

**MOPAN**

**Multilateral Organisations Performance  
Assessment Network**

Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,  
The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,  
Switzerland and The United Kingdom

## **The Annual MOPAN Survey 2007 Donor Perceptions of Multilateral Partnership Behaviour at Country Level**

**This Survey covers**

**The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),  
The World Health Organization (WHO), and  
The African Development Bank (AfDB)**

**Synthesis Report**

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Network members are the Governments of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

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## **FOREWORD**

*It gives us great pleasure to present the Synthesis Report of the fifth MOPAN Annual Survey. The MOPAN Annual Survey is becoming increasingly well established as an instrument for constructive dialogue with multilateral organisations and MOPAN members at headquarters and at country level.*

*The Annual Survey provides periodic perceptual assessments by bilateral agency staff of the partnership behaviour of multilateral organisations at country level. In its process and outcomes the Survey aims to improve understanding, dialogue and strengthened coordination and cooperation between multilaterals, MOPAN members and their embassy and country office staff. The Annual Survey seeks to support both the Monterrey Consensus and contribute to the implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.*

*The Annual Survey is designed to be a light and rapid exercise drawing from perceptions of MOPAN members' embassy and country office staff. It gathers and analyses perceptions of the behaviour of multilaterals in their partnerships and interactions with national stakeholders and other development cooperation agencies at the country level. MOPAN members review the Annual Survey and its methodology on a yearly basis taking into account views provided by MOs who have already been assessed. Since inception in 2003 we consider the Annual Survey to be increasingly robust and increasingly adding value to the wide range of information available on multilateral performance.*

*This year, the Annual Survey covered three institutions – the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization, and the African Development Bank (AfDB). It was conducted in ten countries: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia and Zambia. Country reports and individual questionnaires were produced by MOPAN country teams in all ten countries, resulting in this Synthesis Report.*

*The Annual Survey 2007 demonstrates the wide qualities and value that the three multilaterals bring to partnerships at country level. It also notes areas where MOPAN*

*country staff believe there can be more improvement. MOPAN members look forward to discussing these findings with the UNDP, WHO and AfDB, and we trust that this information will be of use.*

*A recent meeting of MOPAN members highlighted that there existed a range of approaches to assessing multilateral effectiveness among donor organisations beyond the MOPAN annual surveys. It was further acknowledged that the Network should explore the scope for harmonising these approaches and other collaborative work.*

*Finally, we would like to take this opportunity to thank all the multilaterals involved and their country representations for their engagement and constructive reaction to the Survey. We also wish to express our deepest gratitude to all staff in the MOPAN embassies and country offices for their active involvement in this year's exercise, and finally the consultants' group for their support in producing the MOPAN Annual Survey 2007 Synthesis Report.*

*The MOPAN Members Headquarters Group*

*Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom*

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## Acronyms and definitions

### Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
CCA	Common Country Assessment
HDR	Human Development Report
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOPAN	Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network
MO	Multilateral Organisation
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RC	Resident Coordinator
SWAp	Sector-wide approach
TA	Technical advice
TCPR	Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review of UN System Operational Activities for Development
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
WHO	World Health Organization

### Definitions

Annual MOPAN Survey	MOPAN member embassy and country office perceptions of MO partnership behaviour towards national stakeholders on the one hand and other international development agencies on the other form the basis for the Annual MOPAN Survey. The Survey is conducted with the help of a questionnaire and country reports; each year it covers a sample of 3 to 4 different MOs and is carried out in 8 to 10 varying countries.
Country reports	Reports drafted by MOPAN country teams on the partnership behaviour of the selected MOs at the country level based on questionnaire responses and discussions amongst the respective country team members.
MOPAN country teams (CT)	Consist of MOPAN member embassy and country office representatives present in the respective countries of the Survey.
MOPAN HQ Group	Steering body composed of representatives from the headquarters of each MOPAN member (Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and The United Kingdom), and under which the Annual MOPAN Survey is carried out.
Paris Declaration	The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 stipulates a range of measures to improve the effectiveness of international development cooperation.
Partnership performance	Defined as quality of partnership behaviour towards national stakeholders and other international development agencies of the surveyed MO.
Synthesis Report (SR)	The final product of the Survey, which draws on both the country reports and the aggregated questionnaire responses.

## The Annual MOPAN Survey at a glance

**MOPAN:** MOPAN is a network of like-minded donor countries with a common interest in (i) sharing information and mutually drawing on experience in the monitoring and assessment of the work and performance of multilateral organisations (MOs); (ii) conducting annual surveys on MOs through their embassies and country offices (the Annual MOPAN Survey); and (iii) carrying out joint evaluations of MOs.

**The Annual MOPAN Survey:** The focus of the Survey is on MO partnership behaviour towards national stakeholders (governments, NGOs, private sector) in developing countries as well as towards other international development agencies. It is based on the *perceptions* of MOPAN member embassies and country offices, arising from their day-to-day interactions with MOs. The Survey is not an evaluation and, therefore, does not cover actual development results on the ground. Its purpose is *to contribute to* (i) better information about and understanding of MOs, their roles and performance, among decision-makers, parliamentarians and the general public in MOPAN member countries; (ii) a more informed dialogue with MOs at both headquarters and country level; (iii) the involvement of MOPAN embassies and country offices in the surveying of multilateral cooperation; and (iv) the improvement of overall MO performance at country level.

### What is MOPAN?

MOPAN is a group of like-minded donors that in 2003 jointly began to survey the partnership behaviour of MOs at country level. Current members are Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and The United Kingdom.

The Survey is designed as a light and rapid exercise with minimal transaction costs. Covering a sample of 3 to 4 MOs in 8 to 10 countries each year, it is based on the completion by each participating MOPAN member embassy/country office of a *questionnaire on each of the MOs covered by the Survey*, followed by *discussions of the questionnaire responses* among MOPAN members (country teams). Based on these discussions, the country teams establish *country reports* that they share and discuss with the respective surveyed MO country offices, and which, together with the aggregated questionnaire responses, feed into a *Synthesis Report*. The MOPAN HQ Group presents the SR to the relevant MOs at their headquarters, after which MOPAN members post it on their websites alongside any written comments received by the MOs concerned.

Since 2003, MOPAN has carried out four Surveys on selected MOs in countries in which MOPAN members are present. So far, the Surveys have included: the World Bank, WHO and UNICEF (pilot exercise in 2003); UNDP, FAO, and the African Development Bank (AfDB) in 2004; the World Bank, UNFPA and the UNAIDS Secretariat (2005); and UNICEF, ILO and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2006. In 2007, the three MOs assessed are UNDP, WHO and AfDB.

MOPAN members use the findings of the Surveys for their own accountability on multilateral financing and as input: (a) into their policy towards the MOs concerned; (b) to strengthen their participation in the governance of these MOs; (c) for their joint advocacy work; and (d) to contribute to wider debates on aid effectiveness.

### Key features of Survey:

- Joint annual in-house survey
- Perceptions of MO partnership behaviour in developing countries
- Rapid, lightweight methodology with low transaction costs
- Covers 3-4 MOs in 8-10 countries each year
- 8-10 country reports
- 1 Synthesis Report
- High-level dialogue with MOs on Survey findings
- Survey results are used for accountability, policy making and joint advocacy

**Partnership behaviour matters for aid effectiveness:** Aid effectiveness depends as much on *how* donors deliver aid as *what* is delivered, and increasing emphasis has been placed for some time on partnerships at country level. Accordingly, the Survey covers MO contributions to national policy dialogue, advocacy and capacity development, their alignment with national poverty reduction strategies, and their contribution to information sharing, aid coordination and donor harmonisation. The Survey thus provides valuable information about the perceived quality of multilateral aid and the coherence of practice with international commitments such as those of the Rome and Paris Declarations and the T CPR of Operational Activities of the UN Development System. As such, it serves as an indirect measure of MO contributions to poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs.

**Survey coordination and management:** The Survey is carried out under the MOPAN HQ Group, composed of representatives from the headquarters of each MOPAN member. The MOPAN Secretariat plays an administrative and orchestrating role for the Survey. Austria is heading the Secretariat in 2007.

## **1. INTRODUCTION TO THE ANNUAL MOPAN SURVEY 2007**

1.1 The Annual MOPAN Survey 2007 was carried out in 10 countries: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia and Zambia. The three MOs covered by the Survey were the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization, and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

1.2 All 10 MOPAN members involved their embassies and country offices in the Survey. Austria and Finland participated in 4 MOPAN country teams, Norway in 6, Denmark, France, Switzerland and The United Kingdom in 7, Sweden in 8, The Netherlands in 9, and Canada in 10 country teams. On average, there were 7 MOPAN members per country team.

1.3 All 10 country teams delivered a country report. All country reports cover UNDP and WHO. AfDB is covered by all 6 African countries of the Survey.

1.4 In total, 132 questionnaires were completed (Appendix 2): 62 for UNDP (Appendix 2a), 41 for WHO (Appendix 2b) and 29 for AfDB (Appendix 2c).

1.5 The present report is a synthesis of the findings reflected in the country reports. It also refers to the responses of the aggregated questionnaires where they corroborate or further illustrate the qualitative findings of the Survey. The Synthesis Report presents verbatim quotes from the country reports, illustrating specific aspects of the reported findings.

1.6 The following chapters focus on how MOPAN country teams perceive the quality of the partnership behaviour of the three assessed MOs towards national stakeholders and other development agencies, respectively. Each chapter begins with a summary of the main Survey findings on the partnership performance of the MO in question. The UNDP chapter is longer than those on AfDB and WHO thanks to the wealth of information contained in the country reports.

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## 2. THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)

### UNDP partnership performance: main findings

UNDP has country offices in all countries of this year's Survey. The MOPAN country teams are familiar with UNDP. MOPAN member embassies and country offices have frequent contacts and bilateral meetings with UNDP. Most of them also cooperate directly with UNDP.

#### (1) Partnership behaviour towards *national stakeholders*:

**a. Policy dialogue:** The overall assessment of the UNDP contribution to national policy dialogue is positive. At times, UNDP avoids addressing politically sensitive issues or focuses more on its role as coordinator and less on making substantive contributions of its own. MOPAN country teams consider that UNDP supports civil society participation in national policy dialogue, but that it could do better.

**b. Capacity development:** The Survey reveals an inconsistent picture in terms of the UNDP contribution to capacity development of public institutions as well as government ownership. The perception that UNDP often remains directly responsible for project management is considered a major weakness as it limits capacity development and ownership of national partner institutions. The perceptions of the quality of UNDP technical advice are overall positive. Country teams were not able, for lack of information, to judge the UNDP contribution to capacity development of NGOs and the private sector.

**c. Advocacy:** Overall, the country teams acknowledge the UNDP advocacy work. While it seems to be good at supporting government campaigns, UNDP itself does not seem to play a very visible advocacy role.

**d. Alignment with national poverty reduction strategies, policies and procedures:** UNDP is felt to be very supportive of national poverty reduction strategies. While its own programmes are seen as generally well aligned with national poverty reduction strategies, it appears that UNDP has significant difficulties in aligning its business practice with national procedures. UNDP offices seem generally free to take decisions without referring back to headquarters.

#### (2) Partnership behaviour towards *other international development agencies*:

**a. Information sharing:** MOPAN country teams in general appreciate UNDP efforts undertaken in this respect. They see room for improvement with regard to briefings on visiting missions.

**b. Inter-agency coordination:** UNDP is seen as a very active and central actor in aid coordination matters, in particular with regard to inter-agency working groups. Yet, it could/should in certain cases play a more proactive role. At the operational level, the UNDP track record with regard to coordination seems to vary quite considerably from country to country. Local UNDP senior management contributions to inter-agency coordination are recognized and appreciated.

**c. Harmonisation:** UNDP appears to be an active contributor to local donor harmonisation initiatives as well as to harmonisation within the UN system. However, its participation in joint activities (joint programming and field missions) remains limited.

## **UNDP: background information**

UNDP was established in 1965 and is today the UN's global development network. The MDGs are at the centre of the organisation's strategic goals. The UN Secretary-General has entrusted UNDP to act as the coordinator of the UN system's support for achieving the MDGs. UNDP works with counterparts at the country level to set national MDG targets, establish monitoring mechanisms and mobilise public support for the MDGs. With the MDGs as point of departure, UNDP provides knowledge and advocacy to governments and to UN teams in the following practice areas:

- **Democratic Governance:** Promoting political participation and accountability at all levels of society.
- **Poverty Reduction:** Assisting countries in creating pro-poor policies and budgets as well as delivery capacity.
- **Crisis Prevention and Recovery:** Developing innovative approaches and bridging the gap between relief and long-term development.
- **Energy and Environment:** Integrating environment and resource considerations into efforts to reduce poverty.
- **HIV/AIDS:** Mobilising leaders, advocating against discrimination and finding ways to handle loss of human resources.

UNDP chairs the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and leads the efforts to coordinate and harmonise UN development activities in particular with regard to the implementation of the 'One-UN'. It also manages the Resident Coordinator (RC) system.

UNDP regular (core) resources amounted to US\$ 900 million in 2006. Its overall resources (core and non-core) totalled about US\$ 4 billion in the same year. Presently, UNDP has 136 offices covering 166 countries. Its headquarters are in New York. Its Executive Board includes 36 country delegations from around the world, nominated by the different regional groups. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) elect them.

## **A. UNDP at the country level**

### ***Country presence***

2.1 UNDP has country offices in all countries of this year's Survey. Based on information received from 7 MOPAN country teams (Benin, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Mali, Nicaragua, Serbia, Zambia) the number of staff in the UNDP country offices ranges from 36 in Benin to 69 in Bangladesh. On average, about four-fifths are national and one-fifth international staff members (including Junior Programme Officers).

2.2. Based on the figures provided by 7 country teams (Benin, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Egypt, Mali, Nicaragua, Serbia)<sup>1</sup>, UNDP 2006 total financial programme resources are on average around US\$ 25 million per country. The smallest country programme is in Benin (total of US\$ 16 million), while the largest country programme is in Egypt (total of US\$ 47 million). On average, around 17% of the total resources are regular (core)

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<sup>1</sup> The country reports from Ethiopia, Senegal and Zambia do not contain financial information.

resources and 83% are other (non-core) resources.<sup>2</sup> However, there are significant differences between the different country programmes. In Bolivia, Nicaragua and Egypt, over 90% of UNDP financial resources are other resources. In all other countries, the split between regular and other resources is on average 1 to 2, i.e. one-third are regular resources, two-thirds are other resources.

### ***Country programmes***

2.3 According to almost all MOPAN country reports, the UNDP country programmes aim at contributing to two broad goals: reducing poverty and achieving the MDGs on the one hand, and strengthening democratic governance on the other. A further UNDP priority is the management of the environment and of natural resources, as mentioned by 6 MOPAN country teams (Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Nicaragua, and Serbia).

2.4 In the pursuance of these goals, it appears from the MOPAN country reports that UNDP is engaged in a rather large variety of activities, ranging from gender, HIV/AIDS, crisis prevention and recovery, human rights, human security, risk management, local development, economic development, fight against hunger, ICT4D and social services.

### ***Familiarity of MOPAN country teams with UNDP***

2.5 The Survey reveals that overall the country teams are familiar with UNDP (“the most familiar and closest multilateral partner”, “substantial knowledge”, “all MOPAN partners engage with UNDP”, “almost all have medium or high knowledge”, “relatively more familiar with UNDP”, “well informed”). The aggregated questionnaire responses support these observations (see Appendix 2a). Sixty-two (of 69) participating MOPAN member embassies and country offices completed and returned the questionnaire on UNDP. Of these, 16 judged their knowledge of the organisation to be “high”, 42 (approximately two-thirds) considered it as “medium” and only three as “low”.

2.6 The MOPAN member embassies and country offices that completed the questionnaire have frequent contacts with UNDP (i.e. attend meetings in which UNDP representatives are also present). Moreover, it appears from the aggregated questionnaire responses that a clear majority of MOPAN embassies and country offices concerned have regular bilateral meetings with UNDP.

2.7 In the countries of the Survey, most responding embassies and country offices confirm that they also cooperate directly with UNDP. More than half increased their collaboration with UNDP over the last 3 years while a few reduced their direct cooperation. The most common forms of direct collaboration with UNDP are co-financing specific programmes/projects, being part of the same local coordination mechanisms, and participating in the same policy dialogue with the government.

## **B. Perceptions of UNDP partnership behaviour towards national stakeholders**

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<sup>2</sup> **Regular Resources** (formerly called core resources): Those resources that are made up of untied (unearmarked) contributions. **Other Resources**: Resources, other than regular resources, which are received for a specific programme purposes and for the provision of specific services to third parties.

## a. Policy dialogue

### **Contribution to national policy dialogue**

2.8 The overall assessment of the UNDP contribution to national policy dialogue is positive.

2.9 Most country teams express quite positive opinions: Particularly favourable are the perceptions of the country teams in Egypt (“especially strong”), Nicaragua (“significant”) and Serbia (“widely recognised”), followed by Ethiopia (“participates actively”), Bangladesh (“acknowledged and appreciated”), Benin (“mainly positive”<sup>3</sup>), Senegal (“UNDP engages in a regular policy dialogue with the government”). The aggregated questionnaire responses support these overall positive findings.

#### **Box 1: Many positive contributions to policy dialogue ...**

*“UNDP has ... become a front runner in building a kind of dialogue with official partners in Serbia: In fact, UNDP only recently initiated a process trying to gather the entire donor community around key messages to be jointly defined and conveyed to the future government.” (CT Serbia)*

*“UNDP actively supports the workings of the main Local Consultative Group (LCG) and takes active part in many LCG-dialogues ... UNDP furthermore chairs a number of LCG sub-groups.” (CT Bangladesh)*

*“UNDP plays a significant role in policy dialogue in connection with the Human Development Report and the Millennium Development Goals.” (CT Bolivia)*

*“The dialogue around last year’s election support is evaluated positively.” (CT Zambia)*

*“It also readily supports the Government’s dialogue initiatives. The UNDP thus facilitated the government–Technical and Financial Partners [donors] Round Table in Geneva (2004). It intends to play the same role at the next Round Table in late 2007.” (CT Mali)*

2.10 Three country reports (Bolivia, Mali and Zambia) reveal mixed perceptions of the UNDP contribution to policy dialogue. In addition, several country teams with a generally positive impression mention a few weak points, among them:

- In certain cases, UNDP hesitates to openly address controversial/critical policy issues in donor discussions with the government (Bolivia, Ethiopia, Mali, and Zambia); and
- At times, UNDP spends more time and energy on its role as coordinator and facilitator than on making substantive contributions of its own to policy discussions (Bangladesh, Bolivia and Ethiopia).

#### **Box 2: ...but at times UNDP avoids addressing critical issues or does not pay particular attention to its own substantive contributions.**

*“... in other areas, particularly regarding good governance, democracy and human rights, its role is seen as somewhat limited. The MOPAN country team perceives that UNDP is too focused on its role as facilitator and on raising additional funding and therefore avoids a critical dialogue. More emphasis on a policy dialogue in substance would be welcomed.” (CT Bolivia)*

*“... its role is weaker when it comes to the substance of the dialogue. UNDP sometimes tends to uncritically support government policies and [thus limits itself] ... to an observer status in multi-stakeholder dialogue... MOPAN members were disappointed when UNDP, at the peak of*

<sup>3</sup> Throughout this chapter, French quotes have been translated into English.

*political tensions in Ethiopia in November 2005, after consultations with New York, decided (as the only DAG member) not to sign a statement on the donors' reaction to human rights violations." (CT Ethiopia)*

*"By... supporting the Government in policy dialogue, UNDP does not appear overly willing to pursue the joint strategies that Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs/donors) have asked it to lead. As the leader of the gender equality working group, the UNDP has been very cautious and not very proactive, perhaps because of its particular position and/or the sensitivity of the issue." (CT Mali)*

*"In policy discussions, UNDP continues to emphasise its close relationship with the Government. This seems to reflect UNDP's perception of itself as "an honest broker". While it is recognised that UN agencies have a mandate to work closely with governments, it is important that this relationship does not detract from its ability to critically assess government policy – and to actively push for reform where necessary." (CT Zambia)*

### **Civil society participation**

2.11 Broadly speaking, **UNDP appears to support civil society participation in national policy dialogue**. A majority of the country reports (Bangladesh, Benin, Egypt, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, and Zambia) make supportive statements in this regard (e.g. "generally open", "strong", "actively supports", "considered positively", and "largely agrees").

#### **Box 3: UNDP supports the participation of civil society in policy dialogues with government...**

*"UNDP assistance to arrange 'hearings' in Parliament's standing committees during PRS-process is appreciated by the respondents." (CT Bangladesh)*

*"UNDP supports civil society in its policy dialogue with the Government of Benin. In 2007, for example, it helped Social Watch to contribute to the elaboration of the Government's Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction... It also regularly contributes to the organisation of different civil society forums. Recently, for example, it supported a forum on youth employment." (CT Benin)*

*"Examples of UNDP support to civil society include: initiative to have NGOs present their perspective at the donor round table; widespread consultation during the recent CCA-UNDAF process; support for youth leadership and youth engagement in politics..." (CT Nicaragua)*

2.12 In spite of all these positive examples of UNDP supporting the participation of civil society in policy dialogue, **MOPAN country teams are of the view that there is room for improvement**. While some country teams suggest the need to strengthen the participation of civil society in general (Bolivia, Egypt, Mali, and Nicaragua), others are of the view that the private sector should also be more involved (Bangladesh, Mali and Nicaragua).

#### **Box 4: ...but UNDP could do more to involve civil society**

*"Three members of the country team have supported a joint project between the National Electoral Court (CNE) and a civil society network (CPC) aiming at the provision of documentation cards to marginalised groups. The project was coordinated by, and the funds channelled through, UNDP. ... To the observations made by the country team members involved in this project, UNDP has not fulfilled its role in building bridges between the state institution and the civil society network, even though this was one of the main objectives of the project." (CT*

*Bolivia)*

*“There is no regular platform for dialogue between the UNDP and civil society, or any policy of support or partnership with civil society in policy dialogue.” (CT Mali)*

2.13 Only 3 country reports refer to the question related to consultations with civil society on UNDP’s own strategic and analytical work. The others seem to lack adequate information on the subject. While in Zambia there appears to be little consultation between UNDP and the civil society, the country team in Egypt notes that UNDP regularly invites human rights NGOs as well as NGOs working in the social sector to comment on UNDP’s programme. The country team in Bolivia very positively comments the UNDP initiative (in 2006) to establish a “National Council for the Dialogue between Indigenous People’s Organisations, Farmers’ Organisations and the UN system...”.

## **b. Capacity development**

### ***Capacity development of public institutions***

2.14 **The views expressed by the MOPAN country teams with regard to UNDP support for capacity development of public institutions vary considerably.** While 4 country teams voice appreciative opinions (Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nicaragua), 3 country teams are more ambivalent (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Serbia), and 2 country teams (Mali, Zambia) consider the UNDP contribution to capacity development of public institutions even as “not particularly effective”.

2.15 The opinions of the country teams also vary quite considerably with regard to UNDP capacity development support for public institutions at the central level on the one hand and the local level on the other hand. While the Nicaragua country team is of the view that UNDP plays a significant role at both levels, the Ethiopia and Bolivia country teams consider that UNDP is much more active at the central level. Others (in particular Bangladesh and Serbia) have the impression that UNDP plays a more active and effective role in capacity development at the local level.

2.16 A major weak point noted by several country teams (Bolivia, Mali, Nicaragua, Serbia, and Zambia) appears to be that UNDP often remains directly responsible for project management on behalf of the respective donors, a business practice, which in the view of the country teams in Nicaragua, Serbia and Mali, limits capacity development and ownership of national partner institutions.

#### ***Box 5: Positive examples of capacity development of public institutions...***

*“A good example is the support that UNDP provides to strengthen and modernise the capacities of the national parliament. Together with UNICEF, it helped to establish a socio-economic data base (BenInfo) for the monitoring of policies and strategies (MDGs, PRSP and sector policies). It also supported studies measuring the impact of policies on rural poverty and the social situation (land reform, 2006).” (CT Benin)*

*“UNDP’s cooperation with the Ministry of Local Government and, Rural Development on a pilot local governance project is regarded as an important input for the new Local Governance Sector Programme co-supported by the World Bank, the European Commission and Denmark.” (CT Bangladesh)*

*“Capacity building has been provided to critical institutions like the Parliament, the Ombudsman, the Human Rights Commission etc ...UNDP has been effective in developing the capacity of*

central government (and some semi-governmental bodies, such as the National Council for Human Rights); UNDP actively supports the Social Fund for Development aimed at creating jobs and improving access of the poor to public services mostly through NGOs.” (CT Egypt)

**... and some nuanced views**

“The capacity building strategy does not appear to be the best, since it follows a strictly project-based approach. This model is no doubt conducive to developing individual capacities, but not institutional capacities.” (CT Mali)

“It is perceived that UNDP is more effective in technical capacity building, but performing less on the political dimensions of strengthening local government. UNDP seems rather reluctant to take on those components that require political will.” (CT Bangladesh)

**Capacity development of NGOs and the private sector**

**2.17 It appears that most MOPAN country teams have not enough information to provide an informed judgement on UNDP support to capacity development of NGOs and the private sector.**

2.18 Those few country teams that did express views question or doubt UNDP’s ability to offer effective capacity development support to NGOs and the private sector (Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Nicaragua). Only the Mali country team mentions several positive examples, in particular the support UNDP offers to environmental NGOs, the Institutional Development Programme’s Civil Society Capacity Building Component, and the National Citizenship Education Programme. The country teams’ lack of information transpires also very clearly from the aggregated questionnaire responses, in particular with regard to UNDP’s capacity development support for the private sector.

**Government ownership**

2.19 **With regard to government ownership, the MOPAN country reports reveal an uneven picture.** While the country teams in Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali and Serbia share the view that UNDP in general seeks to promote government ownership, the country teams in Benin, Nicaragua and Zambia are of the opinion that UNDP continues to more often fund projects initiated by itself rather than proposals designed and developed by the government.

2.20 Several country teams mention specific hampering factors such as:

- influence of donor priorities and funding where UNDP depends on “non core” resources (Ethiopia, Nicaragua);
- insufficient capacities of the government to develop its own projects (Ethiopia, Nicaragua); and
- prevalence of global priorities over national ones (Zambia).

**Box 6: Strong government ownership in some cases**

“In many cases UNDP funds projects proposed by the line ministries and those that are in line with the Government national objectives.”(CT Egypt)

“The country team concluded with near-unison that UNDP mainly – and very readily - takes up government ideas and further develops them into a concrete project, in most cases in close coordination with the relevant authorities as well as potential donors.” (CT Serbia)

## **Technical advice**

2.21 **The MOPAN country teams' perceptions of UNDP technical advice are overall positive.** Several country teams (Bolivia, Egypt, Mali, Senegal, and Serbia) voice appreciative views (e.g. "technical advice in general is of a high quality", "technical advice was found good", "generally recognised as competent", "its expertise on the matter is recognised", "mostly of high quality"). The other country teams (Benin, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Zambia) express more nuanced views, positive and critical ones. In one case (Ethiopia), the country team is of the view that "UNDP plays an important role in coordinating TA, but is weaker in the implementation [of its own TA-projects]." The Bangladesh country team is of the view that "[UNDP] could improve its delivering of technical assistance", and the country team in Zambia "questions the long-term effect of short-term technical assistance".

2.22 Individual country teams raise a number of issues that may affect the quality of the technical advice provided by UNDP. They consider hampering factors to be:

- an often insufficiently transparent process for selecting and appointing consultants (Nicaragua);
- the TA is at times rather supply than demand driven (Bangladesh);
- dependence on UNOPS Bangkok for procuring international TA (Bangladesh);
- national consultants are often (ex) government officials, which may jeopardise UNDP's neutrality (Bangladesh);
- weak TORs produced by the local office (Bangladesh); and
- limited use made of UNDP's own technical capacity located in various regional centres (Zambia).

2.23 Two country teams refer to the issue of consultants' fees, however, with contradicting conclusions. While the Bangladesh country team is of the view that the remunerations for consultants are excessive, the Benin country team is of the view that the fees offered to consultants, at least for international consultants, are not sufficient to attract high quality consultants.

2.24 With regard to the appropriateness of international expertise, the country teams in Egypt, Mali and Zambia assess the use of it as "good". The country teams in Bolivia, Egypt and Nicaragua consider technical assistance provided by international consultants as "particularly appropriate". The Benin country team, however, questions the quality of the international consultants.

2.25 As to the use of national expertise, the country teams in Egypt, Mali and Zambia consider it "good", while the Benin and Serbia country teams qualify it as "adequate". Other country teams (Bolivia, Nicaragua) are of the view that UNDP could make better use of local know-how.

### **Box 7: Views on technical advice**

*"UNDP mobilised relevant international capacity to support the Electoral Commission in 2006 elections, and actively participated in building capacity of the National AIDS Council at provincial and district levels." (CT Zambia)*

*"Some [MOPAN] members find that UNDP makes good use of national technical advice, notably in relation to the elaboration of the Human Development Reports and the team working with conflict prevention/resolution. Others find, however, that UNDP only cooperates with a reduced*



*number of national consultants that do not reflect diversity of national knowledge.” (CT Bolivia)*

### c. Advocacy

2.26 **Overall, the country teams acknowledge the UNDP advocacy work.** Four country teams (Benin, Egypt, Nicaragua and Senegal) have a largely favourable opinion of UNDP performance in this respect (“relatively strong and visible”, “especially strong”, “a quite clear profile”, “important”).

2.27 In particular, several country teams (Benin, Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali and Nicaragua) consider **UNDP good at supporting government campaigns**. Other positive examples mentioned include:

- UNDP advocacy work in relation to National Human Development Reports (Benin, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Zambia);
- the promotion of the MDGs (Bolivia, Egypt, Zambia);
- the high quality of UNDP publications (Egypt); and
- UNDP advocacy role, especially in the area of poverty reduction (Serbia).

#### **Box 8: Good examples of proactive advocacy work...**

*“UNDP regularly supports government campaigns (e.g. the youth employment forum), and is actively involved in civil society campaigns (e.g. by Social Watch).” (CT Benin)*

*“... UNDP is visible in the media on the ongoing anti-corruption campaign. ... The UNDP publication ‘Beyond Hartals’ (2005) was recognized as an important report, which initiated a substantive debate-” (CT Bangladesh)*

*“...good visibility of the ‘Sailing the Nile’ for MDGs campaign (UNDP/UNV) and HDR launching events; the UNDP is an active advocate and this is visible through media (TV and radio).” (CT Egypt)*

2.28 Six country teams (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Mali, Serbia, Zambia) observe, however, **a limited visibility of UNDP itself** (e.g. “not very visible”, “does not play a very high-profile advocacy role”, “not a leader”). Two country teams (Bolivia, Nicaragua) state that UNDP could and should play a more active and more visible advocacy role. Other country teams (Ethiopia, Mali, and Serbia) are of the opinion that UNDP at times prefers not to address certain issues in public. The Ethiopia country team for example is of the view that “UNDP often adopts a ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach, which ... makes the UNDP role less visible”, while for the Serbia country team: “UNDP seems to direct its advocacy activities more towards institutions than to the general public... UNDP has (thus) less public visibility in key debates than for example the EU or the OSCE.” In one case (Zambia), the MOPAN country team has the impression that the current advocacy strategy generally does not have a clear focus in terms of core messages.

2.29 This overall mixed picture of, on the one hand, good support to government campaigns and limited visibility in some countries on the other hand is confirmed by the aggregated questionnaire responses.

2.30 **The views expressed with regard to UNDP support to civil society campaigns differ quite significantly.** In Benin, Bolivia and Egypt, on the one hand, UNDP support to civil society campaigns is recognised. In Bangladesh, Ethiopia and

Zambia, on the other hand, the perceptions are that UNDP does not actively support civil society campaigns.

**Box 9: ... and some perceived weaknesses**

*“... when the Government questioned the indicators in the last Human Development Report, the UNDP was very low-key and avoided public debate. ... UNDP-Mali is generally seen as very cautious (perhaps too cautious) in discussing and questioning government policies.” (Mali)*

*“... to our knowledge, only very few publications are translated into national languages, with the aim to reach the majority of the population of Benin.” (CT Benin)*

**d. Alignment with national poverty reduction strategies, policies and procedures**

**Support to national poverty reduction strategies**

2.31 Nearly all MOPAN country teams (Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Nicaragua, Serbia, Zambia) consider **UNDP as very supportive of national poverty reduction strategies (PRS) or equivalent national strategies** (“most visible and active”, “strong”, “acknowledged and appreciated”, “important contribution”, “very active”, “very supportive”). The aggregated questionnaire responses support these overall positive observations: A clear majority is of the view that UNDP takes an active part in PRS discussions at central government level and that it supports a participatory process.

2.32 At the same time, however, 2 country teams (Mali, Zambia) consider UNDP participation and support to national poverty monitoring processes as weak. In addition, the Bolivia country team is of the view that although UNDP initially played an active role in the preparations for the national dialogue around the elaboration of the PRS, it could take a more active role in forums discussing the Bolivian National Development Plan.

**Box 10: Active support to the preparation of national poverty reduction strategies**

*“UNDP was actively involved in the preparation of the PRSP ... and actively supports PRS implementation mechanisms (such as the ‘Joint Committee for Monitoring the Implementation Progress of the PRS’)” (CT Bangladesh)*

*“UNDP-Mali takes part in various working groups on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Its analyses are helpful and of good quality.” (CT Mali)*

*“The UNDP has worked extensively with the ministry to prepare a poverty reduction strategy and action plan. ... UNDP has been instrumental in devising and assisting the implementation of Egypt’s Poverty Reduction Strategy and UNDP funds a poverty reduction action plan project.” (CT Egypt)*

**Alignment with national policies and procedures**

2.33 There appears to be broad consensus among country teams that **UNDP country programmes are by and large thematically well aligned with national development policies and strategies** (e.g. “well aligned”, “mostly seen as strong”, “considered to be strong”, “overall aligned”, “largely aligned”).

2.34 On the other hand, a clear majority of the country teams note that **UNDP seems to have significant difficulties in aligning its business practice with national procedures and modalities**. While 3 country teams (Egypt, Ethiopia, and Serbia) have a more nuanced opinion, all other country teams point out clear limitations and shortcomings. It seems to be a particular challenge for UNDP to:

- provide funding through government budgets (Bolivia, Egypt, Mali, Nicaragua, Serbia, Zambia);
- participate in SWAPs (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Nicaragua, Serbia, Zambia);
- contribute to banded/pooled funding (Benin, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Serbia, Zambia);
- avoid parallel project implementation units (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Serbia, Zambia);
- use government procurement systems (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Zambia); and
- adhere to government reporting procedures (Bolivia, Nicaragua, Zambia).

2.35 The reasons seen for these shortcomings are:

- internal rules, regulations and guidelines hampering alignment (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua);
- donors - including members of the MOPAN country team – favouring alternative implementation structures to government structures (Nicaragua, Serbia);
- keenness on seeking income through the administration of donor funds (Bolivia); and
- lack of clear instructions allowing UNDP to provide budgetary support (Mali).

**Box 11: Difficulties in aligning business practice**

*“The general picture is bleak and the general perception is that UNDP is slower than most donors to adopt good alignment practices with regard to financial and procurement systems, reporting etc. UNDP’s insistence on following own procedures creates parallel implementation systems.” (CT Bolivia)*

*“UNDP-Mali realises the limitations of current internal policies. The document outlining the new 2008–2012 UNDP Cooperation Framework thus notes that “one of the lessons learned from implementing the 2003–2007 programme was the difficulty of shifting from the project-based approach to the programme-based approach that other partners now favour in accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Harmonisation and the new trend toward strengthening budgetary assistance create a need for a new kind of UNDP support, for which the Mali office is being repositioned.” (CT Mali)*

**Country-level decision taking**

2.36 To the extent that MOPAN country teams have the necessary information to judge, it appears from the country reports that the **UNDP offices are generally free to take decisions without referring back to headquarters**. The country teams in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Egypt and Serbia explicitly share this view. The aggregated questionnaire responses also support it: Of those that have expressed views, a clear majority perceives the UNDP country offices to “mainly” or “occasionally” take decisions without referring back to headquarters.

## C. Perception of UNDP partnership behaviour towards other development agencies

### a. Information sharing

2.37 Most of the MOPAN country teams are of the view that **in general UNDP proactively shares information with other development agencies** (e.g. “active”, “open”, “MOPAN members are satisfied” “respond promptly”, “willing to listen”, “open approach”, “open-minded”, “readily shares information”, “contributes actively to the exchange of information”). Only 2 MOPAN country teams have an overall less favourable opinion: The Bolivia country team is of the view that “... UNDP’s performance regarding information sharing could be substantially improved”, and the Zambia country team considers that “UNDP is not (really) pro-active in making information available”.

2.38 Although the overall impression is positive, MOPAN country teams are of the view that UNDP could improve the quality of its information management mainly in two areas. Firstly, **UNDP could share more information about visiting missions** (Bolivia, Egypt, Nicaragua, Senegal and Zambia). Secondly, UNDP could seek more information about other agencies’ activities (Bolivia, Mali). The aggregated questionnaire responses confirm these views: About half of the views expressed suggest that UNDP could provide more information about visiting missions and that it could seek more information about other agencies.

### b. Inter-agency coordination

#### *Participation in local donor coordination activities*

2.39 Overall, MOPAN country teams see **UNDP as a very active and central actor with regard to coordination matters**.

2.40 Seven country teams (Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, Zambia) express positive opinions (“highly active”, “participates regularly”, “plays a very important role”, “central position” “participates in an active manner” “participates very actively”). In particular, they perceive UNDP to play an important facilitation role in inter-agency working groups. The Nicaragua country team, for example, reports that UNDP “provides the secretariat of the donor round table”. Moreover, according to the Benin country team, “UNDP has been chairing the Group of heads of missions since the end of 2006”. The aggregated questionnaire responses confirm this positive overall impression: Almost all views expressed see UNDP either “always” or “regularly” participating in local donor coordination activities.

#### **Box 12: Central role in coordination...**

*“The assessment of the UNDP is that it plays a very important role in coordination, both of policy dialogue and of TA. It co-chairs the Development Assistance Group (DAG) and hosts the DAG-secretariat.... Generally UNDP plays a key role in partnership dialogue and coordination and this is very much appreciated by the country team... The UNDP is member or observer in most donor-coordination activities/working groups and normally seeks to improve its coordination with other donors.” (CT Ethiopia)*

*“UNDP, seconded at a later stage by the World Bank, has recently assumed a central position within the development community by initiating an extensive process of jointly formulating issues*

*of common concern to be tackled by the future government. Before and beyond that, UNDP was and is very likely to be present and articulate itself in other initiatives or fields, thus establishing itself as one of the most reliable factors in development cooperation in Serbia.” (CT Serbia)*

*”UNDP takes a very active part in donor coordination in Senegal, by co-chairing the enlarged donors meeting (with the World Bank), by participating in different thematic groups, and, more generally, by facilitating reflection on the architecture of aid coordination mechanisms.” (CT Senegal)*

*”UNDP plays a crucial role in the overall coordination of the UN system in Nicaragua.” (CT Nicaragua)*

2.41 In spite of this overall positive assessment of UNDP participation in donor coordination, there appears to be **room for improvement**. On the one hand, the country reports for Bangladesh, Bolivia, Mali and Nicaragua suggest that UNDP could increase its participation in inter-agency coordination. The Bangladesh country team, for example, notes that UNDP could strengthen its coordination efforts, both in terms of UN inter-agency collaboration but also with bilateral donors. On the other hand, the country teams would at times welcome more *substantive* contributions from UNDP in specific coordination processes (Bolivia and Ethiopia). The Ethiopian country team notes that “UNDP is cautious and often trying to find a balance between government and donor positions”.

**Box 13: ...with room for improvement**

*“Many donors are of the opinion that due to its comparative advantages the UN could play a much more important role in coordination and facilitation.” (CT Nicaragua)*

*“UNDP (together with Canada) leads the coordination of government-donors Round Table 3 (on good governance) and UNDP/Canada co-lead a subgroup on support to the current Constituent Assembly process. In the latter case, UNDP primarily focused on the facilitation aspect, and rarely if ever contributed in substance to the dialogue in terms of criteria for good governance and democracy.... In another case regarding the national UNAIDS group, the participation of the UNDP focal point for HIV-AIDS has been quite poor”(CT Bolivia)*

**Coordination at the programme/project level**

2.42 **The opinions expressed in the country reports regarding UNDP efforts to coordinate at the programme/project level vary quite significantly from country to country.** While some country teams (Benin, Egypt, Serbia) express favourable views (“takes concrete steps to avoid overlaps”, “constantly seeks to improve its coordination with other donors at project/programme level and takes care to avoid overlaps with other agencies”), other country teams (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Mali) consider UNDP coordination effort at the operational level to be patchy.

**Box 14: Coordination at the programme/project level - a favourable view in Benin...**

*“UNDP tries to plan its own activities so as to reinforce those of other development partners, or at least to prevent unnecessary overlaps. UNDP coordinated a substantial part of the financial and in-kind donor contributions to the presidential elections of 2006 and legislative elections of 2007... UNDP also coordinates the interventions of non-resident United Nations agencies in Benin.” (CT Benin)*

**...and some shortcomings in other Survey countries**

*"There are some examples of projects that have been started in isolation, or were agreed upon without proper consultations." (CT Bangladesh)*

*"As an example should also be mentioned the recent humanitarian assistance to Beni, where UNDP has the mandate of coordinating the international cooperation support. In this case UNDP has had problems fulfilling its role ....As a consequence of the negative experiences with UNDP as administrator of the CNE-CPC, the UNDP handling of emergency support in 2006 and 2007, and the organisation's role of administrating funds for the National Productive Dialogue 2005, several members of the country team have actually considered cooperating less with UNDP in the future." (Bolivia)*

*"UNDP does not... [involve other actors] systematically and sometimes ... does not pay enough attention to coordination with others." (CT Mali)*

### **Contribution of local UNDP senior management**

2.43 Overall, the observations in this regard are that **the local UNDP senior management contributions to inter-agency coordination are recognized and appreciated**. Five country teams (Bangladesh, Egypt, Nicaragua, Serbia, and Zambia) explicitly express favourable views in this regard. The Bangladesh country team "recognizes and appreciates the current efforts by the new UNDP Resident Coordinator". The Nicaragua country team acknowledges the strong contributions by local UNDP senior management, but adds that "UNDP is not always involved at the adequate level of representation".

2.44 The Bolivia country team however does not think that the senior management of UNDP-La Paz makes a very significant contribution to inter-agency coordination ("some contribution", but not more).

2.45 The aggregated questionnaire responses confirm the overall positive perception: A majority of the respondents are of the view that the local senior management makes a "strong" contribution to coordination within the donor community.

#### **Box 15: A favourable view in Serbia**

*"The senior management team of UNDP in Serbia, i.e. the Resident Representative and his Deputy, is unanimously recognized as the main motor for above-mentioned achievements; since their consecutive arrivals in the past two years, UNDP has clearly gained effectiveness and recognition." (CT Serbia)*

## **c. Harmonisation**

### **Contribution to local donor harmonisation efforts**

2.46 On the whole, **UNDP is considered to actively contribute to local donor harmonization efforts** (e.g. "actively contributes", "acknowledged and appreciated", "strong", "active part", "pro-active", "good initiatives"). Only a minority (Bolivia, Mali) qualifies the UNDP contribution to local donor harmonisation as modest or insignificant.

#### **Box 16: Very active in some cases...**

*"The UNDP was very active in the preparation and follow-up of the national coordination and harmonization plan and the DAC Paris field study and continues to participate in the national*

*alignment and harmonization monitoring group.” (CT Nicaragua)*

*“UNDP carried out a meeting in early 2006 with the donor society in Egypt to share information about their activities in Egypt and harmonize with the Donors and asked for their opinions on how to improve the UN agencies performance in Egypt.” (CT Egypt)*

2.47 Although the overall assessment is positive, several country teams note some shortcomings, in particular:

- UNDP procedures which limit its ability to participate in joint activities (Benin, Ethiopia, Mali, Nicaragua);
- limited participation in joint programmes (Mali, Nicaragua, Zambia); and
- limited participation in joint field missions (Egypt, Nicaragua).

**Box 17: ... but also some shortcomings**

*“UNDP procedures can slow down important interventions. UNDP does not contribute financially to, or play an active role in the most important mechanisms for local harmonisation: PBS [Protecting Basic Services] and PSNP [Productive Safety Nets Program].” (CT Ethiopia)*

*“.. [UNDP’s establishment of the National Council for the Dialogue between Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations, Farmers’ Organizations and the UN] ... has been criticized for creating a parallel structure ... and for not being well harmonized with other donors’ activities.” (CT Bolivia)*

*“The UNDP is not a key player in efforts to harmonize TFPs [technical and financial partners]. It does take part in ongoing TFP initiatives, such as developing a joint country assistance strategy or an action plan to implement the Paris Declaration. However, it is not a central figure in these processes. Its procedures limit its participation to joint programs.” (CT Mali)*

**Harmonisation within the UN system**

2.48 According to the views expressed, **UNDP actively contributes to harmonisation within the UN system.** Most country teams note positive developments or examples (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Egypt, Mali, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, and Zambia). This positive impression is confirmed by the aggregated questionnaire responses: Almost all respondents are of the view that UNDP either makes “some” or “a strong” contribution to harmonisation within the UN system at the country level.

2.49 Positive examples mentioned by the country teams are:

- UNDP successfully coordinated the development of a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) (Bangladesh, Mali, Nicaragua);
- led a joint country analysis in the context of the Common Country Assessments (Bangladesh, Egypt); and
- the fact that the UNDP Resident Representative represents all present UN organisations in the country (Bolivia).

2.50 At the same time, 2 country teams (Bangladesh, Bolivia) note some shortcomings. The Bangladesh country team is of the view that UNDP has still a long way to go, as its staff members are still “rather protective of their own agency”. And in Bolivia, progress in harmonisation within the UN system UNDP does not seem to have led (so far) to any substantial reduction of the UN system’s transaction costs, e.g. by creating joint offices and thereby economising on administrative expenses.

**Box 18: UNDP actively contributes to harmonisation within the UN system**

*“... a huge coordination effort has been undertaken by UNDP for the preparation of the UN Assistance framework 2008 – 2012, including all UN agencies working in the country. This draft framework has been presented to the donors, which recognised the efforts of UNDP towards more harmonisation within the UN system.” (CT Nicaragua)*

*“As far as harmonisation within the UN system at country level is concerned, the country team concluded to a rather strong contribution of UNDP; the joint programming exercise with UNHCR was perceived as a good example.” (CT Serbia)*

.....



### 3. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)

#### **WHO partnership performance: main findings**

WHO has offices in all 10 countries of the Survey. With a few exceptions benefiting from a high level of information, participating MOPAN country team members have little to medium knowledge of WHO. A majority of members regularly attend meetings in which WHO representatives are also present, but less than half have bilateral meetings. The most common forms of collaboration are in the context of policy dialogue with governments and local coordination efforts.

#### **(1) Partnership behaviour towards *national stakeholders*:**

**a. Policy dialogue:** Most MOPAN country teams perceive WHO to significantly contribute to national policy dialogue in the health sector. WHO support to NGO involvement in policy dialogue, however, appears to be uneven. No country report mentions examples of private sector involvement.

**b. Capacity development:** Overall, the country reports give the impression that WHO is more effectively engaged in supporting capacity development of public institutions, mostly at the central government level, than of private institutions. Views with regard to promoting government ownership in the design and planning of the projects that WHO supports are on the positive side. MOPAN country teams unanimously appreciate the quality of WHO technical advice (TA).

**c. Advocacy:** In a majority of the Survey countries, WHO appears to play a visible and/or strong role in advocacy, mainly in partnership with governments.

**d. Alignment with national poverty reduction strategies, policies and procedures:** While MOPAN country teams have differing perceptions of WHO support to PRS or equivalent strategies, they consider that WHO country strategies, sector strategies and operational activities are thematically well aligned with national development priorities and strategies. WHO is perceived to align its business practice with national procedures and modalities in one way or another, though not uniformly across the board. Based on brief references in the country reports, it appears that WHO country offices are not systematically granted decision-making authority.

#### **(2) Partnership behaviour towards *other international development agencies*:**

**a. Information sharing:** On balance, the WHO contribution to information sharing amongst development agencies is considered to be modest.

**b. Inter-agency coordination:** While WHO appears to be actively involved in local donor coordination groups in the health sector, perceptions regarding coordination at the project/programme level are more critical. The limited information in the country reports gives a fairly positive impression of local senior management contribution to inter-agency coordination.

**c. Harmonisation:** The WHO contribution to local donor harmonisation efforts is judged to be uneven and varying within and between the countries of the Survey. Its contribution to harmonisation within the UN system is considered modest.

### **WHO: background information**

WHO was established in 1948 as a UN specialised agency. Its objective is the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health defined as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. WHO core functions are:

- Providing leadership on matters critical to health and engaging in partnerships where joint action is needed;
- Shaping the knowledge agenda and stimulating the generation, translation and dissemination of valuable knowledge;
- Setting norms and standards, and promoting and monitoring their implementation;
- Articulating ethical and evidence-based policy options;
- Providing technical support, catalysing change, and building sustainable institutional capacity; and
- Monitoring the health situation and assessing health trends.

WHO has a presence in almost 150 countries where it supports governments and engages in strategic partnerships for health and development. It also has 6 regional offices. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) serves as the WHO Regional Office for the Americas. WHO derives its income from government contributions. In the 2004-2005 biennium, WHO sources of income were: assessed (core) contributions (29%) and additional (non core) contributions (71%). The WHO headquarters are in Geneva. It is a member of the UN Development Group (UNDG) and a co-sponsor of UNAIDS.

## **A. WHO at the country level**

### ***Country presence***

3.1 WHO has offices in all 10 countries of the Survey. In Bolivia, the country team notes that WHO is additionally developing departmental offices that provide technical and financial assistance at the local level.

3.2 Of those countries where comparable financial figures are available (Benin, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mali, Nicaragua, Zambia, and Senegal), approved total programme budgets for the biennial 2006/2007 vary considerably, ranging from around US\$ 4.7 in Nicaragua and 5.6 million in Benin to US\$ 31.7 in Bangladesh and US\$ 50.8 million in Ethiopia. In all cases, the share of other resources is larger than the assessed resources.<sup>4</sup>

3.3 WHO country programmes cover the following areas: health systems, child and adolescent health, reproductive health, epidemic alert and response, immunisation and vaccine development, essential medicines, malaria, making pregnancy safer, tuberculosis, surveillance, prevention and management of non-communicable diseases, communicable disease prevention and control, HIV/AIDS, health and environment, and emergency preparedness and response.

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<sup>4</sup> Source of financial data: MOPAN country reports and WHO website [www.who.int](http://www.who.int).

## ***Familiarity with WHO***

3.4 The Survey reveals that overall the country teams have little to medium knowledge of WHO.

3.5 Half of the country teams (Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Senegal and Serbia) point out that a majority of their team members - due to insufficient information on the organisation - were not able to respond to some or all questions of the questionnaire on WHO. However, as a team, the remaining members in these 5 countries felt confident enough to provide views on the different aspects of WHO partnership performance and to include a chapter on it in their respective country reports.

3.6 Almost all participating members in these and the other countries of the Survey relied on little to medium knowledge of WHO: Questionnaires (see Appendix 2b) were returned by 41 (of 69) MOPAN embassies and country offices. Of these, 14 judge their knowledge to be “low” and 22 to be “medium”. Five MOPAN members in Bolivia, Nicaragua, Senegal and Zambia considered their knowledge “high”.

3.7 A majority of the MOPAN member embassies and country offices that completed the questionnaire have regular contacts with WHO (i.e. attend 3-5 or more than 5 meetings in which WHO representatives are also present during a typical three-month period). On the other hand, it appears from the aggregated questionnaire responses that less than half of the MOPAN member embassies and country offices concerned have bilateral meetings with WHO.

3.8 According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, the most common forms of direct collaboration with WHO are participating in the same policy dialogue with the government and being part of the same local coordination mechanisms.

## **B. Perceptions of WHO partnership behaviour towards national stakeholders**

### **a. Policy dialogue**

#### ***Contribution to national policy dialogue***

3.9 **Most MOPAN country teams perceive WHO to significantly contribute to national policy dialogue in the health sector** (e.g. “strong contributor”, “strong contribution”, “significant”, “demonstrably present”). Only the country team in Benin (“still takes little part”<sup>5</sup>), a minority of the country team members in Egypt (“some contribution”) and the Ethiopia country team (“some or minor contribution”) are somewhat hesitant. According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, a clear majority of views expressed perceive WHO as providing “some” or “strong” contribution to national policy dialogue.

***Box 19: In most Survey countries, WHO is considered an important dialogue partner for national governments in the health sector***

<sup>5</sup> Throughout this chapter, French quotes have been translated into English.

*"It is recognized that WHO involvement in the Health, Nutrition and Population donor consortium has improved in recent times, and the contribution of the WHO WR in the 2007 policy dialogue between MOHFW [Ministry of Health and Family Welfare] and the donor partners is commended." (CT Bangladesh)*

*"WHO acts as the Secretariat for the Global Fund in Bolivia and is key in ensuring that all the main players are round the table when policy is being discussed. WHO also takes responsibility for ensuring that policy is consulted through circulating and revising drafts and also disseminating the final results." (CT Bolivia)*

*"The evaluators unanimously considered WHO to be a strong voice in health care policy dialogue. As evidence, they cite WHO's participation in coordinating the implementation of the ten-year health and social development programme (PRODESS)." (CT Mali)*

*"The WHO/PAHO representation in Nicaragua is actively participating in policy dialogue on social and development policies, especially concerning crucial health problems in Nicaragua, such as HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, and epidemic situations." (CT Nicaragua)*

*"WHO's contribution is strong, especially in the elaboration of the National Plan for Health Development (PNDS)." (CT Senegal)*

*"WHO is especially active in the launching of national strategies, e.g. on blood transfer, tobacco control, screening of cancers and various diseases." (CT Serbia)*

3.10 Against the background of this generally positive assessment, 4 country teams raise questions about the confines of the WHO mandate. Whereas the Bangladesh, Mali and Zambia country teams observe that the WHO contribution to policy dialogue in areas of national strategic importance (compared to in different technical areas) could be stronger, the Egypt country team notes that WHO, as a specialised technical agency, has a limited role to play.

3.11 In addition, the Benin country team perceives a tendency for WHO - as the guardian of global norms - to promote corporate health policies, and at times failing to sufficiently take the local context into account.

**Box 20: A critical view in Benin**

*"The impression is that WHO, in general, does not sufficiently involve itself in in-depth discussions, but that it seems to privilege its own approach and dialogue around its own strategic choices. It is WHO's mandate to guarantee standards, but it needs to be flexible in terms of adapting them to national contexts." (CT Benin)*

**Civil society participation**

3.12 **WHO support to NGO involvement in policy dialogue, however, appears to be uneven.** MOPAN country teams differ on this question: Five country teams (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Mali, Serbia and Senegal) agree that WHO has involved NGOs. In the other 5 countries of the Survey (Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Zambia), WHO support to NGO participation in public policy dialogue as well as in its own strategic and analytical work appears to have made a fairly weak impression ("not yet meeting expectations", "not known for engaging with CSOs or the private sector", "replies strongly scattered", "donors are split", "appears to be limited").

**Box 21: Positive examples of the role of WHO in involving NGOs in policy dialogue**

*"WHO has held two comprehensive stakeholder consultations (December 06 and April 07) with*

*the Government and civil society in preparation of their next Country Cooperation Strategy 2008-2013.” (CT Bangladesh)*

*“WHO is a strong contributor to policy dialogue in Bolivia through hosting regular technical policy discussions with the Ministry of Health and also its active participation in the UNAIDS groups and constant coordination with UNICEF, USAID, UK, the Ministry of Health and a wide array of CSOs around the Global Fund (GF) in Bolivia.” (CT Bolivia)*

*“WHO mostly discusses strategies with the government. However, WHO holds regular consultations with civil society and NGOs, and advocates with the Government on their behalf.” (CT Mali)*

*“WHO supports the participation of NGOs in policy dialogue and in the process of developing the PRS; one concrete example is a former cooperation France had with Médecins du Monde on a programme developed by WHO on the reduction of risks related to drug abuse.” (CT Serbia)*

**... and a critical view**

*“WHO speaks with interest about NGOs and the private sector, however, without giving itself the means of implying them in the policy dialogue. Its intention to engage civil society is not implemented in practice.” (CT Benin)*

**3.13 No country report mentions examples of private sector involvement.** According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, almost all MOPAN country team members either disagree that WHO involves the private sector in policy dialogue or have insufficient knowledge on this aspect of partnership behaviour.

## **b. Capacity development**

### **Capacity development in public institutions**

3.14 Overall, the country reports give the impression that **WHO is more effectively engaged in supporting capacity development of public institutions than of private institutions.**

3.15 On balance, MOPAN country teams consider **WHO more effective in supporting capacity development at the central government level than at the local level.** This observation clearly emerges from the Ethiopia, Mali, Nicaragua, Senegal and Zambia country reports as well as from the aggregated questionnaire responses. Only the country team in Benin acknowledges WHO capacity development efforts at the local level (“hospitals”).

#### **Box 22: Capacity development in public institutions**

*“The CT is of the view that overall WHO is contributing to capacity development of public institutions and specialised structures at the central level (particularly Ministry and specialised structures) as well as at the local level (hospitals).” (CT Benin)*

*“WHO works with the Government of Bangladesh on capacity building health issues such as immunisation, tuberculosis, and avian influenza, and also surveillance and monitoring is considered strong.” (CT Bangladesh)*

### **Capacity development of NGOs and the private sector**

3.16 The 5 countries of the Survey commenting on this question paint a mixed picture. On the one hand, WHO performance in Benin and Mali is perceived to be “still little effective” and “less effective as regards NGOs” respectively, and the MOPAN country team in Bangladesh “has the impression that WHO focuses less on capacity building of the non-public sector”. On the other hand, the country team in Bolivia perceives WHO “to be committed to building national capacity with ...civil society organisations” and the Senegal country team perceives WHO to be “relatively effective in supporting NGOs”.

3.17 References to WHO support for capacity development in the private sector are limited to 3 countries of the Survey, and are also diverse. According to the Mali country team “WHO does not contribute at all to capacity development of the private sector”, and the Senegal country team is of the view that WHO “is little or not supposed to support the private sector”. By contrast, one member of the Nicaragua country team is of the view that “in Nicaragua, the private sector in health is weak and not developed at all, yet PAHO/WHO fills a strategic role in technical capacity development, for example with the Guidelines for the Certification of Health Facilities”.

### **Government ownership**

3.18 **Views with regard to promoting government ownership in the design and planning of the projects that WHO supports are on the positive side.**

3.19 Of those country teams expressing a view, 5 (Benin, Bolivia, Mali, Nicaragua and Senegal) are of the opinion that the government usually or always takes the lead in designing and planning projects that WHO supports. While members of the Ethiopia country team have diverging perceptions, the country team in Zambia is the only one to perceive WHO as generally supporting programmes initiated by itself - rather than by the government. According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, a majority of those MOPAN member embassies and country offices with sufficient information to assess WHO performance perceive WHO to mostly or always foster government ownership.

3.20 Reflecting on the WHO mandate, 4 country teams (Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Senegal and Zambia) point out that WHO is a technical and not a funding agency and that it, therefore, provides more technical support to government-owned projects than financial support.

#### **Box 23: Positive examples of government ownership**

*“The country team notes that WHO in Benin tends to fund proposals submitted by the government rather than projects of its own; however, this depends on the type of programme. Thus, the Roll Back Malaria Partnership is a global programme conceived and launched by WHO at the global level with activities in many countries.” (CT Benin)*

*“It seems that WHO, wherever possible, works through national programmes (for example HIV and TB programmes of the Ministry of Health).” (CT Bolivia)*

*“In general, WHO integrates its intervention into Mali’s Social and Sanitary Development Programme (PRODESS), but some of its activities are initiated by WHO Headquarters (World Health Survey and the Health Matrix Network).” (CT Mali)*

## **Technical advice**

3.21 **MOPAN country teams unanimously appreciate the quality of WHO technical advice (TA)** (e.g. “of high quality”, “good quality”, “good technical advice adapted to the needs of the country”, “excellent technical advice”, “largely considered relevant”). The aggregated questionnaire responses confirm this general finding: A clear majority of views expressed “mostly” or “fully” agree that WHO TA is consistently of high quality.

3.22 In two Survey countries (Mali, Nicaragua), the MOPAN country teams add that international TA is considered “to be of high quality” and “appropriate for national needs” respectively. In addition, both country teams as well as the Egypt country team perceive WHO to be making good use of national TA. Conversely, the country team in Benin is of the view that WHO “is not sufficiently drawing on available national expertise... e.g. epidemiological surveillance and the country-wide inoculation coverage, where WHO still seems to continue to work outside government structures.”

3.23 Furthermore, the Bangladesh country team observes that WHO seems to be relatively slow in recruiting and procuring TA, and that UN ceilings on consultant fees sometimes limit the quality of available TA. The same country team also suggests that WHO could make more use of its global expertise. Something that seems to be done in Nicaragua: “During last year’s negotiations on the new Sanitary Career Law Proposal, WHO/PAHO played a leading role and made a strong contribution to the contents of discussions, above all providing advice on similar experiences in other Latin American countries”.

### **Box 24: A positive example on technical expertise in Bolivia**

*“The high quality of WHO technical expertise of staff that works with the Ministry of Health and diverse CSOs is valued by donors. The staff has good personal qualities; they know the country well and are sensitive to the political climate. The staff work alongside national counterparts, often dedicating many extra hours to follow the process to the end – a sign of their commitment and long-term view of relationships. For example, the technical assistance provided by WHO, in terms of acquisition and delivery of vaccines, is excellent and in many ways compensates for the weak institutional capacity of the Ministry of Health.” (CT Bolivia)*

## **c. Advocacy**

3.24 **In a majority of the Survey countries, WHO appears to play a visible and/or strong role in advocacy** (“visible”, “strong advocate”, “good”, “mostly strong and visible”, “fairly strong and visible”, “plays its role”, “strong and visible”, “plays an important role”). A minority consider the WHO advocacy role as “more visible than strong” (Benin) or “relatively modest” (Mali).

3.25 As in the case of policy dialogue, **national governments seem to be the main WHO partners** (Benin, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Egypt, Nicaragua, Senegal, and Zambia).

### **Box 25: WHO plays a visible/strong advocacy role in a majority of the Survey countries**

*“WHO is visible in government health campaigns, such as immunisation, polio and avian influenza.” (CT Bangladesh)*

*“WHO has been a strong advocate for the national ownership in the systems and mechanisms of*

*the Global Fund in Bolivia. They have stood up and questioned the Global Fund for potentially undermining national leadership. WHO's leadership role has been effective for opening up channels of dialogue and communication between national actors and the Global Fund. WHO also backs up and supports implementation of national health campaigns, for example vaccination campaigns, HIV prevention, etc." (CT Bolivia)*

*"The advocacy role of WHO was considered good ... with mentions of the Egyptian Human Development Project and the [MDG] Sailing the Nile campaign." (CT Egypt)*

*"The PAHO (country representative) has shown and continues to show strong leadership in health sector crisis situations and does not let itself be hampered by fear to speak out and comply with its commitments on extremely sensitive issues like the criminalisation of therapeutic abortion in Nicaragua (October 2006)." (CT Nicaragua)*

3.26 More specifically, while in Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Serbia WHO is perceived to make its key documents available to the wider public in local languages and/or popularised forms (e.g. public library, website, and leaflets), this is apparently not (always) the case in Benin, Mali and Senegal. The country team in Benin, however, acknowledges "vaccination campaigns that use oral communication channels in local languages, and which WHO's socio-medical partners make use of".

3.27 Additional observations on advocacy mentioned in the country reports include:

- Emphasis on national - rather than decentralised - campaigns (Benin, Zambia);
- As a result of its close relationship with government, possibility to promote own topics of WHO even if not among defined national health priorities (Bangladesh);
- Limited financial resources for advocacy purposes (Benin);
- Government ownership of WHO activities leaves little visibility to WHO (Egypt); and
- Not afraid of speaking out on sensitive issues (Nicaragua).

#### **d. Alignment with national poverty reduction strategies, policies and procedures**

##### ***Support to national poverty reduction strategies***

3.28 MOPAN country teams have **differing perceptions of WHO participation in PRS discussions at the central government level.**<sup>6</sup> On the one hand, half of the country teams (Benin, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, and Zambia) perceive WHO on the whole as taking an active part. On the other hand, 3 country teams do not consider WHO an active participant (Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Mali). Perceptions of the Egypt country team members are scattered. The Ethiopia country team suggests that the organisation could show more commitment.

3.29 At the same time, a **majority of the country teams perceive WHO to support the implementation of the PRS** or equivalent national strategies (Benin, Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Nicaragua, Serbia, and Zambia).

3.30 In addition, 5 country teams (Bolivia, Egypt, Mali, Nicaragua, and Serbia) are of the view that WHO supports PRS monitoring activities (this could be improved in Benin), and 3 (Bolivia, Nicaragua, Serbia) perceive WHO to support participatory processes.

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<sup>6</sup> Throughout this chapter on alignment, the country teams in Bolivia and Egypt note that a majority of their respective members had insufficient knowledge to comment. Also the aggregated questionnaire responses indicate a fairly high level of insufficient information.



**Box 26: Positive examples on support to national PRS**

*“WHO takes part in the PRS and supports PRS implementation through TA.” (CT Ethiopia)*

*“To the extent that PRODESS is considered an integral component of the PRSP, WHO can be said to participate in sector-wide PRSP implementation and monitoring.” (CT Mali)*

*“WHO/PAHO supports PRS implementation and monitoring especially within the health sector (e.g. analysis and surveys on health indicators).” (CT Nicaragua)*

*“WHO has been active in the discussions around the newly approved Fifth National Development Plan. It also participates in the various fora established to facilitate the implementation of the FNDP, including the Sector Advisory Group and associated technical working groups.” (CT Zambia)*

**Alignment with national policies and strategies**

3.31 Overall, MOPAN country teams **consider WHO country strategies, sector strategies and operational activities to be thematically well aligned with national development priorities and strategies**, although the country teams in Mali and Zambia simultaneously point out the importance given to implementing WHO’s own global agenda (e.g. anti-smoking initiatives in Mali).

3.32 Only the Ethiopia country team perceives WHO country strategy and interventions to be merely “somewhat” aligned with the national PRS and sector strategies, and by way of illustration notes that “unlike other UN agencies, WHO did not take part in this year’s government and UN agencies alignment exercise”.

3.33 The aggregated questionnaire responses confirm this overall finding: Allowing for a relatively high percentage of insufficient information, almost all views expressed “mostly” or “fully” agree that WHO has aligned its work.

**Box 27: Views on WHO alignment with national priorities and strategies**

*“As is the case for most other donors, WHO too uses the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (SCRP) as its main framework of reference at the country level.” (CT Benin)*

*“WHO works to ensure the country programme is aligned with national policies and sector strategies ... [although] it is difficult to assess to what extent WHO has aligned to the National Development Plan as this Plan is very broad and has not yet been operationalised.” (CT Bolivia)*

*“The WHO Country Strategy is largely in line with the PRS and the HNPSP (Health, Nutrition and Population Sector Programme) ... The priorities of the draft Country Cooperation Strategy 2008-2013 are also aligned with national policies. The proposed strategic objectives reflect the national priorities for health.” (CT Bangladesh)*

*“While largely reflecting global commitments, WHO’s Mali country programme is based on the needs expressed in PRODESS. WHO’s sector-wide strategies are based on Mali’s health policy. WHO’s technical cooperation meets the needs expressed in the PRSP’s PRODESS component.” (CT Mali)*

*“Alignment overall is seen as strong in national and sectoral PRS, and technical cooperation perceived as addressing PRS priorities. Most donors also see new activities developed based on PRS and sector priorities.” (CT Nicaragua)*

*“Although WHO’s support to the health sector is seen to target areas prioritized by its own HQ and its own global agenda, its interventions form an integral part of the national health*

programme.” (CT Zambia)

### ***Alignment with national procedures and modalities***

3.34 All country teams except Nicaragua (“area of concern”) perceive WHO to **align its business practice with national procedures and modalities in one way or another, though not uniformly across the board**. Two country teams (Bolivia, Serbia) concede that it is not always possible for WHO to align its business practice where national systems and procedures hardly exist or are not sufficiently rigorously implemented.

3.35 Most often, WHO is perceived to administer its projects through national offices (Benin, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Mali and Zambia). Furthermore, 3 country teams (Bangladesh, Mali, and Senegal) note WHO’s general commitment to following government procedures, although in the case of Mali to continue to use its own reporting system.

3.36 However, no MOPAN country team is aware of any WHO participation in budget support or basket/pooled funding in the countries of the Survey. In addition, WHO is seen to be supporting the implementation and monitoring of sector-wide approach arrangements in only 2 Survey countries, i.e. the SWAp-based PRODESS in Mali and the health SWAp in Zambia. In Nicaragua, WHO is perceived to have “abstained from participating in the Nicaraguan health SWAp, probably because its contribution to the Nicaraguan health sector is technical and not financial”.

### ***Country-level decision taking***

3.37 Based on brief references made in 6 country reports, it appears that **WHO country offices are not systematically granted decision-making authority**. Whereas the country teams in Bolivia (“is able to take decisions”), Ethiopia (“often takes decisions”) and Mali (“takes all decisions”) affirm country-level decision taking, WHO in Benin (“only weak room for manoeuvre”) and Nicaragua (“some decisions were undertaken”) does not seem to be allowed much room for manoeuvre. In Senegal, WHO “does not take decisions before consulting with Geneva”.

3.38 According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, a majority of participating MOPAN member embassies and country offices lacked sufficient information to assess this aspect. Of those views expressed, a majority was of the opinion that the WHO office “occasionally” or “mainly” takes decisions without referring back to its headquarters.

#### ***Box 28: Limited room for manoeuvre in Benin***

*“... , it appears as if the WHO office in Benin has only little room for manoeuvre in the sense that most of the time it must obtain either headquarters’ approval or that of the UNDP Resident Representative charged with a coordination role.” (CT Benin)*

## **C. Perceptions of WHO partnership behaviour towards other development agencies**

### **a. Information sharing**

3.39 On balance, **the WHO contribution to information sharing amongst development agencies is considered to be modest.**

3.40 While the country teams in Ethiopia, Senegal and Serbia generally consider WHO to actively share and seek information, the country teams in Bolivia, Mali, Nicaragua and Zambia perceive it to be effective in some regards (e.g. sharing documents and responding to requests for information), but not in others. Three country teams (Benin, Bangladesh and Egypt) consider information sharing currently to be a general weakness of WHO at the country level.

3.41 Among the reasons given for some of the perceived shortcomings are:

- Weak information sharing about visiting missions (Bolivia, Mali, Nicaragua);
- Information sharing limited to forums and actors in the health sector (Zambia);
- Information sharing not part of the WHO organisational culture (Bangladesh);
- Weak formal mechanisms for information sharing (Bolivia);
- Lack of capacity to take initiatives (Benin); and
- Rather exclusive relationship with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (Bangladesh).

#### **Box 29: Information sharing in Bolivia**

*“The WHO offices in La Paz are a hub for inter-agency meetings, and those among CSOs and the state. They open their doors and offer their meeting rooms for all stakeholders. WHO has a library that is open to the public to consult up-to-date materials relating to health.” (CT Bolivia)*

### **b. Inter-agency coordination**

#### **Participation in local donor working groups**

3.42 Overall, **WHO appears to be actively involved in local donor coordination groups in the health sector.** The aggregated questionnaire responses support this generally positive perception: A majority of views expressed indicate that WHO “regularly” or “always” participates in local donor coordination activities.

3.43 The majority of the MOPAN country teams (Bolivia, Ethiopia, Mali, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, and Zambia) have very positive views (e.g. “very positive coordination”, “participates proactively”, “strong participant”, “always takes part”, “active and resourceful partner”). In non-health related inter-agency meetings, the Bolivia country team notes that UNDP generally represents WHO.

#### **Box 30: Active participation in local donor coordination groups**

*“WHO always seems to have up-to-date information which informs their decisions and the debate in inter-agency meetings... WHO’s participation in the UNAIDS group shows their commitment to*

*an effective coordination with other UN agencies and bilaterals with open and frank discussion to avoid overlap or contradicting approaches.” (CT Bolivia)*

*“WHO as a specialised UN agency on health participates proactively in the working group on Health, Nutrition and Population and served as secretary of this group.” (CT Ethiopia)*

*“WHO always participates in government-initiated TFP [technical and financial partners] coordination activities, particularly in the health sector, where WHO advises the Ministry of Health.” (CT Mali)*

3.44 A minority of the country teams (Benin, Bangladesh and Egypt) affirm that WHO takes part in local donor coordination groups, but are of the view that it could improve its participation.

**Box 31: Room for improvement**

*“WHO’s participation in donor coordination meetings is considered as occasional. It is only present in some donor meetings, but not in all meetings with the Ministry of Health. And when WHO participates in such meetings, it is rarely at the appropriate level.” (CT Benin)*

*“UN inter-agency and donor coordination are not perceived to be among WHO’s priorities. WHO does participate in UN inter-agency meetings at the Head of Mission level, and in the donor health consortium, but WHO has not been active in its role as Chair of the UN HIV/AIDS Theme Group. The office does not regularly participate in donor sub-groups which are related to health (for example, on maternal health or on HIV/AIDS).” (CT Bangladesh)*

*“WHO’s participation in local donor coordination activities could be more active... WHO has not sent a representative to the UN Disaster Management Team meetings, where Avian Influenza matters are regularly discussed, since mid-2006.” (CT Egypt)*

**Coordination at the programme/project level**

3.45 **Perceptions regarding coordination at the project/programme level are more critical.**

3.46 Of those country teams with an overall positive perception of WHO involvement in local donor coordination groups, the country teams in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Senegal are simultaneously of the view that WHO also coordinates its activities well at the programme/project level. Others are more critical: the Mali country team observes that “WHO does not bother to coordinate with other donors in executing projects/programmes ... [which] sometimes leads to duplication of efforts” and the Zambia country team notes that “regular participation and dialogue has yet to result in strong coordination of its activities with that of other actors. As a result of this, duplication of efforts is not uncommon”.

3.47 Also on the more critical side, the Egypt country team perceives WHO to “work mainly in isolation from other aid agencies” and suggests that “the MO may work closely with non-bilateral partners (other UN agencies, World Bank, etc.) in forums not attended by bilateral donors”. In Benin and Bangladesh, perceptions are also rather unfavourable, albeit acknowledging certain efforts by WHO.

3.48 Two country teams anticipate that WHO will pay more attention to coordination in future thanks to the recent arrival of a new WHO Resident Representative (Benin) and because of WHO playing a lead role in the ongoing work to implement the Joint Assistance Strategy in Zambia.

**Box 32: Positive examples of coordination at the operational level:**

*“With a view to enhance donor coordination and harmonisation, WHO as the representative of the donor community, will sit as an observer on the Management Committee meetings of the Canadian-funded support programme to the Bolivian health sector (PASS)<sup>7</sup> over the next 5 years.” (CT Bolivia)*

*“WHO participates in the coordination of activities with other agencies to reduce maternal mortality.” (CT Nicaragua)*

**... and more critical views:**

*“As for coordination efforts undertaken among donors at the project or programme level, the WHO office is not often present... This situation can be the source of a risk of duplication of efforts... [However] a presence is noted in certain areas, for instance with regard to the preparation of project submissions to the Global Fund to combat AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis and to a certain extent with regard to malaria and inoculation programmes.” (CT Benin)*

*“PAHO (as a specialised agency) sometimes has the tendency to expect other (health specialist) partners to subordinate to its coordination.” (CT Nicaragua)*

**Contribution of local senior management**

3.49 Not many country teams commented on this aspect of coordination. Nevertheless, the observations provided by the MOPAN country teams in Bolivia (“the National Representative is very accessible and participates actively in numerous meetings alongside his team”), Nicaragua (“senior management participation is also viewed favourably”), Senegal (“strong contribution”) and Mali (“the local representation contributes to donor coordination to some extent”) **give a fairly positive impression**. Only the country team in Egypt observes that its members are not aware of any contribution of the local senior management to coordination.

3.50 According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, a number of MOPAN member embassies and country offices lacked sufficient information to make an informed judgment. Of those with a view, a majority perceives WHO local senior management to make “some” or a “strong” contribution to coordination within the donor community.

**c. Harmonisation**

**Contribution to local donor harmonisation efforts**

3.51 It appears from the Survey that **the WHO contribution to local donor harmonisation efforts is uneven**.

3.52 Perceptions of the WHO contribution to aid harmonisation **vary within and between the countries of the Survey**. While 4 country teams (Benin, Bolivia, Mali, and Nicaragua) report both positive and negative examples of how WHO has or has not joined in local harmonisation efforts, brief references in 2 other country reports (Ethiopia, Zambia) are favourable.

3.53 In the words of the Serbia country team, “due to the specificity of its mission, which is limited to the health sector, and the generally low degree of donor intervention in this area, harmonisation is hardly an issue”.

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<sup>7</sup> Programa de Apoyo al Sector Salud.

3.54 According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, a number of MOPAN member embassies and country offices did not have sufficient knowledge to make informed judgments on the question of harmonisation, especially regarding harmonisation of project procedures and reporting formats.

**Box 33: Some positive examples of the WHO contribution to local donor harmonisation efforts**

*“WHO endeavours to imply itself with other donors in malaria and inoculation programmes, maternal and child mortality programmes, as well as with regard to the elaboration of different national policies and strategies.” (CT Benin)*

*“WHO is responsive to requests to participate in joint monitoring and evaluation missions (for example joint M&E with DFID on TB and HIV programmes).” (CT Bolivia)*

*“... WHO plays an active role in harmonising the health sector. WHO participates in PRODESS monitoring and evaluation missions, as well as joint missions in the field. ...” (CT Mali)*

*“Significantly, WHO participated in the 2006 Joint Annual Review of the SWAp, with representatives from both the regional level and the country office.” (CT Zambia)*

**...and some more critical views**

*“WHO contributes still little to harmonisation efforts among donors and would stand to gain from a more active involvement in joint analytical work and by aligning its own project procedures. Its participation in implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, alongside that of UNDP, would be most appreciated.” (CT Benin)*

*“There is no evidence/insufficient knowledge that WHO has reviewed and adapted its own project procedures or reporting formats...” (CT Bolivia)*

*“WHO also did not harmonize its project procedures or its reporting format. WHO’s contribution to harmonisation remains limited to the health sector and is limited by rules and procedures that Headquarters dictates.” (CT Mali)*

*“Contributions to local plans are less positive, while joint field missions, adaptation of procedures and reporting are generally considered weak.” (CT Nicaragua)*

**Harmonisation within the UN system**

3.55 The Survey reveals a **modest contribution to harmonisation within the UN system.**

3.56 *At the analytical and strategic levels, WHO is perceived to contribute to the CCA/UNDAF in Egypt and to the UNDAF in Bangladesh and Zambia. Conversely, according to the Mali country team, “WHO is not really proactive in the UNDAF”.*

3.57 *At the programme and project levels, half of the MOPAN country teams (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Senegal, and Zambia) acknowledge some contribution to UN system harmonisation in the health sector, and particularly with regard to HIV/AIDS. The country team in Benin considers the WHO contribution at the programme level to be “insufficient although representation capacities exist”.*

3.58 According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, over half of the views expressed perceive WHO to make “some” contribution to harmonisation within the UN system.

**Box 34: UN system harmonisation in the health sector**

*"WHO does participate or intends to participate in joint UN programmes, such as a joint UN maternal health initiative, a (potential) health programme in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and a joint UN response to refugees in Teknaf..." (CT Bangladesh)*

*"WHO also plays a key coordinating role within the UNAIDS group assuming the Presidency when other UN agencies have not had the capacity to do so. WHO works particularly closely and effectively with UNICEF on HIV and AIDS." (CT Bolivia)*

*"WHO contributes to UN system activities in the area of HIV/AIDS and maternal and child health." (CT Senegal)*

*"WHO participates in the UN system's joint programme for HIV/AIDS..." (CT Zambia)*

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## 4. THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (AfDB)

### **AfDB partnership performance: main findings**

AfDB has offices in 5 of the 6 African countries of the Survey, some of which were established/strengthened only very recently. Apart from a few exceptions benefiting from a high level of knowledge, participating MOPAN member embassies and country offices have low to medium knowledge of AfDB. A clear majority of MOPAN member embassies and country offices regularly attend meetings at which AfDB is also present. However, barely half have regular bilateral meetings with AfDB. Overall, the level of cooperation seems to be either increasing or at least remains unchanged.

#### **(1) Partnership behaviour towards *national stakeholders*:**

**a. Policy dialogue:** On balance, MOPAN country teams consider the AfDB contribution to national policy dialogue as modest. AfDB does not appear to actively support the participation of civil society in national policy dialogue. It also appears to limit dialogue on its own strategies and analytical work mostly to government ministries.

**b. Capacity development:** Perceptions of AfDB support to capacity development of different national stakeholders vary and are partly characterised by limited information. Views on government ownership and technical advice are also limited.

**c. Advocacy:** MOPAN country teams are collectively of the opinion that AfDB is not actively involved in advocacy activities.

**d. Alignment with national poverty reduction strategies, policies and procedures:** It appears from the country reports that AfDB supports the national PRS or equivalent national strategies in one way or another. All 6 MOPAN country teams consider AfDB work as thematically well aligned with government development policies and strategies. On the other hand, MOPAN country teams perceive differing degrees of AfDB business practice alignment with government modalities and procedures. The delegation of decision-making power to the country level appears limited.

#### **(2) Partnership behaviour towards *other international development agencies*:**

**a. Information sharing:** Perceptions of AfDB performance in terms of sharing information in general are mixed, whereby fairly positive perceptions prevail.

**b. Inter-agency coordination:** Overall, the assessment of AfDB participation in inter-agency coordination is positive.

**c. Harmonisation:** Overall, AfDB seems to be contributing to donor harmonisation in the countries of the Survey.



**AfDB: background information**

AfDB was founded in 1964 and began to operate in 1967. Today it is part of the African Development Bank Group, which also comprises the African Development Fund (ADF), established in 1973, and the Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF), established in 1976. To simplify matters, the present report uses the acronym AfDB for the Bank Group as a whole. The AfDB primary objective is to promote sustainable economic growth and social development to reduce poverty in Africa.

AfDB is an international finance institution that provides African countries with ordinary (Bank) and concessional (Fund) loans, as well as with grants and technical assistance. In 2006, AfDB approved 44 loans totalling UA 1.82 billion, 70 grants totalling UA 0.49 billion and 6 HIPC operations totalling UA 0.26 billion. Of the resources made available, 37.2% went to infrastructure, 21.5% to the finance sector, 10.6% to the social sectors, 10.4% to agriculture and rural development, and 17.9% to multisector activities.

AfDB shareholders are 53 African and 24 non-African countries. In 2003, the Bank headquarters temporarily relocated from Abidjan to Tunis due to political unrest and instability in Côte d'Ivoire. At present, AfDB has 22 country offices.

**A. AfDB at the country level*****Country presence***

4.1 AfDB has offices in 5 of the 6 African countries of the Survey (Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Senegal, and Zambia). AfDB established offices in Mali and Zambia as recently as mid-2005 and 2006, respectively. According to the Ethiopia country team, AfDB has strengthened its country office during the last 2 years. There is no country office in Benin but, as indicated by the country team, AfDB envisages the establishment of a permanent representation in the country.

4.2 In 2006, total loan and grant approvals (both AfDB and AfDF) were US\$ 0 for Senegal<sup>8</sup>, US\$ 22.5 for Benin and Mali respectively, US\$ 95.85 million for Zambia, US\$ 346.5 for Ethiopia, and US\$ 597.9 million for Egypt.<sup>9</sup> Quoting from the latest AfDB Country Strategy Papers, the country reports mention the following main pillars of activity: providing an enabling environment for accelerated growth and reinforcing basic infrastructure (Senegal), improving competitiveness and private sector environment as well as capacity building and involving the poor in growth (Mali), production diversification and widening access to basic social services (Benin), infrastructure development, agricultural transformation and governance (Ethiopia), poverty reduction, with the objective of promoting growth and improving social services (Zambia), and promoting private sector development as well as social development and protection (Egypt).

***Familiarity with AfDB***

4.3 The Survey reveals that the MOPAN country teams have low to medium knowledge of AfDB: Whereas the country teams in Egypt and Mali judge their level of knowledge to be "low", the country teams in Benin, Ethiopia and Senegal judge their

<sup>8</sup> US\$ 76.5 million in 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Source of financial data: African Development Bank, Annual Reports.

knowledge “medium”. A majority of the country team members in Zambia considers itself “increasingly familiar with AfDB as a consequence of the Bank establishing a permanent local presence in Lusaka”.

4.4. This finding is supported by the aggregated questionnaire responses (see Appendix 2c): Questionnaires were returned by 29 (of 39) participating MOPAN embassies and country offices. Of these, 13 judged their level of knowledge to be “low” and 13 to be “medium”. Three MOPAN members (one each in Benin, Ethiopia and Zambia) judged their knowledge of AfDB to be “high”.

4.5 Overall, the level of cooperation seems to be either increasing or at least remains unchanged. In particular, 2 country teams (Mali, Zambia) report an increase in contacts since the establishment of an AfDB country office, and in the case of Mali also since the 2004 Annual MOPAN Survey. According to the country team in Benin, “the frequency of contacts depends on the nature of cooperation, including the division of labour between donors, more than the Bank’s presence on the ground”.

4.6 According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, half of those MOPAN member embassies and country offices who cooperate with AfDB have increased their level of cooperation with the Bank over the last 3 years. For the other half, it has remained unchanged. In no country of the Survey has it decreased. The most common forms of collaboration are cooperating within the same local coordination mechanisms and participating in the same policy dialogue with government.

4.7 A clear majority of MOPAN member embassies and country offices that completed the questionnaire have regular contacts with AfDB (i.e. they attend 3-5 or more than 5 meetings in which AfDB representatives are also present). By contrast, it appears from the aggregated questionnaire responses that barely half have regular bilateral meetings with AfDB.

## **B. Perceptions of AfDB partnership behaviour towards national stakeholders**

### **a. Policy dialogue**

#### ***Contribution to national policy dialogue***

4.8 On balance, **MOPAN country teams consider the AfDB contribution to national policy dialogue as modest** (e.g. “relatively small contribution”, “some contribution”, “not actively promoting”, “sporadically”<sup>10</sup>). The aggregated questionnaire responses confirm this general observation: A clear majority of views expressed perceive AfDB as providing “some” or “minor” contribution to policy dialogue.

4.9 In those countries of the Survey where AfDB has recently established a country office (Mali, Zambia) or where the capacity of its country office has recently been strengthened (Ethiopia), the AfDB contribution to policy dialogue is perceived to be improving. On the other hand, the country team in Benin considers the absence of a permanent in-country representation as the main reason why “AfDB’s participation in

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<sup>10</sup> Throughout this chapter, French quotes have been translated into English.

policy dialogue is sporadic; it occurs during field missions of the Bank and is often limited to [the Bank's] sectors of operations".

**Box 35: Improving contribution to policy dialogue in Ethiopia**

*"AfDB makes some contribution to policy dialogue. It takes part in all DAG/ADG-for a [Development Assistance Group]. It is not actively promoting dialogue on policy issues but has recently been represented at high-level discussions. Its capacity is limited although it has recently strengthened its country office and this has also led to more active participation in the activities of the DAG and its Head is currently a member of the Executive Committee of this structure." (CT Ethiopia)*

4.10 In addition, with regard to the nature of AfDB policy dialogue:

- the MOPAN country team in Egypt suggests that AfDB "is extremely discrete in its interactions with the donor community", and that the Bank contribution to policy dialogue may therefore be stronger than recognised; and
- the Mali country team suggests that AfDB tends to uncritically follow national standards and that it could improve the quality of its dialogue by consulting with other major actors, "such as local authorities or private sector/NGOs".

**Civil society participation**

4.11 In general, it appears from the country reports that **AfDB does not actively support the participation of civil society (NGOs and private sector) in national policy dialogue** (e.g. "does not appear to be an active support", "not known for actively engaging", "does little to encourage participation"). An exception to this general tendency is in Egypt, where the country team perceives AfDB to actively support private sector participation in policy dialogue, "although found it difficult to evaluate". To the extent that the MOPAN embassies and country offices expressed a view, the aggregated questionnaire responses suggest that support provided to private sector participation in policy dialogue is more common than to NGOs.

4.12 It also appears from the country reports that **AfDB mostly limits dialogue on its own strategies and analytical work to government ministries**. The aggregated questionnaire responses confirm this finding: Almost all views expressed agree that the Bank mostly limits its dialogue to government ministries.

**Box 36: Consultations with governments on AfDB strategic and analytical work**

*"AfDB's last policy document (2004) was elaborated with a weak participation of civil society and the private sector." (CT Benin)*

*"The MO held extensive discussions with the Government when preparing the country strategy to make sure of alignment and coordination and contribution to reform in February 2005." (CT Egypt)*

*"Although a wide range of actors were invited to the validation workshop of Country Programme Strategy, dialogue seems to be mainly limited to central government structures." (CT Mali)*

**b. Capacity development**

4.13 **Perceptions of AfDB support to capacity development of different national stakeholders (public institutions, national NGOs and the private sector) vary**, and in half of the Survey countries (Egypt, Ethiopia and Mali) are partly characterised by limited information. According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, AfDB would seem to contribute most effectively to capacity development of public institutions at the central level.

#### ***Capacity development of public institutions***

4.14 As for capacity development of public institutions in general, a minority of the Egypt country team members with sufficient information perceive AfDB to be “mostly effective”. Similarly, the Senegal country team perceives AfDB capacity development to “target public institutions”.

4.15 Other country teams differentiate between AfDB central and local level public capacity development. Here the picture is also mixed: The Mali country team perceives AfDB to focus its capacity development support on public institutions at the central level, and suggests that it could do more at the local level. The Ethiopia country team has “some doubt” about the effectiveness of AfDB support to capacity development of public institutions at the central level and insufficient knowledge of Bank support at the local level. The Benin country team is of the view that AfDB is neglecting capacity development of public institutions at the local level.

#### ***Capacity development of national NGOs and the private sector***

4.16 As for capacity development of national NGOs and the private sector, perceptions by MOPAN country teams differ. On the one hand, 2 country teams have a favourable view: While a minority of the Egypt country team perceive AfDB to be “mostly effective”, the Benin country team is of the view that AfDB supports capacity development of local NGOs “through integrated programmes at the local level”, and that the Bank contributes to capacity development in the private sector. On the other hand, 2 other country teams (Mali, Senegal) are not aware of any capacity development of NGOs or the private sector.

4.17 The Zambia country team does not seem to differentiate between capacity development of the public sector and civil society. In its view, “AfDB does not appear to have had much success in ensuring the sustainability of their programmes through capacity development” although the country report does offer some positive examples.

#### ***Box 37: Some illustrations of AfDB support to capacity development***

*“The Bank also supports the Observatory of the Struggle against Corruption (OLC), commercial banks and micro-finance institutions.” (CT Benin)*

*“AfDB works with the Government on its Financial Reform Programme, which includes technical assistance for capacity building of central and local financial institutions, including banking system.” (CT Egypt)*

*“In the PADEC [Decentralization Support Programme] case, capacity building should have been also directed to deconcentrated and decentralised structures and more generally should have been designed according to the institutional context. Two MOPAN members suspect that the current classical project approach might not largely impact the development of national capacities.” (CT Mali)*

*“... AfDB is involved in the PEMFA [Public Expenditure Management and Financial*

*Accountability] programme and some of the PEMFA components build on the Bank supported [procurement] reforms. Also, AfDB has participated in building national capacity of National AIDS Council at provincial and district levels. The Bank has also supported the Human Resource Development and capacity development of health staff.” (CT Zambia)*

### **Government ownership**

4.18 Only 2 country teams (Benin, Egypt) responded to the question on government ownership in the design and planning of the projects that AfDB funds. In their view, AfDB more often funds proposals that have been designed and developed by the government than projects initiated by itself. The aggregated questionnaire responses support this limited information in the country reports: A majority of views expressed perceive AfDB to always or mostly foster government ownership.

### **Technical advice**

4.19 The same 2 country teams were also the only ones to remark on the quality of AfDB technical advice. In Egypt, a minority of the country team agrees on the good quality of AfDB technical advice, and suggests that “AfDB must be in a position to get good quality national TA available in Egypt”. In Benin, according to the country report, AfDB often selects its consultants in consultation with the World Bank.

4.20 According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, there is largely insufficient information on AfDB technical advice. A majority of those who have expressed a view has a positive impression. More specifically, a clear majority considers the Bank’s international expertise to be appropriate for national needs and the Bank to make good use of national expertise.

## **c. Advocacy**

4.21 **MOPAN country teams are collectively of the opinion that AfDB is not actively involved in advocacy activities** (“communication deficit”, “relatively weak”, not proactive”, “not perceived as playing a strong role”, “not visible”, “not an area that AfDB is perceived to be actively contributing”). The aggregated questionnaire responses corroborate these observations: Of those MOPAN member embassies and country offices expressing a view, a great majority disagrees “fully” or “somewhat” that AfDB stimulates and broadens public debate on policy issues.

4.22 In those few cases where some sort of advocacy is observed (Mali, Zambia), MOPAN country teams perceive it to be primarily government-centred and failing to address a broader range of national stakeholders.

4.23 On a positive note, the Mali country team highlights AfDB support to the governmental campaign against bird flu.

### **Box 38: A critical view on advocacy**

*“A communication deficit vis-à-vis the public at large is noted. Because of this deficit, and especially of the absence of a local representation, Bank publications, to our knowledge, are not translated into national languages and therefore not available to most of the country’s population.” (CT Benin)*

#### **d. Alignment with national poverty reduction strategies, policies and procedures**

##### ***Support to national poverty reduction strategies***

4.24 It appears from the country reports that **AfDB supports the national PRS or equivalent national strategies in one way or another**. The aggregated questionnaire responses reflect this finding from the country reports: The majority of views expressed “fully” or “mostly” agree that AfDB supports the national PRS or equivalent national strategies. The MOPAN country teams in Benin and Zambia consider the AfDB small country presence to somewhat influence its contribution to alignment in those countries.

4.25 In 2 countries of the Survey (Benin, Ethiopia), AfDB is perceived to play an “active” role in *PRS discussions*. In Mali, “AfDB has taken part in PRS discussions, although not playing a prominent role”. In Zambia, on the other hand, “due to a lack of in-country presence, AfDB does not have a particularly high profile in the discussions around the design of the FNDP [Fifth National Development Plan]”.

4.26 In 4 countries of the Survey (Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Zambia), AfDB is perceived to be supporting the *implementation* of the PRS. However, not in Benin where, “owing to the fact that it has its office in Tunis, AfDB cannot have a durable and permanent stake in the implementation of the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy”.

4.27 In addition, whereas in Zambia AfDB is seen to support participatory processes, this is explicitly not the case in Mali. Lastly, while AfDB in Zambia is also perceived to support PRS monitoring activities, the Mali country team points out that it is not aware of any AfDB support to PRS monitoring activities.

##### ***Box 39: Support to PRS monitoring activities in Zambia***

*“The 2007 ADF’s Budget Support adopted the common Performance Assessment Framework used by other development partners currently supporting the existing Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS).” (CT Zambia)*

##### ***Alignment with national policies and procedures***

4.28 All 6 MOPAN country teams in Africa consider AfDB work as **thematically well aligned with government development policies and strategies** (e.g. “in great conformity”, “visible and strong”, “fully aligned”, “designed in accordance with PRS and national priorities”). The aggregated questionnaire responses confirm this finding: a clear majority of views expressed “mostly” or “fully” agree that AfDB has aligned its work.

##### ***Box 40: Well aligned with national development policies and strategies...***

*“... it should be noted that the Bank’s sector strategy in the water sector is in coherence with the Government’s results-based budget strategy, established in consultation with the other donors intervening in this sector.” (CT Benin)*

*“AfDB held extensive discussions with the Government when preparing its Country Strategy Paper to make sure of alignment... The AfDB Country Strategy Paper focuses on investment in private sector, improving the financial system and the infrastructure sector in Egypt. These objectives are in line with the national objectives for development.” (CT Egypt)*

*“AfDB’s new country programme is aligned with the FNDP [Fifth National Development Plan], and efforts have been made to identify priority areas (agriculture, infrastructure) where the Bank may*

*have a comparative advantage.” (CT Zambia)*

4.29 On the other hand, MOPAN country teams perceive **differing degrees of AfDB business practice alignment with government modalities and procedures**. MOPAN country teams differ between those who perceive AfDB business practice as on the whole aligned (Egypt, Ethiopia), those who describe a mixed picture (Benin, Zambia), and those who perceive the Bank business practice not to be aligned (Mali, Senegal). It appears from the country reports (and from the aggregated questionnaire responses) that the one way in which AfDB business practice is most commonly aligned is by channelling its funds through the respective government budgets (Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Zambia).

4.30 Individual observations on AfDB business practice alignment mentioned in the country reports include:

- participation in sector-wide approach arrangements, mostly in project form (Benin);
- participation in basket/pooled funding arrangements (Benin); and
- avoiding parallel implementation units (Ethiopia).

4.31 Then again, the Benin country team observes that AfDB makes limited use of government reporting procedures and has a preference to follow its own procurement procedures.

**Box 41: ... but at times weak alignment of business practices**

*“In its speeches and written declarations, AfDB affirms the use of national procedures and institutions ‘to the extent possible’. In reality however, AfDB often follows its own ‘culture’, and considers that local conditions do not allow full delegation of project execution to local institutions and local channels. This is particularly true with regard to local bidding procedures, which are seldom used.” (CT Benin)*

*“AfDB does not comply with alignment on national procedures and modalities, exclusively relying on its own business practices. It is true even in sectors with SWAPs. As an illustration, AfDB organized a 4-5 day workshop to train government officials on AfDB procedures.” (CT Mali)*

*“Preparatory work on the AfDB water assistance to Zambia was well coordinated in the formulation stages; however, when reaching the funding modalities stages it was an AfDB HQ matter only. Support that was initially planned provided as a grant was subsequently provided as a concessional loan – as a result of Zambia’s changed status under the Performance Based Allocation system.” (CT Zambia)*

**Country-level decision taking**

4.32 Based on the perceptions of 3 MOPAN teams (Egypt, Ethiopia and Mali) **the delegation of decision-making power to the country level appears limited**. This rather limited information from three country reports is supported by the aggregated questionnaire responses: Respondents are equally divided between those who perceive the AfDB country offices to be unable to take decisions without referring back to their headquarters and those with insufficient information/knowledge.

4.33 Thanks to the recent (Mali) and planned (Benin) establishment of country offices as well as the strengthening of the Ethiopia country office, MOPAN country teams are confident that the decentralisation of decision-making authority will improve.

## C. Perceptions of AfDB partnership behaviour towards other development agencies

### a. Information sharing

4.34 **Perceptions of AfDB performance in terms of sharing information in general are mixed, whereby fairly positive views prevail.** While 4 country teams (Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Zambia) have positive views (e.g. “relatively good”, “is sharing information”, “generally rather satisfied”, “has made efforts”), 2 country teams (Benin, Senegal) are critical (“a big deficit”, “exchanges little”).

#### **Box 42: Information sharing has recently improved**

*“AfDB has a great contact deficit vis-à-vis the other donors operating in Benin, in particular the bilateral agencies. Exchanges take place at HQs level, but rarely on the ground. AfDB has started to correct this weakness, following complaints from the donors’ side.” (CT Benin)*

*“MOPAN countries appreciate the recent progress in sharing and seeking information, certainly facilitated by the existence of the country office in Mali.” (CT Mali)*

*“AfDB has become better in sharing documents (although some through the headquarters). ... In budget support and in some thematic areas, AfDB has sought information from other donors.” (CT Zambia)*

4.35 More specifically, those 2 country teams expressing a view on visiting AfDB missions perceive AfDB to share little (Egypt) or no (Senegal) information. Another 2 (Benin, Zambia) perceive AfDB to exchange information at the headquarters level (rather than at the country level).

4.36 According to the aggregated questionnaire responses, a majority of the views expressed perceive AfDB to be sharing and seeking information except on AfDB missions where positive and critical views are balanced.

### b. Inter-agency coordination

4.37 Overall, the **assessment of AfDB participation in inter-agency coordination is positive.**

4.38 In 4 countries of the Survey (Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali and Zambia), the MOPAN country teams acknowledge the good performance of AfDB (“active with regular participation”, “works well in cooperation with other donors”, “gets a rather positive rating”, “has made efforts”). Coordination examples provided in the country reports relate inter alia to budget support and sector strategy reviews, local thematic groups and coordination at the programme/project level.

4.39 The Benin country team perceives AfDB to take part in inter-agency coordination efforts, but largely without establishing direct contacts with representatives of other international organisations. This, according to the country report, may be improving because of a very recently established cooperation with one of the MOPAN members.



According to the Senegal country team, the AfDB contribution to inter-agency coordination is “rather small”.

**Box 43: Positive examples of inter-agency coordination**

*“AfDB sends representatives to take part in joint budget support reviews, but also in quarterly and sectoral reviews, as well as in important events, such as the launch or the review of the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (SCRP).” (CT Benin)*

*“AfDB’s participation in local donor coordination activities was seen to be active with regular participation in the DAG<sup>(11)</sup> subgroups [on health and population, water and irrigation, and on gender]. ... AfDB is co-chair in the DAG subgroup of health and population”. (CT Egypt)*

*“[AfDB] participates in working groups and is at present co-chairing the Monitoring and Evaluation TWG<sup>(12)</sup>. AfDB is an active supporter of the PBS<sup>(13)</sup> initiative and tries to coordinate its activities within this framework.” (CT Ethiopia)*

*“In agriculture, AfDB mostly coordinates with the World Bank. ... Preparatory (water sector) activities have been well coordinated with other agencies.” (CT Zambia)*

4.40 The aggregated questionnaire responses support the positive perception of AfDB participation in inter-agency coordination: A majority of views expressed indicate that AfDB “always” or “regularly” participates in local donor coordination activities. A majority of views expressed also note that AfDB seeks to improve its coordination with other donors at the project/programme level and has taken concrete steps to avoid overlaps with other aid agencies.

4.41 More specifically, with regard to the contribution of AfDB local senior management to inter-agency coordination, the country team in Egypt notes “some contribution of the local senior management to coordination within the donor community”, and the Ethiopia country team acknowledges that the head of AfDB is currently a member of the Executive Committee of the Donors Assistance Group.

### **c. Harmonisation**

4.42 Overall, **AfDB seems to be contributing to donor harmonisation in the countries of the Survey.**

4.43 Two MOPAN country teams acknowledge the AfDB contribution in general, albeit with certain reservations: According to the Egypt country report, “local harmonisation efforts were positively noted ... [although] the vast majority of the MOPAN partners did not have sufficient information...”. According to the Ethiopia country team, “AfDB contributes to local harmonisation although its participation sometimes is constrained by its limited capacity at the country office”.

4.44 Two country teams (Mali, Zambia) differentiate between various aspects of donor harmonisation: Whereas both country teams perceive AfDB to be making a positive contribution to local harmonisation plans, they consider the Bank to be rather weak in joint country analytic work and programming as well as in harmonising procedures and

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<sup>11</sup> Donors Assistance Group.

<sup>12</sup> DAG Technical Working Group.

<sup>13</sup> Protecting Basic Services.

reporting formats. Only the Benin country team is generally critical (“a large deficit in participation in harmonisation”).

**Box 44: Positive contribution to local harmonisation action plans ...**

“... all agree that AfDB contributes to national harmonisation action plan (Paris Declaration)... such as the co-organisation of a regional meeting on the ‘Implementation of the Paris Declaration’ in March 2006...” (CT Mali)

“AfDB has signed the WHIP<sup>14]</sup> agreement and is planning to sign the JASZ<sup>15]</sup>, and so are seeking to become more harmonised with other agencies.” (CT Zambia)

**... but rather weak in joint country analytic work and programming...**

“... MOPAN countries are much more critical on joint country analytic work and programming.” (CT Mali)

“Regarding joint analysis, there is room for improvement. There analytical work is usually undertaken by AfDB itself. There was no evidence provided of any jointly conducted analytical work in Zambia in recent years.” (CT Zambia)

**and in harmonising procedures and reporting formats**

“MOPAN countries with sufficient information are unanimous to regret the lack of harmonisation regarding project procedures and reporting formats.” (CT Mali)

“AfDB will have to ensure that their corporate procedures allow the scope to deliver on these [WHIP and JASZ] commitments.” (CT Zambia)

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<sup>14</sup> Wider Harmonisation in Practice MOU.

<sup>15</sup> Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia.

## 5. COMPARISON OF MAIN 2007 FINDINGS WITH MOPAN SURVEY 2004

5.1 One of the main purposes of the Annual MOPAN Survey is to help MOPAN members monitor and compare MO partnership behaviour over time: “As a rolling exercise, the Survey will cover most of the major MOs at the country-level over time. Maintaining a standard methodology makes it possible to compare results over time and identify trends.”<sup>16</sup>

5.2 For the first time since the inception of the MOPAN Survey, it is now possible to compare the findings for UNDP and AfDB, which are the first MOs to have been assessed twice (in 2004 and 2007 respectively).

5.3 In the tables below, the MOPAN HQ Group attempts to compare the main 2007 and 2004 Survey findings for UNDP on the one hand and AfDB on the other. Given only two snapshots so far, the comparison cannot yet claim to reflect firm trends.

5.4 Moreover, when looking at the tables, the reader should keep in mind that the Survey parameters change to some extent from year to year. However, for following general trends over time, this is in line with standard practice.

5.5 For instance, while both the 2004 and 2007 Surveys were conducted in ten countries for UNDP and 6 countries for AfDB, respectively, the country samples as well as the participating embassy and country office staff were not the same.<sup>17</sup> It also ought to be mentioned that the Survey methodology has been refined over the years. In particular, since 2004, the MOPAN HQ Group has slightly revised the questionnaire to account for comments received from MOPAN country teams, and the Synthesis Report now contains quotes from individual country reports, which allows a more concise and better-balanced presentation of findings.

5.6 Finally, when considering the comparison, it is also important to remember that the MOPAN Survey is limited to perceptions of multilateral partnership behaviour at country level (and is not based on actual development results and achievements). Therefore, it does not represent an overall judgement of MO performance by the MOPAN members.

5.7 Yet, the MOPAN HQs Group remains convinced that the Annual MOPAN Surveys continue to provide a very valuable feedback from the country level. It also considers this first comparison of the findings of two Surveys to offer interesting indications and thus to constitute a useful basis for discussion with the MOs concerned.

### A. UNDP partnership performance: comparison between 2007 and 2004

5.8 While the perceptions of UNDP partnership behaviour towards *national stakeholders* are similar to those of 2004, it appears that there has been notable improvement in its partnerships with *other international development agencies*.



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<sup>16</sup> See Methodology of the Survey (Appendix 1).

<sup>17</sup> Benin and Mali are the 2 countries to have participated in the 2004 and 2007 Survey.





Key: Comparison between perceived performance in 2007 and 2004




I. Areas of Observation	II. MOPAN Survey 2004 <sup>18</sup>	III. MOPAN Survey 2007 <sup>19</sup>	IV. Comparison between 2007 and 2004
(1) Partnership behaviour towards <i>national stakeholders</i>			
a. Policy dialogue	<p>"Its contribution to <i>policy dialogue</i> is seen as an important asset, notably in connection with the MDGs. However, UNDP shows weakness when controversial issues are at stake and it then tends to remain silent and become less visible."</p>	<p>"The overall assessment of the UNDP contribution to national policy dialogue is positive. At times, UNDP avoids addressing politically sensitive issues or focuses more on its role as coordinator and less on making substantive contributions of its own. MOPAN country teams consider that UNDP supports civil society participation in national policy dialogue, but that it could do better."</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"></p> <p>UNDP contribution to policy dialogue continues to be highly valued. The perceived avoidance of addressing sensitive topics remains however an issue.</p>
b. Capacity development	<p>"UNDP performance in terms of <i>capacity building</i> is seen to be of good quality, particularly in areas of its specific mandates. It is thought to have improved over the last three years as it has become more responsive to government needs and requests. In the area of <i>support to non-state actors</i>, UNDP – in different ways and quite constructively – has promoted its participation in development issues. On the other hand, UNDP still seems to prefer delivering its support through its own projects, thus undermining any lasting impact on capacity development. Furthermore, there are reservations about its ability to foster <i>country</i></p>	<p>"The Survey reveals an inconsistent picture in terms of the UNDP contribution to capacity development of public institutions as well as government ownership. The perception that UNDP often remains directly responsible for project management is considered a major weakness as it limits capacity development and ownership of national partner institutions. The perceptions of the quality of UNDP technical advice are overall positive. Country teams were not able, for lack of information, to judge the UNDP contribution to capacity development of NGOs and the private sector."</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"></p> <p>UNDP capacity development performance does not seem to have changed much since 2004. Direct UNDP project responsibility continues to be perceived as limiting capacity building and government ownership.</p>

<sup>18</sup> The findings in column II are quoted from the MOPAN Survey 2004 Synthesis Report.

<sup>19</sup> The findings in column III are quoted from the "Summary of findings" of the MOPAN Survey 2007 Synthesis Report.

I. Areas of Observation	II. MOPAN Survey 2004 <sup>18</sup>	III. MOPAN Survey 2007 <sup>19</sup>	IV. Comparison between 2007 and 2004
	<i>ownership</i> in some cases."		
c. Advocacy	"UNDP scores highly on <i>advocacy</i> for human development and poverty eradication, both at the general level and in areas specific to the countries of the Survey. Global, Regional and National Human Development Reports are important channels highlighted in this regard."	"Overall, the country teams acknowledge the UNDP advocacy work. While UNDP seems to be good at supporting government campaigns, UNDP itself does not seem to play a very visible advocacy role."	 <p>While advocacy emerged as a major strength of UNDP from the Survey 2004, it now appears that UNDP, although getting altogether fairly good marks, is less visible as an advocate than three years ago.</p>
d. Alignment with national poverty reduction strategies, policies and procedures	"UNDP is also perceived to have shown a significant performance in connection with national <i>poverty reduction strategies</i> or similar initiatives, both by actively supporting national PRS processes and taking steps to progressively and substantively align its own country programmes and projects."	"UNDP is felt to be very supportive of national poverty reduction strategies. While its own programmes are seen as generally well aligned with national poverty reduction strategies, it appears that UNDP has significant difficulties in aligning its business practice with national procedures. UNDP offices seem generally free to take decisions without referring back to headquarters."	 <p>UNDP support to national poverty reduction strategies appears to remain highly regarded. While UNDP programmes remain well aligned with national policies and strategies, little further progress is noted with regard to the alignment of its business practices with national rules and procedures.</p>
(2) Partnership behaviour towards <i>other international development agencies</i>			
a. Information sharing	"UNDP does not appear as an example of good communication with partners, particularly with regard to missions where it could be more pro-active in sharing information and disconnecting this from fundraising motives."	"MOPAN country teams in general appreciate UNDP efforts undertaken in this respect. They see room for improvement with regard to briefings on visiting missions."	 <p>There appears to be a clear change for the better. However, sharing information about visiting missions remains an issue.</p>
b. Inter-agency coordination	"UNDP performance in the area of <i>inter-agency coordination</i> ... reveals a rather mixed picture. However, on balance it shows promising behaviour thanks to the introduction of new arrangements (such as the UNDAF and the UN House) and to a perceptible	"UNDP is seen as a very active and central actor in aid coordination matters, in particular with regard to inter-agency working groups. Yet, it could/should in certain cases play a more proactive role. At the operational level, the UNDP track record with regard to coordination seems	 <p>From "mixed picture"/"promising behaviour" (2004) to "very active and central actor" (2007) gives a sense of positive change.</p>


I. Areas of Observation	II. MOPAN Survey 2004 <sup>18</sup>	III. MOPAN Survey 2007 <sup>19</sup>	IV. Comparison between 2007 and 2004
	improvement in the quality of Resident Coordinator staffing."	to vary quite considerably from country to country. Local UNDP senior management contributions to inter-agency coordination are recognized and appreciated."	
c. Harmonisation	"With regard to <i>harmonisation</i> , UNDP is not perceived to be taking a proactive stand, but rather to be moving at quite slow pace, in particular as far as harmonising its own procedures with other donor agencies is concerned."	"UNDP appears to be an active contributor to local donor harmonisation initiatives as well as to harmonisation within the UN system. However, its participation in joint activities (joint programming and field missions) remains limited."	 <p>The UNDP contribution to donor harmonisation seems to have gained momentum over the past three years. However, joint activities remain a challenge.</p>

## B. AfDB partnership performance: comparison between 2007 and 2004

5.9 The comparison with 2004 seems to indicate a positive change in AfDB partnership behaviour. Alignment with national poverty reduction strategies and contribution to inter-agency coordination and harmonisation are the three areas in which positive change can be observed.




Key: Comparison between perceived performance in 2007 and 2004






I. Areas of Observation	II. MOPAN Survey 2004 <sup>20</sup>	III. MOPAN Survey 2007 <sup>21</sup>	IV. Comparison between 2007 and 2004
(1) Partnership behaviour towards <i>national stakeholders</i>			
a. Policy dialogue	"Overall, the AfDB perceived role in national policy dialogue has low visibility and its contribution is minor." "The Survey reports cases where the AfDB has consulted widely with civil society.	"On balance, MOPAN country teams consider the AfDB contribution to national policy dialogue as modest. AfDB does not appear to actively support the participation of civil society in national policy	 <p>MOPAN country teams continue to perceive the AfDB contribution to policy dialogue as weak, particularly with regard to</p>

<sup>20</sup> The findings in column II are quoted from the MOPAN Survey 2004 Synthesis Report.

<sup>21</sup> The findings in column III are quoted from the "Summary of findings" of the MOPAN Survey 2007 Synthesis Report.

I. Areas of Observation	II. MOPAN Survey 2004 <sup>20</sup>	III. MOPAN Survey 2007 <sup>21</sup>	IV. Comparison between 2007 and 2004
	However, a more general tendency appears to be that the AfDB mostly limits its dialogue to the respective host governments, and does not support the participation of non-state actors in government initiatives or in its own strategies or analytical work."	dialogue. It also appears to limit dialogue on its own strategies and analytical work mostly to government ministries."	the involvement of civil society.
b. Capacity development	"The AfDB reputation for capacity building at the central and sectoral levels, as well as in the private and civil society sector, is mixed." "The AfDB technical assistance ... is perceived as largely substandard..." "With regard to the AfDB's ability to foster government ownership, the MOPAN country teams' impressions vary."	"Perceptions of AfDB support to capacity development of different national stakeholders vary and are partly characterised by limited information. Views on government ownership and technical advice are also limited."	 <p>Perceptions regarding AfDB performance in capacity development remain diverse with both positive and critical views. However, MOPAN country teams apparently have relatively little information on and insight into AfDB work in this respect.</p>
c. Advocacy	"The Survey suggests that, over the last three years, the AfDB has not actively involved itself in advocacy activities."	"MOPAN country teams are collectively of the opinion that AfDB is not actively involved in advocacy activities."	 <p>Three years later, AfDB is still not perceived to be actively involved in public advocacy activities.</p>
d. Alignment with national poverty reduction strategies, policies and procedures	"The Survey reports that the AfDB has been passive or not visible in the PRS process." "MOPAN country teams are aware of steps taken by the AfDB to align its own work with national poverty reduction strategies ..." "... the AfDB has not yet sufficiently aligned itself to national institutions and procedures ..."	"It appears from the country reports that AfDB supports the national PRS or equivalent national strategies in one way or another. All 6 MOPAN country teams consider AfDB work as thematically well aligned with government development policies and strategies. On the other hand, MOPAN country teams perceive differing degrees of AfDB business practice alignment with government modalities and procedures. The delegation of decision-making power to the country-level appears limited."	 <p>The degree of alignment of AfDB work with national poverty reduction strategies appears to have further improved since 2004. AfDB also seems more visible in terms of supporting national PRS processes. Nevertheless, there is apparently still considerable room for improvement with regard to AfDB alignment with government modalities and procedures.</p>

I. Areas of Observation	II. MOPAN Survey 2004 <sup>20</sup>	III. MOPAN Survey 2007 <sup>21</sup>	IV. Comparison between 2007 and 2004
(2) Partnership behaviour towards <i>other international development agencies</i>			
a. Information sharing	"AfDB information sharing varies significantly from country to country, ranging from a complete lack of communication to sound and improved efforts to share information with other agencies."	"Perceptions of AfDB performance in terms of sharing information in general are mixed, whereby fairly positive perceptions prevail."	 Perceptions of AfDB information sharing performance continue to vary quite considerably.
b. Inter-agency coordination	"In this regard, the Survey suggests that the AfDB mostly works separately from other donors, and that its participation in regular donor coordination activities and cooperation with bilateral donors is weak."	"Overall, the assessment of AfDB participation in inter-agency coordination is positive."	 The much more favourable assessment in 2007 seems to signal a significant positive change.
c. Harmonisation	"The Survey does not find significant participation on the part of the AfDB in local harmonisation initiatives. However, MOPAN country teams expect this to improve when the Bank establishes a field presence."	"Overall, AfDB seems to be contributing to donor harmonisation in the countries of the Survey."	 AfDB contribution to donor harmonisation appears to have gained momentum over the past three years.

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### 1. Methodology of the Survey

#### 1. Rationale

Public opinion and government decision-makers are paying increasing attention to the effectiveness of the MOs to whom they provide resources. The need for better information about MO behaviour in developing countries has become ever more compelling. On the other hand, the resources that each donor can devote to gathering relevant knowledge of multilateral performance are limited.

Working together allows MOPAN members to meet this challenge. Drawing on the collective knowledge and experience of their country-level staff, as well as encouraging their involvement in and ownership of the exercise helps MOPAN avoid duplication of work on all sides. Pooling of resources keeps transaction costs at a minimum and makes the assessments cost-effective for the participating MOPAN members.

#### 2. Approach

MOPAN carries out regular joint assessments of the work of MOs in a number of countries where members have their own bilateral programmes. As a rolling exercise, the Survey will cover most of the major MOs at the country-level over time. Maintaining a standard methodology makes it possible to compare MO specific results over time and identify trends.

The assessment is an opinion survey. It draws upon the perceptions of MOPAN member staff about the in-country performance of MOs, relative to their respective mandates. The Survey cannot assess directly and fully the contribution of particular MOs to poverty reduction since this would require an analysis of wider scope.


Participants give their views on those behavioural aspects of MOs performance where they are likely to be knowledgeable thanks to their direct inter-agency contacts.

The assessment focuses on the quality of the partnership behaviour of the MOs:

- their national partnerships (contribution to policy dialogue, capacity development, advocacy, support to civil society, and alignment to national institutions, policies and administration), and
- their inter-agency partnerships (information sharing, inter-agency coordination, and aid harmonisation).

Due consideration is given to any ongoing reform or assessment process with regard to the MOs concerned.

### 3. Schematic representation of MOPAN methodology



The Survey is implemented at field level during February to April and the Synthesis Report is compiled during May and August. The MOPAN HQ Group adopt the report in October and discussions with the MOs take place by the end of the year.

### 4. Process and instruments

#### The questionnaire

The questionnaire is designed to help each MOPAN member embassy/country office participating in the assessment to assemble its views about MO performance on a range of partnership issues. Each embassy/country office completes it prior to the group discussion(s) within the MOPAN country team and provides an input to the compilation of the country report.

#### The templates on the MOs

To assist the country teams, the MOPAN headquarters group prepares for them a short background note on the key aspects of each MO (e.g. mandate, structure, and organisation, type of activities).

#### The hotline

A hotline is at the disposal of the country teams for advice and support during the actual assessment period. The hotline responds rapidly to their queries about the objectives, the approach, the process as well as the use of the Survey findings.

#### The country team discussion

At the country level, MOPAN member embassy and country office representatives gather as a country team to discuss and compare their individual questionnaire responses and to establish – to the extent possible – a common view of the respective performances of the MOs.

**The country reports**

Each country team prepares and submits a country report that reflects the outcome of the team’s discussions and explains and illustrates the team’s (common) views on the partnership behaviour of the different MOs. The country report also contains information about the team’s process in reaching its consensus.

**The Synthesis Report**

The Synthesis Report, which is the main product of the Survey, provides a synthesis of the observations and findings contained in the country reports. The aggregated questionnaire responses are also an input into the report.

**4. Discussions with the assessed multilateral organisations**

**Dialogue with the MOs at their headquarters**

The MOPAN HQ Group present the Synthesis Report to the MOs concerned at their headquarters. This is an opportunity for a substantive dialogue between the MOPAN Headquarters Group and the MOs and for mutual learning among partners.

**Discussions with the MOs at the country level**

At the country level, the MOPAN country team share the relevant sections of the country report with the respective MO country offices. They hold a follow-up meeting once the Synthesis Report has been issued. Sharing the country report and the Synthesis Report provides an opportunity to increase mutual knowledge and understanding among partners.

**5. Communications**

The final version of the Synthesis Report is posted on the external websites of each of the participating MOPAN members, together with any written comments provided by the assessed MOs.

.....

## 2. Overview of questionnaires returned

UNDP												Number of questionnaires
Country	A	CND	DK	SF	F	NL	N	S	CH	UK		
<i>Africa</i>												
Benin	X	/	√	X	/	√	X	X	√	X		3
Egypt	X	√	√	√	√	√	√	X	√	√		8
Ethiopia	√	√	√	√	X	√	√	√	X	√		8
Mali	X	√	/	X	√	√	X	√	√	X		5
Senegal	√	√	X	X	√	X	X	/	X	/		3
Zambia*	X	√	√	√	X	√	√	√	X	√		6
<i>Asia</i>												
Bangladesh	X	√	√	X	X	√	√	√	√	√		7
<i>Europe</i>												
Serbia	√	√	X	X	√	√	√	√	√	X		7
<i>Latin America</i>												
Bolivia	X	√	√	X	√	√	X	√	/	√		6
Nicaragua	√	√	X	√	√	√	√	√	√	√		9
												<b>total: 62</b>
<b>WHO</b>												
Country	A	CND	DK	SF	F	NL	N	S	CH	UK		
<i>Africa</i>												
Benin	X	/	/	X	√	/	X	X	√	X		2
Egypt	X	√	√	√	√	/	√	X	√	/		6
Ethiopia	√	/	/	/	X	√	/	/	X	/		2
Mali	X	√	/	X	√	√	X	/	√	X		4
Senegal	√	√	X	X	√	X	X	/	X	/		3
Zambia	X	√	√	√	X	√	√	√	X	√		7
<i>Asia</i>												
Bangladesh	X	√	/	X	X	√	√	√	√	√		6
<i>Europe</i>												
Serbia	/	/	X	X	√	/	/	/	/	X		1
<i>Latin America</i>												
Bolivia	X	√	/	X	√	/	X	/	/	√		3
Nicaragua	√	√	X	√	√	√	√	√	/	/		7
												<b>total: 41</b>
<b>AfDB</b>												
Country	A	CND	DK	SF	F	NL	N	S	CH	UK		
<i>Africa</i>												
Benin	X	/	√	X	√	√	X	X	√	X		4
Egypt	X	√	√	√	√	√	√	X	√	/		7
Ethiopia	√	√	/	√	X	√	√	/	X	√		6
Mali	X	√	/	X	/	√	X	/	√	X		3
Senegal	√	√	X	X	√	X	X	/	X	/		3
Zambia*	X	√	√	√	X	√	√	√	X	√		6
												<b>total: 29</b>

√

Completed questionnaire for this particular MO

/

Was member of the country team, but did not complete the questionnaire for this particular MO

X

Did not participate in the Survey in this country

\*

One of the participating countries did not complete the questionnaire on this MO; no information available on which one

**2a. Aggregated questionnaire responses for UNDP  
62 questionnaires from 10 countries**

**Part I: Quality of MO's partnership behaviour towards national stakeholders  
(government, NGOs, private sector)**

**A. POLICY DIALOGUE**

**Q1: How do you perceive the contribution of this MO to policy dialogue?**

	<i>Tick one</i>
Strong contribution	30
Some contribution	21
Minor contribution	10
No contribution	<input type="checkbox"/>
Insufficient information/knowledge	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Total</b>	61

**Q2: Below are a number of ways that MOs can support the participation of civil society (local NGOs, private sector) in policy dialogue. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
Actively supports participatory approaches to public policy initiated by government (public hearings, conferences, beneficiary assessments etc.)	17	28	7	1	6	1	60 (53)
Actively supports NGOs' participation in policy dialogue	5	32	10	5	6	2	60 (52)
Actively supports private sector participation in policy dialogue	3	16	8	4	24	4	59 (31)
Mostly limits dialogue on its own strategies and analytical work to government ministries	3	10	18	19	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	60 (50)

Consults civil society on its own strategy and analytical work	2	25	12	2	16	1	58 (41)
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\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

## B. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

**Q3: In your view, is this MO effective in supporting capacity development of different national stakeholders?**

Capacity development of public institutions at the central level	<b>(tick one)</b>
- Always effective	1
- Mostly effective	32
- Somewhat ineffective	19
- Not effective	6
- Insufficient information/knowledge	4
- Not applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Total*</b>	62 (58)
Capacity development of public institutions at the local level	<b>(tick one)</b>
- Always effective	<input type="checkbox"/>
- Mostly effective	27
- Somewhat ineffective	14
- Not effective	1
- Insufficient information/knowledge	16
- Not applicable	2
<b>Total*</b>	60 (42)
Capacity development of national NGOs	<b>(tick one)</b>
- Always effective	1
- Mostly effective	14
- Somewhat ineffective	4
- Not effective	11
- Insufficient information/knowledge	28
- Not applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Total*</b>	58 (30)
Capacity development of the private sector	<b>(tick one)</b>
- Always effective	1
- Mostly effective	3
- Somewhat ineffective	4
- Not effective	3
- Insufficient information/knowledge	47
- Not applicable	3
<b>Total*</b>	61 (11)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

**Q4: In your view, how does this MO promote or enable government ownership in the design and planning of the projects it funds?**

	<i>Tick one</i>
It only funds proposals that have been designed and developed by government	2
It more often funds proposals that have been designed and developed by the government than projects initiated by itself	21
It more often funds projects initiated by itself than proposals designed and developed by the government	28
It only fund projects initiated by itself and where it has led the identification and planning process	<input type="checkbox"/>
Insufficient information/knowledge	11
<b>Total*</b>	62 (51)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

**Q5: Below are three statements on technical advice (TA). Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
The MO's TA is consistently of high quality	7	25	14	3	12	<input type="checkbox"/>	61 (49)
Its international TA is appropriate for national needs	3	34	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	15	<input type="checkbox"/>	62 (47)
The MO makes good use of national TA	8	16	11	2	21	<input type="checkbox"/>	58 (37)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

### **C. ADVOCACY**

**Q6: Below are different ways that MOs can stimulate and broaden public debate on policy issues. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
It plays a strong and visible advocacy role	13	20	24	3	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	62 (60)
Its key documents are made available in local language(s) and popularised forms	10	18	8	5	20	1	62 (41)

It actively supports government campaigns	4	32	9	2	10	3	60 (47)
It actively engages in civil society campaigns	2	18	20	5	11	3	59 (45)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

#### D. ALIGNMENT WITH NATIONAL POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

**Q7: Below are different ways that MOs can support the national PRS or equivalent national strategy. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
The MO takes an active part in PRS discussions at central government level	30	18	1	6	7	<input type="checkbox"/>	62 (55)
It supports the participatory process	23	23	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	9	<input type="checkbox"/>	59 (50)
It supports the implementation of the PRS (e.g. with TA, resources, projects)	19	22	9	<input type="checkbox"/>	11	<input type="checkbox"/>	61 (50)
It supports PRS monitoring activities	16	22	5	2	15	<input type="checkbox"/>	60 (45)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

**Q8: Below are different ways that MOs may align their work with national poverty reduction strategies and policies. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
Its country strategy/country programme is aligned with the national PRS	27	20	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	61 (51)
Its sector strategies are aligned with national sector strategies	16	25	5	<input type="checkbox"/>	14	1	61 (46)
Its technical cooperation programmes address PRS priorities	14	26	9	<input type="checkbox"/>	11	1	61 (49)
It identifies new activities on the basis of national PRS and relevant sector priorities	13	22	8	<input type="checkbox"/>	15	3	61 (43)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"



**Q9: Below are a number of ways that MOs may align their business practice with national procedures and modalities. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<b>Answer each component</b>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
Where appropriate, its aid funds go through the government budget	3	12	10	24	11	1	61 (49)
Where relevant, it participates in sector-wide approach arrangements	2	13	18	13	11	4	61 (46)
Where relevant, it participates in basket/pooled funding arrangements	4	20	18	10	8	2	62 (52)
Its projects are administered through existing national offices – the MO avoids parallel project implementation units	2	6	26	15	11	1	61 (49)
Where appropriate, it has started using government procurement systems	2	4	21	12	19	3	61 (39)
The MO makes use of government reporting procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	9	21	6	21	4	61 (36)

\*Figure in brackets: total without “Insufficient information to judge” and “Not applicable”

**Q10: In your view, is this MO able to take decisions without referring back to its headquarters?**

	<b>Tick one</b>
Its country office mainly takes decisions without referring back to its headquarters	16
Its country office occasionally takes decisions without referring back to its headquarters	20
Its country office is unable to take decisions without referring back to its headquarters	3
Insufficient information/knowledge	21
<b>Total*</b>	60 (39)

\*Figure in brackets: total without “Insufficient information to judge”

## **Part II: Quality of MO’s partnership behaviour towards other international development agencies**

## E. INFORMATION SHARING

**Q11: Below are a number of statements describing how MOs may share or seek information. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<b>Total*</b>
The MO is proactive in sharing documents and identifying information needs	21	25	8	6	1	61 (60)
The MO responds to requests for information	28	25	7	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	61
It seeks information about other agencies' activities	12	19	21	5	4	61 (57)
It listens and reacts to the information and views of other donors in the country	19	25	15	1	2	62 (60)
The MO shares information about its visiting missions (e.g. TOR, timing, itinerary, main findings)	9	20	20	7	6	62 (56)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

## F. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

**Q12: In your view, does this MO participate in local donor coordination activities, such as donor working groups?**

	<b><i>Tick one</i></b>
Participates always	29
Regular participation	32
Occasional participation	1
Negligible participation	<input type="checkbox"/>
Insufficient information/knowledge	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Total</b>	62

**Q13: In your view, does this MO seek to improve its coordination with other donors at the project/programme level? Please indicate the extent to which you agree that the below statements apply to this MO.**

	<b>Tick one</b>
The MO seeks to improve its coordination with other donors at the project/programme level and has taken concrete steps to avoid overlaps with other aid agencies	42
The MO does not pay particular attention to coordination with others and in some cases has caused duplication of effort	13
The MO mainly works in isolation from other aid agencies	1
Insufficient information/knowledge	4
<b>Total*</b>	60 (56)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

**Q14: How do you perceive the contribution of the local senior management to coordination within the donor community?**

	<b>Tick one</b>
Strong contribution	36
Some contribution	18
Minor contribution	5
No contribution	<input type="checkbox"/>
Insufficient information/knowledge	2
<b>Total*</b>	61 (59)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

## G. HARMONISATION

**Q15: Below are a number of ways that MOs may contribute to local donor harmonisation efforts. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component.</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
The MO actively contributes to local harmonisation action plans	20	22	5	5	7	<input type="checkbox"/>	59 (52)
The MO encourages and actively participates in joint country analytic work	6	25	12	7	12	<input type="checkbox"/>	62 (50)
The MO participates in joint programming with others	6	26	18	1	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	61 (51)
The MO encourages and participates in joint field missions	3	10	24	5	16	1	59 (42)
The MO has reviewed and adapted its own project procedures	2	6	11	9	30	3	61 (28)

The MO has reviewed and adapted reporting formats	<input type="checkbox"/>	5	12	8	32	4	61 (25)
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\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

**Q16 How do you perceive this MO's contribution to harmonisation (e.g. UNDAF, joint programmes, UN House) within the UN system at country level? (This question applies only to UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies.)**

	<i>Tick one</i>
Strong contribution	29
Some contribution	16
Minor contribution	3
No contribution	<input type="checkbox"/>
Insufficient information/knowledge	12
Not applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Total*</b>	60 (48)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

### Part III: Additional questions

**Q17: How many staff members participated in the completion of this questionnaire? (tick one)**

- 35      1 – 2 staff members  
 23      More than 2 – less than 5 staff members  
 3        More than 5 staff members  
 = 61 answers

**Q18: What is the average frequency of your contacts with this MO in a typical three-month period?**

How often do you attend meetings where representatives of this MO are present?	<i>(tick one)</i>
o Never	<input type="checkbox"/>
o 3-5 meetings	28
o More than 5	33
<b>Total</b>	61
How often do you have bilateral discussions with this MO?	<i>(tick one)</i>
o Never	8
o 1-2 times	28
o More than 2	26
<b>Total</b>	62

**Q19: Has your embassy/country office's level of cooperation with this MO changed during the last 3 years?**

	<i>Tick one</i>

Increased in last 3 years	39
Remained unchanged	12
Decreased	9
No cooperation	□
<b>Total</b>	60

**Q20: In what ways does *your* embassy/country office cooperate with this MO?**

<i>Answer each component</i>	Yes	No	<b>Total</b>
We co-finance specific project/programme activities	47	15	62
We participate in the same sector-wide approach arrangements	15	44	59
Both provide general budget support	1	56	57
Both participate in basket/pooled funding	28	32	60
We cooperate within the same local coordination mechanisms	49	13	62
We work together in planning/strategy formulation/appraisal	30	30	60
We undertake joint field missions	12	48	60
We participate in the same policy dialogue with government	47	11	58

High 16      Medium 42      Low 3      (= 61 answers)

**2b. Aggregated questionnaire responses for WHO  
41 questionnaires from 10 countries**

**Part I: Quality of MO's partnership behaviour towards national stakeholders  
(government, NGOs, private sector)**

**A. POLICY DIALOGUE**

**Q1: How do you perceive the contribution of this MO to policy dialogue?**

	<i>Tick one</i>
Strong contribution	15
Some contribution	14
Minor contribution	5
No contribution	<input type="checkbox"/>
Insufficient information/knowledge	1
<b>Total*</b>	35 (34)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

**Q2: Below are a number of ways that MOs can support the participation of civil society (local NGOs, private sector) in policy dialogue. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
Actively supports participatory approaches to public policy initiated by government (public hearings, conferences, beneficiary assessments etc.)	7	12	7	1	13	1	41 (27)
Actively supports NGOs' participation in policy dialogue	4	7	12	5	11	1	40 (28)
Actively supports private sector participation in policy dialogue	1	1	10	5	21	3	41 (17)
Mostly limits dialogue on its own	9	11	3	3	12	1	39 (26)

strategies and analytical work to government ministries							
Consults civil society on its own strategy and analytical work	1	2	10	3	23	2	41 (16)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

## B. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

**Q3: In your view, is this MO effective in supporting capacity development of different national stakeholders?**

Capacity development of public institutions at the central level	(tick one)
- Always effective	2
- Mostly effective	22
- Somewhat ineffective	3
- Not effective	4
- Insufficient information/knowledge	8
- Not applicable	1
<b>Total*</b>	40 (31)
Capacity development of public institutions at the local level	(tick one)
- Always effective	<input type="checkbox"/>
- Mostly effective	9
- Somewhat ineffective	5
- Not effective	5
- Insufficient information/knowledge	16
- Not applicable	2
<b>Total*</b>	37 (19)
Capacity development of national NGOs	(tick one)
- Always effective	<input type="checkbox"/>
- Mostly effective	5
- Somewhat ineffective	5
- Not effective	3
- Insufficient information/knowledge	22
- Not applicable	5
<b>Total*</b>	40 (13)
Capacity development of the private sector	(tick one)
- Always effective	<input type="checkbox"/>
- Mostly effective	2
- Somewhat ineffective	1
- Not effective	4
- Insufficient information/knowledge	29
- Not applicable	4
<b>Total*</b>	40 (7)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

**Q4: In your view, how does this MO promote or enable government ownership in the design and planning of the projects it funds?**

	<i>Tick one</i>
It only funds proposals that have been designed and developed by government	4
It more often funds proposals that have been designed and developed by the government than projects initiated by itself	11
It more often funds projects initiated by itself than proposals designed and developed by the government	8
It only fund projects initiated by itself and where it has led the identification and planning process	1
Insufficient information/knowledge	17
<b>Total*</b>	41 (24)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

**Q5: Below are three statements on technical advice (TA). Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
The MO's TA is consistently of high quality	10	15	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	11	<input type="checkbox"/>	39 (28)
Its international TA is appropriate for national needs	6	16	4	1	12	<input type="checkbox"/>	39 (27)
The MO makes good use of national TA	3	15	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	17	1	39 (21)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

### C. ADVOCACY

**Q6: Below are different ways that MOs can stimulate and broaden public debate on policy issues. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
It plays a strong and visible advocacy role	5	14	11	3	8	<input type="checkbox"/>	41 (33)
Its key documents are made available in local language and popularised forms	5	10	7	3	15	1	41 (25)
It actively supports government campaigns	14	11	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	13	<input type="checkbox"/>	41 (28)



It actively engages in civil society campaigns	2	4	10	4	19	1	40 (20)
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\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

#### D. ALIGNMENT WITH NATIONAL POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

**Q7: Below are different ways that MOs can support the national PRS or equivalent national strategy. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
The MO takes an active part in PRS discussions at central government level	8	7	6	3	17	<input type="checkbox"/>	41 (24)
It supports the participatory process	8	7	4	3	19	<input type="checkbox"/>	41 (22)
It supports the implementation of the PRS (e.g. with TA, resources, projects)	7	15	3	2	14	<input type="checkbox"/>	41 (27)
It supports PRS monitoring activities	11	9	3	1	17	<input type="checkbox"/>	41 (24)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

**Q8: Below are different ways that MOs may align their work with national poverty reduction strategies and policies. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
Its country strategy/country programme is aligned with the national PRS	8	12	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	19	<input type="checkbox"/>	41 (22)
Its sector strategies are aligned with national sector strategies	10	10	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	17	2	41 (22)
Its technical cooperation programmes address PRS priorities	9	13	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	18	<input type="checkbox"/>	41 (23)
It identifies new activities on the basis of national PRS and relevant sector priorities	5	9	8	<input type="checkbox"/>	18	1	41 (22)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

**Q9: Below are a number of ways that MOs may align their business practice with national procedures and modalities. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<b>Answer each component</b>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
Where appropriate, its aid funds go through the government budget	3	2	4	9	18	1	37 (18)
Where relevant, it participates in sector-wide approach arrangements	2	10	7	6	14	1	40 (25)
Where relevant, it participates in basket/pooled funding arrangements	<input type="checkbox"/>	3	5	12	18	1	39 (20)
Its projects are administered through existing national offices – the MO avoids parallel project implementation units	4	11	5	5	15	1	41 (25)
Where appropriate, it has started using government procurement systems	<input type="checkbox"/>	4	4	7	23	1	39 (15)
The MO makes use of government reporting procedures	2	9	4	5	20	<input type="checkbox"/>	40 (20)

\*Figure in brackets: total without “Insufficient information to judge” and “Not applicable”

**Q10: In your view, is this MO able to take decisions without referring back to its headquarters?**

	<b>Tick one</b>
Its country office mainly takes decisions without referring back to its headquarters	6
Its country office occasionally takes decisions without referring back to its headquarters	5
Its country office is unable to take decisions without referring back to its headquarters	4
Insufficient information/knowledge	26
<b>Total*</b>	41 (15)

\*Figure in brackets: total without “Insufficient information to judge”

## **Part II: Quality of MO’s partnership behaviour towards other international development agencies**

## E. INFORMATION SHARING

**Q11: Below are a number of statements describing how MOs may share or seek information. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<b>Total*</b>
The MO is proactive in sharing documents and identifying information needs	9	12	10	3	7	41 (34)
The MO responds to requests for information	16	9	5	1	10	41 (31)
It seeks information about other agencies' activities	3	5	15	4	14	41 (27)
It listens and reacts to the information and views of other donors in the country	4	13	11	2	10	40 (30)
The MO shares information about its visiting missions (e.g. TOR, timing, itinerary, main findings)	1	7	13	9	10	40 (30)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

## F. INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION

**Q12: In your view, does this MO participate in local donor coordination activities, such as donor working groups?**

	<b><i>Tick one</i></b>
Participates always	13
Regular participation	10
Occasional participation	8
Negligible participation	3
Insufficient information/knowledge	7
<b>Total*</b>	41 (34)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

**Q13: In your view, does this MO seek to improve its coordination with other donors at the project/programme level? Please indicate the extent to which you agree that the below statements apply to this MO.**

	<b>Tick one</b>
The MO seeks to improve its coordination with other donors at the project/programme level and has taken concrete steps to avoid overlaps with other aid agencies	13
The MO does not pay particular attention to coordination with others and in some cases has caused duplication of effort	9
The MO mainly works in isolation from other aid agencies	6
Insufficient information/knowledge	12
<b>Total*</b>	40 (28)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

**Q14: How do you perceive the contribution of the local senior management to coordination within the donor community?**

	<b>Tick one</b>
Strong contribution	9
Some contribution	9
Minor contribution	6
No contribution	2
Insufficient information/knowledge	13
<b>Total*</b>	39 (26)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

**G. HARMONISATION**

**Q15: Below are a number of ways that MOs may contribute to local donor harmonisation efforts. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component.</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
The MO actively contributes to local harmonisation action plans	3	9	6	5	16	1	40 (23)
The MO encourages and actively participates in joint country analytic work	5	13	5	3	13	1	40 (26)
The MO participates in joint programming with others	1	14	7	5	12	2	41 (27)
The MO encourages and participates in joint field missions	5	10	4	2	16	2	39 (21)
The MO has reviewed and adapted	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	3	6	26	3	40 (11)

its own project procedures							
The MO has reviewed and adapted reporting formats	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	2	6	26	4	40 (10)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

**Q16 How do you perceive this MO's contribution to harmonisation (e.g. UNDAF, joint programmes, UN House) within the UN system at country level? (This question applies only to UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies.)**

	<i>Tick one</i>
Strong contribution	2
Some contribution	11
Minor contribution	5
No contribution	2
Insufficient information/knowledge	17
Not applicable	4
<b>Total*</b>	41 (20)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

### Part III: Additional questions

**Q17: How many staff members participated in the completion of this questionnaire? (tick one)**

- 33      1 –2 staff members  
6        More than 2 – less than 5 staff members  
      More than 5 staff members  
= 39 answers

**Q18: What is the average frequency of your contacts with this MO in a typical three-month period?**

How often do you attend meetings where representatives of this MO are present?	(tick one)
o Never	10
o 3-5 meetings	22
o More than 5	6
<b>Total</b>	38
How often do you have bilateral discussions with this MO?	(tick one)
o Never	21
o 1-2 times	13
o More than 2	5
<b>Total</b>	39

**Q19: Has your embassy/country office's level of cooperation with this MO changed during the last 3 years?**

	<b><i>Tick one</i></b>
Increased in last 3 years	9
Remained unchanged	14
Decreased	6
No cooperation	10
<b><i>Total</i></b>	<b>39</b>

**Q20: In what ways does your embassy/country office cooperate with this MO?**

<i>Answer each component</i>	Yes	No	<b><i>Total</i></b>
We co-finance specific project/programme activities	14	22	36
We participate in the same sector-wide approach arrangements	16	20	36
Both provide general budget support	2	35	37
Both participate in basket/pooled funding	4	34	38
We cooperate within the same local coordination mechanisms	25	13	38
We work together in planning/strategy formulation/appraisal	25	21	46
We undertake joint field missions	12	26	38
We participate in the same policy dialogue with government	27	11	38

**Q21: With respect to the areas covered by this questionnaire, how do participating staff members judge their level of knowledge of this MO? (*tick one*)**

High 5      Medium 22      Low 14      (=41 answers)

**2c. Aggregated questionnaire responses for AfDB  
29 questionnaires from 6 countries**

**Part I: Quality of MO's partnership behaviour towards national stakeholders  
(government, NGOs, private sector)**

**A. POLICY DIALOGUE**

**Q1: How do you perceive the contribution of this MO to policy dialogue?**

	<i>Tick one</i>
Strong contribution	4
Some contribution	14
Minor contribution	9
No contribution	<input type="checkbox"/>
Insufficient information/knowledge	2
<b>Total*</b>	29 (27)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

**Q2: Below are a number of ways that MOs can support the participation of civil society (local NGOs, private sector) in policy dialogue. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
Actively supports participatory approaches to public policy initiated by government (public hearings, conferences, beneficiary assessments etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	6	6	3	14	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (15)
Actively supports NGOs' participation in policy dialogue	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	11	3	13	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (16)
Actively supports private sector participation in policy dialogue	<input type="checkbox"/>	9	4	2	14	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (15)
Mostly limits dialogue on its own	4	14	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (19)

strategies and analytical work to government ministries							
Consults civil society on its own strategy and analytical work	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	6	2	16	3	29 (10)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

## B. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

**Q3: In your view, is this MO effective in supporting capacity development of different national stakeholders?**

Capacity development of public institutions at the central level	<b>(tick one)</b>
- Always effective	1
- Mostly effective	11
- Somewhat ineffective	7
- Not effective	1
- Insufficient information/knowledge	9
- Not applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Total*</b>	29 (20)
Capacity development of public institutions at the local level	<b>(tick one)</b>
- Always effective	<input type="checkbox"/>
- Mostly effective	5
- Somewhat ineffective	3
- Not effective	5
- Insufficient information/knowledge	14
- Not applicable	2
<b>Total*</b>	29 (13)
Capacity development of national NGOs	<b>(tick one)</b>
- Always effective	<input type="checkbox"/>
- Mostly effective	2
- Somewhat ineffective	4
- Not effective	3
- Insufficient information/knowledge	14
- Not applicable	6
<b>Total*</b>	29 (9)
Capacity development of the private sector	<b>(tick one)</b>
- Always effective	<input type="checkbox"/>
- Mostly effective	4
- Somewhat ineffective	5
- Not effective	2
- Insufficient information/knowledge	17
- Not applicable	1
<b>Total*</b>	29 (11)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"



**Q4: In your view, how does this MO promote or enable government ownership in the design and planning of the projects it funds?**

	<b>Tick one</b>
It only funds proposals that have been designed and developed by government	3
It more often funds proposals that have been designed and developed by the government than projects initiated by itself	15
It more often funds projects initiated by itself than proposals designed and developed by the government	6
It only fund projects initiated by itself and where it has led the identification and planning process	<input type="checkbox"/>
Insufficient information/knowledge	5
<b>Total*</b>	29 (24)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

**Q5: Below are three statements on technical advice (TA). Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
The MO's TA is consistently of high quality	4	6	5	<input type="checkbox"/>	12	2	29 (15)
Its international TA is appropriate for national needs	1	11	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	12	3	29 (14)
The MO makes good use of national TA	2	6	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	16	3	29 (10)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

### **C. ADVOCACY**

**Q6: Below are different ways that MOs can stimulate and broaden public debate on policy issues. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
It plays a strong and visible advocacy role	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	10	10	6	<input type="checkbox"/>	28 (22)
Its key documents are made available in local language(s) and popularised forms	<input type="checkbox"/>	3	5	9	12	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (17)
It actively supports government campaigns	<input type="checkbox"/>	5	3	5	12	3	28

							(13)
It actively engages in civil society campaigns	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	3	10	12	2	28 (14)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

#### D. ALIGNMENT WITH NATIONAL POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

**Q7: Below are different ways that MOs can support the national PRS or equivalent national strategy. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>Total*</i>
The MO takes an active part in PRS discussions at central government level	3	12	7	3	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (25)
It supports the participatory process	4	9	4	3	9	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (20)
It supports the implementation of the PRS (e.g. with TA, resources, projects)	9	14	2	1	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (26)
It supports PRS monitoring activities	5	8	3	2	11	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (18)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

**Q8: Below are different ways that MOs may align their work with national poverty reduction strategies and policies. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>Total*</i>
Its country strategy/country programme is aligned with the national PRS	13	6	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	8	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (21)
Its sector strategies are aligned with national sector strategies	10	9	2	1	6	1	29 (22)
Its technical cooperation programmes address PRS priorities	7	9	1	2	8	2	29 (19)
It identifies new activities on the basis of national PRS and relevant sector priorities	9	9	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (19)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

**Q9: Below are a number of ways that MOs may align their business practice with national procedures and modalities. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>Total*</i>
Where appropriate, its aid funds go through the government budget	7	9	5	3	5	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (24)
Where relevant, it participates in sector-wide approach arrangements	4	8	5	1	9	1	28 (18)
Where relevant, it participates in basket/pooled funding arrangements	4	5	5	4	11	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (18)
Its projects are administered through existing national offices – the MO avoids parallel project implementation units	6	5	5	4	9	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (20)
Where appropriate, it has started using government procurement systems	1	7	3	4	14	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (15)
The MO makes use of government reporting procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	8	4	5	12	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (17)

\*Figure in brackets: total without “Insufficient information to judge” and “Not applicable”

**Q10: In your view, is this MO able to take decisions without referring back to its headquarters?**

	<i>Tick one</i>
Its country office mainly takes decisions without referring back to its headquarters	<input type="checkbox"/>
Its country office occasionally takes decisions without referring back to its headquarters	4
Its country office is unable to take decisions without referring back to its headquarters	13
Insufficient information/knowledge	12
<b>Total*</b>	29 (17)

\*Figure in brackets: total without “Insufficient information to judge”

## Part II: Quality of MO's partnership behaviour towards other international development agencies

### E. INFORMATION SHARING

**Q11: Below are a number of statements describing how MOs may share or seek information. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<b>Total*</b>
The MO is proactive in sharing documents and identifying information needs	6	12	6	2	2	28 (26)
The MO responds to requests for information	7	13	3	1	5	29 (23)
It seeks information about other agencies' activities	7	11	4	2	5	29 (24)
It listens and reacts to the information and views of other donors in the country	5	12	4	2	6	29 (23)
The MO shares information about its visiting missions (e.g. TOR, timing, itinerary, main findings)	4	8	7	7	3	29 (26)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

### F. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

**Q12: In your view, does this MO participate in local donor coordination activities, such as donor working groups?**

	<b>Tick one</b>
Participates always	5
Regular participation	13
Occasional participation	9
Negligible participation	<input type="checkbox"/>
Insufficient information/knowledge	2
<b>Total*</b>	29 (27)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

**Q13: In your view, does this MO seek to improve its coordination with other donors at the project/programme level? Please indicate the extent to which you agree that the below statements apply to this MO.**

	<i>Tick one</i>
The MO seeks to improve its coordination with other donors at the project/programme level and has taken concrete steps to avoid overlaps with other aid agencies	16
The MO does not pay particular attention to coordination with others and in some cases has caused duplication of effort	5
The MO mainly works in isolation from other aid agencies	3
Insufficient information/knowledge	5
<b>Total*</b>	29 (24)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

**Q14: How do you perceive the contribution of the local senior management to coordination within the donor community?**

	<i>Tick one</i>
Strong contribution	3
Some contribution	13
Minor contribution	4
No contribution	3
Insufficient information/knowledge	6
<b>Total*</b>	29 (23)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge"

## G. HARMONISATION

**Q15: Below are a number of ways that MOs may contribute to local donor harmonisation efforts. Please indicate the extent to which you agree that these statements apply to this MO.**

<i>Answer each component.</i>	<i>Fully agree</i>	<i>Mostly agree</i>	<i>Disagree somewhat</i>	<i>Fully disagree</i>	<i>Insufficient info / knowledge</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<b>Total*</b>
The MO actively contributes to local harmonisation action plans	5	13	6	1	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (25)
The MO encourages and actively participates in joint country analytic work	3	9	10	2	5	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (24)
The MO participates in joint programming with others	3	10	10	<input type="checkbox"/>	6	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (23)
The MO encourages and participates	1	5	8	6	8	1	29

in joint field missions							(20)
The MO has reviewed and adapted its own project procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	5	3	21	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (8)
The MO has reviewed and adapted reporting formats	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	4	3	22	<input type="checkbox"/>	29 (7)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

**Q16 How do you perceive this MO's contribution to harmonisation (e.g. UNDAF, joint programmes, UN House) within the UN system at country level? (This question applies only to UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies.)**

	<i>Tick one</i>
Strong contribution	<input type="checkbox"/>
Some contribution	4
Minor contribution	4
No contribution	1
Insufficient information/knowledge	4
Not applicable	12
<b>Total*</b>	25 (9)

\*Figure in brackets: total without "Insufficient information to judge" and "Not applicable"

### Part III: Additional questions

**Q17: How many staff members participated in the completion of this questionnaire? (tick one)**

- 20      1 – 2 staff members  
8        More than 2 – less than 5 staff members  
1        More than 5 staff members  
= 29 answers

**Q18: What is the average frequency of your contacts with this MO in a typical three-month period?**

How often do you attend meetings where representatives of this MO are present?	<i>(tick one)</i>
o Never	3
o 3-5 meetings	21
o More than 5	5
<b>Total</b>	29
How often do you have bilateral discussions with this MO? One country did not answer.	<i>(tick one)</i>
o Never	15
o 1-2 times	9
o More than 2	4
<b>Total</b>	28

**Q19: Has your embassy/country office's level of cooperation with this MO changed during the last 3 years?**

	<b>Tick one</b>
Increased in last 3 years	12
Remained unchanged	11
Decreased	<input type="checkbox"/>
No cooperation	5
<b>Total</b>	28

**Q20: In what ways does your embassy/country office cooperate with this MO?**

<i>Answer each component</i>	Yes	No	<b>Total</b>
We co-finance specific project/programme activities	11	18	29
We participate in the same sector-wide approach arrangements	9	19	28
Both provide general budget support	8	21	29
Both participate in basket/pooled funding	6	23	29
We cooperate within the same local coordination mechanisms	22	7	29
We work together in planning/strategy formulation/appraisal	12	17	29
We undertake joint field missions	5	24	29
We participate in the same policy dialogue with government	21	8	29

**Q21: With respect to the areas covered by this questionnaire, how do participating staff members judge their level of knowledge of this MO? (tick one)**

High 3      Medium 13      Low 13      = 29 answers

