project level. There is a complete, publicly available, repository of EMU managed evaluations. However, UNCTAD does not have an internal repository of all evaluations conducted by technical co-operation programmes and projects – particularly self-evaluations. EMU systematically distils and publicly shares lessons from their managed evaluations, and while there is no system to track uptake lessons learned there is some evidence of programmes collating their own lessons learned for future use.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MI 8.1: A corporate independent evaluation function exists</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Element 1: The evaluation function is independent from other management functions such as planning and managing development assistance (operational independence) |
| Element 2: The Head of evaluation reports directly to the Governing Body of the organisation (Structural independence) |
| Element 3: The evaluation office has full discretion in deciding the evaluation programme |
| Element 4: A separate budget line (approved by the Governing Body) ensures budgetary independence |
| Element 5: The central evaluation programme is fully funded by core funds |
| Element 6: Evaluations are submitted directly for consideration at the appropriate level of decision-making pertaining to the subject of evaluation |
| Element 7: Evaluators are able to conduct their work throughout the evaluation without undue interference by those involved in implementing the unit of analysis being evaluated (Behavioural independence) |

MI 8.1 Analysis

The secretariat has a small Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (EMU), comprised of two staff. OIOS Dashboard reporting for 2016-17 suggests that UNCTAD has the highest rating as a stand-alone evaluation unit (4/4) and for reporting lines (3/3). Currently, the EMU has functional and behavioural independence but is not fully independent in terms of structure. Structural arrangements whereby the DSG, who has an operational mandate, is delegated oversight of the EMU and the opportunity to review reports means that there is potential for perceived lack of independence. In practice, though, the independence is respected, and EMU reports evaluation results directly to the member states.

EMU develops the evaluation programme in consultation with the Working Party on the Strategic Framework and Programme Budget and with the Trade and Development Board.
EMU does not have discrete budget allocations under its management for the conduct of evaluations, neither under the regular budget, nor for TC. However, EMU itself is funded through UNCTAD’s regular budget. Projects that are envisaged to undergo an independent evaluation are expected to have a separate budget line for evaluation, and the funds are managed by the project manager, not EMU.

Despite funding and capacity constraints, between 2016 and 2019 EMU successfully managed an annual evaluation plan of one to nine independent external evaluations per year; these are mostly Development Account evaluations and one subprogramme evaluation. Aligned with the UNCTAD evaluation policy, EMU also managed independent evaluations for programmes and projects over USD 1 million and for projects where donors required independent evaluation. EMU also supports evaluations of programmes and projects where requested by the project manager for both independent and self-evaluations. Self-evaluations, which constitute the majority of evaluations at UNCTAD, are otherwise a direct programme and project management function and are not overseen by EMU.

Sections 14 and 15 of the Evaluation Policy specify requirements for evaluator independence. The Independent Evaluation Report Template includes a disclaimer relating to evaluator independence. Beyond the EMU-supported independent evaluations, there is no clear evidence of how systematically this principle is applied in projects and programmes that may not involve EMU in their independent evaluations. Although EMU consider the likelihood of these to be low, this could not be demonstrated based on the evidence collected.

MI 8.1 Evidence confidence  
Medium confidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 8.2: Consistent, independent evaluation of results (coverage)</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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</table>

Element 1: An evaluation policy describes the principles to ensure coverage, quality and use of findings, including in decentralised evaluations.

Element 2: The policy/an evaluation manual guides the implementation of the different categories of evaluations, such as strategic, thematic, corporate level evaluations, as well as decentralised evaluations.

Element 3: A prioritised and funded evaluation plan covering the organisation’s planning and budgeting cycle is available.

Element 4: The annual evaluation plan presents a systematic and periodic coverage of the organisation’s Interventions, reflecting key priorities.

Element 5: Evidence from sample countries demonstrate that the policy is being implemented.

MI 8.2 Analysis  
Source document

UNCTAD has a sound evaluation policy developed in 2011 and is also guided by the updated 2016 Norms and Standards for Evaluation outlined by the United Nations Evaluation Group. UNCTAD is in the process of revising the evaluation policy and has drafted the UNCTAD Evaluation Policy: Second Edition 2018-2022. Development account evaluations fall under a separate evaluation policy, although the UNCTAD Evaluation Policy has primacy over these. In order to strengthen the quality of evaluation reports and the learning from evaluations of Development Account projects, a Development Account evaluation framework was developed in 2018-19 and will be operationalised for the 12th tranche of projects.
The evaluation policy guides external evaluations commissioned by the Trade and Development Board; external evaluations commissioned by donor agencies and other external bodies; joint external evaluations; external evaluations commissioned by the programme managers; internal evaluations conducted by the Evaluation Unit or in the context of joint evaluations; and self-evaluations by programme managers. Further guidance is included in the Project Managers Handbook, which links to evaluation policies and guidelines, and the *Participatory Self-Evaluation: A Guide for Project Managers*. The Project Managers Handbook describes the two types of evaluation at UNCTAD: independent evaluation conducted by independent consultants and self-evaluation conducted by project managers. If donors do not provide direction, EMU advises project managers to plan for self-evaluations when project budgets are less than USD 1 million. Some major programmes at UNCTAD (such as DMFAS) already have an institutionalised self-evaluation practice. Others, such as in ASYCUDA’s project document template, specify when an external or self-evaluation is appropriate. An evaluation plan template for use by project managers is also included in the project document template and in the Project Clearance Checklist. An OIOS biennial dashboard evaluation for 2016-17 noted that UNCTAD had strong evaluation policy, procedures and planning in place.

There is an indicative evaluation plan for independent external evaluations managed by EMU. It is described in the Annual Programme Plan and Budgets 2020 – though not clearly described in the previous biennium budgets – and in EMU’s annual reports entitled *Evaluation of UNCTAD Activities: Overview*. The Overviews for both 2018 and 2019 include an evaluation plan for the subsequent year, though these are high-level. The Working Party on the Strategic Framework and the Programme Budget provides oversight for the evaluation plan, which is usually in accordance with a three-year evaluation plan that is approved by the Trade and Development Board. Since 2013, each subprogramme has been evaluated, starting with subprogramme 1. UN Development Account projects are included in the formal evaluation plan though the requirement is also part of the Development Account agreements. While there are findings that can be generalised across the organisation, the intended five-year cycle for subprogramme evaluations may not provide sufficient support for positioning in a changing environment. Evaluation requirements for Development Account projects initially required independent evaluation of all projects but, from the 12th tranche onwards, this has been reduced to approximately half – favouring depth over quantity. Such decisions on Development Account projects are made by the steering committee of the Development Account, facilitated by the capacity development programme management office of UNDESA. Several strategically informative project/programme level evaluations may also be included in the Evaluation plan, though these tend to coincide with programme and project requirements rather than a strategic objective.

Operationally, EMU maintains a more detailed evaluation plan that includes the external evaluations approved by the Trade and Development Board and the Development Account evaluations. It also draws from programme- and project-level external evaluations of projects under USD 1 million or directed by donors that are identified within the Trust Fund Document Approval process. According to the plan, EMU managed the following number of evaluations: 2016 = 1 evaluation, 2017 = 6 evaluations, 2018 = 4 evaluations and 2019 = 9 evaluations. The numbers are expected to increase in 2020 and 2021. As they are part of the management function, the evaluation plan does not include programme/project-level participatory self-evaluations.

Given the number of technical co-operation projects and the number of EMU managed evaluations, it is likely that most technical co-operation evaluations would be self-evaluations.
There is evidence that the evaluation policy is being implemented through the actions of the EMU for their managed evaluations. Other project- and programme-independent and self-evaluations do not fall under the view of EMU after the Trust Fund Document Review process, unless the programme manager or officer requests support in the development of a more detailed evaluation plan or for the report. UNCTAD does not yet have a system to track all evaluations planned at the programme/project level, though the 2018 launch of the online Trust Fund Approval Process provides greater transparency and oversight. Reviewed project documents generally did not include detailed evaluation planning or allocation of funds. When evaluation is mentioned, it is more often a statement that an evaluation will be conducted. Though it should be noted that documents in the sample often pre-date improvements to the Trust Fund Document Approval process.

### MI 8.2 Evidence confidence

**Medium confidence**

### MI 8.3: Systems are applied to ensure the quality of evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
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| Overall MI score | 3.00 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element 1</th>
<th>Evaluations are based on design, planning and implementation processes that are inherently quality oriented</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Element 2</td>
<td>Evaluations use appropriate methodologies for data-collection, analysis and interpretation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 3</td>
<td>Evaluation reports present in a complete and balanced way the evidence, findings, conclusions, and where relevant, recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 4</td>
<td>The methodology presented includes the methodological limitations and concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element 5</td>
<td>A process exists to ensure the quality of all evaluations, including decentralised evaluations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### MI 8.3 Analysis

Evaluations are based on processes that are quality oriented. They are guided by the Evaluation Policy and the updated 2016 Norms and Standards for Evaluation outlined by the United Nations Evaluation Group.

In addition, quality in programme- and project-level independent and self-evaluations is supported by the Project Managers Handbook, which links to evaluation policies and guidelines, and the Participatory Self-Evaluation: A Guide for Project Managers and an evaluation report template. The project document template includes a simple evaluation plan template developed by EMU that addresses minimum requirements for evaluation planning. It is supported by the Guidelines for Evaluation Plans in Project Documents that was based on a review of project document evaluation plans. Where donor templates are used, TCS recommends that the minimum requirements are cross-checked and added. EMU is assigned to review the evaluation plans in the project document checklist during the document approval process.

As self-reflected by UNCTAD in the Synthesis of Five Subprogramme Evaluations and Update on the Status of Implementation of Recommendations (2019), the methodological approach for subprogramme evaluations, including data collection methods, requires strengthening. Further, the quality of recommendations will be improved in the next cycle of subprogramme evaluations. Limitations were only identified in the methodology of three of the five reports, with the last two reports providing stronger information. However, the evaluations are well balanced.
The planned Development Account independent evaluations follow the terms of reference issued by EMU that observe Norms and Standards published by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), employ mixed methods, are structured to address OECD-DAC criteria, and include recommendations and limitations.

For the planned external evaluations, EMU reviews the terms of reference for the evaluation team, inception reports and final reports. OIOS Dashboard reporting for 2016-17 rated UNCTAD report quality as 100% good or very good based on a sample of two reports, though recommendations are much lower at 50%. It also identified that UNCTAD had robust evaluation systems in place across all relevant Evaluation Dashboard indicators.

EMU manages evaluations of projects over USD 1 million and projects where donors have specified requirement for independent evaluation, as well as of projects where the project manager seeks the lead of EMU (for both independent and self-evaluations). Using the online Trust Fund Approval Process, EMU keeps track of projects that envisage an independent evaluation and follow-up with project officers accordingly to support evaluation quality.

For technical co-operation project and programme self-evaluations (and the few independent evaluations) that do not fall under the view of EMU after the Trust Fund Approval Process, while there are now strengthened front-end processes and guidelines to ensure evaluation quality, there is limited evidence of systematic quality review processes for evaluation development and the final product. A further limitation is that there were only two self-evaluations within the technical co-operation project sample against which quality could be reviewed.

**MI 8.3 Evidence confidence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 8.4: Mandatory demonstration of the evidence base to design new interventions</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI rating</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MI score</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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</table>

Element 1: A formal requirement exists to demonstrate how lessons from past interventions have been taken into account in the design of new interventions

Element 2: Clear feedback loops exist to feed lessons into new interventions design

Element 3: There is evidence that lessons from past interventions have informed new interventions

Element 4: Incentives exist to apply lessons learnt to new interventions

Element 5: The number/share of new operations designs that draw on lessons from evaluative approaches is made public

**MI 8.4 Analysis**

Updated UN procedures for programme planning and budgeting require consideration of evaluations and lessons learned for annual programming and budgeting, though those applied in Proposed Budget for 2020 do not have a technical co-operation focus. At the operational level for technical co-operation, there is no formal requirement in the project document templates or approval checklist to demonstrate how lessons from past interventions have been considered in the design of new TC interventions. However, lessons learned are one of the ten minimum requirements for RBM.
At the project level, there is one clear, though limited, feedback loop to feed lessons into new intervention designs. The project document template requires identification of lessons learned from past projects with regards to budgeting. The evaluation plan templates within the same document require reference to how evaluation findings, lessons learned and recommendations have fed into the new project design, but it is included in the evaluation plan rather than the project planning section. This somewhat weakens the requirement, and neither this nor the budget lesson learned requirement is part of the approval process in the project document checklist. Further, as there is no central repository for all programme/project evaluations, it may be difficult for staff to locate previous evaluations to identify lessons.

Some TC examples do suggest the collection, consideration and/or use of lessons learned in designing new interventions; though this is not yet standard practice throughout the secretariat for TC and is often informal – relying on institutional memory. For example, the Investment Policy Review Implementation Report: Lessons Learned, 2018 collates lessons from 15 TC implementation initiatives to inform future initiatives. The DMFAS strategic plan development process builds on lessons learned from the previous plan as well as recommendations from evaluations. The ASYCUDA project implementation approach is based on adaptive management, scaling up from pilot initiatives and learning and adapting as the project progresses. However, this approach is not formally structured across the ASYCUDA programme as an ongoing project-to-project learning mechanism.

While Development Account (DA) projects are less than 10% of UNCTAD technical co-operation projects, training and information sessions are organised to share information relating to various aspects of project management and evaluation. For instance, a session organised in June 2019 brought together TC focal points and DA project officers on the topics of requirements for the new project proposals under the 12th tranche, evaluation requirements and lessons learned from previous evaluations, financial monitoring, and communications strategies. Also, a SharePoint database has been developed that contains project documents, annual progress reports and evaluation reports for the current and earlier DA projects. The database can be accessed by all staff and serves to promote information sharing and lessons learning.

The lack of consistency in application of lessons learned may also be partly due to the programming being based on demand rather than strategic analysis.

There is no explicit incentive to apply lessons learned to new interventions.

The number/share of new operation designs that draw on lessons are not tracked, nor is there a requirement to publicly share this information.

| MI 8.4 Evidence confidence | High confidence |
| MI 8.5: Poorly performing interventions proactively identified, tracked and addressed | Score |
| Overall MI rating | Unsatisfactory |
| Overall MI score | 2.00 |

Element 1: A system exists to identify poorly performing interventions

Element 2: Regular reporting tracks the status and evolution of poorly performing interventions

Element 3: A process for addressing the poor performance exists, with evidence of its use

Element 4: The process clearly delineates the responsibility to take action
### MI 8.5 Analysis

Organisationally, senior staff currently only have oversight of poor TC programme/project performance through reviewing rates of expenditure. UNCTAD used to have a system that helped to track TC project performance, referred to as the Project Portal. This was no longer supported following the introduction of Umoja in 2015.

Project progress reporting can support identification of risks and issues, though this is on a project-by-project basis overseen by the project manager rather than a tracking or oversight system. Some progress reports for 2017-18 in the project document sample used the TCS global annual reporting template and included risk monitoring, lessons learned and an annex for internal reporting linked to the TC Toolbox that identifies status, major delays, and whether intervention of senior management was required. Further, some programmes such as DMFAS and Business Facilitation have strong progress reporting mechanisms. While there is a system in place whereby project officers inform TCS of project progress once a year using a global progress reporting template, as well as the input into the TCS annual report on TC activities, it does not have identification of poor performance as its purpose, and reporting is not yet comprehensive.

Pending the Umoja 2 extension that would once again link budget to project performance, UNCTAD will continue to rely on the monthly budget utilisation reports. Recently UNCTAD has been exploring an interim system that should improve tracking, but the current situation does not allow for effective oversight and tracking of project performance.

### MI 8.5 Evidence confidence

High confidence

### MI 8.6: Clear accountability system ensures responses and follow-up to and use of evaluation recommendations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall MI rating</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>3.00</td>
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</table>

- **Element 1**: Evaluation reports include a management response (or has one attached or associated with it)

- **Element 2**: Management responses include an action plan and/or agreement clearly stating responsibilities and accountabilities

- **Element 3**: A timeline for implementation of key recommendations is proposed

- **Element 4**: A system exists to regularly track status of implementation

- **Element 5**: An annual report on the status of use and implementation of evaluation recommendations is made public

### MI 8.6 Analysis

All annual external subprogramme evaluations include a management response.

There is evidence of an improved approach to management response to the subprogramme (SP) evaluations. SP1 does not include an action plan and/or agreement clearly stating responsibilities and accountabilities. SP2 somewhat addresses and generally provides decisive responses about what it is doing and will do. SP3, SP4 and SP5 are clear, though actions are not timebound unless against a specific, planned division/UNCTAD product. Timelines are reported to the Working Party on the Strategic Framework and Programme Budget.

A system exists to track the status of implementation, although there is reluctance among some managers to provide the required updates.

### Source document

21, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 137, 138, 139, 140, 159, 181, 182, 183, 184

39, 58, 71, 74, 77, 79, 82, 83, 109, 136
Implementation status of subprogramme recommendations is annually reported to the Working Party on the Strategic Framework and Programme Budget and is publicly available on the UNCTAD website. The scope of the annual status reporting is typically one subprogramme per year, though status was reported for all in September 2019.

There is no evident system within TC to respond to evaluation findings or to use evaluation results at the programme and project level. Application of this MI to TC needs to consider that the evaluation policy has a USD 1 million threshold for self-evaluations (unless directed otherwise by the donor) and that management responses are not applicable to self-evaluations, though an action plan could apply. The TC project sample used for this assessment only included two self-/joint evaluations and did not include independent evaluations, except for UNDAF projects which are too broad to consider for review of UNCTAD TC systems. Other reviewed independent evaluations for programmes/projects did not include management response or action items to respond to recommendations. Updated UN procedures for programme planning and budgeting require consideration of evaluations and lessons learned for annual programming and budgeting, though those applied in the Proposed Budget for 2020 do not have a technical co-operation focus.

For evaluations conducted by OIOS and JIU, refer to KPI 4.

| MI 8.6 Evidence confidence | High confidence |
| MI 8.7: Uptake of lessons learned and best practices from evaluations and other reports | Score |
| Overall MI rating | Unsatisfactory |
| Overall MI score | 2.00 |

Element 1: A complete and current repository of evaluations and their recommendations is available for use

Element 2: A mechanism for distilling and disseminating lessons learned internally exists

Element 3: A dissemination mechanism to partners, peers and other stakeholders is available and employed

Element 4: A system is available and used to track the uptake of lessons learned

Element 5: Evidence is available that lessons learned and good practices are being applied

Element 6: A corporate policy for Disclosure of information exists and is also applied to evaluations

| MI 8.7 Analysis | Source document |
| Evaluations included in the annual evaluation plan are publicly available on the UNCTAD website. At the programme and project level, however, UNCTAD does not have a central repository for all evaluations including self-evaluations. The intent signalled in the project document evaluation plans within the Trust Fund Approval Process gives EMU insight into how many self- or external project evaluations are being undertaken at the divisional level, and EMU tracks external evaluations within their mandate or where requested by the project manager. As self-evaluations are a management function, EMU does not have full oversight of them, and it is currently up to the projects to share their self-evaluations with EMU. Before the introduction of Umoja, there was an internal tool to track external evaluations and self-evaluations, but that was made redundant in 2015. | 20, 34, 35, 45, 50, 68, 83, 170, 185 |
The process for distilling lessons learned is not yet mature, although there have been synthesis reports prepared from planned evaluations and made publicly available on UNCTAD’s website. EMU has prepared their annual report *Evaluation of UNCTAD Activities: Overview* nearly every year since 2011, these consolidate the main findings from planned evaluations and lessons learned/recommendations. It is presented to the UNCTAD Working Party on the Strategic Framework and the Programme Budget where findings are discussed.

In 2018, EMU published *Looking at the Bigger Picture: A Meta-Analysis of Evaluations 2011-2017* that analysed more than 250 recommendations from the 29 planned evaluations conducted between 2011 and 2017. This covered six in-depth programme evaluations (including subprogrammes 1-4), 23 final project evaluations, and more than 80 countries primarily in sub-Saharan Africa, East Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. It aimed to raise awareness of repeat recommendations and is intended to be conducted every five years. In 2019, EMU prepared a synthesis of the five subprogramme evaluations, aimed at strengthening the use of evaluations and the feedback loop into the programme cycle. It did so by extracting key findings and lessons learned from the five evaluations and extrapolating, overall, whether and how the UNCTAD strategic framework was effective as a programming tool in support of a greater development contribution by the organisation.

Specifically for technical co-operation programmes and projects, some examples also suggest the collection, consideration and/or use of lessons learned such as in the DMFAS Strategic Plan and the recently developed E-commerce and Digital Economy Programme Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. However, this is not yet standard practice throughout the secretariat for TC and is often informal – relying on institutional memory. Development Account evaluations have a stronger learning mechanism, as they have required external evaluations that are included within the evaluation plan, but these form only a small and specific part of UNCTAD’s technical co-operation.

There is currently no system to track the uptake of lessons learned.

Following the update to UN procedures for programme planning and budgeting, lessons learned are now included in the Proposed Budget for 2020 that refers to seven evaluations that have informed plan development, though these do not have a TC focus.

There is no specific corporate policy for disclosure of information, though the UNCTAD Evaluation Policy itself specifies that “all reports of external evaluations — except in cases when the reports contain material of a confidential nature — should be public documents, and their dissemination should be facilitated by placing them on the internet in an easily accessible and a readable manner”.

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**MI 8.7 Evidence confidence**

High confidence: 20, 34, 35, 45, 50, 68, 83, 170, 185
RESULTS
Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way

Note: KPIs 9-12 have not been scored or rated, in accordance with the agreement reached between MOPAN and UNCTAD. All text below refers to the TC pillar only and must not be extrapolated to other pillars nor to UNCTAD as a whole.

KPI 9: Development and humanitarian objectives are achieved, and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals

UNCTAD interventions in TC, as evidenced through evaluations, other results reports and independent assessments, have attained a satisfactory level of results in relation to their stated development objectives. UNCTAD’s target groups pertain to Conference member states and particularly to priority countries, LDCs, LLDCs, SIDSs and FCASs. Therefore, results assessment for each subprogramme largely focuses on the extent to which member states have been supported with TC priorities. Overall, the five subprogramme evaluations demonstrate positive performance in relation to the stated targets in terms of country coverage, including the extent to which projects have covered the prime target countries. For instance, the subprogramme 3 (DITC) evaluation demonstrated that TC initiatives in advisory services, training courses, seminars and field projects have covered the targeted 41 countries of which 16 (39%) are from the UNCTAD priority countries.

Overall, the main TC flagship programmes are evaluated as having high relevance, effectiveness and efficiency in relation to improved governance. Member countries provide positive feedback on these programmes and attest that they remain in the most part flexible to their needs and contexts. UNCTAD interventions, particularly the larger programmes that absorb the most financing, are generally evaluated as satisfactory, including feedback by the countries. These programmes, and also some of the evaluated projects, have been assessed as contributing to significant changes in development policies and programmes or leading to system reforms. For specific projects, the relevance and effectiveness are also evaluated as satisfactory and in some cases highly satisfactory. However, most evaluations note that the evidence in relation to results has been more related to generation of outputs rather than outcomes; therefore, there is difficulty in assessing the extent to which initiatives contribute to longer-term goals. This is consistently reflected in the evaluation recommendations for more attention to tracking progress towards longer-term benefits.

UNCTAD’s results in relation to gender are improving, but environmental sustainability and tackling the effects of climate change are not strongly evident across most evaluations. Yet, there are examples where UNCTAD has developed knowledge products in partnership with other agencies or has provided support for environmental initiatives.

MI 9.1: Interventions assessed as having achieved their stated development and/or humanitarian objectives and attained expected results

| MI rating | Not applicable |
| MI score | Not applicable |

| MI 9.1 Analysis | Source document |

Evaluations demonstrate that UNCTAD has largely achieved satisfactory results. A majority of evaluations determined that projects achieved their intended objectives. The evaluations for each subprogramme as well as 12 specific project evaluations were reviewed and also overviews of evaluations for each Working Party on the Strategic Framework and the Programme Budget from 2013, 2016, 2018 and 2019. These evaluations all concluded that the initiatives being assessed are rated as relevant to highly relevant, have achieved positive results and, in the main, are efficient. Most note that the evaluations are conducted too early to make an assessment of impact and sustainability.
A particularly effective aspect of UNCTAD’s work is in its focus on the most vulnerable countries. For instance, the subprogramme 3 (DITC) evaluation demonstrated that TC initiatives in advisory services, training courses, seminars and field projects have covered the targeted 41 countries of which 16 (39%) are from the UNCTAD priority countries.

Particularly effective areas of UNCTAD’s activities include the Division on Investment and Enterprise’s TC Investment Policy Reviews where evaluations have reported increases in foreign direct investment inflows and increased knowledge levels of stakeholders. Evaluation of the eTrade for All Initiative concludes that UNCTAD has improved transparency of reporting on government resources. A commonly raised constraint to results is the extent to which UNCTAD spreads resources too thinly. While this contributes to cost-efficiency in achieving results, feedback from the countries is that assistance is insufficient to achieve the expected outcomes. Evaluations identified difficulties in reporting results for capacity development activities. For example, the Evaluation Overview for the Working Party on the Strategic Framework and Programme Budget 78th session, 2019 states that “there is a general assumption that capacity building activities automatically lead to an increase in knowledge and enable beneficiaries to carry out the tasks for which they have been trained (p. 11).” This leads to lack of clarity in the extent to which results have been achieved.

A common recommendation in evaluations was to develop stronger results frameworks linking activities to intended outcomes so that longer-term results can be tracked more effectively. UNCTAD’s project and programme evaluations and other reports on results demonstrated that UNCTAD’s interventions already have clearly stated objectives and a specific results framework. However, the findings of most evaluations within the reviewed documents are that performance assessment has been focused more on outputs than outcomes. This is now changing in the design documents of more recent projects, with a greater focus on expected results and hence more attention to outcome indicators in the latest evaluations.

### MI 9.1 Evidence confidence

| Score | High confidence |

### MI 9.2: Interventions assessed as having realised the expected positive benefits for target group members

| MI rating | Not applicable |
| MI score | Not applicable |
| MI 9.2 Analysis | Source document |

Projects and programmes are largely assessed as having positive benefits for the expected target groups. In light of UNCTAD’s role, target groups pertain to Conference member states and particularly to priority countries, LDCs, LLDCs, SIDSs and FCASs. Therefore, main benefits relate to improved institutional processes within target member states’ governments. The main flagship programmes, ASYCUDA and DMFAS, cover 58% of expenditures, and member states demonstrate consistently positive performance. A 2018 external midterm review of the DMFAS programme found that a large number of target beneficiaries felt that the programme was having the intended benefits for recipient countries as positive impacts on recording, debt reporting and preparation of debt statistics.
There are now a number of evaluations that present strong evidence to convey the benefits accrued to target groups, particularly through the use of respondent and beneficiary surveys for training participants and partner governments. For example, the Evaluation Overview for the Working Party on the Strategic Framework and the Programme Budget in 2013 noted the increase in employment and revenues in the private sector resulting from the Empretec and Business Linkages Programmes. Another example was the end-of-phase evaluation for the Tanzania UN Trade Cluster Programme in 2016 where accomplishment of results at the grassroots level included evidence of increased delivery reliability and improved quality control measures for milk suppliers. In relation to increased capacity, knowledge and confidence through TC, UNCTAD’s 2017 Annual Report outlines UNCTAD’s support for national workshops that allowed the collaboration of stakeholders and policy makers to understand the need for and have the capacity to prepare national action plans to develop cotton by-products in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Similarly, government officials who participated in UNCTAD’s online course on Trade and Gender in 2019 provided a 96% level of satisfaction for the course delivery.

The 2019 Evaluation of UNCTAD Activities: Overview identified a limited inclusion of all stakeholders as a barrier to the realisation of benefits for all target groups. The external evaluation of the project Strengthening the Capacity of the Economic Community of Central African States to Enhance Domestic Production Linkages from the Mineral Resources Sector noted that UNCTAD had made efforts to incorporate high-level government officials in the project but had failed to include the private sector and other stakeholders, limiting the witnessing of benefits to the government alone. As a result, the evaluation suggested that UNCTAD revisit workplans and “develop strategies for raising extrabudgetary resources to increase the TC portfolio, to better meet stakeholder needs”.

**MI 9.2 Evidence confidence**

- **Score**: High confidence

**MI 9.3: Interventions assessed as having contributed to significant changes in national development policies and programmes (policy and capacity impacts), or needed system reforms**

- **MI rating**: Not applicable
- **MI score**: Not applicable

**MI 9.3 Analysis**

UNCTAD’s TC interventions, particularly the larger programmes that absorb the most financing, are generally appreciated by the countries and lead to changes in policies and systems. In particular, DMFAS has contributed to more complete and transparent reporting on debt as outlined in a 2018 midterm review of the programme. Between 2006 and 2015, there was a 100% increase in the number of member countries producing high quality debt reports.

A testimonial from TradeMark East Africa presented in the 2019 ASYCUDA Compendium suggests ASYCUDA World has contributed to significant improvements in efficiency in customs and trade between Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. This was achieved through support of the Single Customs Territory that utilised the ASYCUDA system.

UNCTAD’s policy tools including the Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development and the Road Map for the Reform of the International Investment Agreement Regime have contributed to 100 country reviews of international investment networks, and approximately 60 treaty clauses have also benefitted from this work. In 2017, UNCTAD’s report to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Programme Performance Report records that UNCTAD’s technical assistance has contributed to 19 developing countries revising or implementing competition and consumer protection legislation and frameworks.
Specific examples of countries utilising UNCTAD support in strategy and policy development are presented in the 2018 external evaluation of UNCTAD subprogramme 5. This report particularly notes the effectiveness of UNCTAD’s Diagnostic Trade Integration studies and their contribution to the mainstreaming of trade into national policies and strategies in numerous countries including Ethiopia, Mali and Senegal. The studies are also noted in this evaluation to be of use for other international organisations in the development of policy and country partnership documents.

UNCTAD’s 2017 Annual Report outlines the organisation’s provision of an environment through national workshops that allowed the collaboration of stakeholders and policy makers to develop national action plans to create cotton by-products. Furthermore, the 2017 UNGA programme performance report of the United Nations for the biennium 2016-17 identifies UNCTAD’s role in the adoption of a policy statement by Southern African countries following the Least Developed Countries Report 2016.

The 2016 overview of an evaluation of UNCTAD activities noted that surveys of participants in UNCTAD capacity building activities had been conducted. These surveys indicate that UNCTAD training has been useful as a reference document for trade negotiations and policy making and has therefore contributed to strengthened national policy environments.

A number of UNCTAD recommendations have been incorporated into policy by some member states according to a 2018 external evaluation of UNCTAD subprogramme 5. The evaluation concluded that overall UNCTAD subprogramme 5 contributes to the promotion of evidence-based national policies and international measures relating to trade and economics.

However, there have been some factors that have negatively impacted on the achievement of results in relation to changes in national policies and programmes. One such factor is outlined in the 2019 Overview of the Evaluation of UNCTAD Activities. Specifically the external evaluation of the project Strengthening the Capacity of the Economic Community of Central African States to Enhance Domestic Production Linkages from the Mineral Resources Sector set up the task forces as outlined in project design, but a lack of motivation and cohesiveness at the national and regional levels limited the project’s impacts on strategic policy change.

| MI 9.3 Evidence confidence | High confidence |
| MI 9.4: Interventions assessed as having helped improve gender equality and the empowerment of women | Score |
| MI rating | Not applicable |
| MI score | Not applicable |

Evidence from evaluations demonstrates a solid commitment to improving direct gender outcomes in terms of focus and participation. Attempts have been made by UNCTAD to mainstream gender into their own structures and mechanisms as outlined in KPI 2, and these attempts are creating a positive trend across the organisation. Evaluation reports are increasingly reporting on the extent to which gender-related concerns are addressed. Still, this shift is yet to become substantially evident in the results analysis of projects.

There are several project evaluations that highlight substantial results in improving gender equality. One example is a Development Account project “Enhancing capacities of developing countries to mainstream gender in trade policy” that sought to strengthen the capacity of governments in Bhutan, Cabo Verde, Rwanda and Uruguay to mainstream gender in trade policy and make trade policy more responsive to the specific needs of women. Additional funding was...
received for country studies in Angola, the Gambia and Lesotho to reproduce the project activities. The evaluation in 2016 noted that the workshop in each country and subsequent country-level reports in local languages generated good feedback on raising awareness of gender aspects to be considered in trade policies. This was considered likely to be catalytic in developing future work on mainstreaming gender into trade policy. The evaluator noted a high execution rate of planned budgets and full implementation of all planned activities but that project activities were spread too widely, preventing sufficient follow-up with national counterparts.

Nevertheless, there is less evidence of impact on gender equality and mainstreaming, i.e. structural improvement in gender equality. There is continued reference to the need to strengthen mainstreaming in evaluations, but the overall trajectory over time is positive. The independent evaluation for the project “Climate change impacts in coastal transport infrastructure in the Caribbean: Enhancing the adaptive capacity of Small Island Developing States” suggests that the inclusion of gender in some projects is due to the largely technical nature of many UNCTAD interventions. The evaluation goes on to highlight attempts that were made to encourage the participation of women in project activities. Furthermore, the independent project evaluation for the project eTrade for All highlights the difficulties UNCTAD experiences in mainstreaming gender into their work because of the perceived lack of importance given to the topic by national governments in relation to trade. Nevertheless, project staff did attempt to mainstream gender concerns in the project but to limited success, with approximately half of all project stakeholders being unsure to what extent gender is conceptually or practically figuring into the project. As such, UNCTAD’s efforts to mainstream gender have focused on encouraging the participation of women in training and capacity building activities.

The 2018 Evaluation of UNCTAD Activities: Overview provides an example of improved knowledge levels regarding the gender and trade nexus. The evaluation draws on the previous external evaluation of the project “support developing country policymakers in the formulation of national entrepreneurship policies through the implementation of entrepreneurship policy frameworks”. This evaluation suggests that gender was incorporated into the project only to a minimal extent by encouraging equal participation in project activities. Additionally, attendees at national workshops were surveyed and more than 50% stated that they had been made aware of the gender dimension of entrepreneurship policies. Similarly, UNCTAD’s data relating to their 2019 Online Course on Trade and Gender suggest that 54% of policy participants felt equipped to design and/or implement gender-sensitive trade policy.

The external evaluation of the project “Accelerating progress of selected West African countries towards the achievement of internationally agreed development goals, particularly Millennium Development Goal 8, through trade-related training and capacity-building” found that, while participation by women in the project was minimal, the project had contributed to changing attitudes and stereotypes relating to women and participation in information technology-related business. An external global evaluation of the Delivering Results Together Fund highlights some progress towards gender equality through the drafting of a National Strategy for Gender Equality in Albania that benefitted from UNCTAD’s support to the Istanbul Convention.

A particularly positive example of improved outcomes for women and gender equality is evident in a case study from Tanzania. In this case, the completion note indicates that the support for a non-government, non-profit organisation resulted in the development of a new market outlet for female farmers in the Kilimanjaro area as well as promoting women into leadership roles within the farming sector.

**MI 9.4 Evidence confidence**

2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 19, 29, 36, 48, 50, 52, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 67, 68, 70, 72, 76, 78, 81, 84, 86, 98, 100, 103, 126, 136, 140

High confidence
MI 9.5: Interventions assessed as having helped improve environmental sustainability/helped tackle the effects of climate change

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**MI 9.5 Analysis**

Assessments of the extent to which UNCTAD is contributing to improved environmental sustainability or is tackling the effects of climate change is not strongly evident in results reports or evaluations. The analysis of environmental aspects is largely missing in the majority of programme and project evaluations. However, there are indications of growing attention to environmental factors in documents over time.

A 2014 external evaluation of UNCTAD subprogramme 2 outlines interventions aimed at the environment but suggests that these revolve around capacity building and knowledge enhancement. The 2015 external evaluation of UNCTAD subprogramme 3 does outline that UNCTAD “has provided country-level support...in the identification of high-potential green sectors for domestic markets and green exports” (p. 11). The 2018 Programme Performance Report of the United Nations for the Biennium 2016-2017 claims that “as a result of support provided 36 countries designed or implemented policies, programmes, normative initiatives or institutional arrangements to take advantage of trade and creative economy opportunities...in the area of green export strategies and green growth”. These numbers achieve the biennium target outlined by UNCTAD in the 2017 Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2018-19 Part IV.

One area relating to environmental sustainability where UNCTAD has contributed to positive outcomes is in terms of the promotion and uptake of processes that prioritise green products and export processes. Other activities of UNCTAD relating to the environment include organising conferences and training events for government actors according to the Evaluation of the project Zambia Green Jobs Programme: Enhancing Competitiveness and Sustainable Business among MSMEs in Zambia’s Building Construction Centre conducted by the International Labour Organisation. The contribution of such activities to increased understanding and knowledge levels is outlined in the independent project evaluation for “Development Account project 1415O on climate change impact on coastal transport infrastructure in the Caribbean: Enhancing the adaptive capacity of small island developing states” that includes the following quote from a training participant who felt that the training had “helped to show how real the challenge of climate change could be as well as the extent of potential impacts throughout the economy, environment and society”. The evaluation also found that the project had contributed to enhanced capacities of policy makers, transport planners and transport infrastructure managers to plan and develop adaption measures in their own contexts. Furthermore, UNCTAD has also run a number of training events in relation to climate resilient transport and finance as outlined in the 2017 Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2018-19 Part IV.

However, there is little evidence of how these activities have led to wider uptake and action on environmental recommendations. Similarly, it is not well demonstrated how these activities have gone beyond knowledge and capacity building to tangible improvements to environmental sustainability as a result.

**MI 9.5 Evidence confidence**

High confidence
MI 9.6: Interventions assessed as having helped improve good governance (as defined in 2.1c)

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MI 9.6 Analysis

Many of the TC programmes and projects support improved economic governance as an integral part of the mandate.

UNCTAD’s TC main contributions to economic governance revolve around improving data availability and transparency leading to more accountable governments and institutions. One such example is outlined in the Division on Investment and Enterprise’s 2018 Results and Impact Report where it is highlighted that the development of an “e-government digital platform to enhance information access and streamline and automate procedures” assisted in “helping to reduce bureaucratic costs and thereby strengthen good governance” (p. 33). The report further emphasised that this platform has been implemented in 30 countries, reducing administrative processes by 80%.

Furthermore, the Lessons Learned from Investment Policy Reviews Implementation Report published in 2018 outlined how UNCTAD activities have contributed to the improvement of frameworks and governance in many countries relating to consumer protection. The report particularly illustrates this in the context of Colombia. Following UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Review for Colombia the country’s competition authority has placed an increased emphasis on good governance and corporate social responsibility. These actions have reached further than governance to also increase foreign direct investment, particularly for sustainable development objectives.

UNCTAD’s DMFAS system contributes to improvements in governance by increasing data availability as outlined in the August 2019 issue of SDG Pulse entitled UNCTAD DMFAS Programme – Strengthening Debt Management in Support of Good Governance. This publication outlines the process of encouraging transparent and reliable debt statistics through a stepwise process advocated to target countries while also providing training opportunities relating to debt statistics and reporting. This system is being used in 57 countries. The 2018 Annual Report on the Debt Management and Financial Analysis System Programme suggests that “39 DMFAS countries produce a debt statistics bulletin”; thus, DMFAS is contributing to improving debt-data transparency and medium-term financial planning.

UNCTAD has also contributed to improvements in governance through advocacy channels. The 2018 Lessons Learned from Investment Policy Reviews Implementation Report outlined the role that the Investment Policy Reviews can play in advocating for action within the government regarding a variety of topics including resource allocation and investment. These policy reviews also allow for the easier tracking of progress towards targets by countries as illustrated in the Division on Investment and Enterprise’s 2018 Results and Impact Report. The reports include a table that has recently been made available in an electronic format to monitor progress in the implementation of recommendations as outlined in the Investment Policy Reviews.
UNCTAD has collaborated with other organisations to contribute to good economic governance through the development of tools, programmes and frameworks that promote integrity, transparency, responsibility and efficiency. One such example is outlined in The Compendium 2019 Case Studies report for the ASYCUDA programme. This report highlights an example of collaboration with the World Customs Organization for an expansion to the ASYCUDA World system that focused on the promotion of integrity within the Customs institution. The expansion is being implemented in nine countries.

### MI 9.6 Evidence confidence

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### MI 9.7: Interventions assessed as having helped improve human rights

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Overall, although UNCTAD does not have a clearly articulated policy on human rights, it can be argued that the organisation’s mandate has an implicit approach recognising basic human rights as part of good economic governance. The focus of UNCTAD on LDCs, LLDCs, SIDSs and FCAs is largely due to the acknowledgement of vulnerability for the populations in those countries. As with gender, there has been increasing focus on the concern regarding human rights, particularly in relation to cross-border movements and treatment of refugees. However, this area of focus is not clearly evident across UNCTAD’s work. For example, several project evaluations noted that there had been sensitive consideration of human rights, but that the approach for mainstreaming was not proactive.

The 2018 overview of evaluation of UNCTAD activities, specifically the external evaluation of the project “Strengthening pro-growth macroeconomic management capacities for enhanced regional financial and monetary co-operation among selected countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, and West and Central Africa” suggested an inclusion of human rights during implementation. This evaluation also acknowledged that this recognition of the human rights domain contributed to increased awareness of macroeconomic policy on human rights.

The external evaluation of the project Strengthening the Capacity of the Economic Community of Central African States to Enhance Domestic Production Linkages from the Mineral Resources Sector present in the 2019 overview of the evaluation of UNCTAD activities illustrates UNCTAD’s intentions to incorporate human rights: “The project had raised the importance of equitable development, including that of human rights, in the extractive sectors, with the overall objective of supporting economic development”. However, there is no further follow-up of the extent to which this was actually achieved.

The external evaluation of the project “Strengthening the capacities of developing country policymakers, investment promotion officials and academia in two priority sectors to attract investment for sustainable and inclusive development” as presented in the 2019 overview of the evaluation of UNCTAD activities suggest that incorporating human rights into design is not enough. “The evaluation concluded that the project team had treated gender and human rights in a sensitive manner. The gender and human rights dimensions of investment policymaking had not figured prominently in the project document, yet the project had adopted a proactive approach to mainstreaming gender and human rights concerns into its activities”.

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The summary of the external evaluation of UNCTAD subprogramme 5 presented in the 2019 overview of the evaluation of UNCTAD activities found that, while "some progress was observed on human rights"; "there was a need for an enhanced and systematic human rights...approach in future programming" (p. 3). Similarly, the external evaluation of the project "supporting member states in developing and launching sustainable product export strategies through national sustainable product export reviews" as presented in the 2019 overview of the evaluation of UNCTAD activities suggests that "the project had not incorporated a thorough gender or human rights perspective, neither in its design nor its implementation".

**KPI 10: Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate**

As noted in KPI 9, when considering whether UNCTAD responds to the needs of target groups, UNCTAD's mandate related to supporting member states as the prime target group needs to be considered. In this regard, there is strong evidence that UNCTAD's TC interventions are targeted towards the needs and priorities of the partner countries.

Evaluations consistently assess the programme and project’s relevance as high or very high. The evaluations provide clear justification of relevance and note the good level of country partner engagement in the projects as evidence in this regard. However, there is less evidence of the extent to which the initiatives supported by UNCTAD contribute to the realisation of national goals.

The larger programmes with relatively large self-financing are clearly aligned to national interests and in general are noted as related to clear national development objectives. The evaluations point to some investments arising from other processes such as replication of good practices (i.e. supply-driven), due to availability of donor support (donor-driven), rather than being country initiated.

There are problem analyses referred to in the design documents and these seem to contribute to the delivery of coherent projects. UNCTAD’s engagement in the UNDAF/UNSDCF process is seen as contributing to coherence at country level in line with the One UN approach. Yet, for some of the smaller projects that are part of the “product toolkit” of UNCTAD or where there are multi-country capacity development offerings by UNCTAD, the rationale for engagement is documented as a response of the country to opportunities offered rather than UNCTAD responding strategically to national development goals and objectives.

**MI 10.1 Analysis**

From the perspective of the UNCTAD target groups referring to national governments, evaluations confirm that there has been good feedback from the stakeholders in most projects on the extent to which needs and priorities of the country within the specific focus of the project are addressed.

The ASYCUDA in Operation Synthesis of Case Studies demonstrates 23 examples of how the ASYCUDA programme has been implemented in different countries. Each example focuses on a different range of benefits that have been achieved as a result of the implementation of the ASYCUDA systems. This demonstrates how, although ASYCUDA is developed as a standard platform based on global good practices, it has been applied in different ways according the identified needs of the specific member state.
Given that the majority of UNCTAD’s interventions are aimed towards high-level decision makers, policy makers and government and institutional stakeholders and that a large portion of UNCTAD’s services are delivered upon request from beneficiary governments, the supplied documents indicate that UNCTAD is responsive to needs and priorities. There are examples of this responsiveness presented in ASYCUDA in Action: Compendium 2019. One such example is the Georgian government’s desire to increase public service delivery efficiency by automating a number of processes. ASYCUDA assisted the Georgian government to introduce modern and automated systems that streamlined business processes and simplified a number of procedures and requirements. Similarly, the ASYCUDA Compendium 2019: Case Studies outlines further examples of UNCTAD’s responsiveness to country needs. A particularly positive example is the use of the ASYCUDA World system in Zimbabwe. The document notes that a strength of the system is its ability to evolve as the country context changes and develops. UNCTAD has made successive upgrades to the system available that respond to particular emerging needs of the country stakeholder.

Feedback from member countries reinforces an appreciation of UNCTAD’s ability to respond to their changing needs. A 2018 independent midterm review of the Strategic Plan 2016-2019 of the DMFAS programme indicated that 77% of DMFAS recipients rate very highly UNCTAD’s ability to modify the DMFAS programme to respond to changing needs and circumstances.

A number of beneficiaries from UNCTAD activities indicated that the training they had received was relevant to them and had improved their capacity to do their particular job. This sentiment was presented in a number of documents including the 2017 UNCTAD Annual Report. The independent evaluation of the Development Account project “Climate change impacts on coastal transport infrastructure in the Caribbean: Enhancing the adaptive capacity of Small Island Developing States” also highlights the relevance of UNCTAD interventions and training to national and regional contexts. The evaluation states that “project management responded to the changing needs of the beneficiaries” (p. 39) and that “the workshop was not only relevant but that it was also timely. Having just come out of one of the most disastrous hurricane seasons in the Caribbean region, the workshop’s topic was the answer to a number of questions that had arisen as a result.”

### MI 10.1 Evidence confidence

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### MI 10.2: Interventions assessed as having helped contribute to the realisation of national development goals and objectives

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### MI 10.2 Analysis

The key programmes such as ASYCUDA and DMFAS are clearly aligned to national interests and, in general, are noted as clear national development objectives. Other projects are more peripheral and more donor-driven. While countries may be interested in these projects, the rationale for engagement is more localised rather than at the level of national development goals and objectives.

UNCTAD’s assistance as outlined in the 2017 “Review of the technical cooperation activities of UNCTAD and their financing” is perceived to have contributed to a national goal that is common to a number of countries: World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession. UNCTAD’s assistance to countries aiming to achieve WTO accession has been specifically designed to be multifaceted to respond to this goal. UNCTAD’s approach includes assistance with negotiations and wider required actions including for policy regulation and institutions. UNCTAD’s assistance has contributed to a number of countries successfully achieving WTO accession including Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Seychelles and Yemen.
The aforementioned review of UNCTAD's TC activities also outlines how UNCTAD's assistance has helped countries to mainstream trade into national development plans and identify other required action to achieve national goals. This assistance has taken the form of assistance in identifying trade priorities and developing and implementing action implementation matrices.

As mentioned above, UNCTAD provides much of its services and interventions at the request of national stakeholders, ensuring they are responsive and help contribute to national goals. This is especially highlighted in the ASYCUDA publication Compendium 2019: Case Studies. For example, a process of internal government collaboration in Mauritania had identified a need for the automation of dispute settlement procedures. UNCTAD developed a new module for ASYCUDA World that recorded and processed offences and so upgraded the current system in Mauritania to achieve this identified need.

A 2019 independent project evaluation of the project “Supporting Member States in developing and launching sustainable product export strategies through national Sustainable Product Export Reviews” found that UNCTAD’s support did respond to an identified gap in current assistance. It stated: “All stakeholders and sources of information (documents, survey and interviews) confirmed that the project was pertinent both from a technical and political point of view. Most beneficiaries highlighted that only UNCTAD had engaged in the kind of research and analysis related to green products and services and potential trade impacts. The project’s activities and products (workshops and publications) were well suited to address the different country and regional priorities, including some important bottlenecks during implementation in several countries” (p. 15).

However, while UNCTAD attempts to make clear in many documents a responsiveness to the needs of a country (for instance, every evaluation always includes a question under the relevance criteria that asks for an assessment of alignment of the organisation’s intervention with national goals and objectives), UNCTAD’s provision of assistance in line with national goals and objectives is not always as clearly identified in project documents nor reflected in evaluations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 10.2 Evidence confidence</th>
<th>Medium confidence</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MI 10.3: Results assessed as having been delivered as part of a coherent response to an identified problem</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI rating</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI score</td>
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UNCTAD attempts to ensure cohesion in its approaches through collaboration with various stakeholders. One example of such collaboration is present in the Division on Investment and Enterprise’s 2018 Results and Impact Report. This example involves working with the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) on a project involving employment, investment and entrepreneurship in Ethiopia. The project aims to assist with the creation of employment opportunities through the promotion of investment in the productive sectors of the economy. UNCTAD and UNIDO were expected to jointly undertake an assessment of the entrepreneurial ecosystem and organise stakeholder consultations. These consultations will be an opportunity to begin drafting a national strategy and action plan for entrepreneurship.

8, 9, 10, 49, 51, 55, 58, 60, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 75, 77, 78, 86, 98, 103, 136
Another mechanism that UNCTAD utilises to ensure a coherent approach is through participation in the One United Nations Fund as outlined in the 2019 “Review of the technical cooperation activities of UNCTAD and their financing”. The review states that this fund is designed to ensure “sustainability for technical assistance by leveraging key added value and enhancing cross-sectoral policy coherence” (p. 7). The fund is designed to pool funding to minimise duplication of activities within the UN system. Yet, for some of the smaller projects that are part of the “product toolkit” of UNCTAD or where there are multi-country capacity development offerings by UNCTAD, the rationale for engagement is documented as a response of the country to opportunities offered rather than UNCTAD responding strategically to national development goals and objectives.

The 2019 independent evaluation of the eTrade for All project further identifies UNCTAD’s attempts to adopt a cohesive approach to interventions. The evaluation identified the projects communication and collaboration with development partners and the private sector to maximise outcomes by recognising comparative advantages and sharing capabilities and resources. The evaluation acknowledged that “strengthened partner synergies” was one of the main outputs of the project and that this was 71% achieved. Stakeholders and beneficiaries support these ideas with “36% of stakeholders reporting strengthened coherence or synergies among partners’ e-commerce activities and 43% giving a medium rating to the same criteria”.

Project frameworks such as theory of changes and logical frameworks were identified as important influences on the level of coherence achieved by UNCTAD activities. Each project proposal includes an analysis of general context and the overarching problem to be addressed. For the key programmes, the results are delivered as part of a coherent response to demand. For other projects, this is more ad hoc than coherent. Evidence of a positive results framework is present in the evaluation conducted by the International Labour Organization for the project Zambia Green Jobs Programme. The evaluation states that “the project’s key framework is well developed. The relations between the different elements are generally logical and coherent, and the majority of outputs are tangible”.

There are other examples where the absence of a strong framework has impacted on the coherence of approaches, as illustrated in the 2018 independent project evaluation of the development account project “Climate Change impacts on coastal transport infrastructure in the Caribbean: Enhancing the adaptive capacity of Small Island Developing States”. The evaluation identified the unfulfilled potential of a systemic approach and framework in allowing for further collaboration and ensuring that results were realistic, transparent and accountable. Furthermore, the 2015 OIOS Audit of UNCTAD’s Special Unit on Commodities states that “there was also no systemic coordination during the strategic planning and annual work planning process such as joint planning meeting to ensure coherence of activities planned” (p. 4).

**MI 10.3 Evidence confidence**

High confidence
**KPI 11: Results are delivered efficiently**

Evaluations consistently assess UNCTAD’s initiatives as efficient. This is largely reported to be as a result of careful management of available funds and tight financial controls. UNCTAD makes efforts to replicate good results across other member countries, enhancing efficiency of original investments. The subprogramme evaluations conclude that resources are used efficiently within each subprogramme. Both of the main TC programmes, ASYCUDA and DMFAS, are assessed as being efficient due to the small size of the core team and the broad reach and documented positive results for each programme. Similarly, evaluations state that the work in relation to e-commerce and other information and communications technology products increases efficiency for member states and that the delivery mechanism in terms of cost and viability for member states uptake facilitates programme efficiency.

The main cost components in relation to TC are staffing, staff travel and consultancy; in general, the technical staffing is assessed as being efficiently applied to work programmes to generate results. However, there was some indication of potential duplication of project activities between divisions that could be address e.g. between the ALDC and DITC, as noted in the subprogramme evaluation for ALDC. Furthermore, a common weakness identified in projects is the extent to which resources, particularly for technical staff and for capacity development support, are spread too thinly across different countries, impacting on the required level of depth to influence change.

Many Development Account evaluations indicate that a lack of resources has impacted on implementation and the level of results achieved. This was a particular concern raised in the Accelerating Progress for West African Countries project where the participants were too few per country and the extent of training provided was assessed as insufficient to achieve the expected outcomes. The evidence from project evaluations indicates that budget-neutral project extensions are frequent. While these are often valid and related to country context, the delays are not always well documented. Development Account project extension requests require approval from DA headquarters in New York.

**MI 11.1: Interventions assessed as resource/cost-efficient**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI rating</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>MI score</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
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</table>

**MI 11.1 Analysis**

The current distinct interventions are largely cost-efficient due to the efforts in the organisation to stretch resources and the tight financial controls. Delays do occur, often for valid reasons related to country context, but are not always well documented. Development Account project extension requests require approval from DA headquarters in New York.

An important contribution to resource efficiency identified in a number of documents was UNCTAD’s use of comparative advantage and synergies with development partners to keep costs low. The summary of the external evaluation of the project “Climate change impacts on coastal transport infrastructure in the Caribbean: Enhancing the adaptive capacity of Small Island Developing States” presented in the 2019 Overview of Evaluations highlights the importance of the utilisation of partners and comparative advantage in minimising costs. This utilisation of partnerships and associated leveraging of financial resources was seen to add significant value to the project. Furthermore, co-operation between partners was highlighted as particularly important in the context of a number of UNCTAD’s direct target beneficiaries (African nations and LDCs). This is illustrated in the external evaluation of UNCTAD subprogramme 3 that suggests co-operation has contributed to “greater results and cost-effectiveness”. The importance of collaboration and synergies to overall cost-effectiveness was further underlined in the 2019 Synthesis of the five subprogramme evaluations and update on the status of implementation of recommendations. This report acknowledged that UNCTAD had achieved substantial results with the given budget. Further co-operation and identification of synergies were identified as a common idea for improvements in efficiency.
UNCTAD has taken several measures aimed at improving resource efficiency, particularly in regard to capacity building and technical assistance activities. For example, there has been a push to provide more regional-level training than national-level as this has the capability to reach more stakeholders for similar costs. However, there is also an acknowledgement of the risks of decreased beneficiary numbers with this approach. Similarly, UNCTAD has migrated a number of its technical assistance training activities from being solely provided in a face-to-face setting to being a mixture of face-to-face and online, which has reduced costs.

The meta-analysis of six programme evaluations and 23 final project evaluations in 2018 demonstrated that the third-highest number of recommendations from evaluations relate to implementation (including allocation of resources).

**MI 11.1 Evidence confidence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 11.2: Implementation and results assessed as having been achieved on time (given the context, in the case of humanitarian programming)</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MI rating</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
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<td>MI score</td>
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</table>

Given the lack of performance tracking, the extent of timeliness is difficult to assess. The evidence from project evaluations indicates that time extensions are frequent. While these are often valid and related to country context, the delays are not well documented or analysed. Interviews with project-level staff included frequent references to delays experienced, often as a result of country contexts such as elections and changing budget allocations or priorities. Security situations also affected time schedules.

Numerous results-specific documents commended projects for their timely completion (documents 101, 224, 187, 197, 107 and 116). Some projects suffered delays due to a number of factors including lack of financial resources and external limitations (documents 102, 101 and 72). Some projects also showed improvements in timeliness and efficiency as the project progressed (documents 216 and 8). A common factor identified as impacting on timeliness was the strength of the design and frameworks of projects requiring design amendments during implementation (documents 101, 184 and 187).

**MI 11.2 Evidence confidence**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source document</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8, 10, 39, 42, 49, 54, 62, 68, 69, 72, 77, 81, 84, 98, 100, 109, 133, 125</td>
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KPI 12: Results are sustainable

The 2016 Conference outcome document Nairobi Maafikiano provides an overview on how the three pillars of UNCTAD will contribute to strengthening the enabling environment for trade and development. The evaluation results demonstrate that UNCTAD does deliver results that contribute towards institutional and policy change. The ASYCUDA and DMFAS evaluations in particular note the extent to which respective member states contribute their own resources to implementation and continuation of operations and how these operations result in broader policy and institutional change; although the extent of results is variable. It is also difficult to assess the extent to which UNCTAD’s capacity building activities have actually resulted in increased and sustained capacities. Evaluations continue to recommend more effort to build and sustain capacity.

Evaluations often refer to the strength of UNCTAD in using collaboration to engage partners and to encourage the uptake of TC support. One example is a Development Account project that engaged with business schools globally in partnership with Empretec and the Sustainable Stock Exchange to embed social impact investment in the development activities of 270 business schools. The investment in capacity development is seen as a contribution to sustainable outcomes, where knowledge and capacity have been built. Out of the 12 project evaluations reviewed, as well as the annual evaluation summary reviews and subprogramme evaluations, all raised concerns about the sustainability of the initiatives. The evaluators raised concerns regarding the relatively short period of intervention, the resources being spread too thinly to create sufficient momentum for sustainable change, and the need for greater connection with other initiatives and partners. In addition, evaluation recommendations suggest placing more attention on developing exit strategies in programme and project design.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 12.1: Benefits assessed as continuing or likely to continue after project programme completion or there are effective measures to link the humanitarian relief operations to recovery, to resilience and eventually to longer-term developmental results</th>
<th>Score</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MI rating</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
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For the major programmes, the benefits are likely to be sustained by the country. The mid-term review of DMFAS in 2018 noted some differences in the extent to which the benefits are sustained. The adoption of the DMFAS system was found to be cost-efficient and for that reason is likely to be sustained as government understand the financial benefits in continuing with the system. The data summarised in the MTR demonstrates that those countries that continue to implement the DMFAS system show positive debt coverage and quality, debt data reporting and analysis. Nonetheless, the MTR found that some countries have found it easier to sustain the system than others. It also found that a few of the advanced countries with a more complex structure of borrowing may decide that DMFAS does not cover all their requirements and instead look for commercial-linked systems. Others remain strongly dependent on UNCTAD for continuing support.

Project evaluations of smaller projects do not rate sustainability as high. There is generally little information on how projects are to be sustained, other than identifying the need for follow-on funding. In particular, there are a number of pilot projects but a lack of mechanisms for replication and scale-up identified both within projects and within divisional planning.

| MI 12.1 Evidence confidence | High confidence |

| MI 12.1 Evidence confidence |

7, 8, 10, 15, 39, 42, 49, 50, 53, 54, 58, 59, 68, 69, 70, 72, 76, 77, 78, 81, 84, 86, 97, 100, 117, 125, 126, 136, 140
### MI 12.2: Interventions assessed as having built sufficient institutional and/or community capacity for sustainability, or have been absorbed by government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MI 12.2 Analysis</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tr>
<td>The type of programmes supported by UNCTAD are largely designed to build institutional capacity and have a proven track record in doing this.</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
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<td>Smaller projects also often have an institutional change objective, and these have variable results in terms of how well these objectives have been achieved. The evaluations note that this is often related to the extent to which resources are available and also relies on a political environment that has resulted in changes in personnel or priorities. One example where there is a clear positive result in institutional capacity for sustainability is in a Development Account project Promoting Business Models for Sustainable Development. This was carried out in partnership with business school associations and social impact networks. The project was also co-branded with the UNCTAD Emretec and Sustainable Stock Exchange initiatives. This created co-ownership of the project and embedded the focus on impact investing within the partner organisations.</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
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<td>The OIOS assessment of UNCTAD in 2015 noted that it is difficult to assess the extent to which UNCTAD's extensive capacity building activities have actually resulted in increased and sustained capacities. There is no doubt that UNCTAD implements a number of activities with the intention of improving capacities and has largely met their implementation targets.</td>
<td>Source document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was some evidence in the form of beneficiary surveys and flow-on activities that UNCTAD's interventions are having a positive effect. The most frequently cited outcome of UNCTAD capacity building activities was action on policy and framework development. This was followed by improvements in awareness and knowledge levels, improved national and institutional training capacities, and the creation of tools and the capacities to use them to tackle development issues.</td>
<td>3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 39, 43, 46, 48, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 68, 70, 72, 73, 76, 77, 78, 81, 86, 97, 98, 100, 125, 126, 136, 140</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluations often refer to the strength of UNCTAD in using collaboration to engage partners and to encourage the uptake of TC support. For instance, the aforementioned Promoting Business Models for Sustainable Development project succeeded in embedding social impact investment in the development activities of 270 business schools. The investment in capacity development is seen as a contribution to sustainable outcomes, where knowledge and capacity have been built.</td>
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<tr>
<td>However, capacity building effectiveness still remains as a recommendation in a number of documents, especially in terms of strengthening capacities at the national and institutional levels as opposed to the individual specifically involved in the intervention.</td>
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### MI 12.2 Evidence confidence

| High confidence |
**MI 12.3: Interventions assessed as having strengthened the enabling environment for development**

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<td>MI rating</td>
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<td>MI score</td>
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**MI 12.3 Analysis**

The UNCTAD strategic document *From Actions to Results: Implementation of the Nairobi Maafikiano In a Changing Environment (2017)* outlines how UNCTAD aims to take stock of the growing relevance of UNCTAD’s work given both the UN’s reform focus on integrated policy advice on the global enabling environment and the need for SDG financing advice. It sets out directions for UNCTAD’s work to provide greater thought leadership to UN country teams through intensifying partnerships with the UN development system.

Much of the evidence for strengthening the enabling environment in results reports and evaluations relates to activities that are linked to collaboration and co-operation between UNCTAD member states. Although policy building through research and consensus are not within the scope of evidence collection, the link between TC and the other UNCTAD pillars is consistently referred to as a positive factor supporting the enabling environment for TC activities to occur, particularly in the Review of TC Activities of UNCTAD and Their Financing for the Working Party on the Strategic Framework and Programme Budget in 2019.

The 2019 Review of TC highlights the work that has been done in carrying out peer reviews of competition and consumer protection law. Voluntary peer reviews are conducted with intergovernmental groups of experts convened by UNCTAD that then lead to specific country action plans, e.g. in Morocco in 2018. The lessons from the TC implementation helps to feed back into research and policy analysis that contributes to the enabling environment for improved competition and consumer protection legislation. Another example of linked TC work that contributes to a wider enabling environment is where the Division on International Trade and Commodities and the Division on Technology and Logistics worked jointly on the Liner Shipping Bilateral Connectivity Index. The Index is designed to have wide application across multiple countries to understand their shipping connectivity profile and opportunities to strengthen national and cross-boundary maritime connectivity. The Index is a contribution towards pro-development transportation policies.

**MI 12.3 Evidence confidence**

Medium confidence
Annex 2. List of documents

All document listed below are UNCTAD publications or official open access access documents, unless indicated otherwise.

1. UNCTAD (2016), *From Decision to Action: Moving towards an inclusive and equitable global economic environment for trade and development* [outcome document of the 14th UNCTAD quadrennial conference], United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
2. UNCTAD (2017), *From Actions to Results: Implementation of the Nairobi Maafikiano in a Changing Environment* [provides strategic direction to the Secretariat]
3. UNCTAD (2019), *Draft UNCTAD programme plan and performance information for the year 2020 (part II of the proposed programme budget)*, Trade and Development Board
4. UNCTAD, (2013), *UNCTAD fundraising strategy for TC activities*
6. UN Secretariat (2018), Message on management reform from USGs [relating to the Secretary-General’s reform agenda]
7. UNCTAD (2018), *Report of the Trade and Development Board on its sixty-fifth session, part II*
9. UNCTAD (2018), *Midterm review of the Nairobi Maafikiano*
10. UNCTAD (2018), Review of the technical cooperation activities of UNCTAD and their financing, Annex 1: Review of activities undertaken in 2017, report by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD
11. UNCTAD (2018), Organigramme
12. UN (n.d.), Checklist for Mainstreaming Gender Equality and Women’s Economic Empowerment in TC Projects, United Nations
13. UNCTAD (2019), Gender Task Force
15. UNCTAD (2017), SWAP reporting
16. UNCTAD (n.d.), Implementing Partners Guideline
17. UNCTAD (2018), Launch of due diligence guidelines for partnerships (memo)
18. UNCTAD (2018), Due diligence framework
19. UNCTAD (n.d.), UNCTAD Toolbox Delivering Results
20. UNCTAD (n.d.), TC project document
21. UNCTAD (2018), Project manager handbook, TC projects (for internal use)
22. UNCTAD (n.d.), Project clearance checklist (for new and repeated projects)
23. UNCTAD (2018), New TC directives and project document templates [memo]
25. UNCTAD (2017), UNCTAD minimum requirements for RBM
26. UNCTAD (n.d.), UNCTAD-led RBM workshops
27. UNCTAD (2016), TC Results Framework
29. UNGA (2018), Programme performance report of the United Nations for the biennium 2016-2017, report of the Secretary-General
30. UNCTAD (2018), *IMDIS biennial closure/UNCTAD PPR 2016-2017*
32. UNCTAD (2017), *Guidelines for Evaluation Plans in Project Documents*
33. UNCTAD (n.d.), Evaluation report template
34. UNCTAD (2011), UNCTAD evaluation policy
35. UNCTAD (2018), Meta-analysis of evaluation reports 2011-2017
37. OIOS (2019), Evaluation of the United Nations entities’ preparedness, policy coherence, and early results associated with their support to Sustainable Development Goals
38. UNCTAD (2019), The DMFAS Programme: Answers to Donors FAQs
40. UNCTAD (2018), DMFAS Programme Annual Report 2017
41. UNCTAD (2018), Summary of the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the DMFAS Programme
42. UNCTAD (2017), Conclusions of the 11th DMFAS Advisory Group Meeting
43. UNCTAD (2019), The DMFAS Programme: An Overview
44. UNCTAD (2018), Risk Management in the DMFAS Programme
45. UNCTAD (n.d.), DMFAS Programme Strategic Plan 2016-2019
46. UNCTAD (n.d.), Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2018-2019, Subprogramme Plan
47. UNCTAD (n.d.), DIAE Workplan 2018-2019
48. UNCTAD (n.d.), DIAE TC Offers [from UNCTAD Toolbox]
49. UNCTAD (2019), DMFAS Programme Annual Report 2018
50. UNCTAD (2018), UNCTAD Annual Report 2018 Highlights
51. UNCTAD (2019), Review of the TC Programmes and their Financing
52. UNCTAD SDG Pulse (2019), UNCTAD Empretec – Inspiring Entrepreneurship
53. UNCTAD SDG Pulse (2019), UNCTAD Train for Trade – Strengthening Knowledge for Sustainable Economic Development
54. UNCTAD SDG Pulse (2019), UNCTAD DMFAS Programme – Strengthening Debt Management in Support of Good Governance
55. UNCTAD (2019), Compendium 2019: Case Studies ASYCUDA Programme
56. UNCTAD (2019), UNCTAD Trade, Gender and Development Programme – Online Course 2019 Statistics
59. UNCTAD (2018), E-Commerce and Digital Economy Programme Workplan for 2018-2020 [Note: Work in progress, not final document]
60. UNCTAD, Division on Technology and Logistics (2018), Review of Technical Cooperation, Working Party on the Strategic Framework and Programme Budget 78th Session
61. UNCTAD (2019), ASYCUDA in Action: Compendium 2019, United Conference on Trade and Development
63. OIOS (2017), Audit of Technical Cooperation Projects in the Division on Investment and Enterprise at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
65. OIOS (2017), Audit of TC Projects in the Division on Investment and Enterprise at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
66. OIOS (2017), Audit of the Use of Consultants at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
68. OIOS (2015), Audit of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Special Unit on Commodities
70. UNCTAD (2019), Synthesis of the five subprogramme evaluations and update on the status of implementation and recommendations, Trade and Development Board
88. UNCTAD (2018), DIAE Results and Impacts Report 2018
89. UNCTAD/R. Guerrero (2018), Development Account Project 1415O Climate change impacts of coastal transport infrastructure in the Caribbean Project Evaluation Report
93. UNCTAD (2019), Note on Selected Administrative and Financial Arrangements in the UNCTAD Secretariat (in connection with MOPAN KPIs 1,3,4 and 7)
94. UNCTAD (2019), UN Reform Update
95. UNCTAD (2019), Overall Alignment
96. UNCTAD (2019), 10 Minimum RBM Requirements
97. UNCTAD (n.d.), Frequently Asked Questions [RBM]
98. UNCTAD (2016), Results-Based Management for UNCTAD TC, Guidelines for Project Planning
100. UNCTAD Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (2019), Independent Evaluation of the Project “eTrade for all”
101. UNCTAD Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (2019), Independent Project Evaluation: “Supporting Member states in developing and launching sustainable product export strategies through national sustainable product export reviews (Development Account project 1415L)”
102. UNCTAD (2018), Independent Project Evaluation of the Development account project 1415O Climate change impacts on coastal transport infrastructure in the Caribbean: Enhancing the adaptive capacity of Small island Developing States
103. UNCTAD (2016), Report on Individual DRT-F Policy Initiative – Albania
107. UNCTAD (2013), Improvement of the Indirect Taxation’s Operational Capacity through the Full Implementation of the ASYCUDA World: 1st Progress Report (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
108. UNCTAD (2013), Improvement of the Indirect Taxation’s Operational Capacity through the Full implementation of the ASYCUDA World: 2nd Progress Report (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
109. UNCTAD (2013), Improvement of the Indirect Taxation’s Operational Capacity through the Full Implementation of the ASYCUDA World: 3rd Progress Report (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
110. UNCTAD (2013), Improvement of the Indirect Taxation’s Operational Capacity through the Full Implementation of the ASYCUDA World: 4th Progress Report (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
111. UNCTAD (2013), Improvement of the Indirect Taxation’s Operational Capacity through the Full Implementation of the ASYCUDA World: Final Report (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
114. UNCTAD (2017), Formalization of Small Businesses in El Salvador: Third Quarterly Report
117. UNCTAD (2017), Formalization of Small Businesses in El Salvador: Sixth Quarterly Report
118. UNCTAD (2018), Formalization of Small Businesses in El Salvador: Seventh Quarterly Report
120. UNCTAD (2015), Strengthening Competition and Consumer Protection Enforcement Capacities in Ethiopia: Progress Performance Report
121. UNCTAD (2016), Strengthening Competition and Consumer Protection Enforcement Capacities in Ethiopia: Progress Performance Report
122. UNCTAD (2017), Strengthening Competition and Consumer Protection Enforcement Capacities in Ethiopia: Progress Performance Report
123. UNCTAD (2018), Strengthening Competition and Consumer Protection Enforcement Capacities in Ethiopia: Progress Performance Report
127. UNCTAD/SECO/UN (n.d.), Trade Cluster Project in Tanzania Completion Note
128. Ministry of Industry Trade and Investment (n.d.), UN Tanzania, Swiss Confederation and UN Inter-agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity, “Tanzania UN Trade Cluster Programme: Highlights from Tanzania”
142. UNCTAD (2018), ILO led Green jobs Joint Programme: Zambia project: Progress Performance Report, 2018
143. UNCTAD (2017), Trust Fund Project Document: EU-UNCTAD Joint Programme for Angola for Trade II
145. UNCTAD/European Union (2017), EU-UNCTAD Joint Programme for Angola: Train for Trade II – Annex V: Request for payment for contribution agreement with an international organisation
146. UNCTAD (2019), Review of the technical cooperation activities of UNCTAD and their financing: Report by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD – Annex I: Review of activities undertaken in 2018*
147. UNCTAD (2019), Review of the technical cooperation activities of UNCTAD and their financing: Report by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD – Annex II: Statistical tables
148. UNCTAD (2016), UNCTAD Project Review Committee – Terms of Reference
149. UNCTAD (n.d.), Internal Delegation of Authority (RMS Note)
150. UNCTAD Secretary-General (n.d.), Note to Jan Beagle Under-Secretary-General for Management Strategy Policy and Compliance
151. UNCTAD (n.d.), Note on Internal Delegation of Authority
152. UN (2019), Interoffice Memorandum: Promulgation of Service Provider(s) Arrangements for United Nations Secretariat Entities
154. JIU (2015), Review of Activities and Resources Devoted to Address Climate Change in the United Nations System organisations
156. Dep. Sec-Gen Isabelle Durant (2018), Letter to Counsellor Mr. Edouard Jay outlining UNCTAD policy on Sexual exploitation and abuse of authority in the workplace
158. UN Secretariat (2016), Information Circular: Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Framework of the United Nations Secretariat
159. UN Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (2019), Risk Catalogue: Risk Universe and Definitions
161. UNCTAD (2019), Monthly dashboard of project / situation of client institutions (Excel spreadsheet)
164. UNCTAD (n.d.), Results Framework – Enterprise
165. UNCTAD (n.d.), Results Framework – Commodities
166. UNCTAD (n.d.), Results framework – Competition and Consumer Protection Programme
167. UNCTAD (n.d.), Results Framework – Creative Economy
168. UNCTAD (n.d.), Results Framework – Trade Negotiations and Commercial Diplomacy
169. UNCTAD (n.d.), Results Framework – Trade Facilitation
170. UNCTAD (n.d.), Results Framework – Transport Section
171. UNCTAD (n.d.), Roll-out of RBM for Technical Cooperation: Expected Results
174. UNCTAD (n.d.), Result Based Management Strategy for UNCTAD Trade Facilitation Section
181. UNCTAD (2018), Trade and Development Board Working Party on the Strategic Framework and the Programme Budget, Seventy-sixth session, Funding mechanism for pending TC requests received by UNCTAD
182. MOPAN (n.d.), “MOPAN questions on partnerships”;– KPI 6 notes
183. SECO/UN Cluster Tanzania (2015), Progress Performance Report, 2015
184. SECO/UN Cluster Tanzania (2016), Progress Performance Report, 2016
185. SECO/UN Cluster Tanzania (2017), Progress Performance Report, 2017
186. SECO/UN Cluster Tanzania (2018), Progress Performance Report, 2018
188. UNCTAD/UN Zambia Green Jobs Programme (2012), Final Joint Programme Narrative Report Inception Phase
189. UNCTAD (n.d.), Average number of days for completion of requests in the Trust Fund Documents System
Annex 3. Results of the 2019 MOPAN external partner survey

The online survey was administered by MOPAN and was conducted over a period of 3 weeks, starting on the 15 October and closing on the 6 November.

**Number of respondents:** 65  
**Sample size:** 206  
**Survey response rate:** 32%

This annex displays survey results by respondents groups. Two groups have been considered, clients of the technical co-operation (TC) pillar including in particular government partners, and other partners of TC including for example partner agencies and donor partners. Besides clearly separating the feedback from clients, this grouping allows respecting the confidentiality of responses that would have been compromised by a more granular breakdown given the sample size.

**Respondent profile:**

- TC clients: 65 respondents
- Other partners: 11 respondents

**Geographical coverage:**

The geographical coverage shows the number of respondents per country, with a breakdown into single country, regional or multi-country, and global. The percentages for each category are as follows:

- A single country: 39%
- Regional or multi-country: 48%
- Global: 13%

Countries with number of respondents:

- Albania: 0
- Angola: 2
- Benin: 6
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 8
- El Salvador: 4
- Equatorial Guinea: 4
- Ethiopia: 4
- Rwanda: 8
- Tanzania: 2
- Turkmenistan: 8
- Zambia: 0

**Number of respondents:** 0 2 4 6 8 10
STAFFING

UNCTAD has sufficient staffing to deliver results

UNCTAD has sufficiently skilled and experienced staff

UNCTAD has sufficient continuity of staff to build relationships

UNCTAD’s staff can make critical strategic and programming decisions locally

INTERVENTIONS (programmes, projects, normative work)

UNCTAD’s interventions fit national programmes and results of partner countries

UNCTAD’s interventions are tailored to the needs of the local context
UNCTAD has a clear understanding of its comparative advantage

UNCTAD is adaptive to changes in context

UNCTAD is realistic in its assessment of national and regional capacities

UNCTAD appropriately manages risk in a given context

UNCTAD’s interventions are implemented to sustain impact over time

Excellent  Very good  Fairly good  Fairly poor  Very poor  Extremely poor  Don’t know / No opinion
**INTERVENTIONS (cross-cutting issues and familiarity)**

**Familiarity with the gender strategy of UNCTAD**

- TC clients
- Other partners

**Familiarity with the environmental sustainability strategy of UNCTAD, including addressing climate change**

- TC clients
- Other partners

**Familiarity with the strategy of UNCTAD setting out how it intends to engage with promoting good economic governance**

- TC clients
- Other partners

**Familiarity with the strategy of UNCTAD setting out how it intends to take forward its policy commitment on human rights**

- TC clients
- Other partners

**INTERVENTIONS (cross-cutting issues and organisational performance)**

**UNCTAD promotes gender equality**

- TC clients
- Other partners
UNCTAD promotes environmental sustainability and addresses climate change

UNCTAD promotes principles of good governance

UNCTAD promotes human rights

MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS

UNCTAD prioritises working in synergy and partnerships

UNCTAD shares key information with partners on an ongoing basis

UNCTAD uses regular review points with partners to identify challenges
UNCTAD’s organisational procedures are synergised with partners

UNCTAD provides high quality inputs to country or regional dialogue

UNCTAD’s views are well respected in country or regional policy dialogue

UNCTAD conducts mutual assessments of progress with national and regional partners

UNCTAD channels resources through country systems as the default option

UNCTAD builds capacity in countries where systems are not up to the required standard

EXCELLENT  VERY GOOD  FAIRLY GOOD  FAIRLY POOR  VERY POOR  EXTREMELY POOR  DON’T KNOW / NO OPINION

TC clients

Other partners

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

EXCELLENT  VERY GOOD  FAIRLY GOOD  FAIRLY POOR  VERY POOR  EXTREMELY POOR  DON’T KNOW / NO OPINION

TC clients

Other partners

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
UNCTAD’s organisational procedures do not cause delays for implementing partners

UNCTAD’s knowledge products are useful for my work

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

UNCTAD prioritises a results-based approach

UNCTAD uses robust performance data when designing and implementing interventions

UNCTAD bases its policy and strategy decisions on robust performance data

![Chart showing survey results for UNCTAD's organisational procedures](chart1.png)

![Chart showing survey results for UNCTAD's knowledge products](chart2.png)

![Chart showing survey results for UNCTAD's prioritisation of a results-based approach](chart3.png)

![Chart showing survey results for UNCTAD's use of robust performance data](chart4.png)

![Chart showing survey results for UNCTAD's basis on robust performance data](chart5.png)
EVIDENCE BASE FOR PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING

UNCTAD clearly states which of its interventions must be evaluated

Where required, UNCTAD ensures that evaluations are carried out

UNCTAD participates in joint evaluations at the country and regional levels

UNCTAD intervention designs contain a statement on the evidence base

UNCTAD identifies under-performing interventions

UNCTAD addresses any under-performing areas of intervention

Excellent Very good Fairly good Fairly poor Very poor Extremely poor Don't know / No opinion
UNCTAD follows up evaluation recommendations systematically

UNCTAD learns lessons from experience rather than repeating the same mistakes

Legend:
- Excellent
- Very good
- Fairly good
- Fairly poor
- Very poor
- Extremely poor
- Don’t know / No opinion
For any questions or comments, please contact:
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